McpService.enforceBasicLoginGate re-implements AuthController.login's pre-token
SSO/MFA gate; silent drift would re-open the bypass. Add an AST contract test
(comments stripped) asserting BOTH method bodies contain validateSsoEnforcement,
the EE-MFA require, and checkMfaRequirements — so dropping the gate from either
side fails CI. Test-only (no core/auth refactor).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 4-step html-embed gate (feature-enabled AND role-allowed -> stripHtmlEmbedNodes)
was replicated across call-sites, pinned only by brittle source-regex tests. Add
stripHtmlEmbedIfNotAllowed(json, {featureEnabled, role, onStrip}) and migrate the
5 plain strip-all sites (collab handler, page create+duplicate, both import paths,
transclusion) to it, each keeping its own feature/role resolve + log via onStrip.
Left the 2 sites with different semantics: persistence.extension (#29 preserve-
admin) and share.service (feature-only kill-switch, no role gate). Real unit tests
replace the regex pins; behavior identical.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
16 suites were disabled via testPathIgnorePatterns due to two root causes: lib0
ESM not transformed (the @hocuspocus/server -> lib0/decoding.js chain) and stock
'should be defined' specs built via Test.createTestingModule without providers.
Add lib0 to transformIgnorePatterns; convert the 14 DI placeholders to direct
new X(...) instantiation with stub deps (keeping a real construct smoke test);
re-enable the suites. Also updates the public-share limiter test to assert the
fail-closed behavior from #62 (surfaced now that the suite runs). Full server
suite: 67 passed, 689 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The shared MCP_TOKEN guard moved from 'Authorization: Bearer <MCP_TOKEN>' to the
X-MCP-Token header (Authorization is now per-user Basic/Bearer), silently breaking
existing /mcp clients. Document it as a Breaking Change in CHANGELOG (reconfigure
to X-MCP-Token). Add a once-per-process migration warning: when MCP_TOKEN is set,
no x-mcp-token is present, and Authorization carries the old 'Bearer <MCP_TOKEN>',
log a hint to migrate — without changing the auth decision (still rejected) or
logging the token value.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assessment of the page-embed depth/cycle cap: the server /pages/template/lookup
returns FLAT single-level content and does NOT recurse into embedded pages — the
recursive expansion + the PAGE_EMBED_MAX_DEPTH cap are entirely client render
concerns, and a scripted client is already bounded by the per-user throttle
(30/min) + the ArrayMaxSize(50) per-call cap. So no server-side depth guard is
needed; documented at lookupTemplate so future readers don't add a redundant one
or assume server recursion exists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
handleMessage became a no-op and PageWsListener intentionally ignored
PAGE_UPDATED, so a rename/icon change (client operation:updateOne) was no longer
rebroadcast -> other clients saw stale title/icon in the sidebar+breadcrumbs
until a reload (create/duplicate/restore were covered; updateOne regressed).
Add a server-authoritative onPageUpdated handler: PageService.update detects a
real title/icon change (DTO carries the field AND value differs; no-op/content-
only saves excluded) and attaches a treeUpdate snapshot to PAGE_UPDATED; the
listener broadcasts a tree updateOne via the restriction-aware emitTreeEvent
(so a restricted page's title never leaks). Content-only saves attach nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
sidebar-pages-tree.spec tested a LOCAL COPY of the tree-shaping (so a regression
in the real getSidebarPagesTree was invisible) and justified it with a false
jest-config claim (the ^src mapping exists). Extract the pure shaping into
shapeSidebarPagesTree(); the service now calls it and the spec imports the REAL
helper. Behavior unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The concurrent-soft-delete guard was already covered; add the missing assertion
that update() returns toView(updated) from the post-update re-fetch (full
AgentRoleView shape, distinct second findById row), so a regression returning the
stale pre-update view or leaking columns is caught.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The anonymous share page-fetch tool's positive branch (sanitize via
updatePublicAttachments then jsonToMarkdown before returning to the model) was
untested, so a dropped/reordered sanitizer would ship a comment-mark/raw-
attachment leak with green tests. Add a positive-branch test pinning the
sanitizer call + that markdown derives from sanitized content, and a soft-deleted
test asserting a generic error with no content fetch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
invalidateSpaceRestrictionCache has no callers because no restriction-mutation
path exists yet (PagePermissionRepo mutators are uncalled; there is no
restrict/grant/revoke endpoint), so the 30s spaceHasRestrictions cache could
serve a stale 'no restrictions' verdict. Until a mutation endpoint exists to
wire the direct invalidation, lower the TTL (30s -> 3s) to bound the worst-case
window; the invalidation primitive is kept for that future endpoint.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
chatModel was a free string accepted with empty/garbage values, failing only at
runtime as a provider 503; tighten it (trim + non-empty + max 200). Driver was
already @IsIn(AI_DRIVERS). Collapse the client driver list to one AI_DRIVER_VALUES
source and add a contract test that reads the server AI_DRIVERS and fails on
client/server drift.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
collectPageEmbedsFromPmJson (and the sibling collectors/remap) recursed with no
guard, so a pathological/cyclic non-JSON input could stack-overflow (RangeError).
Add a depth cap (1000, far above any real doc nesting) so such input is handled
gracefully. Normal documents are unaffected. Updates a stale test that asserted
the old throwing behavior.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
trustProxy was unconditionally true, so req.ip came from a client-forgeable
X-Forwarded-For and the per-IP throttles (share-AI, /mcp brute-force) were
spoofable. Make it env-configurable (TRUST_PROXY) with a safe default that
trusts XFF only from loopback/private proxies, documented in .env.example.
NOTE: this changes the default from trust-all; deployments whose proxy is on a
public IP must set TRUST_PROXY (caveat documented).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A custom AI-role's text preceded the only SAFETY_FRAMEWORK block and replaced
the persona, so a jailbreak in the role text sat before the safety rules.
buildSystemPrompt now emits SAFETY both before AND after the persona, with the
role/persona delimited as lower-trust (<role_persona note=...>); the default
persona is sandwiched too. Context (currently-viewing-page) preserved.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
#67: movePage didn't check the destination wasn't the page itself or inside its
own subtree, so MCP/REST/agent/fast-drag could persist+broadcast a cycle. Reject
before the update (self-parent, or moved page among the destination parent's
ancestors via getPageBreadCrumbs).
#64: movePage emitted PAGE_MOVED from a stale pre-read even when the row didn't
change / was concurrently deleted (phantom move). Gate the emit on
updateResult.numUpdatedRows !== 0n. Both are movePage hardening in one method.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
#60: streamText had no maxOutputTokens, so one anonymous request could run up
the provider bill. Add maxOutputTokens (env SHARE_AI_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS, default
512) via resolveShareAiMaxOutputTokens().
#95: the anonymous path hand-built error strings, diverging from the unified
describeProviderError format used on the authenticated path; both onError blocks
now call describeProviderError so a share reader sees 402/429/503 causes in the
same form (and the stack is still logged). Both changes are in this one file and
share hunks, hence one commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A user with password=NULL passed the missing/disabled guard and reached
comparePasswordHash(pw, null), which native bcrypt rejects -> 500 on
/api/auth/login and, on /mcp, a leaky 401 that the brute-force limiter ignored
(enumeration oracle + limiter evasion). Treat a null/empty password like a
missing user in verifyUserCredentials (dummy compare for timing parity + unified
CREDENTIALS_MISMATCH_MESSAGE) and reject early in changePassword before bcrypt.
Contract spec asserts the null-password guard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
MAX_SHARE_MESSAGE_CHARS only counted text parts, so a forged non-text part
(tool-result/file/data) bypassed the cap and bloated the model input
(token-DoS); convertToModelMessages would also expand a forged tool-result. The
anonymous path runs no tools, so a client non-text part is never legitimate —
reject any message with a non-text part (isTextUIPart) before the size check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The per-workspace anonymous share-AI cost cap failed OPEN on a Redis error
(return true => admit), so a Redis outage removed the cap entirely (unmetered
billable anonymous calls). The feature is optional, so unavailability is
harmless: fail CLOSED (return false => controller 429s) instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolve the html-embed.spec.ts conflict as a union: both #46 and #49 (already in
develop) added different test cases to the same file. Keep all of them —
stripHtmlEmbedNodes gets #46's root-node case plus develop's deeply-nested,
non-object and empty-content cases; #46's collectHtmlEmbedSources and
stripDisallowedHtmlEmbedNodes suites and develop's hasHtmlEmbedNode suite all
kept; imports unioned. No production code conflicted.
Full suite green: server 651, client (16 files), editor-ext 56, mcp 247.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolve conflicts from the parallel page-embed refactor that landed in develop
via #49:
- page-embed-view.tsx: keep develop's canonical decideEmbedState for the
cycle/depth/availability guard; keep #45's #39 chrome cleanup (single source
link, IconFileText fallback) and #40 refresh remount key. Drop #45's now-unused
isPageEmbedCycle/isPageEmbedTooDeep wiring.
- page-embed-picker.tsx: use develop's excludeHost util; drop #45's duplicate
filterPageEmbedOptions and its test.
- page-embed-ancestry-context.test.tsx: keep #45's superset suite.
- page-template-access.spec.ts: keep develop's constructor args; update the two
deleteByReferenceAndSources assertions to the new 4-arg workspace-scoped
signature introduced by #45 (#36 defense-in-depth).
Full suite green: server 624, client 219, editor-ext 56, mcp 247.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
After develop merged, mcp.service.ts calls decideBasicGate from mcp-auth.helpers.
The gate spec mocked the whole module returning only FailedLoginLimiter, so the
merged code crashed with 'decideBasicGate is not a function' (7/7 failing).
Spread jest.requireActual('./mcp-auth.helpers') so the real helpers are kept and
the gate exercises real logic; keep only FailedLoginLimiter stubbed so its
constructor runs without a real sweep timer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add .github/workflows/test.yml (pnpm + Node 22): on pull_request and push
to develop it installs, builds @docmost/editor-ext and runs `pnpm -r test`
across all packages (server Jest, client Vitest, editor-ext Vitest,
packages/mcp node:test). So tests now run automatically in CI, not just
on demand.
To make the run green, quarantine the 16 pre-existing stock NestJS
`should be defined` scaffold specs via jest `testPathIgnorePatterns` —
they never compiled (missing DI providers / lib0 ESM) and assert nothing
useful. Tracked for a proper fix/removal in issue #56. Verified each
pattern drops only its scaffold (46 of 62 suites still collected) and the
full `pnpm -r test` is green: server 587, client 185, editor-ext 56,
mcp 247.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add ~330 tests across server (Jest), client (Vitest), editor-ext (Vitest)
and packages/mcp (node:test) for the gitmost features added since
053a9c0d: AI chat, AI agent roles, public-share assistant, MCP per-user
auth, HTML embed, page templates/embed, realtime tree, tree
expand/collapse, and the AI-settings UI.
Test-tooling fixes (prerequisite, were silently hiding coverage):
- Repair 3 page-template specs broken by the 11-arg TransclusionService
constructor; they never compiled, so template access-control / content
-leak / unsync-strip coverage was fictitious.
- Build @docmost/editor-ext before server tests via a `pretest` hook;
the stale dist omitted the new HtmlEmbed/PageEmbed exports (TS2305).
- Let jest resolve the .tsx email templates: add `tsx` to
moduleFileExtensions and widen the ts-jest transform to (t|j)sx?.
Behaviour-preserving "extract pure core" refactors that the tests drive:
- server: resolveShareAssistantRequest + uiMessageTextLength
(public-share controller), decideBasicGate + mapAuthResultToResponse
(mcp), buildErrorAssistantRecord (ai-chat), jsonbObject export (roles).
- client: render-raw-html + shouldExecute/canEdit, decide-embed-state,
page-embed picker utils, tree-socket reducers, open/close branch maps,
isEndpointConfigured/resolveKeyField; buildTreeWithChildren now treats
a permission-trimmed orphan as a root instead of crashing.
Deferred (need a test DB or HTTP harness, documented in the specs):
repo-level Postgres integration tests and the public-share XFF E2E.
Pre-existing DI/lib0-ESM suite failures are untouched and out of scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Post-merge hardening from the #13 security review:
- isInitializeRequestBody now delegates to the SDK isInitializeRequest (same
predicate as packages/mcp/http.ts), so a bare {method:'initialize'} with no
id/params no longer triggers the side-effecting login() (audit-spam /
user_sessions growth) before http.ts 400s it.
- Bind the Bearer path to the instance workspace: verifyBearerAccess rejects a
token whose payload.workspaceId != the instance workspace (resolved via
workspaceRepo.findFirst, consistent with the Basic path); optional param so
it's a no-op when unset.
- Close the user-enumeration timing oracle in verifyUserCredentials: the
missing/disabled branch now runs a bcrypt compare against a module-level dummy
hash whose cost (12) matches production saltRounds, so both paths take one
equal-cost bcrypt compare; the exact CREDENTIALS_MISMATCH_MESSAGE is preserved.
- Document the trusted-proxy requirement for the spoofable per-IP brute-force
limiter in .env.example (trustProxy is on; deploy behind a trusted proxy).
- Add real-execution coverage for enforceBasicLoginGate (SSO enforced / EE-MFA
bundled vs not / user-MFA / workspace-enforced-MFA) instead of stubbing the gate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A non-admin's transient htmlEmbed could execute in other open editors until the
debounced (10s) onStoreDocument strip. Add a ~300ms onChange-debounced early
strip (guardHtmlEmbed) that converges the shared ydoc for everyone far sooner.
Safety-critical details:
- Scheduled from onChange ONLY for non-admins AND only when the workspace toggle
is ON (cached per-document in onLoadDocument), so the common toggle-OFF case
does zero extra work.
- guardHtmlEmbed does ALL async work (toggle + persisted allow-list read) FIRST,
then performs fromYdoc -> strip -> fragment.delete -> applyUpdate in a single
SYNCHRONOUS, await-free block, so no inbound Yjs update can interleave and a
concurrent edit can never be clobbered. Bails if document.isDestroyed.
- Reuses the #29 preserve logic (admin-vetted embeds survive; only the non-admin's
new ones are stripped). Loop-safe (corrective update has null origin -> no
reschedule; post-strip no embed -> cheap no-op). Per-document timer cleared on
unload. onStoreDocument stays the authoritative backstop.
The irreducible residual is only the very first inbound broadcast before the
debounce fires — Hocuspocus exposes no synchronous beforeBroadcast filter.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The collab persist strip keyed to the storing connection's user, so when a
non-admin co-editor stored, it removed an admin's legitimately-authored embed
too (data loss). Now: toggle OFF still strips all (feature disabled); toggle ON
+ non-admin storer strips only NEWLY-introduced embeds and preserves those
already present in the persisted content (admin-vetted), via new helpers
collectHtmlEmbedSources + stripDisallowedHtmlEmbedNodes (identity = attrs.source,
already-vetted HTML). The ydoc reflect is now guarded by a deep-equal check so
an unrelated non-admin edit that touches no new embed doesn't churn the doc.
A non-admin still cannot add a new embed. Documents the allow-list TOCTOU
(best-effort snapshot read outside the lock; converges on next store).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The create/duplicate/import gate tests asserted gate presence via brittle
expect(SRC).toMatch(/regex/) over the source text plus a reimplemented
applyGate() stand-in, so a refactor could break the real gate while they still
passed. Rewrite both specs to execute the REAL methods (PageService.create /
duplicatePage; ImportService.importPage; FileImportTaskService.processGenericImport)
with each caller role and assert on the PERSISTED content via hasHtmlEmbedNode:
member -> stripped, admin/owner+toggle ON -> preserved, toggle OFF -> stripped
for everyone, unknown/missing role -> fail-closed. No source-regex assertions
remain.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- The security-relevant catch->not_found branch in lookupTemplate (returns
not_found instead of raw content when comment-mark stripping throws) is now
tested by forcing the strip to throw with a malformed text node, asserting no
content/marks leak.
- not_found for a soft-deleted source resolved through the REAL
filterViewerAccessiblePageIds (deletedAt-excluded), not the stubbed filter.
- Rename the misleading 'honours <=50 cap' test to reflect it only exercises
dedup (the cap lives in the DTO, never engaged in the service unit).
- Cover the onlyTemplates search filter (restricts to is_template=true).
Also fix two pre-existing failing 'should be defined' specs (search service +
controller) that couldn't resolve the @InjectKysely token via createTestingModule.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extract the per-node pageEmbed remap decision into a shared pure helper
(remapPageEmbedSourceId) and use it BOTH in PageService.duplicatePage and the
JSON walker, so the test guards the real production path (not a mirror that
could drift). Behavior is identical: source in the copied set -> new copy id;
otherwise keep the original. Add jest coverage (16 tests): the remap helper
(in-set/out-of-set/null/nested), syncPageTemplateReferences toDelete (stale refs
removed with the right workspaceId), and insertTemplateReferencesForPages
multi-workspace grouping/filtering.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The transclusion specs predated two added constructor params, so they failed to
compile (TS2554: expected 11 args, got 10) and the suites couldn't run. Add the
missing mock args: workspaceRepo (param 11) in the lookup/access specs, and
pageTemplateReferencesRepo (param 4, which had shifted pageRepo into the wrong
slot) in the unsync-html-embed spec. All three suites now compile and pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolve conflicts at shared registration points by unioning both features
(footnotes + the already-merged html-embed / page-embed work):
- slash-menu/menu-items.ts, editor extensions.ts: keep both imports + configures
- collaboration.util.ts: register footnote nodes and pageEmbed
- editor-ext marked.utils.ts: register footnote + html-embed markdown extensions
- editor-ext package.json/tsconfig.json/vitest.config.ts: union of test config
(jsdom env for footnote DOM tests + combined test/spec include glob)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The current page id was only injected as text in the system prompt, which a
proxy (CLIProxyAPI) can rewrite/truncate, so the agent could lose track of 'this
page'. Add a getCurrentPage tool the model can call to read the open page (id +
title) from the server-side request context (forUser now takes openedPage,
threaded from body.openPage — the same value used for the system prompt). The
inline system-prompt line is kept as belt-and-suspenders. Reads/writes still go
through the CASL-enforced page tools by id, so this is strictly not worse than
the existing prompt hint — just delivered over a channel the proxy can't mangle.
User-approved on the issue. Completes #43 together with the hardness-1 fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
stripHtmlEmbedNodes only filtered children, so a (never-in-practice) bare
htmlEmbed root node would be returned as-is. Add a defensive root check that
returns an embed-free doc, making the helper total — it can never return a node
for which hasHtmlEmbedNode is true. Adds a unit test for the root case.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Completes the workspace htmlEmbed kill-switch. The public-share path already
strips at serve time when the toggle is OFF, but the authenticated read paths
(/info and /history/info) returned page/history content with embeds intact, so
a disabled feature kept executing for in-workspace view-only viewers until the
page was next saved. Now both paths resolve the workspace toggle and run
stripHtmlEmbedNodes when it's OFF (fail-closed on a missing workspace), before
any markdown/html format conversion. Admin-authored content only — completeness,
not privilege escalation. Injects WorkspaceRepo into PageController.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Consistency hardening from #17 review (not currently exploitable):
- toggleTemplate now explicitly rejects a page outside the caller's workspace
(page.workspaceId !== user.workspaceId -> NotFound, avoiding existence leak)
instead of relying solely on the space-membership model.
- PageTemplateReferencesRepo.deleteByReferenceAndSources is now workspace-scoped
(adds a workspaceId filter + param), matching the 'scope by workspaceId
everywhere' invariant; the sole caller threads its workspaceId.
The PAGE_TEMPLATE_THROTTLER limit is intentionally left as-is (the issue's
throttle item was 'consider only'; no change without usage data).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 'used in N pages' reverse-navigation method had zero callers in the merged
PR #17 — unreachable, untested code. Remove it. The reverse-navigation feature
can be (re)added with the method if/when it's actually built.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace bare //@ts-ignore (no space, no reason) with // @ts-expect-error plus a
reason on the pageEmbed sourcePageId reassignment, matching the codebase style.
ProseMirror Attrs is read-only typed, so the reassignment genuinely errors —
@ts-expect-error is valid here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
PageTemplateController (added on this branch) guards its lookup/toggle routes
with UserThrottlerGuard, which depends on the throttler options provided by
ThrottleModule. CollaborationModule -> TransclusionModule registers that
controller, and the collab server bootstraps CollabAppModule, which did not
import ThrottleModule. The API server's AppModule does, so :3000 booted, but
the collab server (:3001) crashed at startup with
'Nest can't resolve dependencies of the UserThrottlerGuard ... THROTTLER:MODULE_OPTIONS'.
Without collab the editor can't sync, so live editing was broken on this branch.
Import ThrottleModule into CollabAppModule, mirroring AppModule, so the guard
resolves in the collab process too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Anonymous public-share AI assistant:
- Add a workspace setting `publicShareAssistantRoleId` so an admin can pick which
agent role (identity/persona) the anonymous assistant adopts. The role's
instructions REPLACE the built-in persona while the immutable safety framework
is still always appended; the role's optional model override takes precedence
over the cheap publicShareChatModel. Resolved server-authoritatively
(workspace-scoped, soft-delete aware; disabled/missing roles fall back to the
built-in persona, so the tool scope remains the real security boundary).
- Plumb the field through the update DTO, ai-settings service, the workspace.repo
ALLOWED whitelist, resolve()/getMasked(), stream-time role resolution and the
prompt/model, plus the settings UI: a new "Assistant identity" Select listing
enabled roles (and surfacing a saved-but-disabled role explicitly).
Public-share branding / floating icon:
- Fix the AI assistant FAB overlapping the "Powered by ..." button (both were
Affixed bottom-right): stack the FAB above the bottom-right branding.
- Rename "Powered by Docmost" -> "Powered by Gitmost" and point the link at the
gitmost repo.
Tests: extend public-share-chat.spec (role persona replacement still appends the
safety framework, resolveShareRole edge cases, model-override precedence).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The html-embed feature toggle was enforced CLIENT-side in the NodeView (reads
settings.htmlEmbed from the logged-in workspace), so an anonymous public-share
viewer — who has no workspace context — always saw it as OFF and got a
placeholder instead of the executing embed. That broke the whole point (a
tracker must run for anonymous visitors).
Make it server-authoritative:
- share.service prepareContentForShare (the single path both share-content
flows use) strips htmlEmbed from served content when the workspace toggle is
OFF; both callers (updatePublicAttachments host page + lookupTransclusionForShare)
resolve the toggle once and pass it. Fail-closed: missing workspace -> OFF ->
stripped.
- NodeView executes whatever it was served in read-only/share mode
(shouldExecute = !editor.isEditable || htmlEmbedEnabled); the disabled
placeholder now only shows in the editable editor when OFF.
Net: anonymous share + toggle ON -> server serves the (admin-authored) embed ->
it executes for everyone; toggle OFF -> stripped server-side from every
share-content path (true kill switch); a non-admin embed can never be served
(save-path strip). No XSS regression in the editable editor.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- make addTreeNode receivers idempotent (invalidateOnCreatePage guard +
buildTree dedup) so the author's self-echo no longer duplicates the node
- broadcast realtime tree updates for bulk copy/duplicate and import via a
root refetch: PAGE_CREATED now carries spaceId and the WS listener falls
back to refetchRootTreeNodeEvent when no per-node snapshot is present
- remove the now-dead client-relay inbound path (isTreeEvent/handleTreeEvent)
that remained a stale-restriction-cache attack surface
- honest string|null cast for a root move's parent id
- add tests: buildTree dedup; onPageCreated per-node vs refetch branching
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
