Files
gitmost/apps/server/src/integrations/sandbox/sandbox.store.ts
claude_code 8842bc8bf3 fix(sandbox): address PR #250 follow-up review — XSS hardening, eviction reconcile, doc sync (#243)
Security (must-fix):
- sandbox.controller: the anonymous GET /api/sb/:id response now sets
  X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, a restrictive CSP, and Content-Disposition=
  attachment for any mime outside a raster-image allowlist (png/jpeg/gif/webp/
  avif). entry.mime is attacker-controlled, so an evil.svg/evil.html could
  otherwise execute script inline on the Docmost origin (stored XSS). Mirrors
  the public attachment route's hardening.

Stability:
- client.stashPage: reconcile mirrors AFTER the final document put, not only
  before it. The doc blob is the newest entry and FIFO eviction drops the
  oldest = this stash's own images, so the stored doc could reference an
  evicted blob (consumer 404) and over-report images.mirrored. A bounded loop
  now reverts doc-put-evicted mirrors, drops the stale doc blob, and re-puts
  until stable. Regenerated packages/mcp/build/.
- sandbox.controller: emit Cache-Control on the 304 branch too (ttlSeconds is
  computed before the conditional check).

Docs:
- Bump the MCP tool count 39 -> 40 across all READMEs and AGENTS.md (the
  registry now exposes exactly 40 tools).

Refactor:
- SandboxStore.asSink() centralizes the {put,has,evict} sink + uri<->id
  mapping; the embedded-MCP and in-app agent-tools wiring sites share it.

Tests:
- security headers (inline vs attachment, nosniff, CSP), 304 Cache-Control,
  putAndLink URL form, has()/remove(), asSink() round-trip, getSandboxPublicUrl
  (trailing-slash trim + APP_URL fallback), and a stash test where the doc put
  itself evicts a mirrored image.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-28 19:08:06 +03:00

179 lines
5.9 KiB
TypeScript

import { Injectable, Logger, OnModuleDestroy } from '@nestjs/common';
import { createHash, randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
import { EnvironmentService } from '../environment/environment.service';
import { SANDBOX_API_PATH } from './sandbox.constants';
// In-RAM, process-local blob store. No disk, no DB. Ephemeral by design: a
// restart empties it. A blob is addressed by an unguessable randomUUID() which
// IS the read capability — there are NO tokens. Each blob is immutable (its id
// never maps to changing content), so its sha256 is a perfect strong ETag.
export interface SandboxEntry {
buf: Buffer;
mime: string;
sha256: string;
expiresAt: number;
}
export interface SandboxPutResult {
id: string;
sha256: string;
size: number;
}
@Injectable()
export class SandboxStore implements OnModuleDestroy {
private readonly logger = new Logger(SandboxStore.name);
// Map preserves insertion order, so the first key is the oldest entry — used
// for FIFO eviction when the total-bytes RAM guard is exceeded.
private readonly map = new Map<string, SandboxEntry>();
private totalBytes = 0;
// Background sweep clears expired entries so never-fetched blobs do not linger
// until the next get(). unref()'d so it never holds the event loop open;
// cleared on module destroy. Mirrors the sweepTimer pattern in
// integrations/mcp/mcp.service.ts and packages/mcp/src/http.ts.
private readonly sweepIntervalMs = 60_000;
private readonly sweepTimer: NodeJS.Timeout;
constructor(private readonly environmentService: EnvironmentService) {
this.sweepTimer = setInterval(() => {
try {
this.sweep();
} catch (err) {
this.logger.error('Sandbox sweep failed', err as Error);
}
}, this.sweepIntervalMs);
this.sweepTimer.unref?.();
}
onModuleDestroy(): void {
clearInterval(this.sweepTimer);
}
/**
* Store a blob and return its read capability id + integrity metadata. The
* per-blob cap is chosen by mime (images get the larger image cap), and the
* total-store RAM guard evicts oldest entries to make room. Throws a clear
* error when a single blob cannot fit even after eviction. Blob bodies are
* never logged.
*/
put(buf: Buffer, mime: string): SandboxPutResult {
const perBlobCap = mime.startsWith('image/')
? this.environmentService.getSandboxMaxImageBytes()
: this.environmentService.getSandboxMaxBytes();
if (buf.length > perBlobCap) {
throw new Error(
`Sandbox blob of ${buf.length} bytes exceeds the ${perBlobCap}-byte per-blob cap`,
);
}
const maxTotal = this.environmentService.getSandboxMaxTotalBytes();
if (buf.length > maxTotal) {
throw new Error(
`Sandbox blob of ${buf.length} bytes exceeds the total store cap of ${maxTotal} bytes`,
);
}
// Drop expired entries first, then evict oldest until the new blob fits.
this.sweep();
while (this.totalBytes + buf.length > maxTotal && this.map.size > 0) {
const oldest = this.map.keys().next().value as string;
this.evict(oldest);
}
const id = randomUUID();
const sha256 = createHash('sha256').update(buf).digest('hex');
const expiresAt = Date.now() + this.environmentService.getSandboxTtlMs();
this.map.set(id, { buf, mime, sha256, expiresAt });
this.totalBytes += buf.length;
return { id, sha256, size: buf.length };
}
/**
* Store a blob and return its anonymous read URL plus integrity metadata.
* Owns the single sandbox-URL composition (`${publicBase}${SANDBOX_API_PATH}/
* <id>`) so callers never hand-build the route; the raw put() stays public for
* tests/low-level callers. sha256 is also the blob's strong ETag.
*/
putAndLink(
buf: Buffer,
mime: string,
): { uri: string; sha256: string; size: number } {
const stored = this.put(buf, mime);
const base = this.environmentService.getSandboxPublicUrl();
return {
uri: `${base}${SANDBOX_API_PATH}/${stored.id}`,
sha256: stored.sha256,
size: stored.size,
};
}
/**
* Adapter to the package's blob-sandbox sink contract `{ put, has, evict }`.
* The sink speaks anonymous `uri`s while the store is keyed by `id`, so this is
* the ONE place that maps a sandbox uri back to its id (the last path segment).
* Both wiring sites (embedded MCP + in-app agent tools) use this so the uri↔id
* mapping and URL composition live next to putAndLink, not copy-pasted.
*/
asSink(): {
put: (buf: Buffer, mime: string) => { uri: string; sha256: string; size: number };
has: (uri: string) => boolean;
evict: (uri: string) => void;
} {
const idOf = (uri: string) => uri.substring(uri.lastIndexOf('/') + 1);
return {
put: (buf, mime) => this.putAndLink(buf, mime),
has: (uri) => this.has(idOf(uri)),
evict: (uri) => this.remove(idOf(uri)),
};
}
/** True if the blob is still live (not evicted/expired). */
has(id: string): boolean {
return this.get(id) !== undefined;
}
/** Drop a blob by id (public wrapper over the private FIFO evict). */
remove(id: string): void {
this.evict(id);
}
/** Returns the entry, or undefined if missing OR expired (lazy expiry). */
get(id: string): SandboxEntry | undefined {
const entry = this.map.get(id);
if (!entry) return undefined;
if (entry.expiresAt <= Date.now()) {
this.evict(id);
return undefined;
}
return entry;
}
/** Current number of live entries (test/diagnostic helper). */
get size(): number {
return this.map.size;
}
/** Current total bytes held (test/diagnostic helper). */
get bytes(): number {
return this.totalBytes;
}
private evict(id: string): void {
const entry = this.map.get(id);
if (entry) {
this.totalBytes -= entry.buf.length;
this.map.delete(id);
}
}
private sweep(): void {
const now = Date.now();
for (const [id, entry] of this.map) {
if (entry.expiresAt <= now) {
this.evict(id);
}
}
}
}