The fail-closed limiter behavior (#62 primary item) already shipped; this
finishes the issue by lowering the default hourly per-workspace cap from 300
to 100 to better fit real anonymous-assistant load. Still overridable via
SHARE_AI_WORKSPACE_MAX_PER_HOUR.
- public-share-workspace-limiter.ts: SHARE_AI_WORKSPACE_MAX_PER_WINDOW 300 -> 100.
- .env.example: documented default + example value 300 -> 100.
- public-share-chat.spec.ts: update the default-cap assertion to 100.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements Option 2 of #93. The restricted branch of broadcastPageMoved
previously resolved its audience twice — emitToAuthorizedUsers and
emitDeleteToUnauthorized each ran an independent fetchSockets +
getUserIdsWithPageAccess — leaving a race window between the two snapshots
where a socket could receive both the move and the delete (leak) or neither
(lost compensating delete).
- ws.service.ts: add emitMoveWithRestrictionSplit() that takes ONE socket
snapshot and ONE authorization resolution, then partitions the room:
authorized users get the moveTreeNode, everyone else (unauthorized +
anonymous) get the compensating deleteTreeNode. Disjoint + complete by
construction. Remove the now-unused emitToAuthorizedUsers /
emitDeleteToUnauthorized; keep private broadcastToAuthorizedUsers (still
used by emitRestrictedAwareToSpace).
- ws-tree.service.ts: broadcastPageMoved restricted branch now drives move +
delete from the single method.
- specs: assert the single method is used and that fetchSockets /
getUserIdsWithPageAccess are each called exactly once (single snapshot);
re-route ws-service.spec to emitTreeEvent after the method removal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extract makeConnectHandler(queryClient) (owning the firstConnect flag) from
UserProvider and test it: first connect does NOT invalidate; a reconnect
invalidates both root-sidebar-pages + sidebar-pages. Behavior-identical (#66).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ru-RU had only '{{name}} is typing…' but not 'AI agent' / 'AI agent is typing…',
so the Russian typing indicator was mixed-language. Add them (AI-агент / AI-агент
печатает…) grouped with the named key. en-US is already complete; other locales
intentionally keep the en-US fallback (full translation is a separate effort).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Export + test isHtmlEmbedFeatureEnabled: the 'HTML embed' slash item is hidden by
default / when the toggle is off / on broken localStorage (no throw), shown only
when the workspace toggle is exactly true.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extract clampHeight + isTrustedHeightMessage + the HTML_EMBED_SANDBOX token
constant from the NodeView and test them: clamp bounds; reject a resize message
from a foreign window / wrong type / NaN/Infinity; accept a valid same-source
finite message; assert the sandbox is exactly 'allow-scripts allow-popups
allow-forms' (no allow-same-origin) and rendered via srcDoc (not src).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DTO: trackerHead @IsString/@MaxLength(20000) + htmlEmbed @IsBoolean accept/reject
cases. CASL: a non-admin updating trackerHead/htmlEmbed gets ForbiddenException
(update not called); owner/admin proceed. Audit: a no-op trackerHead re-save
doesn't enter the audit diff.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extract the admin trackerHead <head> injection into a pure injectTrackerHead()
and test it: a snippet containing $&/$$/backtick-dollar survives BYTE-FOR-BYTE
(pins the function-replacer fix), empty/whitespace/undefined and a missing </head>
leave the html unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extract the shared assistant-name predicate (resolveAssistantName: trimmed name
or null) used by typing-indicator + message-item, and unit-test the branches
(name shown; whitespace-only -> 'AI agent' fallback; undefined -> fallback).
Behavior-identical (|| -> ?? since the helper returns null).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Relocate resolveTrustProxy from main.ts (untestable — bootstraps on import) to
integrations/environment/trust-proxy.util.ts and import it back. Unit-test every
branch (empty/undefined -> safe loopback/private default; true/false; hop count;
trim; CIDR/negative passthrough) so a regression can't silently re-open the XFF
spoofing hole (#61).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Covers the #63 guard: a message with a non-text part -> 400 'Unsupported message
content'; a message mixing text + a non-text part still 400s (before the 413
size check).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the missing tests for the #67 guard: self-move and a destination inside the
moved page's subtree both throw BadRequestException before updatePage; a
legitimate move proceeds. Mocks pageRepo + spies getPageBreadCrumbs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- ai-chat: drop the unused pagePermissionRepo injection from
PublicShareChatToolsService (its only use moved into
ShareService.resolveReadableSharePage); update all 5 positional
test construction sites to match the 3-arg constructor.
- env: correct the anonymous share-AI per-workspace cap comment —
the limiter FAILS CLOSED on Redis failure (#62), not open.
- docs: sync README.ru.md with README.md — move "Page templates"
from Planned to Done and drop the dead plan-doc link.
Remaining test-coverage gaps tracked as #102, #103, #104, #105, #106.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reconcile the diverged develop (13 ahead / 20 behind) with gitea/develop.
Conflict resolution — html-embed: keep the local sandboxed-iframe model
(opaque-origin srcdoc, no role-gating) and supersede gitea's same-origin
strip/kill-switch hardening (#26/#28/#29/#30). The 4 conflicted html-embed
source files resolve to the local version; the 3 strip-era spec files stay
deleted. The strip apparatus (stripDisallowedHtmlEmbedNodes,
collectHtmlEmbedSources, canAuthorHtmlEmbed, htmlEmbedAllowed) is fully gone.
Integrate gitea's page-templates / page-embed work (#31-#40) cleanly.
Fix an auto-merge arity mismatch: two new gitea page-template specs
constructed TransclusionService with the pre-sandbox 11-arg signature; drop
the trailing workspaceRepo argument to match the reduced 10-arg constructor.
Verified: server + client tsc --noEmit clean; jest (html-embed + transclusion)
14 suites / 119 tests passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The anonymous public-share "Ask AI" chat labeled every assistant turn
with the generic "AI agent" even when an Assistant identity (agent role)
was configured. Surface the configured identity name instead, falling
back to "AI agent" when no identity is set.
- server: AiSettingsService.resolvePublicShareAssistantName resolves the
configured role's name (null when unset/missing/disabled), mirroring
PublicShareChatService.resolveShareRole; ShareController returns it as
aiAssistantName on /shares/page-info (only when the assistant is on).
- client: thread aiAssistantName -> ShareAiWidget -> MessageList ->
MessageItem/TypingIndicator via an optional assistantName prop; the
internal chat omits it and keeps showing "AI agent".
- i18n: add "{{name}} is typing…" (en-US, ru-RU) for the typing line.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Deduplicate the "save a workspace setting" plumbing shared by HtmlEmbedSettings
and TrackerSettings (workspace atom read, isLoading state, updateWorkspace + atom
merge forcing settings[key], success/error notifications) into a new
feature-scoped hook useWorkspaceSetting(key).
- Each component keeps its own interaction model: html-embed is an optimistic
toggle with revert-on-failure; tracker is edit-then-save on an explicit button.
- Unify error handling on the better pattern: surface err.response?.data?.message
and use console.error (html-embed previously used console.log + a generic message).
No user-facing behavior change; client typecheck clean.
Test-coverage follow-ups (untested trackerHead injection in ShareSeoController and
the no-op audit branch) tracked in #100.
isBlocked was checked synchronously but recordFailure ran only AFTER the bcrypt
awaits, so N concurrent /mcp Basic requests for one email all slipped past the
threshold. Add FailedLoginLimiter.tryReserve (atomic synchronous check+increment)
+ release (undo), and reserve all 3 keys BEFORE any await so the (threshold+1)-th
concurrent attempt is rejected before its bcrypt runs. The reservation IS the
failure record (post-await recordFailure removed -> counted exactly once). Non-
credential early throws (missing workspace, SSO/MFA gate) and business errors
release the reservation so they don't burn a victim's budget; success clears.
Tests prove login() runs exactly threshold times under concurrency and that
gate/config rejects don't consume budget.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The three collect*FromPmJson collectors shared the same recursion (and the #55
depth cap) but were copy-pasted, so a future edit could diverge them. Extract a
generic collectNodes(doc, {type, map, key, lastWins, skipChildrenOfType}) and
reimplement all three on it, byte-output-identical (transclusions last-wins;
references/embeds first-wins + transclusionSource skip). Documents (not removes)
the write-only page_template_references graph and the near-duplicate client
lookup-context as tracked follow-ups, per the issue's guidance.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The '(shareId,pageId) -> usable non-restricted page in THIS share' boundary was
written as 3 must-be-identical async sequences. They weren't: the chat funnel
omitted an explicit page.deletedAt check (latently safe via getShareForPage's
CTE) and layered isSharingAllowed separately. Add ShareService.resolveReadable-
SharePage(shareId,pageId,workspaceId) running the single canonical sequence
(getShareForPage -> id match (skipped when null) -> findById -> !deletedAt ->
!hasRestrictedAncestor) returning {share,page}|null; getSharedPage, the funnel,
and the getSharePage tool all use it. hasRestrictedAncestor now lives in the one
method no caller can skip; the funnel still returns uniform 404s and keeps
isSharingAllowed. Adds a direct security-invariant test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address the non-test code-review findings on the htmlEmbed sandbox change
(test-coverage gaps are tracked in issue #99):
- html-embed-view: track the iframe's reported content height even while a
fixed height is set, so clearing the height (fixed -> auto) without editing
the source no longer leaves the frame pinned to the stale value. Derive the
fixed-height predicate once; seed autoHeight to the default.
- html-embed-view: drop width/border from the iframe inline style (the
.htmlEmbedFrame CSS class already provides them).
- html-embed-sandbox: coalesce height reports via requestAnimationFrame and
skip <=1px deltas to damp the self-measure feedback loop; fix the misleading
bootstrap comment.
- tracker-settings: add an aria-label to the snippet Textarea (a11y).
- CHANGELOG: note the removal of server-side role-based HTML-embed stripping.
resolveRoleForRequest and resolveShareRole duplicated the security invariant
'role exists, not soft-deleted, enabled, workspace-scoped, else null'. Move it to
AiAgentRoleRepo.findLiveEnabled(id, workspaceId) (deletedAt IS NULL + enabled +
workspace scope) and have both services call it, preserving each one's roleId
derivation + null handling. (describeProviderError half of #95 was done earlier.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
emitTreeEvent and emitCommentEvent were byte-identical (same room resolution,
spaceHasRestrictions gate, hasRestrictedAncestor, authorized-only vs broadcast
fallback). Collapse the body into one private emitRestrictedAwareToSpace; both
stay thin wrappers with unchanged signatures, so the restriction-routing gate
lives in exactly one place. Adds coverage for the comment entry point.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
McpService.enforceBasicLoginGate re-implements AuthController.login's pre-token
SSO/MFA gate; silent drift would re-open the bypass. Add an AST contract test
(comments stripped) asserting BOTH method bodies contain validateSsoEnforcement,
the EE-MFA require, and checkMfaRequirements — so dropping the gate from either
side fails CI. Test-only (no core/auth refactor).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 4-step html-embed gate (feature-enabled AND role-allowed -> stripHtmlEmbedNodes)
was replicated across call-sites, pinned only by brittle source-regex tests. Add
stripHtmlEmbedIfNotAllowed(json, {featureEnabled, role, onStrip}) and migrate the
5 plain strip-all sites (collab handler, page create+duplicate, both import paths,
transclusion) to it, each keeping its own feature/role resolve + log via onStrip.
Left the 2 sites with different semantics: persistence.extension (#29 preserve-
admin) and share.service (feature-only kill-switch, no role gate). Real unit tests
replace the regex pins; behavior identical.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
16 suites were disabled via testPathIgnorePatterns due to two root causes: lib0
ESM not transformed (the @hocuspocus/server -> lib0/decoding.js chain) and stock
'should be defined' specs built via Test.createTestingModule without providers.
Add lib0 to transformIgnorePatterns; convert the 14 DI placeholders to direct
new X(...) instantiation with stub deps (keeping a real construct smoke test);
re-enable the suites. Also updates the public-share limiter test to assert the
fail-closed behavior from #62 (surfaced now that the suite runs). Full server
suite: 67 passed, 689 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The shared MCP_TOKEN guard moved from 'Authorization: Bearer <MCP_TOKEN>' to the
X-MCP-Token header (Authorization is now per-user Basic/Bearer), silently breaking
existing /mcp clients. Document it as a Breaking Change in CHANGELOG (reconfigure
to X-MCP-Token). Add a once-per-process migration warning: when MCP_TOKEN is set,
no x-mcp-token is present, and Authorization carries the old 'Bearer <MCP_TOKEN>',
log a hint to migrate — without changing the auth decision (still rejected) or
logging the token value.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assessment of the page-embed depth/cycle cap: the server /pages/template/lookup
returns FLAT single-level content and does NOT recurse into embedded pages — the
recursive expansion + the PAGE_EMBED_MAX_DEPTH cap are entirely client render
concerns, and a scripted client is already bounded by the per-user throttle
(30/min) + the ArrayMaxSize(50) per-call cap. So no server-side depth guard is
needed; documented at lookupTemplate so future readers don't add a redundant one
or assume server recursion exists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
handleMessage became a no-op and PageWsListener intentionally ignored
PAGE_UPDATED, so a rename/icon change (client operation:updateOne) was no longer
rebroadcast -> other clients saw stale title/icon in the sidebar+breadcrumbs
until a reload (create/duplicate/restore were covered; updateOne regressed).
Add a server-authoritative onPageUpdated handler: PageService.update detects a
real title/icon change (DTO carries the field AND value differs; no-op/content-
only saves excluded) and attaches a treeUpdate snapshot to PAGE_UPDATED; the
listener broadcasts a tree updateOne via the restriction-aware emitTreeEvent
(so a restricted page's title never leaks). Content-only saves attach nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
sidebar-pages-tree.spec tested a LOCAL COPY of the tree-shaping (so a regression
in the real getSidebarPagesTree was invisible) and justified it with a false
jest-config claim (the ^src mapping exists). Extract the pure shaping into
shapeSidebarPagesTree(); the service now calls it and the spec imports the REAL
helper. Behavior unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The concurrent-soft-delete guard was already covered; add the missing assertion
that update() returns toView(updated) from the post-update re-fetch (full
AgentRoleView shape, distinct second findById row), so a regression returning the
stale pre-update view or leaking columns is caught.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The anonymous share page-fetch tool's positive branch (sanitize via
updatePublicAttachments then jsonToMarkdown before returning to the model) was
untested, so a dropped/reordered sanitizer would ship a comment-mark/raw-
attachment leak with green tests. Add a positive-branch test pinning the
sanitizer call + that markdown derives from sanitized content, and a soft-deleted
test asserting a generic error with no content fetch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
invalidateSpaceRestrictionCache has no callers because no restriction-mutation
path exists yet (PagePermissionRepo mutators are uncalled; there is no
restrict/grant/revoke endpoint), so the 30s spaceHasRestrictions cache could
serve a stale 'no restrictions' verdict. Until a mutation endpoint exists to
wire the direct invalidation, lower the TTL (30s -> 3s) to bound the worst-case
window; the invalidation primitive is kept for that future endpoint.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
chatModel was a free string accepted with empty/garbage values, failing only at
runtime as a provider 503; tighten it (trim + non-empty + max 200). Driver was
already @IsIn(AI_DRIVERS). Collapse the client driver list to one AI_DRIVER_VALUES
source and add a contract test that reads the server AI_DRIVERS and fails on
client/server drift.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up fixes to the htmlEmbed-sandbox / trackerHead change:
- share-seo: inject trackerHead via a function replacer so `$`-sequences
($&, $', $`, $$) in the admin snippet are inserted literally instead of
being treated as String.replace substitution patterns; warn when the
</head> marker is absent instead of silently skipping injection.
- mcp: register a passthrough `htmlEmbed` node in the schema mirror so an
AI/MCP edit of a page containing an embed no longer throws
"Unknown node type: htmlEmbed" in TiptapTransformer.toYdoc.
- editor-ext + client: treat a non-finite `data-height` as auto (null) so a
crafted/corrupted height cannot disable auto-resize or yield a NaN iframe
height; extract a shared clampHeight helper.
- client: rename render-raw-html.{ts,test.ts} -> html-embed-sandbox.{...} and
shouldExecute -> shouldRender so the seam name matches the sandbox model.
- client: i18n the iframe title; surface the real error reason in
tracker-settings (console.error + err.response.data.message).
- docs: note hasHtmlEmbedNode is now a test-only helper; add an Unreleased
CHANGELOG entry; drop the dangling "arbitrary HTML embed" planning-doc ref.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
collectPageEmbedsFromPmJson (and the sibling collectors/remap) recursed with no
guard, so a pathological/cyclic non-JSON input could stack-overflow (RangeError).
Add a depth cap (1000, far above any real doc nesting) so such input is handled
gracefully. Normal documents are unaffected. Updates a stale test that asserted
the old throwing behavior.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
trustProxy was unconditionally true, so req.ip came from a client-forgeable
X-Forwarded-For and the per-IP throttles (share-AI, /mcp brute-force) were
spoofable. Make it env-configurable (TRUST_PROXY) with a safe default that
trusts XFF only from loopback/private proxies, documented in .env.example.
NOTE: this changes the default from trust-all; deployments whose proxy is on a
public IP must set TRUST_PROXY (caveat documented).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
WS events missed during a disconnect (wifi blip, sleep) were lost, so the
sidebar tree silently diverged until a manual reload. On RECONNECT (not the
first connect) invalidate the root-sidebar-pages + sidebar-pages queries so the
tree refetches through the authorized API and re-converges.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
After a merge decideEmbedState became the canonical guard and inlines the
cycle/too-deep logic, leaving these predicates called only by their own tests.
Remove them (and their test blocks); keep PAGE_EMBED_MAX_DEPTH (used by
decideEmbedState). Production behavior stays covered by decide-embed-state.test.ts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A custom AI-role's text preceded the only SAFETY_FRAMEWORK block and replaced
the persona, so a jailbreak in the role text sat before the safety rules.
buildSystemPrompt now emits SAFETY both before AND after the persona, with the
role/persona delimited as lower-trust (<role_persona note=...>); the default
persona is sandwiched too. Context (currently-viewing-page) preserved.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
#67: movePage didn't check the destination wasn't the page itself or inside its
own subtree, so MCP/REST/agent/fast-drag could persist+broadcast a cycle. Reject
before the update (self-parent, or moved page among the destination parent's
ancestors via getPageBreadCrumbs).
#64: movePage emitted PAGE_MOVED from a stale pre-read even when the row didn't
change / was concurrently deleted (phantom move). Gate the emit on
updateResult.numUpdatedRows !== 0n. Both are movePage hardening in one method.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
#60: streamText had no maxOutputTokens, so one anonymous request could run up
the provider bill. Add maxOutputTokens (env SHARE_AI_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS, default
512) via resolveShareAiMaxOutputTokens().
#95: the anonymous path hand-built error strings, diverging from the unified
describeProviderError format used on the authenticated path; both onError blocks
now call describeProviderError so a share reader sees 402/429/503 causes in the
same form (and the stack is still logged). Both changes are in this one file and
share hunks, hence one commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A user with password=NULL passed the missing/disabled guard and reached
comparePasswordHash(pw, null), which native bcrypt rejects -> 500 on
/api/auth/login and, on /mcp, a leaky 401 that the brute-force limiter ignored
(enumeration oracle + limiter evasion). Treat a null/empty password like a
missing user in verifyUserCredentials (dummy compare for timing parity + unified
CREDENTIALS_MISMATCH_MESSAGE) and reject early in changePassword before bcrypt.
Contract spec asserts the null-password guard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The widget hardcoded a generic 'Something went wrong' body and ignored
error.message, violating AGENTS.md. Render describeChatError(error.message, t) —
the same helper the internal chat uses — so a reader sees the real 402/429/503
cause instead of a bare 'try again'.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
MAX_SHARE_MESSAGE_CHARS only counted text parts, so a forged non-text part
(tool-result/file/data) bypassed the cap and bloated the model input
(token-DoS); convertToModelMessages would also expand a forged tool-result. The
anonymous path runs no tools, so a client non-text part is never legitimate —
reject any message with a non-text part (isTextUIPart) before the size check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The per-workspace anonymous share-AI cost cap failed OPEN on a Redis error
(return true => admit), so a Redis outage removed the cap entirely (unmetered
billable anonymous calls). The feature is optional, so unavailability is
harmless: fail CLOSED (return false => controller 429s) instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Convert the htmlEmbed node from same-origin raw-HTML execution to a sandboxed
iframe (sandbox="allow-scripts allow-popups allow-forms", no allow-same-origin,
srcdoc) with postMessage auto-resize (validated by event.source) and an optional
manual height attr. The block now runs in an opaque origin and cannot reach the
viewer's cookies/session/API, so it is safe for any member.
Because the block is now harmless, remove the entire admin/role gating apparatus:
drop htmlEmbedAllowed/canAuthorHtmlEmbed/stripDisallowedHtmlEmbedNodes/
collectHtmlEmbedSources and every role-based strip on the write paths (collab
REST/MCP + socket, page create/duplicate, import x2, transclusion unsync), along
with the now-unused WorkspaceRepo/UserRepo injections and the PageService.create
callerRole param. Keep one strip: prepareContentForShare still removes htmlEmbed
on the anonymous public-share read path when the workspace master toggle is OFF.
The workspace settings.htmlEmbed toggle is now a plain feature switch (gates the
slash-menu and share rendering); when ON the block is available to all members.
Add settings.trackerHead: an admin-only raw HTML/JS analytics snippet injected
verbatim into the <head> of public share pages only (ShareSeoController), for
trackers that genuinely need same-origin. Admin-gated via the existing CASL
Manage/Settings ability; never injected into the authenticated app shell.
Closes security-review findings #1, #2, #4, #5, #10 (and #3 as a security issue).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Harden the anonymous public-share AI assistant against token-cost abuse
before exposing it to the internet:
- Add an env-tunable per-request output ceiling (maxOutputTokens) to the
public-share streamText call so one anonymous request cannot run up the
provider bill even if the per-IP throttle is evaded. New
resolveShareAiMaxOutputTokens() / SHARE_AI_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS_DEFAULT
(env SHARE_AI_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS, default 512), mirroring
resolveShareAiWorkspaceMax().
- Flip the per-workspace cost limiter to FAIL CLOSED on Redis failure
(was fail-open): if Redis is unavailable we cannot prove the workspace is
under its cap, so deny rather than admit an unmetered, billable call.
- Update the limiter spec (fail-open -> fail-closed) and add resolver tests;
document both knobs in .env.example.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
