Security (must-fix):
- sandbox.controller: the anonymous GET /api/sb/:id response now sets
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, a restrictive CSP, and Content-Disposition=
attachment for any mime outside a raster-image allowlist (png/jpeg/gif/webp/
avif). entry.mime is attacker-controlled, so an evil.svg/evil.html could
otherwise execute script inline on the Docmost origin (stored XSS). Mirrors
the public attachment route's hardening.
Stability:
- client.stashPage: reconcile mirrors AFTER the final document put, not only
before it. The doc blob is the newest entry and FIFO eviction drops the
oldest = this stash's own images, so the stored doc could reference an
evicted blob (consumer 404) and over-report images.mirrored. A bounded loop
now reverts doc-put-evicted mirrors, drops the stale doc blob, and re-puts
until stable. Regenerated packages/mcp/build/.
- sandbox.controller: emit Cache-Control on the 304 branch too (ttlSeconds is
computed before the conditional check).
Docs:
- Bump the MCP tool count 39 -> 40 across all READMEs and AGENTS.md (the
registry now exposes exactly 40 tools).
Refactor:
- SandboxStore.asSink() centralizes the {put,has,evict} sink + uri<->id
mapping; the embedded-MCP and in-app agent-tools wiring sites share it.
Tests:
- security headers (inline vs attachment, nosniff, CSP), 304 Cache-Control,
putAndLink URL form, has()/remove(), asSink() round-trip, getSandboxPublicUrl
(trailing-slash trim + APP_URL fallback), and a stash test where the doc put
itself evicts a mirrored image.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security:
- stash_page: reject path-traversal / percent-encoded srcs before the authed
loopback fetch (resolveInternalFilePath), closing an SSRF/exfiltration hole
where a crafted node.attrs.src could read an arbitrary internal GET endpoint
into the anonymous sandbox.
Stability:
- stash_page: revert + recount mirrors FIFO-evicted by a later put in the same
stash (no dangling sandbox refs, honest images.mirrored/failed); free image
blobs if the final document put throws.
- Reject/clamp non-positive SANDBOX_TTL_MS to the 1h default (warn once).
- Log mirror failures unconditionally (console.warn, no blob bodies).
Cleanup / architecture:
- Remove dead expiresAt from SandboxPutResult.
- Centralize the /api/sb route in SANDBOX_ROUTE_SEGMENT/SANDBOX_API_PATH and
move URL composition into SandboxStore.putAndLink; drop the duplicated sink
closures and the now-unused EnvironmentService injection from McpService and
AiChatToolsService.
- Un-export isInternalFileUrl; document the process-local (instance-bound)
sandbox limitation in the tool description and .env.example.
Docs/tests:
- README/README.ru: 38 -> 39 tools + stash_page entry.
- Add traversal/normalize/recursion unit tests, stash self-eviction +
doc-put-throw + empty/octet-stream mock tests, controller If-None-Match
(wildcard/weak/list) + Cache-Control tests, and SANDBOX_TTL_MS validation
tests. Regenerate packages/mcp/build.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add an ephemeral, process-local blob store so the in-app agent (and the
embedded MCP) can hand a large page document and its images to an external
consumer WITHOUT routing the bytes through the model context or Docmost auth.
- SandboxStore (@Injectable singleton): Map<uuid,{buf,mime,sha256,expiresAt}>
in RAM only. put() picks a per-blob cap by mime (image vs doc), enforces a
total-bytes RAM guard with oldest-first eviction, and stamps a TTL; get()
lazily expires. sha256 computed at put() doubles as the strong ETag. An
unref'd sweep interval clears expired entries and is cleared on destroy.
- GET /api/sb/:uuid anonymous controller: serves raw bytes with Content-Type,
Content-Length and ETag=sha256; 404 on missing/expired/non-UUID (anti-
traversal), 304 on a matching If-None-Match. No tokens, no 401 — the
capability is the unguessable UUID + short TTL + TLS. Auth-exempt the same
way as /api/files/public (no JwtAuthGuard) plus an /api/sb entry in main.ts's
workspace-resolution preHandler so a remote consumer with no workspace host
is not rejected.
- stash_page tool in both layers (MCP resource_link + in-app {uri,size,sha256,
images}). client.stashPage serializes the get_page_json shape, mirrors every
INTERNAL file/image src (type-agnostic, covers drawio/excalidraw/video/file)
into the sandbox under Docmost auth and rewrites src to the sandbox URL;
external http(s) srcs are left untouched; dedup by src; a failed image fetch
is counted, never aborts the doc.
- SANDBOX_PUBLIC_URL / SANDBOX_TTL_MS / SANDBOX_MAX_BYTES /
SANDBOX_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES / SANDBOX_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES wired through the
environment service + validation + .env.example.
- SandboxModule (@Global) provides the shared store to the controller,
McpService and AiChatToolsService (same instance for put and get).
Tests: SandboxStore (round-trip, sha256, TTL lazy + sweep, caps, eviction),
SandboxController (200+ETag+CT+CL, 404 missing/expired/non-UUID, 304), and a
mock-HTTP stashPage test (mirror+rewrite internal, keep external, dedup, failed
image counted, returns only a link). Interoperates with the vvzvlad/habr-mcp
consumer's anonymous-GET + sha256-ETag + resource_link contract.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
