81823fce1e
Convert the htmlEmbed node from same-origin raw-HTML execution to a sandboxed iframe (sandbox="allow-scripts allow-popups allow-forms", no allow-same-origin, srcdoc) with postMessage auto-resize (validated by event.source) and an optional manual height attr. The block now runs in an opaque origin and cannot reach the viewer's cookies/session/API, so it is safe for any member. Because the block is now harmless, remove the entire admin/role gating apparatus: drop htmlEmbedAllowed/canAuthorHtmlEmbed/stripDisallowedHtmlEmbedNodes/ collectHtmlEmbedSources and every role-based strip on the write paths (collab REST/MCP + socket, page create/duplicate, import x2, transclusion unsync), along with the now-unused WorkspaceRepo/UserRepo injections and the PageService.create callerRole param. Keep one strip: prepareContentForShare still removes htmlEmbed on the anonymous public-share read path when the workspace master toggle is OFF. The workspace settings.htmlEmbed toggle is now a plain feature switch (gates the slash-menu and share rendering); when ON the block is available to all members. Add settings.trackerHead: an admin-only raw HTML/JS analytics snippet injected verbatim into the <head> of public share pages only (ShareSeoController), for trackers that genuinely need same-origin. Admin-gated via the existing CASL Manage/Settings ability; never injected into the authenticated app shell. Closes security-review findings #1, #2, #4, #5, #10 (and #3 as a security issue). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
3.9 KiB
3.9 KiB