Merge remote-tracking branch 'gitea/develop' into fix/541-reconnect-timeout

При живом обрыве SSE вход в лестницу reconnect происходил только
после резолва getRun(cid) (ре-сид из персиста). Путь REJECT
обрабатывался через .catch, но ЗАВИСШИЙ getRun (соединение есть,
ответа нет) был не ограничен: axios-клиент (lib/api-client.ts) не
имеет timeout, а stalled-idle-cap взводится только ПОСЛЕ входа в
reconnecting/polling. Итог — FSM залипала в `streaming` без баннера
и без поллинга до сокет-таймаута браузера (минуты). Это тот самый
класс тихого зависания, который устраняет эпик #497.

Оборачиваю ожидание getRun гонкой с таймаутом
(RECONNECT_RESEED_TIMEOUT_MS = 4s): по таймауту берётся ТОТ ЖЕ
фолбэк, что и на reject — dropLivePartialAndReplayFromStart() +
enterReconnect(runId), так что лестница/поллинг стартуют и
stalled-idle-cap взводится. Локальный флаг `settled` делает ветви
resolve/reject/timeout взаимоисключающими: поздний резолв getRun
после сработавшего таймаута полностью игнорируется (не входит в
reconnect повторно, не перетирает replay-from-start устаревшим
ре-сидом, ничего не перевзводит). Таймер живёт в reseedTimerRef и
очищается при размонтировании (никаких висящих setTimeout).

Тесты: hang-кейс (getRun не резолвится -> по таймауту FSM в
reconnecting, live-partial сброшен, replay-from-start) и
late-resolve safety (поздний резолв — no-op). Мутация: замена гонки
на голый getRun краснит оба #541-теста.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.env.example

@@ -251,16 +251,6 @@ MCP_DOCMOST_PASSWORD=
 # Default 120000 (2 min).
 # AI_MCP_CALL_TIMEOUT_MS=120000
 
-# Kill-switch for the agent API-key feature (#501). Default ON when unset — a
-# deploy that never sets it must NOT silently kill every agent. STRICT parse:
-# only the literals `true` / `false` are accepted; a typo like `=0`/`=off`/`=False`
-# FAILS AT BOOT by design (never silently read as "enabled"), so the switch is
-# guaranteed to actually flip when an operator flips it during an incident. When
-# set to `false`: all api-key auth is DENIED (every api-key token is rejected) and
-# the api-key management endpoints return 404. The resolved state is logged at boot
-# (`API keys: ENABLED/DISABLED (API_KEYS_ENABLED=...)`) so it is verifiable per deploy.
-# API_KEYS_ENABLED=true
-
 # Max JSON/urlencoded request body size (bytes). Fastify's 1 MiB default is too
 # small for a long AI-chat research turn: the client resends the FULL message
 # history (every tool call + search result) on each turn, so a deep conversation's

.github/workflows/develop.yml

@@ -226,13 +226,6 @@ jobs:
       - name: Build mcp
         run: pnpm --filter @docmost/mcp build
 
-      # apps/server imports @docmost/token-estimate at runtime (history-budget.ts,
-      # #490); its dist/ is gitignored and `test:e2e` type-checks + runs the code,
-      # so build it here or tsc fails with TS2307 Cannot find module
-      # '@docmost/token-estimate' (mirrors the editor-ext / mcp build steps above).
-      - name: Build token-estimate
-        run: pnpm --filter @docmost/token-estimate build
-
       - name: Run migrations
         run: pnpm --filter ./apps/server migration:latest
 

.github/workflows/test.yml

@@ -159,14 +159,6 @@ jobs:
       - name: Build prosemirror-markdown
         run: pnpm --filter @docmost/prosemirror-markdown build
 
-      # @docmost/token-estimate is a shared workspace package the client vitest
-      # suite resolves via its dist build (main: ./dist/index.js); dist/ is
-      # gitignored and `pnpm -r test` does NOT honour nx `dependsOn: ^build`, so
-      # build it before the recursive test run or the client suite fails with
-      # "Failed to resolve import '@docmost/token-estimate'" (#490).
-      - name: Build token-estimate
-        run: pnpm --filter @docmost/token-estimate build
-
       - name: Run unit tests
         run: pnpm -r test
 

Dockerfile

@@ -59,14 +59,6 @@ COPY --from=builder /app/packages/mcp/data /app/packages/mcp/data
 COPY --from=builder /app/packages/prosemirror-markdown/build /app/packages/prosemirror-markdown/build
 COPY --from=builder /app/packages/prosemirror-markdown/package.json /app/packages/prosemirror-markdown/package.json
 
-# apps/server imports @docmost/token-estimate (workspace:*) at runtime
-# (history-budget.ts, #490). tsc emits only dist/ and dist/ is gitignored, so the
-# prod install would resolve a broken workspace symlink and the server would die
-# with ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND on the first history-budget call. Ship the built
-# package + its manifest, mirroring prosemirror-markdown above.
-COPY --from=builder /app/packages/token-estimate/dist /app/packages/token-estimate/dist
-COPY --from=builder /app/packages/token-estimate/package.json /app/packages/token-estimate/package.json
-
 # Copy root package files
 COPY --from=builder /app/package.json /app/package.json
 COPY --from=builder /app/pnpm*.yaml /app/

apps/client/src/features/ai-chat/components/chat-thread.test.tsx

@@ -1254,4 +1254,88 @@ describe("ChatThread — live reconnect + stalled", () => {
     });
     expect(onResumeFallback).toHaveBeenCalledWith(false); // POLL_IDLE_CAP -> idle -> disarm
   });
+
+  it("#541: getRun HANGS on a live disconnect — the timeout race still enters reconnect (no silent freeze in `streaming`)", async () => {
+    // MUTATION-VERIFY: revert the race to a bare `getRun(cid).then/.catch` and this
+    // reddens — a HUNG (never-settling, NOT rejected) getRun leaves the FSM stuck in
+    // `streaming` with no reconnect banner and no poll (the axios client sets no
+    // request timeout, and the stalled-idle cap only arms AFTER reconnecting/polling).
+    renderLive();
+    h.state.getRun.mockReset();
+    h.state.getRun.mockReturnValue(new Promise(() => {})); // getRun HANGS forever
+    await disconnect(); // live partial = liveMsg (id "a2")
+    expect(h.state.getRun).toHaveBeenCalledWith("c1");
+    // BEFORE the bound fires the FSM is still in the live turn — the very freeze bug.
+    expect(screen.queryByText(/reconnecting/i)).toBeNull();
+    // The recovery-start bound fires -> the SAME fallback as the reject path.
+    act(() => {
+      vi.advanceTimersByTime(4_000);
+    });
+    expect(screen.getByText(/reconnecting/i)).toBeTruthy();
+    // The live partial (a2) was DROPPED from the store (replay-from-start, no stale
+    // tail-apply base). Mirrors the getRun-REJECT test's inspection.
+    const removedLivePartial = (
+      h.state.setMessages as unknown as {
+        mock: { calls: [unknown][] };
+      }
+    ).mock.calls.some(([updater]) => {
+      if (typeof updater !== "function") return false;
+      const out = (updater as (p: { id: string }[]) => { id: string }[])([
+        { id: "a2" },
+        { id: "u1" },
+      ]);
+      return !out.some((m) => m.id === "a2");
+    });
+    expect(removedLivePartial).toBe(true);
+    // ...and the anchor was NULLED -> replay-from-start (no ?anchor=&n= over the partial).
+    advanceToAttempt(1);
+    expect(h.state.resumeStream).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(h.state.transport!.prepareReconnectToStreamRequest!().api).toBe(
+      "/api/ai-chat/runs/c1/stream",
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("#541: a getRun resolve AFTER the timeout already fired is IGNORED (no double reconnect, no stale re-seed)", async () => {
+    // The timeout wins first and enters the ladder via replay-from-start. When the
+    // hung getRun FINALLY answers, its late `.then` must be a full no-op: it must not
+    // re-seed the store from the (now stale) persisted row, must not re-set the
+    // anchor, and must not re-enter reconnect. The local `settled` flag makes the
+    // resolve/reject/timeout branches mutually exclusive.
+    // MUTATION-VERIFY: drop the `settled` guard (let the late `.then` run) and the
+    // late re-seed re-sets the anchor (URL regains ?anchor=a2&n=3) + calls setMessages.
+    renderLive();
+    let resolveGetRun!: (v: unknown) => void;
+    h.state.getRun.mockReset();
+    h.state.getRun.mockReturnValue(
+      new Promise((r) => {
+        resolveGetRun = r;
+      }),
+    );
+    await disconnect();
+    act(() => {
+      vi.advanceTimersByTime(4_000); // bound fires -> replay-from-start, reconnecting
+    });
+    expect(screen.getByText(/reconnecting/i)).toBeTruthy();
+    advanceToAttempt(1);
+    expect(h.state.resumeStream).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    // Anchor is null -> replay-from-start URL (the pre-condition the late resolve must
+    // not undo).
+    expect(h.state.transport!.prepareReconnectToStreamRequest!().api).toBe(
+      "/api/ai-chat/runs/c1/stream",
+    );
+    const setMessagesCallsBefore = h.state.setMessages.mock.calls.length;
+    // NOW the hung getRun finally resolves with a persisted anchor (id a2, steps 3).
+    await act(async () => {
+      resolveGetRun(persistedAnchor());
+      await Promise.resolve();
+    });
+    // The late resolve did NOT re-seed the store...
+    expect(h.state.setMessages.mock.calls.length).toBe(setMessagesCallsBefore);
+    // ...did NOT re-set the anchor (URL stays replay-from-start, no ?anchor=&n=)...
+    expect(h.state.transport!.prepareReconnectToStreamRequest!().api).toBe(
+      "/api/ai-chat/runs/c1/stream",
+    );
+    // ...and did NOT trigger a fresh reconnect attach.
+    expect(h.state.resumeStream).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
 });

apps/client/src/features/ai-chat/components/chat-thread.tsx

@@ -81,6 +81,17 @@ const STREAM_THROTTLE_MS = 50;
 // THREAD now (the FSM owns polling->stalled); the window just polls while armed.
 const DEGRADED_POLL_IDLE_MAX_MS = 10 * 60_000;
 
+// #541: the bound on the persist re-seed (getRun) wait when ENTERING the reconnect
+// ladder after a live SSE drop. The axios client (lib/api-client.ts) sets NO request
+// timeout, and the stalled-idle cap only arms AFTER the FSM enters reconnecting/
+// polling — which never happens if getRun HANGS (connection established, no response).
+// Without this bound a live drop + a hung getRun sticks the FSM in `streaming` with
+// no banner and no poll until the browser socket timeout (minutes) — the silent-freeze
+// class #497 eliminates. This is a deliberate RECOVERY-START bound (drop the live
+// partial + enter the ladder so the poll/idle-cap arms), intentionally much shorter
+// than any network socket timeout — not a network read timeout.
+const RECONNECT_RESEED_TIMEOUT_MS = 4_000;
+
 /** The #487 active (non-terminal) run statuses — mirrors the server's
  *  ACTIVE_RUN_STATUSES. A run-fact is "active" only for these. */
 function isActiveRunStatus(status: string | null | undefined): boolean {
@@ -286,6 +297,9 @@ export default function ChatThread({
   // stalled inactivity cap. Cleared by the cancelReconnect effect / the cap effect.
   const reconnectTimerRef = useRef<ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null>(null);
   const idleCapTimerRef = useRef<ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null>(null);
+  // #541: the persist re-seed (getRun) timeout race on the disconnect->reconnect
+  // entry. Held in a ref so unmount (DISPOSE cleanup) clears it — no dangling timer.
+  const reseedTimerRef = useRef<ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null>(null);
 
   // #491 tail-only: seed EVERY persisted row unchanged (no strip). The streaming
   // tail holds steps 0..N-1; the run-stream registry's tail (steps >= N) is APPENDED
@@ -748,37 +762,68 @@ export default function ChatThread({
           anchorRef.current = null;
         };
         if (cid) {
-          void getRun(cid)
-            .then((res) => {
-              if (!mountedRef.current) return;
-              const persisted = res.message;
-              if (persisted && persisted.role === "assistant") {
-                anchorRef.current = {
-                  id: persisted.id,
-                  stepsPersisted: stepsPersistedOf(persisted),
-                };
-                // Replace the live partial with the persisted row IN PLACE by id —
-                // the re-seed from persist. The attach's tail (steps >= N) then
-                // appends to a store holding EXACTLY steps 0..N-1: no duplication.
-                setMessages((prev) => mergeById(prev, rowToUiMessage(persisted)));
-              } else {
-                // No persisted assistant row (pre-first-frame break): drop the live
-                // partial + replay from start (no anchor/n) so nothing is duplicated.
-                dropLivePartialAndReplayFromStart();
-              }
-              enterReconnect(res.run?.id ?? runId);
-            })
-            .catch(() => {
-              if (!mountedRef.current) return;
-              // Persist read FAILED: we cannot re-seed from fresh persist, and a
-              // stale mount-time anchor over the live partial would tail-apply
-              // already-present steps -> duplication (a flaky-network blip:
-              // SSE + getRun both fail, network recovers in ~1s, the registry still
-              // covers from the mount frontier). Restore the removed-filter guarantee
-              // instead: drop the live partial + replay from start / 204 -> poll.
+          // #541: bound the persist re-seed wait with a timeout race. getRun goes
+          // through the axios client, which has NO request timeout; a HUNG getRun
+          // (connection open, no response) — distinct from a REJECT, which the
+          // `.catch` already handles — would otherwise never let us enter the ladder,
+          // leaving the FSM stuck in `streaming` with no banner and no poll until the
+          // browser socket timeout. `settled` makes the three branches (resolve /
+          // reject / timeout) mutually exclusive: whichever fires FIRST wins and the
+          // others become no-ops. So a LATE getRun resolve AFTER the timeout is fully
+          // ignored — it cannot (i) re-enter reconnect a second time, (ii) overwrite
+          // the timeout's replay-from-start with a stale re-seed, or (iii) re-arm any
+          // timer. On timeout we take the SAME fallback as the reject path (drop the
+          // live partial + enter the ladder, so the poll and the stalled-idle cap arm).
+          let settled = false;
+          const finishReseed = (apply: () => void): void => {
+            if (settled) return;
+            settled = true;
+            if (reseedTimerRef.current) {
+              clearTimeout(reseedTimerRef.current);
+              reseedTimerRef.current = null;
+            }
+            if (!mountedRef.current) return;
+            apply();
+          };
+          reseedTimerRef.current = setTimeout(() => {
+            finishReseed(() => {
               dropLivePartialAndReplayFromStart();
               enterReconnect(runId);
             });
+          }, RECONNECT_RESEED_TIMEOUT_MS);
+          void getRun(cid)
+            .then((res) => {
+              finishReseed(() => {
+                const persisted = res.message;
+                if (persisted && persisted.role === "assistant") {
+                  anchorRef.current = {
+                    id: persisted.id,
+                    stepsPersisted: stepsPersistedOf(persisted),
+                  };
+                  // Replace the live partial with the persisted row IN PLACE by id —
+                  // the re-seed from persist. The attach's tail (steps >= N) then
+                  // appends to a store holding EXACTLY steps 0..N-1: no duplication.
+                  setMessages((prev) => mergeById(prev, rowToUiMessage(persisted)));
+                } else {
+                  // No persisted assistant row (pre-first-frame break): drop the live
+                  // partial + replay from start (no anchor/n) so nothing is duplicated.
+                  dropLivePartialAndReplayFromStart();
+                }
+                enterReconnect(res.run?.id ?? runId);
+              });
+            })
+            .catch(() => {
+              finishReseed(() => {
+                // Persist read FAILED: we cannot re-seed from fresh persist, and a
+                // stale mount-time anchor over the live partial would tail-apply
+                // already-present steps -> duplication (a flaky-network blip:
+                // SSE + getRun both fail, network recovers in ~1s, the registry still
+                // covers from the mount frontier). Restore the removed-filter guarantee
+                // instead: drop the live partial + replay from start / 204 -> poll.
+                dropLivePartialAndReplayFromStart();
+                enterReconnect(runId);
+              });
+            });
         } else {
           dropLivePartialAndReplayFromStart();
           enterReconnect(runId);
@@ -903,6 +948,12 @@ export default function ChatThread({
     }
     return () => {
       mountedRef.current = false;
+      // #541: clear the in-flight persist re-seed timeout (not an FSM effect timer,
+      // so DISPOSE does not touch it) — no dangling setTimeout after unmount.
+      if (reseedTimerRef.current) {
+        clearTimeout(reseedTimerRef.current);
+        reseedTimerRef.current = null;
+      }
       dispatch({ type: "DISPOSE" }); // aborts attach + timers, bumps epoch (I5)
     };
     // Mount-only by design; the parent remounts per chat via `key`.

apps/client/src/features/page/tree/components/space-tree.tsx

@@ -281,12 +281,10 @@ const SpaceTree = forwardRef<SpaceTreeApi, SpaceTreeProps>(function SpaceTree(
       setOpenTreeNodes((prev) => ({ ...prev, [id]: isOpen }));
       if (isOpen) {
         const node = treeModel.find(data, id) as SpaceTreeNode | null;
-        // Same "unloaded branch" predicate the realtime insert paths use
-        // (`isUnloadedBranch`) so the lazy-load gate and the realtime inserts
-        // (`insertByPosition` / `placeByPosition`) can never disagree about what
-        // counts as unloaded (#525). Note: local raw `insert` (DnD/create-page)
-        // does not yet route through it — see #525 follow-up.
-        if (treeModel.isUnloadedBranch(node)) {
+        if (
+          node?.hasChildren &&
+          (!node.children || node.children.length === 0)
+        ) {
           const fetched = await fetchAllAncestorChildren({
             pageId: id,
             spaceId: node.spaceId,

apps/client/src/features/page/tree/model/tree-model.test.ts

@@ -74,48 +74,6 @@ describe("treeModel.isDescendant", () => {
   });
 });
 
-// #525: the single "is this branch unloaded?" predicate shared by the lazy-load
-// gate and the insert paths. Unloaded == server says hasChildren but none are
-// present locally (canonical form `children: []`, also `undefined`). A parent
-// without hasChildren is genuinely empty, not unloaded.
-describe("treeModel.isUnloadedBranch", () => {
-  type PH = TreeNode<{ name: string; hasChildren?: boolean }>;
-  it("true for hasChildren + empty array (canonical unloaded form)", () => {
-    const n: PH = { id: "p", name: "P", hasChildren: true, children: [] };
-    expect(treeModel.isUnloadedBranch(n)).toBe(true);
-  });
-  it("true for hasChildren + undefined children", () => {
-    const n: PH = { id: "p", name: "P", hasChildren: true };
-    expect(treeModel.isUnloadedBranch(n)).toBe(true);
-  });
-  it("false for hasChildren + already-loaded children", () => {
-    const n: PH = {
-      id: "p",
-      name: "P",
-      hasChildren: true,
-      children: [{ id: "c", name: "C" }],
-    };
-    expect(treeModel.isUnloadedBranch(n)).toBe(false);
-  });
-  it("false for a genuinely-empty parent (no hasChildren)", () => {
-    expect(
-      treeModel.isUnloadedBranch({
-        id: "p",
-        name: "P",
-        hasChildren: false,
-        children: [],
-      } as PH),
-    ).toBe(false);
-    expect(
-      treeModel.isUnloadedBranch({ id: "p", name: "P" } as PH),
-    ).toBe(false);
-  });
-  it("false for null/undefined", () => {
-    expect(treeModel.isUnloadedBranch(null)).toBe(false);
-    expect(treeModel.isUnloadedBranch(undefined)).toBe(false);
-  });
-});
-
 describe("treeModel.visible", () => {
   it("returns only root nodes when no openIds", () => {
     const v = treeModel.visible(fixture, new Set());
@@ -239,64 +197,43 @@ describe("treeModel.insertByPosition", () => {
     ]);
   });
 
-  type PH = TreeNode<{
-    name: string;
-    position?: string;
-    hasChildren?: boolean;
-  }>;
-
-  // #159 #1 / #525: inserting/moving a node under an UNLOADED parent must NOT
-  // materialize a partial `[node]` list — that would defeat the lazy-load gate and
-  // hide the parent's other real children. The canonical unloaded form here is
-  // `children: []` + `hasChildren: true` (from `pageToTreeNode` /
-  // `pruneCollapsedChildren`), which the pre-#525 `=== undefined` guard MISSED.
-  // The node is left to be lazy-loaded; the chevron stays enabled.
-  it("does NOT materialize a child under an UNLOADED parent (children: [], hasChildren: true)", () => {
-    const tree: PH[] = [
-      { id: "p", name: "P", position: "a0", hasChildren: true, children: [] },
-    ];
-    const node: PH = { id: "x", name: "X", position: "a1" };
-    const t = treeModel.insertByPosition(tree, "p", node);
-    const parent = treeModel.find(t, "p");
-    // The node was NOT inserted (children stay unloaded -> lazy-load fetches the
-    // full set, including this node, on expand). MUTATION: the pre-#525 predicate
-    // `children === undefined` does not fire for `[]`, so it would insert `[x]`
-    // here and reredden this expectation.
-    expect(parent?.children).toEqual([]);
-    expect(treeModel.find(t, "x")).toBeNull();
-    // ...and the chevron stays enabled so the user can expand to load it.
-    expect((parent as PH).hasChildren).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  it("does NOT materialize a child under an UNLOADED parent (children undefined, hasChildren: true)", () => {
-    const tree: PH[] = [
-      { id: "p", name: "P", position: "a0", hasChildren: true }, // children: undefined
-    ];
-    const node: PH = { id: "x", name: "X", position: "a1" };
-    const t = treeModel.insertByPosition(tree, "p", node);
-    const parent = treeModel.find(t, "p");
-    expect(parent?.children).toBeUndefined();
-    expect(treeModel.find(t, "x")).toBeNull();
-    expect((parent as PH).hasChildren).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  it("DOES insert under a genuinely-empty parent (children: [], hasChildren: false)", () => {
-    const tree: PH[] = [
-      { id: "p", name: "P", position: "a0", hasChildren: false, children: [] },
-    ];
-    const node: PH = { id: "x", name: "X", position: "a1" };
-    const t = treeModel.insertByPosition(tree, "p", node);
-    // No server children (`hasChildren: false`), so materializing the first child
-    // is correct — nothing is hidden.
-    expect(treeModel.find(t, "p")?.children?.map((n) => n.id)).toEqual(["x"]);
-  });
-
-  it("DOES insert under a genuinely-empty parent (children undefined, hasChildren: false)", () => {
+  // #159 #1: inserting/moving a node under a parent whose children are NOT
+  // loaded (`children === undefined`, e.g. a collapsed page) must NOT materialize
+  // a partial `[node]` list — that would defeat the lazy-load gate and hide the
+  // parent's other real children. The node is left to be lazy-loaded; only
+  // `hasChildren` is flagged so the chevron appears.
+  it("does NOT materialize a child under an UNLOADED parent (children undefined)", () => {
+    type PH = TreeNode<{
+      name: string;
+      position?: string;
+      hasChildren?: boolean;
+    }>;
     const tree: PH[] = [
       { id: "p", name: "P", position: "a0", hasChildren: false }, // children: undefined
     ];
     const node: PH = { id: "x", name: "X", position: "a1" };
     const t = treeModel.insertByPosition(tree, "p", node);
+    const parent = treeModel.find(t, "p");
+    // The node was NOT inserted (children stay unloaded -> lazy-load fetches the
+    // full set, including this node, on expand).
+    expect(parent?.children).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(treeModel.find(t, "x")).toBeNull();
+    // ...but the chevron is enabled so the user can expand to load it.
+    expect((parent as PH).hasChildren).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("DOES insert under a LOADED-but-empty parent (children: [])", () => {
+    type PH = TreeNode<{
+      name: string;
+      position?: string;
+      hasChildren?: boolean;
+    }>;
+    const tree: PH[] = [
+      { id: "p", name: "P", position: "a0", hasChildren: false, children: [] },
+    ];
+    const node: PH = { id: "x", name: "X", position: "a1" };
+    const t = treeModel.insertByPosition(tree, "p", node);
+    // A loaded (empty) child list is complete, so the node IS inserted.
     expect(treeModel.find(t, "p")?.children?.map((n) => n.id)).toEqual(["x"]);
   });
 

apps/client/src/features/page/tree/model/tree-model.ts

@@ -43,26 +43,6 @@ export const treeModel = {
     };
   },
 
-  // A branch is "unloaded" when the server says it HAS children (`hasChildren`)
-  // but none are present locally. The canonical unloaded form in this codebase
-  // is `children: []` (produced by `pageToTreeNode` and by `pruneCollapsedChildren`
-  // resetting collapsed branches), NOT `children: undefined` — so a predicate that
-  // only checks `=== undefined` misses the real case and materializes a misleading
-  // partial list (#525). This is the SINGLE source of truth for "should a
-  // fetch/materialize be deferred?", shared by the lazy-load gate (`handleToggle`)
-  // and the realtime insert paths (`insertByPosition` / `placeByPosition`), so they
-  // can never drift apart again. (The local raw `insert` primitive and its DnD/
-  // create-page callers do NOT yet route through this predicate — see #525
-  // follow-up.) A parent WITHOUT `hasChildren` is genuinely empty
-  // (no server children) — inserting its first child is correct, not deferred.
-  isUnloadedBranch<T extends object>(
-    node: TreeNode<T> | null | undefined,
-  ): boolean {
-    if (!node) return false;
-    const hasChildren = (node as { hasChildren?: boolean }).hasChildren === true;
-    return hasChildren && (node.children == null || node.children.length === 0);
-  },
-
   isDescendant<T extends object>(
     tree: TreeNode<T>[],
     ancestorId: string,
@@ -147,15 +127,14 @@ export const treeModel = {
     }
     const parent = treeModel.find(tree, parentId);
     // The parent is in the tree but its children have NOT been lazy-loaded yet
-    // (`hasChildren` set + children absent/empty — see `isUnloadedBranch`; the
-    // canonical unloaded form is `children: []`, NOT just `undefined`). Inserting
+    // (`children === undefined`, distinct from a loaded-but-empty `[]`). Inserting
     // here would MATERIALIZE a misleading partial child list (`[node]`) that
     // defeats the lazy-load gate — which fetches only when children are
     // absent/empty — so the parent's OTHER real children would never load and the
     // moved/added node would be the only one shown (a silent data loss, #159 #1).
     // Instead, leave the children unloaded and just flag `hasChildren` so the
     // chevron appears; expanding fetches the FULL set (including this node).
-    if (parent && treeModel.isUnloadedBranch(parent)) {
+    if (parent && parent.children === undefined) {
       return treeModel.update(
         tree,
         parentId,

apps/client/src/features/websocket/tree-socket-reducers.test.ts

@@ -82,19 +82,17 @@ describe("applyMoveTreeNode", () => {
     ]);
   });
 
-  it("does NOT create a partial child list when the destination is loaded-but-collapsed (children unloaded) — keeps it lazy-loadable (#159 #525)", () => {
-    // `dstCollapsed` is in the tree but its children were never lazy-loaded. The
-    // CANONICAL unloaded form here is `hasChildren: true` + `children: []` (from
-    // `pageToTreeNode` / `pruneCollapsedChildren`), NOT `children: undefined`.
-    // The pre-#525 predicate (`children === undefined`) missed this form and
-    // inserted `src` as the ONLY child ([src]), defeating the lazy-load gate and
-    // HIDING the parent's other real children. Now the move leaves children
-    // unloaded (so expanding fetches the FULL set, including src).
+  it("does NOT create a partial child list when the destination is loaded-but-collapsed (children unloaded) — keeps it lazy-loadable (#159)", () => {
+    // `dstCollapsed` is in the tree but its children were never lazy-loaded
+    // (children === undefined). The OLD behavior inserted `src` as the ONLY
+    // child ([src]), which defeated the lazy-load gate and HID the parent's
+    // other real children. Now the move leaves children unloaded (so expanding
+    // fetches the FULL set, including src) and just flags hasChildren.
     const tree: SpaceTreeNode[] = [
       node("dstCollapsed", {
         position: "a0",
-        hasChildren: true,
-        children: [],
+        hasChildren: false,
+        children: undefined as unknown as SpaceTreeNode[],
       }),
       node("src", { position: "a9" }),
     ];
@@ -107,10 +105,9 @@ describe("applyMoveTreeNode", () => {
       pageData: {},
     });
     const dst = treeModel.find(next, "dstCollapsed");
-    // Children stay unloaded ([] not materialized to [src]) -> the lazy-load gate
-    // fetches the FULL set (incl. src) on expand. MUTATION: the pre-#525
-    // `=== undefined` predicate would insert [src] here and redden this.
-    expect(dst?.children).toEqual([]);
+    // Children stay unloaded -> the lazy-load gate fetches the FULL set (incl.
+    // src) on expand, rather than showing a misleading partial [src] list.
+    expect(dst?.children).toBeUndefined();
     expect(dst?.hasChildren).toBe(true);
     // src moved away from its old root slot (it lives under dstCollapsed
     // server-side and reappears when the parent is expanded/loaded).

apps/server/src/collaboration/collaboration.module.ts

@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import { TransclusionService } from '../core/page/transclusion/transclusion.serv
 import { TransclusionModule } from '../core/page/transclusion/transclusion.module';
 import { StorageModule } from '../integrations/storage/storage.module';
 import { EnvironmentModule } from '../integrations/environment/environment.module';
-import { ApiKeyModule } from '../core/api-key/api-key.module';
 
 @Module({
   providers: [
@@ -32,7 +31,6 @@ import { ApiKeyModule } from '../core/api-key/api-key.module';
   exports: [CollaborationGateway],
   imports: [
     TokenModule,
-    ApiKeyModule,
     WatcherModule,
     StorageModule.forRootAsync({
       imports: [EnvironmentModule],

apps/server/src/collaboration/extensions/authentication.extension.spec.ts

@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@ describe('AuthenticationExtension.onAuthenticate', () => {
   let pageRepo: { findById: jest.Mock };
   let spaceMemberRepo: { getUserSpaceRoles: jest.Mock };
   let pagePermissionRepo: { canUserEditPage: jest.Mock };
-  let apiKeyService: { validate: jest.Mock };
 
   // Build the hocuspocus onAuthenticate payload. connectionConfig.readOnly
   // starts false; the extension flips it to true on a read-only downgrade.
@@ -80,15 +79,12 @@ describe('AuthenticationExtension.onAuthenticate', () => {
       }),
     };
 
-    apiKeyService = { validate: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ user: {}, workspace: {} }) };
-
     ext = new AuthenticationExtension(
       tokenService as any,
       userRepo as any,
       pageRepo as any,
       spaceMemberRepo as any,
       pagePermissionRepo as any,
-      apiKeyService as any,
     );
     // Silence the extension's logger (it warns/debugs on denial branches).
     jest.spyOn(ext['logger'], 'warn').mockImplementation(() => undefined);
@@ -235,73 +231,4 @@ describe('AuthenticationExtension.onAuthenticate', () => {
     // No internal ai_chats row for an MCP/service-account collab edit → null.
     expect(ctx.aiChatId).toBeNull();
   });
-
-  // --- #501: api-key laundering guard (fail-closed discriminator) ----------
-  describe('api-key laundering guard', () => {
-    it('api_key principal → row-checks the key on connect (valid key proceeds)', async () => {
-      tokenService.verifyJwt.mockResolvedValue(
-        buildJwt({ principal: 'api_key', apiKeyId: 'key-1' }),
-      );
-      const data = buildData();
-      await ext.onAuthenticate(data as any);
-
-      expect(apiKeyService.validate).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-      expect(apiKeyService.validate).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-        expect.objectContaining({ apiKeyId: 'key-1', type: JwtType.API_KEY }),
-      );
-    });
-
-    it('REVOKED api_key → Unauthorized on connect, BEFORE any page/user lookup', async () => {
-      tokenService.verifyJwt.mockResolvedValue(
-        buildJwt({ principal: 'api_key', apiKeyId: 'key-1' }),
-      );
-      // The shared validator denies a revoked key.
-      apiKeyService.validate.mockRejectedValue(new UnauthorizedException());
-
-      await expect(ext.onAuthenticate(buildData() as any)).rejects.toThrow(
-        UnauthorizedException,
-      );
-      // No new collab connection: the key check gates before page access.
-      expect(pageRepo.findById).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-    });
-
-    it('api_key principal missing apiKeyId → Unauthorized (malformed)', async () => {
-      tokenService.verifyJwt.mockResolvedValue(buildJwt({ principal: 'api_key' }));
-      await expect(ext.onAuthenticate(buildData() as any)).rejects.toThrow(
-        UnauthorizedException,
-      );
-      expect(apiKeyService.validate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-    });
-
-    it('session principal → NO api-key check (session-backed, incl. internal agent)', async () => {
-      tokenService.verifyJwt.mockResolvedValue(buildJwt({ principal: 'session' }));
-      await ext.onAuthenticate(buildData() as any);
-      expect(apiKeyService.validate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-    });
-
-    it('claimless token WITHIN the grace window → trusted (legacy pre-rollout)', async () => {
-      // Default rolloutAt = now, so we are inside the grace window.
-      tokenService.verifyJwt.mockResolvedValue(buildJwt()); // no principal
-      await expect(ext.onAuthenticate(buildData() as any)).resolves.toBeDefined();
-      expect(apiKeyService.validate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-    });
-
-    it('claimless token AFTER the grace window → Unauthorized (fail-closed)', async () => {
-      // Move the rollout reference far into the past so the grace has elapsed.
-      (ext as any).rolloutAt = Date.now() - 25 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
-      tokenService.verifyJwt.mockResolvedValue(buildJwt()); // no principal
-      await expect(ext.onAuthenticate(buildData() as any)).rejects.toThrow(
-        UnauthorizedException,
-      );
-    });
-
-    it('infra error from the api-key row-check propagates (not masked)', async () => {
-      tokenService.verifyJwt.mockResolvedValue(
-        buildJwt({ principal: 'api_key', apiKeyId: 'key-1' }),
-      );
-      const boom = new Error('db down');
-      apiKeyService.validate.mockRejectedValue(boom);
-      await expect(ext.onAuthenticate(buildData() as any)).rejects.toBe(boom);
-    });
-  });
 });

apps/server/src/collaboration/extensions/authentication.extension.ts

@@ -14,37 +14,20 @@ import { findHighestUserSpaceRole } from '@docmost/db/repos/space/utils';
 import { SpaceRole } from '../../common/helpers/types/permission';
 import { isUserDisabled } from '../../common/helpers';
 import { getPageId } from '../collaboration.util';
-import {
-  JwtApiKeyPayload,
-  JwtCollabPayload,
-  JwtType,
-} from '../../core/auth/dto/jwt-payload';
+import { JwtCollabPayload, JwtType } from '../../core/auth/dto/jwt-payload';
 import { resolveProvenance } from '../../common/decorators/auth-provenance.decorator';
 import { observeCollabAuth } from '../../integrations/metrics/metrics.registry';
-import { ApiKeyService } from '../../core/api-key/api-key.service';
-
-// Max lifetime of a collab token (generateCollabToken uses expiresIn '24h'). Used
-// as the rollout grace window below: once this long has elapsed since this
-// process started serving the #501 code, every STILL-VALID collab token was
-// necessarily minted post-rollout and MUST carry the `principal` discriminator,
-// so a claimless one is a bug and is rejected (fail-closed) rather than trusted.
-const COLLAB_TOKEN_GRACE_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
 
 @Injectable()
 export class AuthenticationExtension implements Extension {
   private readonly logger = new Logger(AuthenticationExtension.name);
 
-  // Reference instant for the claimless-rejection grace window. Overridable so a
-  // unit test can drive the pre-/post-grace boundary without wall-clock waits.
-  protected rolloutAt = Date.now();
-
   constructor(
     private tokenService: TokenService,
     private userRepo: UserRepo,
     private pageRepo: PageRepo,
     private readonly spaceMemberRepo: SpaceMemberRepo,
     private readonly pagePermissionRepo: PagePermissionRepo,
-    private readonly apiKeyService: ApiKeyService,
   ) {}
 
   async onAuthenticate(data: onAuthenticatePayload) {
@@ -71,36 +54,6 @@ export class AuthenticationExtension implements Extension {
       throw new UnauthorizedException('Invalid collab token');
     }
 
-    // #501 — fail-closed api-key laundering guard. A collab token minted by an
-    // api-key principal carries principal='api_key' + apiKeyId; re-check the key
-    // on connect so a REVOKED key gets NO new collab connections (a collab token
-    // outlives its 24h, but a revoked key can no longer open fresh ones). An
-    // api-key token missing its apiKeyId is malformed → reject. A claimless token
-    // (no recognized principal) is trusted only DURING the rollout grace window
-    // (a legacy pre-rollout session token, which api keys could never mint);
-    // once the grace has elapsed every valid token must carry the discriminator,
-    // so a claimless one is a bug and is rejected (not silently trusted for 24h).
-    const principal = jwtPayload.principal;
-    if (principal === 'api_key') {
-      if (!jwtPayload.apiKeyId) {
-        throw new UnauthorizedException();
-      }
-      // Row-check via the SHARED validator: throws Unauthorized on a revoked/
-      // expired/disabled key; an infra error propagates (not masked). No new
-      // connection for a dead key.
-      await this.apiKeyService.validate({
-        sub: jwtPayload.sub,
-        workspaceId: jwtPayload.workspaceId,
-        apiKeyId: jwtPayload.apiKeyId,
-        type: JwtType.API_KEY,
-      } as JwtApiKeyPayload);
-    } else if (principal !== 'session') {
-      // Unrecognized/absent discriminator: reject once past the grace window.
-      if (Date.now() - this.rolloutAt >= COLLAB_TOKEN_GRACE_MS) {
-        throw new UnauthorizedException();
-      }
-    }
-
     const userId = jwtPayload.sub;
     const workspaceId = jwtPayload.workspaceId;
 

apps/server/src/core/api-key/api-key.controller.spec.ts

@@ -1,193 +0,0 @@
-import { ForbiddenException, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
-import { ApiKeyController } from './api-key.controller';
-import {
-  WorkspaceCaslAction,
-  WorkspaceCaslSubject,
-} from '../casl/interfaces/workspace-ability.type';
-
-/**
- * Authorization contract for the /api-keys management surface.
- *
- *  - A token cannot manage tokens (an api_key PRINCIPAL is 403 on every method)
- *    — GitHub-PAT semantics closing post-revocation laundering.
- *  - admin (CASL Manage on API) sees/revokes all workspace keys; a member only
- *    their own.
- *  - kill-switch OFF -> the surface 404s (looks like the feature does not exist).
- */
-
-function makeController(over: any = {}) {
-  const apiKeyService = {
-    create: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
-      token: 'tok',
-      key: { id: 'k1', name: 'n', expiresAt: null, createdAt: new Date() },
-    }),
-    revoke: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
-    ...(over.apiKeyService ?? {}),
-  };
-  const apiKeyRepo = {
-    findAllInWorkspace: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
-    findByCreator: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
-    findById: jest.fn(),
-    ...(over.apiKeyRepo ?? {}),
-  };
-  const workspaceAbility = {
-    createForUser: jest.fn().mockReturnValue({
-      can: (_a: any, _s: any) => over.canManage ?? false,
-    }),
-    ...(over.workspaceAbility ?? {}),
-  };
-  const environmentService = {
-    isApiKeysEnabled: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(over.enabled ?? true),
-    ...(over.environmentService ?? {}),
-  };
-  const auditService = { log: jest.fn() };
-  const controller = new ApiKeyController(
-    apiKeyService as any,
-    apiKeyRepo as any,
-    workspaceAbility as any,
-    environmentService as any,
-    auditService as any,
-  );
-  return {
-    controller,
-    apiKeyService,
-    apiKeyRepo,
-    workspaceAbility,
-    environmentService,
-    auditService,
-  };
-}
-
-const user = { id: 'u-1', workspaceId: 'ws-1' } as any;
-const workspace = { id: 'ws-1' } as any;
-const reqAccess = () => ({ raw: {}, ip: '1.2.3.4', socket: {} }) as any;
-const reqApiKey = () =>
-  ({ raw: { authType: 'api_key', apiKeyId: 'k-self' }, ip: '1.2.3.4', socket: {} }) as any;
-
-describe('ApiKeyController — a token cannot manage tokens', () => {
-  it('403 on create for an api_key principal', async () => {
-    const { controller, apiKeyService } = makeController();
-    await expect(
-      controller.create({ name: 'x' } as any, user, reqApiKey()),
-    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ForbiddenException);
-    expect(apiKeyService.create).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-
-  it('403 on list for an api_key principal', async () => {
-    const { controller } = makeController();
-    await expect(
-      controller.list(user, workspace, reqApiKey()),
-    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ForbiddenException);
-  });
-
-  it('403 on revoke for an api_key principal', async () => {
-    const { controller } = makeController();
-    await expect(
-      controller.revoke({ id: 'k1' } as any, user, workspace, reqApiKey()),
-    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ForbiddenException);
-  });
-});
-
-describe('ApiKeyController — kill-switch OFF → 404', () => {
-  it('create/list/revoke all 404 when disabled', async () => {
-    const { controller } = makeController({ enabled: false });
-    await expect(
-      controller.create({ name: 'x' } as any, user, reqAccess()),
-    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotFoundException);
-    await expect(
-      controller.list(user, workspace, reqAccess()),
-    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotFoundException);
-    await expect(
-      controller.revoke({ id: 'k1' } as any, user, workspace, reqAccess()),
-    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotFoundException);
-  });
-});
-
-describe('ApiKeyController — list scoping', () => {
-  it('admin (Manage on API) lists ALL workspace keys', async () => {
-    const { controller, apiKeyRepo } = makeController({ canManage: true });
-    await controller.list(user, workspace, reqAccess());
-    expect(apiKeyRepo.findAllInWorkspace).toHaveBeenCalledWith('ws-1');
-    expect(apiKeyRepo.findByCreator).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-
-  it('member lists ONLY their own keys', async () => {
-    const { controller, apiKeyRepo } = makeController({ canManage: false });
-    await controller.list(user, workspace, reqAccess());
-    expect(apiKeyRepo.findByCreator).toHaveBeenCalledWith('u-1', 'ws-1');
-    expect(apiKeyRepo.findAllInWorkspace).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-});
-
-describe('ApiKeyController — revoke scoping', () => {
-  it("member cannot revoke another user's key (403)", async () => {
-    const { controller, apiKeyRepo, apiKeyService } = makeController({
-      canManage: false,
-    });
-    apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue({
-      id: 'k1',
-      creatorId: 'someone-else',
-      workspaceId: 'ws-1',
-    });
-    await expect(
-      controller.revoke({ id: 'k1' } as any, user, workspace, reqAccess()),
-    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ForbiddenException);
-    expect(apiKeyService.revoke).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-
-  it('member CAN revoke their own key', async () => {
-    const { controller, apiKeyRepo, apiKeyService } = makeController({
-      canManage: false,
-    });
-    apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue({
-      id: 'k1',
-      creatorId: 'u-1',
-      workspaceId: 'ws-1',
-    });
-    await controller.revoke({ id: 'k1' } as any, user, workspace, reqAccess());
-    expect(apiKeyService.revoke).toHaveBeenCalledWith('k1', 'ws-1');
-  });
-
-  it("admin CAN revoke another user's key", async () => {
-    const { controller, apiKeyRepo, apiKeyService } = makeController({
-      canManage: true,
-    });
-    apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue({
-      id: 'k1',
-      creatorId: 'someone-else',
-      workspaceId: 'ws-1',
-    });
-    await controller.revoke({ id: 'k1' } as any, user, workspace, reqAccess());
-    expect(apiKeyService.revoke).toHaveBeenCalledWith('k1', 'ws-1');
-  });
-
-  it('404 when the key does not exist', async () => {
-    const { controller, apiKeyRepo } = makeController({ canManage: true });
-    apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
-    await expect(
-      controller.revoke({ id: 'k1' } as any, user, workspace, reqAccess()),
-    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotFoundException);
-  });
-});
-
-describe('ApiKeyController — create emits audit + returns token once', () => {
-  it('logs API_KEY_CREATED and returns the token + computed expiry', async () => {
-    const { controller, auditService } = makeController();
-    const res = await controller.create(
-      { name: 'ci' } as any,
-      user,
-      reqAccess(),
-    );
-    expect(res.token).toBe('tok');
-    expect(res.apiKey).toMatchObject({ id: 'k1', name: 'n' });
-    expect(auditService.log).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-      expect.objectContaining({ event: 'api_key.created' }),
-    );
-  });
-});
-
-// Sanity: the CASL subject used is the workspace API subject.
-it('uses WorkspaceCaslSubject.API with the Manage action', () => {
-  expect(WorkspaceCaslSubject.API).toBe('api_key');
-  expect(WorkspaceCaslAction.Manage).toBeDefined();
-});

apps/server/src/core/api-key/api-key.controller.ts

@@ -1,201 +0,0 @@
-import {
-  Body,
-  Controller,
-  ForbiddenException,
-  HttpCode,
-  HttpStatus,
-  Inject,
-  Logger,
-  NotFoundException,
-  Post,
-  Req,
-  UseGuards,
-} from '@nestjs/common';
-import { Throttle } from '@nestjs/throttler';
-import { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
-import { ApiKeyService } from './api-key.service';
-import { ApiKeyRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/api-key/api-key.repo';
-import { CreateApiKeyDto } from './dto/create-api-key.dto';
-import { RevokeApiKeyDto } from './dto/revoke-api-key.dto';
-import { AuthUser } from '../../common/decorators/auth-user.decorator';
-import { AuthWorkspace } from '../../common/decorators/auth-workspace.decorator';
-import { JwtAuthGuard } from '../../common/guards/jwt-auth.guard';
-import { User, Workspace } from '@docmost/db/types/entity.types';
-import WorkspaceAbilityFactory from '../casl/abilities/workspace-ability.factory';
-import {
-  WorkspaceCaslAction,
-  WorkspaceCaslSubject,
-} from '../casl/interfaces/workspace-ability.type';
-import { AuditEvent, AuditResource } from '../../common/events/audit-events';
-import {
-  AUDIT_SERVICE,
-  IAuditService,
-} from '../../integrations/audit/audit.service';
-import { EnvironmentService } from '../../integrations/environment/environment.service';
-import { UserThrottlerGuard } from '../../integrations/throttle/user-throttler.guard';
-import { AUTH_THROTTLER } from '../../integrations/throttle/throttler-names';
-
-@UseGuards(JwtAuthGuard)
-@Controller('api-keys')
-export class ApiKeyController {
-  private readonly logger = new Logger(ApiKeyController.name);
-
-  constructor(
-    private readonly apiKeyService: ApiKeyService,
-    private readonly apiKeyRepo: ApiKeyRepo,
-    private readonly workspaceAbility: WorkspaceAbilityFactory,
-    private readonly environmentService: EnvironmentService,
-    @Inject(AUDIT_SERVICE) private readonly auditService: IAuditService,
-  ) {}
-
-  // Kill-switch OFF: the issuance surface disappears entirely (404), not a 403 —
-  // it must look like the feature does not exist.
-  private assertEnabled(): void {
-    if (!this.environmentService.isApiKeysEnabled()) {
-      throw new NotFoundException();
-    }
-  }
-
-  // A token cannot manage tokens (GitHub-PAT semantics): an api-key principal is
-  // refused on the management surface, so a leaked key cannot mint a replacement
-  // or revoke the keys that would lock it out (closes post-revocation laundering).
-  private rejectApiKeyPrincipal(req: FastifyRequest): void {
-    if ((req.raw as { authType?: string }).authType === 'api_key') {
-      throw new ForbiddenException('API keys cannot manage API keys');
-    }
-  }
-
-  private clientIp(req: FastifyRequest): string {
-    return req.ip ?? req.socket?.remoteAddress ?? 'unknown';
-  }
-
-  @HttpCode(HttpStatus.OK)
-  @UseGuards(JwtAuthGuard, UserThrottlerGuard)
-  @Throttle({ [AUTH_THROTTLER]: { limit: 10, ttl: 60_000 } })
-  @Post('create')
-  async create(
-    @Body() dto: CreateApiKeyDto,
-    @AuthUser() user: User,
-    @Req() req: FastifyRequest,
-  ) {
-    this.assertEnabled();
-    this.rejectApiKeyPrincipal(req);
-
-    // undefined -> service default (1 year); null -> unlimited; string -> Date.
-    const expiresAt =
-      dto.expiresAt === undefined
-        ? undefined
-        : dto.expiresAt === null
-          ? null
-          : new Date(dto.expiresAt);
-
-    const { token, key } = await this.apiKeyService.create(
-      user,
-      dto.name,
-      expiresAt,
-    );
-
-    this.auditService.log({
-      event: AuditEvent.API_KEY_CREATED,
-      resourceType: AuditResource.API_KEY,
-      resourceId: key.id,
-    });
-    // The durable trail lives in container logs (AUDIT_SERVICE is a Noop in this
-    // build). No token material — the JWT is only ever returned in the response.
-    this.logger.log(
-      `API key created: id=${key.id} name=${JSON.stringify(
-        key.name,
-      )} actor=${user.id} expiresAt=${
-        key.expiresAt ? new Date(key.expiresAt).toISOString() : 'never'
-      } ip=${this.clientIp(req)}`,
-    );
-
-    // Return the token ONCE (never retrievable again) and the computed expiry so
-    // the caller/UI can surface "expires <date>" (the year-default time-bomb
-    // early-warning).
-    return {
-      token,
-      apiKey: {
-        id: key.id,
-        name: key.name,
-        expiresAt: key.expiresAt,
-        createdAt: key.createdAt,
-      },
-    };
-  }
-
-  @HttpCode(HttpStatus.OK)
-  @Post('list')
-  async list(
-    @AuthUser() user: User,
-    @AuthWorkspace() workspace: Workspace,
-    @Req() req: FastifyRequest,
-  ) {
-    this.assertEnabled();
-    this.rejectApiKeyPrincipal(req);
-
-    const ability = this.workspaceAbility.createForUser(user, workspace);
-    // Admin (CASL Manage on API): every key in the workspace, attributed to its
-    // creator (closes "a leaked key of a departed employee is invisible"). A
-    // member sees only their own.
-    const keys = ability.can(
-      WorkspaceCaslAction.Manage,
-      WorkspaceCaslSubject.API,
-    )
-      ? await this.apiKeyRepo.findAllInWorkspace(workspace.id)
-      : await this.apiKeyRepo.findByCreator(user.id, workspace.id);
-
-    return keys.map((k) => ({
-      id: k.id,
-      name: k.name,
-      expiresAt: k.expiresAt,
-      lastUsedAt: k.lastUsedAt,
-      createdAt: k.createdAt,
-      creator: k.creator,
-    }));
-  }
-
-  @HttpCode(HttpStatus.OK)
-  @Post('revoke')
-  async revoke(
-    @Body() dto: RevokeApiKeyDto,
-    @AuthUser() user: User,
-    @AuthWorkspace() workspace: Workspace,
-    @Req() req: FastifyRequest,
-  ) {
-    this.assertEnabled();
-    this.rejectApiKeyPrincipal(req);
-
-    const key = await this.apiKeyRepo.findById(dto.id, workspace.id);
-    // Uniform 404 for a missing/already-revoked key regardless of who asks — no
-    // existence oracle for keys the caller may not own.
-    if (!key) {
-      throw new NotFoundException();
-    }
-
-    const ability = this.workspaceAbility.createForUser(user, workspace);
-    const canManageAll = ability.can(
-      WorkspaceCaslAction.Manage,
-      WorkspaceCaslSubject.API,
-    );
-    // Admin may revoke any key in the workspace; a member only their own.
-    if (!canManageAll && key.creatorId !== user.id) {
-      throw new ForbiddenException();
-    }
-
-    await this.apiKeyService.revoke(key.id, workspace.id);
-
-    this.auditService.log({
-      event: AuditEvent.API_KEY_DELETED,
-      resourceType: AuditResource.API_KEY,
-      resourceId: key.id,
-    });
-    this.logger.log(
-      `API key revoked: id=${key.id} name=${JSON.stringify(
-        key.name,
-      )} actor=${user.id} ip=${this.clientIp(req)}`,
-    );
-
-    return { success: true };
-  }
-}

apps/server/src/core/api-key/api-key.module.ts

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
-import { ApiKeyService } from './api-key.service';
-import { ApiKeyController } from './api-key.controller';
-import { TokenModule } from '../auth/token.module';
-
-// Core (non-EE) API-key feature: issuance REST endpoints + the shared validator
-// consumed by jwt.strategy (REST) and McpService (the /mcp Bearer router).
-// DatabaseModule (global) provides ApiKeyRepo/UserRepo/WorkspaceRepo; CaslModule
-// (global) provides WorkspaceAbilityFactory; TokenModule provides TokenService
-// (the no-exp api-key signer). ApiKeyService is exported so AuthModule (for
-// jwt.strategy) and McpModule (for the /mcp router) can inject it directly,
-// replacing the absent EE `ee/api-key` dynamic require.
-@Module({
-  imports: [TokenModule],
-  controllers: [ApiKeyController],
-  providers: [ApiKeyService],
-  exports: [ApiKeyService],
-})
-export class ApiKeyModule {}

apps/server/src/core/api-key/api-key.service.spec.ts

@@ -1,299 +0,0 @@
-import { UnauthorizedException } from '@nestjs/common';
-import { ApiKeyService } from './api-key.service';
-import { JwtType } from '../auth/dto/jwt-payload';
-
-/**
- * Security contract for ApiKeyService.validate — the single validator shared by
- * jwt.strategy (REST) and the /mcp Bearer router.
- *
- * Invariants under test:
- *  - Anti-enumeration: every DEFINITE deny (missing/revoked/expired row, disabled
- *    user, workspace mismatch, kill-switch off) throws the SAME bare
- *    UnauthorizedException — an agent cannot distinguish expired from revoked.
- *  - deny-on-decision / 5xx-on-infra: an UNEXPECTED (infra) error PROPAGATES as
- *    itself (→ 5xx), never masked as a 401.
- *  - Expiry is read from the ROW, never a JWT exp claim.
- *  - No validate cache (each call re-reads the row → immediate revocation).
- */
-
-const APP_SECRET = 'secret';
-
-function makeDeps(over: Partial<Record<string, any>> = {}) {
-  const apiKeyRepo = {
-    findById: jest.fn(),
-    insert: jest.fn(),
-    softDelete: jest.fn(),
-    touchLastUsed: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
-    ...(over.apiKeyRepo ?? {}),
-  };
-  const userRepo = {
-    findById: jest.fn(),
-    ...(over.userRepo ?? {}),
-  };
-  const workspaceRepo = {
-    findById: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'ws-1' }),
-    ...(over.workspaceRepo ?? {}),
-  };
-  const tokenService = {
-    generateApiToken: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue('minted.jwt.token'),
-    ...(over.tokenService ?? {}),
-  };
-  const environmentService = {
-    isApiKeysEnabled: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(true),
-    getApiKeysEnabledRaw: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(undefined),
-    getAppSecret: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(APP_SECRET),
-    ...(over.environmentService ?? {}),
-  };
-  const service = new (ApiKeyService as unknown as new (...a: any[]) => ApiKeyService)(
-    apiKeyRepo,
-    userRepo,
-    workspaceRepo,
-    tokenService,
-    environmentService,
-  );
-  return { service, apiKeyRepo, userRepo, workspaceRepo, tokenService, environmentService };
-}
-
-const payload = (over: Record<string, any> = {}) => ({
-  sub: 'u-1',
-  workspaceId: 'ws-1',
-  apiKeyId: 'key-1',
-  type: JwtType.API_KEY,
-  ...over,
-});
-
-const activeRow = (over: Record<string, any> = {}) => ({
-  id: 'key-1',
-  name: 'k',
-  creatorId: 'u-1',
-  workspaceId: 'ws-1',
-  expiresAt: null,
-  lastUsedAt: null,
-  deletedAt: null,
-  ...over,
-});
-
-const activeUser = (over: Record<string, any> = {}) => ({
-  id: 'u-1',
-  workspaceId: 'ws-1',
-  deactivatedAt: null,
-  deletedAt: null,
-  isAgent: false,
-  ...over,
-});
-
-describe('ApiKeyService.validate', () => {
-  it('returns { user, workspace } for a valid active key', async () => {
-    const { service, apiKeyRepo, userRepo } = makeDeps();
-    apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeRow());
-    userRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeUser());
-
-    const res = await service.validate(payload() as any);
-
-    expect(res.user).toMatchObject({ id: 'u-1' });
-    expect(res.workspace).toMatchObject({ id: 'ws-1' });
-    // Loads isAgent so downstream provenance does not silently degrade.
-    expect(userRepo.findById).toHaveBeenCalledWith('u-1', 'ws-1', {
-      includeIsAgent: true,
-    });
-  });
-
-  // --- Anti-enumeration: every deny is the SAME bare 401 -------------------
-  const denyCases: Array<[string, (d: ReturnType<typeof makeDeps>) => void]> = [
-    [
-      'missing/orphaned row',
-      (d) => d.apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(undefined),
-    ],
-    [
-      'revoked (soft-deleted → findById returns undefined)',
-      (d) => d.apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(undefined),
-    ],
-    [
-      'expired (expires_at in the past)',
-      (d) => {
-        d.apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(
-          activeRow({ expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() - 1000) }),
-        );
-        d.userRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeUser());
-      },
-    ],
-    [
-      'disabled user',
-      (d) => {
-        d.apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeRow());
-        d.userRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(
-          activeUser({ deactivatedAt: new Date() }),
-        );
-      },
-    ],
-    [
-      'user not found',
-      (d) => {
-        d.apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeRow());
-        d.userRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
-      },
-    ],
-    [
-      'creator/sub mismatch',
-      (d) => {
-        d.apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeRow({ creatorId: 'other' }));
-        d.userRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeUser());
-      },
-    ],
-    [
-      'workspace row missing',
-      (d) => {
-        d.apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeRow());
-        d.userRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeUser());
-        d.workspaceRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
-      },
-    ],
-    [
-      'kill-switch OFF',
-      (d) => d.environmentService.isApiKeysEnabled.mockReturnValue(false),
-    ],
-    [
-      'malformed payload (missing apiKeyId)',
-      () => undefined,
-    ],
-  ];
-
-  it.each(denyCases)(
-    'throws a bare UnauthorizedException with NO message for: %s',
-    async (label, arrange) => {
-      const deps = makeDeps();
-      arrange(deps);
-      const p =
-        label === 'malformed payload (missing apiKeyId)'
-          ? (payload({ apiKeyId: undefined }) as any)
-          : (payload() as any);
-
-      const err = await deps.service.validate(p).catch((e) => e);
-      expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(UnauthorizedException);
-      // Anti-enumeration: identical, class-less message for every failure mode.
-      expect(err.message).toBe('Unauthorized');
-    },
-  );
-
-  it('kill-switch OFF denies BEFORE any DB read', async () => {
-    const { service, apiKeyRepo, environmentService } = makeDeps();
-    environmentService.isApiKeysEnabled.mockReturnValue(false);
-
-    await expect(service.validate(payload() as any)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
-      UnauthorizedException,
-    );
-    expect(apiKeyRepo.findById).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-
-  // --- Infra error propagates (5xx), NOT masked as 401 ---------------------
-  it('PROPAGATES an infra (DB) error instead of masking it as 401', async () => {
-    const { service, apiKeyRepo } = makeDeps();
-    const boom = new Error('connection terminated');
-    apiKeyRepo.findById.mockRejectedValue(boom);
-
-    await expect(service.validate(payload() as any)).rejects.toBe(boom);
-  });
-
-  // --- No cache: revocation is immediate on the next call ------------------
-  it('re-reads the row on every call (no validate cache → immediate revocation)', async () => {
-    const { service, apiKeyRepo, userRepo } = makeDeps();
-    apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeRow());
-    userRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeUser());
-    await service.validate(payload() as any);
-
-    // Now the key is revoked (row invisible) — the very next call denies.
-    apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
-    await expect(service.validate(payload() as any)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
-      UnauthorizedException,
-    );
-    expect(apiKeyRepo.findById).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
-  });
-
-  // --- last_used_at is throttled + fire-and-forget -------------------------
-  it('touches last_used_at when stale and skips when fresh', async () => {
-    const { service, apiKeyRepo, userRepo } = makeDeps();
-    userRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeUser());
-
-    // Stale (never used) -> touch.
-    apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeRow({ lastUsedAt: null }));
-    await service.validate(payload() as any);
-    expect(apiKeyRepo.touchLastUsed).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-
-    // Fresh (used 1 minute ago) -> skip.
-    apiKeyRepo.touchLastUsed.mockClear();
-    apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(
-      activeRow({ lastUsedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 60_000) }),
-    );
-    await service.validate(payload() as any);
-    expect(apiKeyRepo.touchLastUsed).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-
-  it('a failing last_used_at touch never fails the request', async () => {
-    const { service, apiKeyRepo, userRepo } = makeDeps();
-    apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeRow({ lastUsedAt: null }));
-    userRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeUser());
-    apiKeyRepo.touchLastUsed.mockRejectedValue(new Error('write failed'));
-
-    await expect(service.validate(payload() as any)).resolves.toMatchObject({
-      user: { id: 'u-1' },
-    });
-  });
-});
-
-describe('ApiKeyService.create (mint-then-insert, no exp)', () => {
-  it('mints the JWT BEFORE inserting the row and returns the token once', async () => {
-    const { service, apiKeyRepo, tokenService } = makeDeps();
-    const order: string[] = [];
-    tokenService.generateApiToken.mockImplementation(async () => {
-      order.push('mint');
-      return 'tok';
-    });
-    apiKeyRepo.insert.mockImplementation(async (row: any) => {
-      order.push('insert');
-      return { ...row, createdAt: new Date() };
-    });
-
-    const user = { id: 'u-1', workspaceId: 'ws-1' } as any;
-    const res = await service.create(user, 'my key');
-
-    expect(order).toEqual(['mint', 'insert']);
-    expect(res.token).toBe('tok');
-    // The id is generated before minting and reused for the row.
-    const mintArg = tokenService.generateApiToken.mock.calls[0][0];
-    const insertArg = apiKeyRepo.insert.mock.calls[0][0];
-    expect(mintArg.apiKeyId).toBe(insertArg.id);
-  });
-
-  it('applies the 1-year default when expiresAt is undefined', async () => {
-    const { service, apiKeyRepo } = makeDeps();
-    apiKeyRepo.insert.mockImplementation(async (row: any) => row);
-    const user = { id: 'u-1', workspaceId: 'ws-1' } as any;
-
-    await service.create(user, 'k');
-
-    const insertArg = apiKeyRepo.insert.mock.calls[0][0];
-    const days =
-      (insertArg.expiresAt.getTime() - Date.now()) / (24 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
-    expect(days).toBeGreaterThan(364);
-    expect(days).toBeLessThan(367);
-  });
-
-  it('honors an explicit null (unlimited)', async () => {
-    const { service, apiKeyRepo } = makeDeps();
-    apiKeyRepo.insert.mockImplementation(async (row: any) => row);
-    const user = { id: 'u-1', workspaceId: 'ws-1' } as any;
-
-    await service.create(user, 'k', null);
-
-    expect(apiKeyRepo.insert.mock.calls[0][0].expiresAt).toBeNull();
-  });
-
-  it('does NOT insert a row when minting fails (mint-then-insert → inert)', async () => {
-    const { service, apiKeyRepo, tokenService } = makeDeps();
-    tokenService.generateApiToken.mockRejectedValue(new Error('mint failed'));
-    const user = { id: 'u-1', workspaceId: 'ws-1' } as any;
-
-    await expect(service.create(user, 'k')).rejects.toThrow('mint failed');
-    expect(apiKeyRepo.insert).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-});

apps/server/src/core/api-key/api-key.service.ts

@@ -1,191 +0,0 @@
-import {
-  Injectable,
-  Logger,
-  OnModuleInit,
-  UnauthorizedException,
-} from '@nestjs/common';
-import { v7 as uuid7 } from 'uuid';
-import { ApiKeyRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/api-key/api-key.repo';
-import { UserRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/user/user.repo';
-import { WorkspaceRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/workspace/workspace.repo';
-import { TokenService } from '../auth/services/token.service';
-import { EnvironmentService } from '../../integrations/environment/environment.service';
-import { JwtApiKeyPayload } from '../auth/dto/jwt-payload';
-import { ApiKey, User, Workspace } from '@docmost/db/types/entity.types';
-import { isUserDisabled } from '../../common/helpers';
-
-// Default lifetime for a new key when the caller does not specify one: 1 year.
-// The owner runs a homelab where agents live for years; forcing rotation is
-// operational pain, so an explicit `null` (unlimited) is also allowed.
-const DEFAULT_LIFETIME_MS = 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
-
-// last_used_at is a best-effort forensics stamp, not an access record; we only
-// refresh it when it is older than this to avoid a write on every request. The
-// 1h resolution is a deliberate constant (forensics granularity, not accounting).
-const LAST_USED_THROTTLE_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000;
-
-/**
- * Core API-key lifecycle service. Owns minting (create), the single validator
- * shared by BOTH the REST jwt.strategy path and the /mcp Bearer path (validate),
- * and revocation (revoke). The `api_keys` ROW is the sole source of truth for a
- * key's lifetime and revocation — never the JWT, which carries no `exp` claim.
- */
-@Injectable()
-export class ApiKeyService implements OnModuleInit {
-  private readonly logger = new Logger(ApiKeyService.name);
-
-  constructor(
-    private readonly apiKeyRepo: ApiKeyRepo,
-    private readonly userRepo: UserRepo,
-    private readonly workspaceRepo: WorkspaceRepo,
-    private readonly tokenService: TokenService,
-    private readonly environmentService: EnvironmentService,
-  ) {}
-
-  onModuleInit() {
-    // Boot log so the kill-switch state after each deploy is verifiable in logs.
-    const enabled = this.environmentService.isApiKeysEnabled();
-    const raw = this.environmentService.getApiKeysEnabledRaw();
-    this.logger.log(
-      `API keys: ${enabled ? 'ENABLED' : 'DISABLED'} (API_KEYS_ENABLED=${
-        raw ?? 'unset'
-      })`,
-    );
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Mint a new key for `user`. mint-then-insert ordering (R1):
-   *   1. generate the id first — it must be in the JWT payload before the row.
-   *   2. mint the JWT (no `exp` claim). A mint failure aborts before any row is
-   *      written (inert), so a half-created key cannot exist.
-   *   3. insert the row last. A lost response leaves an orphaned row that is
-   *      visible in `list` and self-heals (the user revokes it).
-   * The token is returned ONCE and never stored — the JWT is self-contained, so
-   * no token material lives in the table.
-   *
-   * `expiresAt`: `undefined` -> default 1 year; `null` -> unlimited (explicit);
-   * a Date -> that instant (a past date is rejected at the DTO layer).
-   */
-  async create(
-    user: User,
-    name: string,
-    expiresAt?: Date | null,
-  ): Promise<{ token: string; key: ApiKey }> {
-    const resolvedExpiresAt =
-      expiresAt === undefined
-        ? new Date(Date.now() + DEFAULT_LIFETIME_MS)
-        : expiresAt;
-
-    const apiKeyId = uuid7();
-
-    const token = await this.tokenService.generateApiToken({
-      apiKeyId,
-      user,
-      workspaceId: user.workspaceId,
-    });
-
-    const key = await this.apiKeyRepo.insert({
-      id: apiKeyId,
-      name,
-      creatorId: user.id,
-      workspaceId: user.workspaceId,
-      expiresAt: resolvedExpiresAt,
-    });
-
-    return { token, key };
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * The single validator for an api-key principal, shared by jwt.strategy and the
-   * /mcp Bearer router. Returns `{ user, workspace }` (the same shape the access
-   * path returns) so the AuthUser/AuthWorkspace decorators and MCP identity work
-   * unchanged.
-   *
-   * Failure semantics (R4, anti-enumeration): a DEFINITE negative fact — feature
-   * disabled, missing/revoked/expired row, workspace mismatch, disabled user —
-   * throws a bare `UnauthorizedException` (a single generic 401 for every case;
-   * an agent cannot distinguish expired from revoked, and its reaction is
-   * identical). An UNEXPECTED (infra) error is NOT caught here: it propagates so
-   * the surface returns 5xx, never a masked 401 (deny-on-decision / 5xx-on-infra).
-   * There is NO validate cache: it is 2–3 PK lookups (~1ms), two orders of
-   * magnitude cheaper than the bcrypt it replaces; a cache would only add a
-   * Date-serialization trap and a revocation lag. Revocation is immediate.
-   */
-  async validate(
-    payload: JwtApiKeyPayload,
-  ): Promise<{ user: User; workspace: Workspace }> {
-    // Kill-switch OFF: deny unconditionally (same generic 401). Note the
-    // endpoints additionally 404 at the controller; here we deny the token.
-    if (!this.environmentService.isApiKeysEnabled()) {
-      throw new UnauthorizedException();
-    }
-
-    if (!payload?.apiKeyId || !payload?.sub || !payload?.workspaceId) {
-      throw new UnauthorizedException();
-    }
-
-    const row = await this.apiKeyRepo.findById(
-      payload.apiKeyId,
-      payload.workspaceId,
-    );
-    // Absent row = revoked (soft-deleted, invisible to findById), orphaned
-    // (creator/workspace cascade-deleted), or never existed. All terminal deny.
-    if (!row) {
-      throw new UnauthorizedException();
-    }
-
-    // Expiry is read from the ROW, never an `exp` JWT claim.
-    if (row.expiresAt && row.expiresAt.getTime() <= Date.now()) {
-      throw new UnauthorizedException();
-    }
-
-    const user = await this.userRepo.findById(
-      payload.sub,
-      payload.workspaceId,
-      { includeIsAgent: true },
-    );
-    if (!user || isUserDisabled(user)) {
-      throw new UnauthorizedException();
-    }
-
-    // The key acts only as its creator (defence in depth against a token whose
-    // signed `sub` ever drifted from the row's owner).
-    if (row.creatorId !== user.id) {
-      throw new UnauthorizedException();
-    }
-
-    const workspace = await this.workspaceRepo.findById(payload.workspaceId);
-    if (!workspace) {
-      throw new UnauthorizedException();
-    }
-
-    // Best-effort, throttled, fire-and-forget forensics stamp AFTER all checks.
-    this.touchLastUsed(row);
-
-    return { user, workspace };
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Revoke (soft-delete) a key. Authorization/ownership is decided by the caller
-   * (the controller, via CASL); this only performs the terminal write. Idempotent:
-   * a second revoke is a no-op (the row is already invisible).
-   */
-  async revoke(id: string, workspaceId: string): Promise<void> {
-    await this.apiKeyRepo.softDelete(id, workspaceId);
-  }
-
-  // Throttled best-effort last_used_at bump: skip if it was touched within the
-  // window; otherwise fire-and-forget so a stamp write never fails or slows the
-  // request (mirrors SessionActivityService.trackActivity).
-  private touchLastUsed(row: ApiKey): void {
-    const last = row.lastUsedAt ? new Date(row.lastUsedAt).getTime() : 0;
-    if (Date.now() - last < LAST_USED_THROTTLE_MS) return;
-    void this.apiKeyRepo.touchLastUsed(row.id).catch((err) => {
-      this.logger.warn(
-        `Failed to update api_key last_used_at for ${row.id}: ${
-          (err as Error)?.message ?? err
-        }`,
-      );
-    });
-  }
-}

apps/server/src/core/api-key/dto/create-api-key.dto.ts

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-import {
-  IsDateString,
-  IsNotEmpty,
-  IsOptional,
-  IsString,
-  MaxLength,
-  registerDecorator,
-  ValidationOptions,
-} from 'class-validator';
-
-/**
- * `expiresAt` must be strictly in the future. Skips validation for `null`
- * (explicit "unlimited") and `undefined` (server applies the 1-year default),
- * so only an actually-supplied date is range-checked. Rejecting a PAST date at
- * the DTO layer means a caller cannot mint an already-dead key.
- */
-function IsFutureDateString(options?: ValidationOptions) {
-  return function (object: object, propertyName: string) {
-    registerDecorator({
-      name: 'isFutureDateString',
-      target: object.constructor,
-      propertyName,
-      options: {
-        message: 'expiresAt must be a date in the future',
-        ...options,
-      },
-      validator: {
-        validate(value: unknown) {
-          if (value === null || value === undefined) return true;
-          if (typeof value !== 'string') return false;
-          const t = Date.parse(value);
-          return !Number.isNaN(t) && t > Date.now();
-        },
-      },
-    });
-  };
-}
-
-export class CreateApiKeyDto {
-  @IsString()
-  @IsNotEmpty()
-  @MaxLength(255)
-  name: string;
-
-  // undefined -> default 1 year (applied server-side); null -> unlimited
-  // (explicit); an ISO date string -> that instant, which must be in the future.
-  @IsOptional()
-  @IsDateString()
-  @IsFutureDateString()
-  expiresAt?: string | null;
-}

apps/server/src/core/api-key/dto/revoke-api-key.dto.ts

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-import { IsUUID } from 'class-validator';
-
-export class RevokeApiKeyDto {
-  @IsUUID()
-  id: string;
-}

apps/server/src/core/auth/auth.controller.spec.ts

@@ -20,71 +20,3 @@ describe('AuthController', () => {
     expect(controller).toBeDefined();
   });
 });
-
-// The collab-token handler is the ARM-SEAM of the #501 anti-laundering defense:
-// it derives the api-key origin args ({ apiKeyId }) from the SIGNED-derived
-// `req.raw` fields (stamped by jwt.strategy) and threads them into the collab
-// token mint, forcing principal='api_key' so a later key revoke rejects NEW
-// collab connections. A regression here (reading `body`, dropping `apiKeyId`,
-// or inverting the ternary) would silently mint api-key requests as
-// principal='session' and reopen the laundering hole with a green suite. These
-// tests pin the EXACT args the controller passes to authService.getCollabToken.
-describe('AuthController.collabToken arms the api-key origin (#501)', () => {
-  let controller: AuthController;
-  let getCollabToken: jest.Mock;
-
-  const user = { id: 'u-1', workspaceId: 'ws-1' } as any;
-  const workspace = { id: 'ws-1' } as any;
-
-  beforeEach(() => {
-    getCollabToken = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ token: 'ct' });
-    controller = new AuthController(
-      { getCollabToken } as any, // authService
-      {} as any, // sessionService
-      {} as any, // environmentService
-      {} as any, // moduleRef
-      {} as any, // auditService
-    );
-  });
-
-  it('threads { apiKeyId } when req.raw marks an api_key principal (ARMED)', async () => {
-    const req = { raw: { authType: 'api_key', apiKeyId: 'k-1' } } as any;
-
-    await controller.collabToken(user, workspace, req);
-
-    expect(getCollabToken).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-    expect(getCollabToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith(user, 'ws-1', {
-      apiKeyId: 'k-1',
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('passes undefined for a normal session request (NOT armed)', async () => {
-    const req = { raw: {} } as any;
-
-    await controller.collabToken(user, workspace, req);
-
-    expect(getCollabToken).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-    expect(getCollabToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith(user, 'ws-1', undefined);
-  });
-
-  it('does NOT arm when api_key authType lacks an apiKeyId', async () => {
-    const req = { raw: { authType: 'api_key' } } as any;
-
-    await controller.collabToken(user, workspace, req);
-
-    expect(getCollabToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith(user, 'ws-1', undefined);
-  });
-
-  it('reads the SIGNED req.raw, never a spoofable client body', async () => {
-    // A client-supplied body claiming api_key must be ignored: only the
-    // jwt.strategy-stamped req.raw can arm the api-key origin.
-    const req = {
-      raw: {},
-      body: { authType: 'api_key', apiKeyId: 'attacker' },
-    } as any;
-
-    await controller.collabToken(user, workspace, req);
-
-    expect(getCollabToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith(user, 'ws-1', undefined);
-  });
-});

apps/server/src/core/auth/auth.controller.ts

@@ -207,20 +207,8 @@ export class AuthController {
   async collabToken(
     @AuthUser() user: User,
     @AuthWorkspace() workspace: Workspace,
-    @Req() req: FastifyRequest,
   ) {
-    // Thread the api-key origin (#501): when the requester authenticated with an
-    // api key (jwt.strategy stamped req.raw.authType/apiKeyId), the minted collab
-    // token carries principal='api_key' + apiKeyId so a later revoke of the key
-    // rejects NEW collab connections. A normal session request mints a
-    // principal='session' token. Reading the SIGNED-derived req.raw fields (never
-    // a client body) keeps it unspoofable.
-    const raw = req.raw as { authType?: string; apiKeyId?: string };
-    const apiKey =
-      raw.authType === 'api_key' && raw.apiKeyId
-        ? { apiKeyId: raw.apiKeyId }
-        : undefined;
-    return this.authService.getCollabToken(user, workspace.id, apiKey);
+    return this.authService.getCollabToken(user, workspace.id);
   }
 
   @SkipThrottle({ [AUTH_THROTTLER]: true })

apps/server/src/core/auth/auth.module.ts

@@ -5,13 +5,9 @@ import { JwtStrategy } from './strategies/jwt.strategy';
 import { WorkspaceModule } from '../workspace/workspace.module';
 import { SignupService } from './services/signup.service';
 import { TokenModule } from './token.module';
-import { ApiKeyModule } from '../api-key/api-key.module';
 
 @Module({
-  // ApiKeyModule supplies ApiKeyService, injected into JwtStrategy so an
-  // api_key Bearer/cookie token is validated directly (replacing the absent EE
-  // `ee/api-key` dynamic require).
-  imports: [TokenModule, WorkspaceModule, ApiKeyModule],
+  imports: [TokenModule, WorkspaceModule],
   controllers: [AuthController],
   providers: [AuthService, SignupService, JwtStrategy],
   exports: [SignupService, AuthService],

apps/server/src/core/auth/dto/jwt-payload.ts

@@ -33,17 +33,6 @@ export type JwtPayload = {
   aiChatId?: string | null;
 };
 
-// The AUTH-PRINCIPAL kind behind a collab token — distinct from `actor`
-// (provenance). Stamped into EVERY newly-minted collab token (#501): 'session'
-// for a normal user/session (incl. the internal AI agent, which is session-
-// backed), 'api_key' when the token was minted by an api-key principal (an
-// external MCP agent). The discriminator keys on the token's ORIGIN, so the
-// collab seam can re-check a revoked api key on connect and reject a claimless
-// token after the rollout grace window. NOT keyed on `actor:'agent'` — the
-// internal agent is 'agent' but session-backed, so it must stay on the no-check
-// path.
-export type CollabPrincipal = 'session' | 'api_key';
-
 export type JwtCollabPayload = {
   sub: string;
   workspaceId: string;
@@ -55,13 +44,6 @@ export type JwtCollabPayload = {
   // Nullable: an external MCP agent has no internal ai_chats row, so it carries
   // an 'agent' actor with a null aiChatId.
   aiChatId?: string | null;
-  // Auth-principal discriminator (#501). Present on every post-rollout token;
-  // its absence on a still-valid token past the grace window is treated as an
-  // error, not trust (fail-closed).
-  principal?: CollabPrincipal;
-  // Only when principal === 'api_key': the minting key's id, so the collab seam
-  // can row-check (and reject) a revoked key on connect.
-  apiKeyId?: string;
 };
 
 export type JwtExchangePayload = {

apps/server/src/core/auth/services/auth.service.ts

@@ -375,20 +375,10 @@ export class AuthService {
     }
   }
 
-  async getCollabToken(
-    user: User,
-    workspaceId: string,
-    // Origin of the request minting this collab token (#501). When the caller is
-    // an api-key principal, its apiKeyId is threaded into the token so the collab
-    // seam can re-check the key on connect (closing api-key -> long-lived-collab
-    // laundering). Absent for a normal session/human request.
-    apiKey?: { apiKeyId: string },
-  ) {
+  async getCollabToken(user: User, workspaceId: string) {
     const token = await this.tokenService.generateCollabToken(
       user,
       workspaceId,
-      undefined,
-      apiKey,
     );
     return { token };
   }

apps/server/src/core/auth/services/token.service.behavior.spec.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 import { ForbiddenException, UnauthorizedException } from '@nestjs/common';
-import * as jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
 import { TokenService } from './token.service';
 import { JwtType } from '../dto/jwt-payload';
 
@@ -214,175 +213,4 @@ describe('TokenService.generateCollabToken', () => {
       aiChatId: 'chat-456',
     });
   });
-
-  // #501 fail-closed discriminator: EVERY collab token carries a principal.
-  it("defaults principal to 'session' with NO apiKeyId (normal/internal-agent path)", async () => {
-    const { service, jwtService } = makeTokenService();
-    await service.generateCollabToken(makeUser() as never, 'ws-1');
-    const [payload] = jwtService.sign.mock.calls[0];
-    expect(payload.principal).toBe('session');
-    expect(payload).not.toHaveProperty('apiKeyId');
-  });
-
-  it("the internal agent (provenance, NO apiKey) still gets principal='session'", async () => {
-    const { service, jwtService } = makeTokenService();
-    await service.generateCollabToken(
-      makeUser() as never,
-      'ws-1',
-      { actor: 'agent', aiChatId: 'chat-1' },
-    );
-    const [payload] = jwtService.sign.mock.calls[0];
-    // Keyed on api-key ORIGIN, not actor: an is_agent session token is 'session'.
-    expect(payload.principal).toBe('session');
-    expect(payload).not.toHaveProperty('apiKeyId');
-  });
-
-  it("stamps principal='api_key' + apiKeyId when minted by an api-key principal", async () => {
-    const { service, jwtService } = makeTokenService();
-    await service.generateCollabToken(
-      makeUser() as never,
-      'ws-1',
-      undefined,
-      { apiKeyId: 'key-9' },
-    );
-    const [payload] = jwtService.sign.mock.calls[0];
-    expect(payload.principal).toBe('api_key');
-    expect(payload.apiKeyId).toBe('key-9');
-  });
 });
-
-/**
- * API-key token minting MUST carry NO `exp` claim — the ONLY source of truth for
- * a key's lifetime/revocation is its `api_keys` row, checked on every request.
- *
- * This is a LIVE-bug regression: the shared JwtService is registered with a
- * global `signOptions.expiresIn` (default '90d') that merges into every sign(),
- * so an api-key minted through it silently gets exp=now+90d and an "unlimited"
- * key dies in 90 days. TokenService.generateApiToken mints through a dedicated
- * no-expiry signer instead. These tests construct the REAL signer (a real secret
- * via the stubbed EnvironmentService) and decode the produced JWT to assert the
- * observable property: no `exp`.
- */
-describe('TokenService.generateApiToken (no exp claim ever)', () => {
-  const APP_SECRET_LOCAL = 'apikey-secret';
-
-  function makeRealSignerService() {
-    // Give the SHARED jwtService a global expiresIn so a regression (minting
-    // through it) would show up as an exp claim — the exact live bug.
-    const { JwtService } = require('@nestjs/jwt');
-    const sharedJwt = new JwtService({
-      secret: APP_SECRET_LOCAL,
-      signOptions: { expiresIn: '90d', issuer: 'Docmost' },
-    });
-    const environmentService = {
-      getAppSecret: () => APP_SECRET_LOCAL,
-    };
-    const service = new (TokenService as unknown as new (
-      ...args: unknown[]
-    ) => TokenService)(sharedJwt, environmentService);
-    return { service };
-  }
-
-  const user = makeUser({ id: 'svc-1', workspaceId: 'ws-1' });
-
-  it('mints an api-key JWT with NO exp claim and issuer Docmost', async () => {
-    const { service } = makeRealSignerService();
-
-    const token = await service.generateApiToken({
-      apiKeyId: 'key-1',
-      user: user as never,
-      workspaceId: 'ws-1',
-    });
-
-    const decoded = jwt.decode(token) as Record<string, unknown>;
-    // The observable security property: no expiry lives in the JWT.
-    expect(decoded.exp).toBeUndefined();
-    expect(decoded).toMatchObject({
-      sub: 'svc-1',
-      apiKeyId: 'key-1',
-      workspaceId: 'ws-1',
-      type: JwtType.API_KEY,
-      iss: 'Docmost',
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('demonstrates the live bug it guards: the SHARED signer WOULD add exp', () => {
-    const { JwtService } = require('@nestjs/jwt');
-    const sharedJwt = new JwtService({
-      secret: APP_SECRET_LOCAL,
-      signOptions: { expiresIn: '90d', issuer: 'Docmost' },
-    });
-    // Even with empty per-call options the global expiresIn merges in.
-    const leaky = sharedJwt.sign({ sub: 'x', type: JwtType.API_KEY }, {});
-    expect((jwt.decode(leaky) as Record<string, unknown>).exp).toBeDefined();
-  });
-
-  it('refuses to mint for a disabled user', async () => {
-    const { service } = makeRealSignerService();
-    await expect(
-      service.generateApiToken({
-        apiKeyId: 'key-1',
-        user: makeUser({ deactivatedAt: new Date() }) as never,
-        workspaceId: 'ws-1',
-      }),
-    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ForbiddenException);
-  });
-});
-
-/**
- * verifyJwtOneOf is the type-routing primitive: verify the signature once and
- * assert the token type is on an explicit allowlist. It must NOT degrade into a
- * "return whatever type" helper — a token whose type is off the allowlist is
- * rejected with the same generic error as a single-type mismatch.
- */
-describe('TokenService.verifyJwtOneOf (allowlist type-routing)', () => {
-  it('returns the payload when the type is on the allowlist', async () => {
-    const verifyAsync = jest
-      .fn()
-      .mockResolvedValue({ type: JwtType.API_KEY, sub: 'u-1' });
-    const { service } = makeTokenService({ verifyAsync });
-
-    const payload = await service.verifyJwtOneOf(token123(), [
-      JwtType.ACCESS,
-      JwtType.API_KEY,
-    ]);
-
-    expect(payload).toMatchObject({ type: JwtType.API_KEY, sub: 'u-1' });
-    expect(verifyAsync).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-  });
-
-  it('accepts the OTHER allowed type too', async () => {
-    const verifyAsync = jest
-      .fn()
-      .mockResolvedValue({ type: JwtType.ACCESS, sub: 'u-1' });
-    const { service } = makeTokenService({ verifyAsync });
-
-    await expect(
-      service.verifyJwtOneOf(token123(), [JwtType.ACCESS, JwtType.API_KEY]),
-    ).resolves.toMatchObject({ type: JwtType.ACCESS });
-  });
-
-  it('rejects a token whose type is OFF the allowlist (confused-deputy guard)', async () => {
-    const verifyAsync = jest
-      .fn()
-      .mockResolvedValue({ type: JwtType.COLLAB, sub: 'u-1' });
-    const { service } = makeTokenService({ verifyAsync });
-
-    await expect(
-      service.verifyJwtOneOf(token123(), [JwtType.ACCESS, JwtType.API_KEY]),
-    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(UnauthorizedException);
-  });
-
-  it('verifies the signature exactly ONCE', async () => {
-    const verifyAsync = jest
-      .fn()
-      .mockResolvedValue({ type: JwtType.ACCESS });
-    const { service } = makeTokenService({ verifyAsync });
-    await service.verifyJwtOneOf(token123(), [JwtType.ACCESS]);
-    expect(verifyAsync).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-  });
-});
-
-function token123(): string {
-  return 'a.b.c';
-}

apps/server/src/core/auth/services/token.service.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import {
   UnauthorizedException,
 } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { JwtService } from '@nestjs/jwt';
+import type { StringValue } from 'ms';
 import { EnvironmentService } from '../../../integrations/environment/environment.service';
 import {
   JwtApiKeyPayload,
@@ -61,12 +62,6 @@ export class TokenService {
     // token carries no actor/aiChatId and is treated as 'user' downstream.
     // aiChatId is nullable for an external agent with no internal ai_chats row.
     provenance?: { actor: 'agent'; aiChatId: string | null },
-    // Optional api-key origin (#501). When the collab token is minted by an
-    // api-key principal (an external MCP agent), the caller passes the key id so
-    // the token carries principal='api_key' + apiKeyId and the collab seam can
-    // re-check the key on connect. Absent -> principal='session' (a normal
-    // user/session, including the internal session-backed AI agent).
-    apiKey?: { apiKeyId: string },
   ): Promise<string> {
     if (isUserDisabled(user)) {
       throw new ForbiddenException();
@@ -76,10 +71,6 @@ export class TokenService {
       sub: user.id,
       workspaceId,
       type: JwtType.COLLAB,
-      // Fail-closed discriminator on EVERY minted token: 'api_key' when minted by
-      // an api-key principal, else 'session'.
-      principal: apiKey ? 'api_key' : 'session',
-      ...(apiKey ? { apiKeyId: apiKey.apiKeyId } : {}),
       ...(provenance
         ? { actor: provenance.actor, aiChatId: provenance.aiChatId }
         : {}),
@@ -132,8 +123,9 @@ export class TokenService {
     apiKeyId: string;
     user: User;
     workspaceId: string;
+    expiresIn?: StringValue | number;
   }): Promise<string> {
-    const { apiKeyId, user, workspaceId } = opts;
+    const { apiKeyId, user, workspaceId, expiresIn } = opts;
     if (isUserDisabled(user)) {
       throw new ForbiddenException();
     }
@@ -145,32 +137,7 @@ export class TokenService {
       type: JwtType.API_KEY,
     };
 
-    // API-key tokens carry NO `exp` claim EVER — the ONLY source of truth for a
-    // key's lifetime and revocation is its `api_keys` row (checked on every
-    // request), not the JWT. This CANNOT use `this.jwtService`: TokenModule
-    // registers it with a global `signOptions.expiresIn` (JWT_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN,
-    // default '90d'), which merges into EVERY sign() call — even `sign(payload,
-    // {})` — and `{ expiresIn: undefined }` THROWS rather than stripping it
-    // (verified empirically). So an "unlimited" key minted through the shared
-    // signer would silently get exp=now+90d and die in 90 days regardless of its
-    // row. We mint through a dedicated no-expiry signer, re-stamping only
-    // `issuer: 'Docmost'` for claim parity with the shared signer.
-    return this.apiKeyJwtService().sign(payload);
-  }
-
-  // Lazily-built JWT signer for API-key tokens: same APP_SECRET, same 'Docmost'
-  // issuer, but WITHOUT the global `expiresIn` — so minted API-key tokens have no
-  // `exp` claim. Built once and cached. Verification still goes through the
-  // shared verifier (same secret); `verifyAsync` does not require an `exp`.
-  private _apiKeyJwtService?: JwtService;
-  private apiKeyJwtService(): JwtService {
-    if (!this._apiKeyJwtService) {
-      this._apiKeyJwtService = new JwtService({
-        secret: this.environmentService.getAppSecret(),
-        signOptions: { issuer: 'Docmost' },
-      });
-    }
-    return this._apiKeyJwtService;
+    return this.jwtService.sign(payload, expiresIn ? { expiresIn } : {});
   }
 
   async generatePdfRenderToken(
@@ -210,31 +177,4 @@ export class TokenService {
 
     return payload;
   }
-
-  /**
-   * Verify a token's signature ONCE and assert its `type` is one of `allowed`.
-   *
-   * This is the type-routing primitive for surfaces that legitimately accept
-   * more than one token type on the same Bearer slot (the /mcp Bearer path
-   * accepts both an ACCESS and an API_KEY token). It is deliberately NOT a
-   * "verify-and-return-whatever-type" helper — that would be a reusable
-   * confused-deputy footgun (any caller could then feed an attachment/collab
-   * token where an access token is expected). An explicit allowlist preserves
-   * the type-pinning property of `verifyJwt`: a token whose `type` is not in the
-   * allowlist is rejected with the SAME generic error as a type mismatch, and
-   * the signature is verified exactly once (no double-verify).
-   */
-  async verifyJwtOneOf(token: string, allowed: JwtType[]) {
-    const payload = await this.jwtService.verifyAsync(token, {
-      secret: this.environmentService.getAppSecret(),
-    });
-
-    if (!allowed.includes(payload.type)) {
-      throw new UnauthorizedException(
-        'Invalid JWT token. Token type does not match.',
-      );
-    }
-
-    return payload;
-  }
 }

apps/server/src/core/auth/strategies/jwt.strategy.spec.ts

@@ -22,8 +22,7 @@ describe('JwtStrategy — provenance derivation', () => {
     const userSessionRepo: any = { findActiveById: jest.fn() };
     const sessionActivityService: any = { trackActivity: jest.fn() };
     const environmentService: any = { getAppSecret: () => 'test-secret' };
-    // ACCESS-path tests never touch the api-key seam; a bare stub suffices.
-    const apiKeyService: any = { validate: jest.fn() };
+    const moduleRef: any = {};
 
     const strategy = new JwtStrategy(
       userRepo,
@@ -31,7 +30,7 @@ describe('JwtStrategy — provenance derivation', () => {
       userSessionRepo,
       sessionActivityService,
       environmentService,
-      apiKeyService,
+      moduleRef,
     );
     return { strategy, userRepo };
   }
@@ -123,29 +122,25 @@ describe('JwtStrategy — provenance derivation', () => {
 });
 
 /**
- * Provenance derivation on the API-KEY path (jwt.strategy.validateApiKey, #486
- * + #501).
+ * Provenance derivation on the API-KEY path (jwt.strategy.validateApiKey, #486).
  *
  * The access-token path stamped provenance; the API-key path returned early
  * WITHOUT it, so an is_agent API key's REST writes recorded no 'agent' marker.
  * The API-key payload carries no signed claim, so provenance is resolved from the
- * SERVER-SIDE user returned by ApiKeyService.validate: isAgent -> 'agent',
+ * SERVER-SIDE user returned by ApiKeyService.validateApiKey: isAgent -> 'agent',
  * otherwise 'user'; aiChatId is always null (an API key has no ai_chats row).
  *
- * #501 wires the CORE ApiKeyService (the EE `ee/api-key` module is absent in the
- * fork) directly into the strategy — no dynamic require. The strategy also stamps
- * `req.raw.authType='api_key'` + `req.raw.apiKeyId` for the "a token cannot manage
- * tokens" guard on the /api-keys surface.
+ * The enterprise ApiKeyService is not bundled in the OSS build, so the strategy
+ * loads it through an overridable `resolveApiKeyService` seam that we stub here.
  */
-describe('JwtStrategy — API-key provenance derivation (#486/#501)', () => {
-  function makeApiKeyStrategy(validateImpl: (p: any) => Promise<any>) {
+describe('JwtStrategy — API-key provenance derivation (#486)', () => {
+  function makeApiKeyStrategy(validateApiKeyImpl: (p: any) => Promise<any>) {
     const userRepo: any = { findById: jest.fn() };
     const workspaceRepo: any = { findById: jest.fn() };
     const userSessionRepo: any = { findActiveById: jest.fn() };
     const sessionActivityService: any = { trackActivity: jest.fn() };
     const environmentService: any = { getAppSecret: () => 'test-secret' };
-    const validate = jest.fn(validateImpl);
-    const apiKeyService: any = { validate };
+    const moduleRef: any = {};
 
     const strategy = new JwtStrategy(
       userRepo,
@@ -153,9 +148,14 @@ describe('JwtStrategy — API-key provenance derivation (#486/#501)', () => {
       userSessionRepo,
       sessionActivityService,
       environmentService,
-      apiKeyService,
+      moduleRef,
     );
-    return { strategy, validate };
+    // Stub the EE ApiKeyService seam (the real module is not in the OSS build).
+    const validateApiKey = jest.fn(validateApiKeyImpl);
+    jest
+      .spyOn(strategy as any, 'resolveApiKeyService')
+      .mockReturnValue({ validateApiKey });
+    return { strategy, validateApiKey };
   }
 
   const makeReq = () => ({ raw: {} as Record<string, any> });
@@ -166,23 +166,22 @@ describe('JwtStrategy — API-key provenance derivation (#486/#501)', () => {
     type: JwtType.API_KEY,
   });
 
-  it("stamps actor='agent' + authType/apiKeyId for an is_agent API key", async () => {
+  it("stamps actor='agent' for an is_agent API key (from the validated user)", async () => {
     const validated = {
       user: { id: 'svc-1', isAgent: true },
       workspace: { id: 'ws-1' },
     };
-    const { strategy, validate } = makeApiKeyStrategy(async () => validated);
+    const { strategy, validateApiKey } = makeApiKeyStrategy(
+      async () => validated,
+    );
     const req = makeReq();
 
     const result = await strategy.validate(req, apiKeyPayload() as any);
 
-    expect(validate).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(validateApiKey).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
     expect(req.raw.actor).toBe('agent');
     // API keys carry no internal ai_chats row -> null.
     expect(req.raw.aiChatId).toBeNull();
-    // Principal-kind markers for the management-surface guard.
-    expect(req.raw.authType).toBe('api_key');
-    expect(req.raw.apiKeyId).toBe('key-1');
     // The validated auth object is returned unchanged (req.user shape preserved).
     expect(result).toBe(validated);
   });
@@ -198,19 +197,25 @@ describe('JwtStrategy — API-key provenance derivation (#486/#501)', () => {
 
     expect(req.raw.actor).toBe('user');
     expect(req.raw.aiChatId).toBeNull();
-    expect(req.raw.authType).toBe('api_key');
   });
 
-  it('propagates a validate() rejection and stamps nothing', async () => {
-    const { strategy } = makeApiKeyStrategy(async () => {
-      throw new UnauthorizedException();
-    });
+  it('throws Unauthorized (and stamps nothing) when the EE module is missing', async () => {
+    const userRepo: any = { findById: jest.fn() };
+    const strategy = new JwtStrategy(
+      userRepo,
+      { findById: jest.fn() } as any,
+      { findActiveById: jest.fn() } as any,
+      { trackActivity: jest.fn() } as any,
+      { getAppSecret: () => 'test-secret' } as any,
+      {} as any,
+    );
+    // EE not bundled: the seam returns null.
+    jest.spyOn(strategy as any, 'resolveApiKeyService').mockReturnValue(null);
     const req = makeReq();
 
     await expect(
       strategy.validate(req, apiKeyPayload() as any),
     ).rejects.toThrow(UnauthorizedException);
     expect(req.raw.actor).toBeUndefined();
-    expect(req.raw.authType).toBeUndefined();
   });
 });

apps/server/src/core/auth/strategies/jwt.strategy.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { Injectable, UnauthorizedException } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { Injectable, Logger, UnauthorizedException } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { PassportStrategy } from '@nestjs/passport';
 import { Strategy } from 'passport-jwt';
 import { EnvironmentService } from '../../../integrations/environment/environment.service';
@@ -9,18 +9,20 @@ import { UserSessionRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/session/user-session.repo';
 import { SessionActivityService } from '../../session/session-activity.service';
 import { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
 import { extractBearerTokenFromHeader, isUserDisabled } from '../../../common/helpers';
+import { ModuleRef } from '@nestjs/core';
 import { resolveProvenance } from '../../../common/decorators/auth-provenance.decorator';
-import { ApiKeyService } from '../../api-key/api-key.service';
 
 @Injectable()
 export class JwtStrategy extends PassportStrategy(Strategy, 'jwt') {
+  private logger = new Logger('JwtStrategy');
+
   constructor(
     private userRepo: UserRepo,
     private workspaceRepo: WorkspaceRepo,
     private userSessionRepo: UserSessionRepo,
     private sessionActivityService: SessionActivityService,
     private readonly environmentService: EnvironmentService,
-    private readonly apiKeyService: ApiKeyService,
+    private moduleRef: ModuleRef,
   ) {
     super({
       jwtFromRequest: (req: FastifyRequest) => {
@@ -100,17 +102,12 @@ export class JwtStrategy extends PassportStrategy(Strategy, 'jwt') {
   }
 
   private async validateApiKey(req: any, payload: JwtApiKeyPayload) {
-    // The fork ships the core `ApiKeyService` (the EE `ee/api-key` module is
-    // absent). `validate` throws a bare UnauthorizedException on any definite
-    // deny (missing/revoked/expired row, disabled user, kill-switch off) and
-    // propagates infra errors (→ 5xx) rather than masking them as a 401.
-    const result = await this.apiKeyService.validate(payload);
+    const apiKeyService = this.resolveApiKeyService();
+    if (!apiKeyService) {
+      throw new UnauthorizedException('Enterprise API Key module missing');
+    }
 
-    // Stamp the principal kind + key id so the /api-keys management surface can
-    // enforce "a token cannot manage tokens". Done in this branch because it
-    // returns before the shared ACCESS-path stamping below.
-    req.raw.authType = 'api_key';
-    req.raw.apiKeyId = payload.apiKeyId;
+    const result = await apiKeyService.validateApiKey(payload);
 
     // Stamp the agent-edit provenance for the API-KEY path too (#486). Unlike the
     // access-token path above, it CANNOT be resolved before this point: the
@@ -122,10 +119,32 @@ export class JwtStrategy extends PassportStrategy(Strategy, 'jwt') {
     // SERVER-SIDE user (never a client field), so an 'agent' badge is unspoofable
     // — mirroring the access-token path. Passing `null` for the claim means the
     // actor is decided solely by user.isAgent.
-    const provenance = resolveProvenance(result.user, null);
+    const provenance = resolveProvenance((result as any)?.user, null);
     req.raw.actor = provenance.actor;
     req.raw.aiChatId = provenance.aiChatId;
 
     return result;
   }
+
+  /**
+   * Resolve the enterprise ApiKeyService, or `null` when the EE module is not
+   * bundled in this build (community build). Extracted as an overridable seam so
+   * the API-key provenance stamping can be unit-tested without the EE package
+   * present (docmost is OSS + a separate EE bundle; `require` of the EE path
+   * throws here). Any load/resolve error is treated as "module missing".
+   */
+  protected resolveApiKeyService(): {
+    validateApiKey: (payload: JwtApiKeyPayload) => Promise<unknown>;
+  } | null {
+    try {
+      // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
+      const ApiKeyModule = require('./../../../ee/api-key/api-key.service');
+      return this.moduleRef.get(ApiKeyModule.ApiKeyService, { strict: false });
+    } catch (err) {
+      this.logger.debug(
+        'API Key module requested but enterprise module not bundled in this build',
+      );
+      return null;
+    }
+  }
 }

apps/server/src/core/core.module.ts

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import {
 } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { UserModule } from './user/user.module';
 import { AuthModule } from './auth/auth.module';
-import { ApiKeyModule } from './api-key/api-key.module';
 import { WorkspaceModule } from './workspace/workspace.module';
 import { PageModule } from './page/page.module';
 import { AttachmentModule } from './attachment/attachment.module';
@@ -30,7 +29,6 @@ import { ClsMiddleware } from 'nestjs-cls';
   imports: [
     UserModule,
     AuthModule,
-    ApiKeyModule,
     WorkspaceModule,
     PageModule,
     AttachmentModule,

apps/server/src/database/database.module.ts

@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ import { AiProviderCredentialsRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/ai-chat/ai-provider
 import { AiMcpServerRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/ai-chat/ai-mcp-server.repo';
 import { AiAgentRoleRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/ai-agent-roles/ai-agent-roles.repo';
 import { PageEmbeddingRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/ai-chat/page-embedding.repo';
-import { ApiKeyRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/api-key/api-key.repo';
 import { PageListener } from '@docmost/db/listeners/page.listener';
 import { PostgresJSDialect } from 'kysely-postgres-js';
 import * as postgres from 'postgres';
@@ -130,7 +129,6 @@ import { firstSqlToken } from '../integrations/metrics/metrics.constants';
     AiMcpServerRepo,
     AiAgentRoleRepo,
     PageEmbeddingRepo,
-    ApiKeyRepo,
     PageListener,
   ],
   exports: [
@@ -166,7 +164,6 @@ import { firstSqlToken } from '../integrations/metrics/metrics.constants';
     AiMcpServerRepo,
     AiAgentRoleRepo,
     PageEmbeddingRepo,
-    ApiKeyRepo,
   ],
 })
 export class DatabaseModule implements OnApplicationBootstrap {

apps/server/src/database/repos/api-key/api-key.repo.ts

@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-import { Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
-import { InjectKysely } from 'nestjs-kysely';
-import { KyselyDB, KyselyTransaction } from '@docmost/db/types/kysely.types';
-import { DB, Users } from '@docmost/db/types/db';
-import { dbOrTx } from '@docmost/db/utils';
-import { ApiKey, InsertableApiKey } from '@docmost/db/types/entity.types';
-import { jsonObjectFrom } from 'kysely/helpers/postgres';
-import { ExpressionBuilder } from 'kysely';
-
-// Public-facing shape: the api_keys row plus a compact creator attribution used
-// by the admin list (the workspace-wide view attributes each key to its author).
-export type ApiKeyWithCreator = ApiKey & {
-  creator: Pick<Users, 'id' | 'name' | 'email' | 'avatarUrl'> | null;
-};
-
-@Injectable()
-export class ApiKeyRepo {
-  constructor(@InjectKysely() private readonly db: KyselyDB) {}
-
-  // Compact creator attribution embedded in the admin list rows. A nested
-  // subquery (jsonObjectFrom) keeps it one round-trip; the token material is
-  // never stored, so nothing sensitive is joined in.
-  private withCreator(eb: ExpressionBuilder<DB, 'apiKeys'>) {
-    return jsonObjectFrom(
-      eb
-        .selectFrom('users')
-        .select(['users.id', 'users.name', 'users.email', 'users.avatarUrl'])
-        .whereRef('users.id', '=', 'apiKeys.creatorId'),
-    ).as('creator');
-  }
-
-  async findById(
-    id: string,
-    workspaceId: string,
-    trx?: KyselyTransaction,
-  ): Promise<ApiKey | undefined> {
-    const db = dbOrTx(this.db, trx);
-    return db
-      .selectFrom('apiKeys')
-      .selectAll()
-      .where('id', '=', id)
-      .where('workspaceId', '=', workspaceId)
-      // Convention (soft-delete): a revoked key is invisible to reads.
-      .where('deletedAt', 'is', null)
-      .executeTakeFirst();
-  }
-
-  async findByCreator(
-    creatorId: string,
-    workspaceId: string,
-  ): Promise<ApiKeyWithCreator[]> {
-    return this.db
-      .selectFrom('apiKeys')
-      .selectAll('apiKeys')
-      .select((eb) => this.withCreator(eb))
-      .where('creatorId', '=', creatorId)
-      .where('workspaceId', '=', workspaceId)
-      .where('deletedAt', 'is', null)
-      .orderBy('createdAt', 'desc')
-      .execute() as unknown as Promise<ApiKeyWithCreator[]>;
-  }
-
-  async findAllInWorkspace(
-    workspaceId: string,
-  ): Promise<ApiKeyWithCreator[]> {
-    return this.db
-      .selectFrom('apiKeys')
-      .selectAll('apiKeys')
-      .select((eb) => this.withCreator(eb))
-      .where('workspaceId', '=', workspaceId)
-      .where('deletedAt', 'is', null)
-      .orderBy('createdAt', 'desc')
-      .execute() as unknown as Promise<ApiKeyWithCreator[]>;
-  }
-
-  async insert(
-    insertable: InsertableApiKey,
-    trx?: KyselyTransaction,
-  ): Promise<ApiKey> {
-    const db = dbOrTx(this.db, trx);
-    return db
-      .insertInto('apiKeys')
-      .values(insertable)
-      .returningAll()
-      .executeTakeFirst();
-  }
-
-  // Soft-delete = revoke. Terminal: the row stays for forensics but is invisible
-  // to every read above, so validate() denies it immediately (no grace window).
-  async softDelete(id: string, workspaceId: string): Promise<void> {
-    await this.db
-      .updateTable('apiKeys')
-      .set({ deletedAt: new Date(), updatedAt: new Date() })
-      .where('id', '=', id)
-      .where('workspaceId', '=', workspaceId)
-      .where('deletedAt', 'is', null)
-      .execute();
-  }
-
-  // Throttled best-effort forensics stamp. Not on the critical path: callers
-  // fire-and-forget and swallow errors, so it never fails a request.
-  async touchLastUsed(id: string): Promise<void> {
-    await this.db
-      .updateTable('apiKeys')
-      .set({ lastUsedAt: new Date() })
-      .where('id', '=', id)
-      .where('deletedAt', 'is', null)
-      .execute();
-  }
-}

apps/server/src/integrations/environment/environment.service.ts

@@ -70,23 +70,6 @@ export class EnvironmentService {
     return this.configService.get<string>('JWT_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN', '90d');
   }
 
-  // Kill-switch for the agent API-key feature. Default ON (unset -> enabled): a
-  // deploy that never sets the variable must NOT silently kill every agent. The
-  // parse is STRICT — the value is validated by environment.validation to be
-  // exactly 'true' or 'false' (or absent), so a typo like `=0`/`=off`/`=False`
-  // fails at boot rather than being read as "enabled" (which would leave an
-  // operator who yanked the switch during an incident with it still on). When
-  // OFF: validate() denies every api-key token and the issuance endpoints 404.
-  isApiKeysEnabled(): boolean {
-    return this.configService.get<string>('API_KEYS_ENABLED', 'true') !== 'false';
-  }
-
-  // Raw value (or undefined) for the boot log, so the state after each deploy is
-  // verifiable in container logs: `API keys: ENABLED/DISABLED (API_KEYS_ENABLED=...)`.
-  getApiKeysEnabledRaw(): string | undefined {
-    return this.configService.get<string>('API_KEYS_ENABLED');
-  }
-
   getCookieExpiresIn(): Date {
     const expiresInStr = this.getJwtTokenExpiresIn();
     let msUntilExpiry: number;

apps/server/src/integrations/environment/environment.validation.ts

@@ -103,15 +103,6 @@ export class EnvironmentVariables {
   @IsString()
   TYPESENSE_LOCALE: string;
 
-  // Agent API-key kill-switch. Optional (absent -> default ON). STRICT: only the
-  // literals 'true'/'false' are accepted, so `=0`/`=off`/`=False` fail at boot
-  // instead of being silently read as "enabled" — the switch must actually flip
-  // when an operator flips it. See EnvironmentService.isApiKeysEnabled.
-  @IsOptional()
-  @IsIn(['true', 'false'])
-  @IsString()
-  API_KEYS_ENABLED: string;
-
   @IsOptional()
   @ValidateIf((obj) => obj.AI_DRIVER)
   @IsIn(['openai', 'openai-compatible', 'gemini', 'ollama'])

apps/server/src/integrations/export/internal-link-parity.spec.ts

@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-import { INTERNAL_LINK_REGEX } from './utils';
-import { isInternalPagePath } from '@docmost/prosemirror-markdown';
-
-/**
- * Cross-package DRIFT GUARD for the internal-link subset invariant (#522).
- *
- * The client-side `isInternalPagePath`
- * (`packages/prosemirror-markdown/src/lib/internal-links.ts`) promotes a markdown
- * link to `internal: true` on import. Every link it marks internal MUST be one
- * the server would backlink and export-rewrite — i.e. the client matcher MUST be
- * a STRICT SUBSET of the server's canonical `INTERNAL_LINK_REGEX`
- * (`./utils.ts`). If the client ever accepts a path the server rejects, that link
- * is stored internal but silently dropped from the backlink graph and broken on
- * export — the exact bug #522 fixed.
- *
- * This spec is the load-bearing guard: it imports the LIVE server regex AND the
- * LIVE `isInternalPagePath` (no hand-copied regex on either side). A narrowing of
- * EITHER — most dangerously the server regex — reddens here. The in-package
- * accept/reject test documents the client's behaviour but cannot see the server
- * regex; this top-layer spec is what makes the subset relation mechanical
- * (AGENTS.md rule #7: a CI test that fails on drift of the source of truth).
- */
-describe('internal-link subset parity (client isInternalPagePath ⊆ server INTERNAL_LINK_REGEX)', () => {
-  // Every path the CLIENT accepts. Kept deliberately broad across the risky
-  // dimensions — the slug charset (digits, hyphens, mixed case, leading/trailing
-  // hyphen), the space charset, and the optional trailing slash — so a narrowing
-  // of the server regex on any of them reddens the subset assertion below.
-  const CLIENT_ACCEPTS = [
-    '/s/eng/p/abc123',
-    '/s/eng/p/abc123/', // trailing slash
-    '/s/My-Space/p/A-b-C-9', // hyphens + mixed case in both segments
-    '/s/x/p/z', // shortest
-    '/s/eng/p/my-page-abc123', // slug with hyphens (extractPageSlugId shape)
-    '/s/eng/p/-lead', // leading hyphen in slug
-    '/s/eng/p/trail-', // trailing hyphen in slug
-    '/s/eng/p/0123456789', // all-digit slug
-    '/s/a.b/p/abc', // dot in the SPACE segment (space charset is [^/]+)
-    '/s/space with space/p/abc', // space char in the SPACE segment
-  ];
-
-  it('every corpus path is actually client-accepted (guards the corpus itself)', () => {
-    // If a path here stopped being client-accepted the subset test would pass
-    // vacuously; assert acceptance up front so the corpus stays meaningful. The
-    // filter-to-empty form names the offending paths on failure.
-    const notAccepted = CLIENT_ACCEPTS.filter((h) => !isInternalPagePath(h));
-    expect(notAccepted).toEqual([]);
-  });
-
-  it('every client-accepted path also matches the LIVE server regex (subset)', () => {
-    // The mechanical drift guard: narrow the server INTERNAL_LINK_REGEX and at
-    // least one hyphen/charset/structure case appears here.
-    const notInServer = CLIENT_ACCEPTS.filter((h) => !INTERNAL_LINK_REGEX.test(h));
-    expect(notInServer).toEqual([]);
-  });
-
-  it('the client rejects forbidden-slug-char paths the server also rejects', () => {
-    // Documents the subset BOUNDARY: correct shape, forbidden slug char. The
-    // client and the LIVE server regex must agree on rejection.
-    const forbidden = [
-      '/s/eng/p/abc.def',
-      '/s/eng/p/abc_def',
-      '/s/eng/p/abc%20',
-      '/s/eng/p/abc~x',
-    ];
-    const clientAccepts = forbidden.filter((h) => isInternalPagePath(h));
-    const serverAccepts = forbidden.filter((h) => INTERNAL_LINK_REGEX.test(h));
-    expect(clientAccepts).toEqual([]);
-    expect(serverAccepts).toEqual([]);
-  });
-});

apps/server/src/integrations/mcp/mcp-auth.helpers.ts

@@ -304,102 +304,37 @@ export function clientIp(req: ClientIpRequest): string {
   return 'unknown';
 }
 
-// The decoded payload shared by the /mcp Bearer allowlist. Carries the `type`
-// discriminator and the API-key `apiKeyId`, on top of the access-token fields.
-export interface McpBearerPayload {
-  type?: JwtType;
+// Minimal structural shape of the TokenService.verifyJwt method we depend on,
+// so this module never imports the concrete TokenService (heavy graph).
+export interface AccessJwtVerifier {
+  verifyJwt: (
+    token: string,
+    type: JwtType,
+  ) => Promise<{
+    sub?: string;
+    email?: string;
+    workspaceId?: string;
+    sessionId?: string;
+  }>;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Bind a TokenService-like verifier into a one-arg `verifyJwt(token)` that
+ * ALWAYS enforces `JwtType.ACCESS`. This is the single place where the /mcp
+ * Bearer path pins the token type: a Bearer access token must be verified AS an
+ * access token (not refresh/exchange/collab/etc.), so the type literal is fixed
+ * here rather than at the call site. McpService.verifyMcpBearer delegates to
+ * this, keeping the `JwtType.ACCESS` choice testable without the heavy graph.
+ */
+export function bindAccessJwtVerifier(
+  tokenService: AccessJwtVerifier,
+): (token: string) => Promise<{
   sub?: string;
   email?: string;
   workspaceId?: string;
   sessionId?: string;
-  apiKeyId?: string;
-}
-
-// Minimal structural shape of the TokenService.verifyJwtOneOf method.
-export interface OneOfJwtVerifier {
-  verifyJwtOneOf: (
-    token: string,
-    allowed: JwtType[],
-  ) => Promise<McpBearerPayload>;
-}
-
-/**
- * Bind a TokenService-like verifier into a one-arg `verifyJwtOneOf(token)` that
- * pins the /mcp Bearer ALLOWLIST to exactly {ACCESS, API_KEY}. This is the single
- * place the /mcp Bearer path pins the token type: the /mcp Bearer slot
- * legitimately accepts either an ACCESS token (a
- * human's session token) OR an API_KEY token (an agent's key), but NOTHING else
- * (collab/exchange/attachment/etc. are rejected with the generic type error).
- * The allowlist is fixed here rather than at the call site, and the signature is
- * verified exactly once (see verifyMcpBearer).
- */
-export function bindMcpBearerVerifier(
-  tokenService: OneOfJwtVerifier,
-): (token: string) => Promise<McpBearerPayload> {
-  return (token: string) =>
-    tokenService.verifyJwtOneOf(token, [JwtType.ACCESS, JwtType.API_KEY]);
-}
-
-// Deps for the /mcp Bearer router. `verifyJwtOneOf` is the one-arg verifier bound
-// above (allowlist {ACCESS, API_KEY}); the ACCESS-specific revocation/disabled
-// deps mirror BearerVerifyDeps; `validateApiKey` is the SHARED api-key row-check.
-export interface McpBearerDeps
-  extends Omit<BearerVerifyDeps, 'verifyJwt'> {
-  verifyJwtOneOf: (token: string) => Promise<McpBearerPayload>;
-  // Row-check for an API_KEY principal — the SAME validator REST uses. Throws
-  // UnauthorizedException on a definite deny; PROPAGATES an infra error (→ 5xx),
-  // never masking it as a 401. Not a login attempt: the Basic limiter is not
-  // involved on this path.
-  validateApiKey: (payload: McpBearerPayload) => Promise<unknown>;
-}
-
-/**
- * Verify a /mcp Bearer token that may be an ACCESS token OR an API_KEY token, and
- * route by type. The signature is verified EXACTLY ONCE (verifyJwtOneOf); the
- * result is reused so the ACCESS branch does not re-verify.
- *
- *   - API_KEY -> bind to THIS instance's workspace FIRST (a token for another
- *     workspace is rejected), THEN run the shared `validateApiKey` row-check.
- *     No session/limiter involvement (an API key is not a login).
- *   - ACCESS  -> the unchanged `verifyBearerAccess` (session-active + not-disabled
- *     checks), fed a closure over the already-verified payload so "verify once"
- *     and "helper unchanged" coexist.
- *
- * Throws UnauthorizedException on any auth failure (uniform generic message — no
- * enumeration of why); propagates an infra error from `validateApiKey` as itself.
- */
-export async function verifyMcpBearer(
-  token: string,
-  deps: McpBearerDeps,
-): Promise<{ sub?: string; email?: string }> {
-  const generic = 'Invalid or expired token';
-  const payload = await deps.verifyJwtOneOf(token);
-
-  if (payload.type === JwtType.API_KEY) {
-    if (!payload.sub || !payload.workspaceId) {
-      throw new UnauthorizedException(generic);
-    }
-    // Instance-binding (mirrors verifyBearerAccess): reject an API_KEY token
-    // minted for a different workspace before touching the DB.
-    if (
-      deps.expectedWorkspaceId &&
-      payload.workspaceId !== deps.expectedWorkspaceId
-    ) {
-      throw new UnauthorizedException(generic);
-    }
-    // Shared row-check. A definite deny throws Unauthorized; an infra error
-    // propagates (→ 5xx), which the caller must NOT convert to a 401.
-    await deps.validateApiKey(payload);
-    return { sub: payload.sub };
-  }
-
-  // ACCESS: reuse verifyBearerAccess WITHOUT re-verifying the signature.
-  return verifyBearerAccess(token, {
-    verifyJwt: async () => payload,
-    expectedWorkspaceId: deps.expectedWorkspaceId,
-    findUser: deps.findUser,
-    findActiveSession: deps.findActiveSession,
-  });
+}> {
+  return (token: string) => tokenService.verifyJwt(token, JwtType.ACCESS);
 }
 
 // Minimal shapes for the Bearer revocation/disabled check. Kept structural so
@@ -793,24 +728,18 @@ export async function resolveMcpSessionConfig(
     };
   }
 
-  // --- 2) fallback A: Bearer JWT (user-supplied ACCESS or agent API_KEY) ---
+  // --- 2) fallback A: Bearer access-JWT (user-supplied token) ---
   const bearer = extractBearer(authHeader);
   if (bearer) {
     let payload: { sub?: string; email?: string };
     try {
       payload = await deps.verifyAccessJwt(bearer);
     } catch (err) {
-      // Anti-enumeration (Bearer leg): EVERY auth failure surfaces the SAME
-      // generic 401 — expired/revoked/wrong-type/unknown are indistinguishable
-      // to the caller (its reaction is identical either way). But an UNEXPECTED
-      // (infra) error is NOT an auth verdict: rethrow it AS ITSELF so the surface
-      // maps it to 5xx (mapAuthResultToResponse), never masking a DB/Redis
-      // outage as a bad token. verifyMcpBearer throws UnauthorizedException on a
-      // definite deny and lets an infra error from validateApiKey propagate.
-      if (err instanceof UnauthorizedException) {
-        throw new UnauthorizedException('Invalid or expired token');
-      }
-      throw err;
+      const message =
+        err instanceof Error && err.message
+          ? err.message
+          : 'Invalid or expired token';
+      throw new UnauthorizedException(message);
     }
     return {
       config: { apiUrl, getToken: async () => bearer },

apps/server/src/integrations/mcp/mcp-basic-login-gate.spec.ts

@@ -115,7 +115,6 @@ function makeService(opts: {
     undefined as never, // userRepo
     undefined as never, // userSessionRepo
     moduleRef as never, // moduleRef (read by the MFA branch)
-    undefined as never, // apiKeyService (unused by the login-gate path)
     undefined as never, // sandboxStore (unused by the login-gate path)
   );
   // Stop the constructor's unref'd sweep timer leaking across tests.

apps/server/src/integrations/mcp/mcp.module.ts

@@ -4,16 +4,13 @@ import { McpService } from './mcp.service';
 import { DatabaseModule } from '@docmost/db/database.module';
 import { AuthModule } from '../../core/auth/auth.module';
 import { TokenModule } from '../../core/auth/token.module';
-import { ApiKeyModule } from '../../core/api-key/api-key.module';
 
 // Community MCP feature: the server itself serves the Model Context Protocol
 // over HTTP at /mcp. DatabaseModule (global) provides WorkspaceRepo. AuthModule
 // supplies AuthService (per-user HTTP-Basic login validation) and TokenModule
-// supplies TokenService (Bearer JWT verification for the token path). ApiKeyModule
-// supplies ApiKeyService (the shared api-key row-check for the API_KEY Bearer
-// branch, so an agent authenticates with a key instead of the bcrypt Basic path).
+// supplies TokenService (Bearer access-JWT verification for the token fallback).
 @Module({
-  imports: [DatabaseModule, AuthModule, TokenModule, ApiKeyModule],
+  imports: [DatabaseModule, AuthModule, TokenModule],
   controllers: [McpController],
   providers: [McpService],
 })

apps/server/src/integrations/mcp/mcp.service.spec.ts

@@ -6,10 +6,9 @@ import {
   isCredentialsFailure,
   isInitializeRequestBody,
   verifyBearerAccess,
-  verifyMcpBearer,
-  bindMcpBearerVerifier,
   sharedTokenMatches,
   clientIp,
+  bindAccessJwtVerifier,
   extractBearer,
   decideBasicGate,
   mapAuthResultToResponse,
@@ -525,28 +524,13 @@ describe('resolveMcpSessionConfig', () => {
     expect(resolved.identity).toBe('bearer:user-9');
   });
 
-  it('Bearer invalid -> UNIFORM generic 401 (anti-enumeration, reason not leaked)', async () => {
-    // #501: the Bearer leg no longer surfaces the specific reason. Whether the
-    // token is expired, revoked, wrong-type or unknown, the caller sees ONE bare
-    // 'Invalid or expired token' — an agent's reaction is identical, and a leaked
-    // class would be an enumeration oracle.
+  it('Bearer invalid -> specific 401 from verifyAccessJwt', async () => {
     const verifyAccessJwt = jest
       .fn()
       .mockRejectedValue(new UnauthorizedException('jwt expired'));
     await expect(
       resolveMcpSessionConfig('Bearer expired', makeDeps({ verifyAccessJwt })),
-    ).rejects.toThrow('Invalid or expired token');
-  });
-
-  it('Bearer INFRA error -> propagates (NOT masked as 401)', async () => {
-    // A non-UnauthorizedException (e.g. a DB outage in the api-key row-check) is
-    // not an auth verdict: it must propagate so the surface maps it to 5xx.
-    const verifyAccessJwt = jest
-      .fn()
-      .mockRejectedValue(new Error('connection terminated'));
-    await expect(
-      resolveMcpSessionConfig('Bearer x', makeDeps({ verifyAccessJwt })),
-    ).rejects.toThrow('connection terminated');
+    ).rejects.toThrow('jwt expired');
   });
 
   it('no creds + env service account configured -> service-account config', async () => {
@@ -1017,104 +1001,48 @@ describe('clientIp (XFF-fallback precedence, item 5)', () => {
   });
 });
 
-describe('bindMcpBearerVerifier pins the {ACCESS, API_KEY} allowlist (#501)', () => {
-  it('calls verifyJwtOneOf with exactly [ACCESS, API_KEY]', async () => {
-    const verifyJwtOneOf = jest
+describe('bindAccessJwtVerifier enforces JwtType.ACCESS (item 3)', () => {
+  it('calls TokenService.verifyJwt with JwtType.ACCESS as the second argument', async () => {
+    // Mock TokenService: assert the type literal is pinned to ACCESS so swapping
+    // to REFRESH (or omitting the type) breaks this test.
+    const verifyJwt = jest
       .fn()
-      .mockResolvedValue({ type: JwtType.API_KEY, sub: 'u-1' });
-    await bindMcpBearerVerifier({ verifyJwtOneOf })('the.jwt');
-    expect(verifyJwtOneOf).toHaveBeenCalledWith('the.jwt', [
-      JwtType.ACCESS,
-      JwtType.API_KEY,
-    ]);
-    // Pin the concrete enum values too.
-    expect(verifyJwtOneOf.mock.calls[0][1]).toEqual(['access', 'api_key']);
-  });
-});
+      .mockResolvedValue({ sub: 'user-1', workspaceId: 'ws-1' });
+    const verify = bindAccessJwtVerifier({ verifyJwt });
 
-describe('verifyMcpBearer routes by token type (#501)', () => {
-  const accessDeps = (over: any = {}) => ({
-    verifyJwtOneOf: jest.fn(),
-    expectedWorkspaceId: 'ws-1',
-    findUser: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ deactivatedAt: null }),
-    findActiveSession: jest
-      .fn()
-      .mockResolvedValue({ userId: 'u-1', workspaceId: 'ws-1' }),
-    validateApiKey: jest.fn(),
-    ...over,
+    await verify('the.access.jwt');
+
+    expect(verifyJwt).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(verifyJwt).toHaveBeenCalledWith('the.access.jwt', JwtType.ACCESS);
+    // Pin the real enum value too, so renaming/repointing the enum member is caught.
+    expect(verifyJwt.mock.calls[0][1]).toBe('access');
   });
 
-  it('API_KEY -> row-checks via validateApiKey and does NOT touch session/limiter', async () => {
-    const deps = accessDeps({
-      verifyJwtOneOf: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
-        type: JwtType.API_KEY,
-        sub: 'svc-1',
-        workspaceId: 'ws-1',
-        apiKeyId: 'k-1',
-      }),
-      validateApiKey: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ user: { id: 'svc-1' } }),
-    });
-    const res = await verifyMcpBearer('tok', deps);
-    expect(deps.validateApiKey).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-    // No session lookup on the api-key path (not a login).
-    expect(deps.findActiveSession).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-    expect(res).toEqual({ sub: 'svc-1' });
+  it('passes through the verified payload', async () => {
+    const payload = { sub: 'user-9', email: 'u@e.com', workspaceId: 'ws-1' };
+    const verifyJwt = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(payload);
+    await expect(
+      bindAccessJwtVerifier({ verifyJwt })('t'),
+    ).resolves.toBe(payload);
   });
 
-  it('API_KEY for ANOTHER workspace -> rejected before the row-check', async () => {
-    const deps = accessDeps({
-      verifyJwtOneOf: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
-        type: JwtType.API_KEY,
-        sub: 'svc-1',
-        workspaceId: 'ws-OTHER',
-        apiKeyId: 'k-1',
-      }),
-      validateApiKey: jest.fn(),
-    });
-    await expect(verifyMcpBearer('tok', deps)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
-      UnauthorizedException,
-    );
-    expect(deps.validateApiKey).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-
-  it('API_KEY infra error from validateApiKey PROPAGATES (not masked)', async () => {
-    const boom = new Error('db down');
-    const deps = accessDeps({
-      verifyJwtOneOf: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
-        type: JwtType.API_KEY,
-        sub: 'svc-1',
-        workspaceId: 'ws-1',
-        apiKeyId: 'k-1',
-      }),
-      validateApiKey: jest.fn().mockRejectedValue(boom),
-    });
-    await expect(verifyMcpBearer('tok', deps)).rejects.toBe(boom);
-  });
-
-  it('ACCESS -> runs the session/disabled checks and does NOT call validateApiKey', async () => {
-    const deps = accessDeps({
-      verifyJwtOneOf: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
-        type: JwtType.ACCESS,
-        sub: 'u-1',
-        workspaceId: 'ws-1',
-        sessionId: 'sess-1',
-        email: 'u@e.com',
-      }),
-    });
-    const res = await verifyMcpBearer('tok', deps);
-    expect(deps.findActiveSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith('sess-1');
-    expect(deps.validateApiKey).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-    expect(res).toEqual({ sub: 'u-1', email: 'u@e.com' });
-  });
-
-  it('verifies the signature exactly ONCE (single verifyJwtOneOf, no re-verify)', async () => {
-    const verifyJwtOneOf = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
-      type: JwtType.ACCESS,
-      sub: 'u-1',
+  // The Bearer revocation/disabled checks (verifyBearerAccess) are covered above;
+  // this binds the ACCESS-type enforcement that verifyMcpBearer wires in.
+  it('feeds verifyBearerAccess so the whole Bearer chain enforces ACCESS', async () => {
+    const verifyJwt = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
+      sub: 'user-1',
       workspaceId: 'ws-1',
+      sessionId: 'sess-1',
     });
-    await verifyMcpBearer('tok', accessDeps({ verifyJwtOneOf }));
-    expect(verifyJwtOneOf).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    const res = await verifyBearerAccess('t', {
+      verifyJwt: bindAccessJwtVerifier({ verifyJwt }),
+      findUser: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ deactivatedAt: null }),
+      findActiveSession: jest
+        .fn()
+        .mockResolvedValue({ userId: 'user-1', workspaceId: 'ws-1' }),
+    });
+    expect(verifyJwt).toHaveBeenCalledWith('t', JwtType.ACCESS);
+    expect(res).toEqual({ sub: 'user-1', email: undefined });
   });
 });
 
@@ -1270,7 +1198,6 @@ describe('McpService.onModuleDestroy — CollabSession teardown (#486)', () => {
       {} as any,
       {} as any,
       {} as any,
-      {} as any,
     );
   }
 

apps/server/src/integrations/mcp/mcp.service.ts

@@ -14,17 +14,16 @@ import { UserSessionRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/session/user-session.repo';
 import { AuthService } from '../../core/auth/services/auth.service';
 import { TokenService } from '../../core/auth/services/token.service';
 import { validateSsoEnforcement } from '../../core/auth/auth.util';
-import { JwtApiKeyPayload } from '../../core/auth/dto/jwt-payload';
+import { JwtPayload } from '../../core/auth/dto/jwt-payload';
 import { Workspace } from '@docmost/db/types/entity.types';
-import { ApiKeyService } from '../../core/api-key/api-key.service';
 import {
   FailedLoginLimiter,
   resolveMcpSessionConfig,
-  verifyMcpBearer,
+  verifyBearerAccess,
   isInitializeRequestBody,
   sharedTokenMatches,
   clientIp,
-  bindMcpBearerVerifier,
+  bindAccessJwtVerifier,
   decideBasicGate,
   mapAuthResultToResponse,
   DocmostMcpConfig,
@@ -106,10 +105,6 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
     private readonly userRepo: UserRepo,
     private readonly userSessionRepo: UserSessionRepo,
     private readonly moduleRef: ModuleRef,
-    // Shared api-key row-check for the /mcp API_KEY Bearer branch (same validator
-    // REST uses). Also lets an agent authenticate to /mcp with an api key instead
-    // of the bcrypt Basic path, so parallel reads stop starving the limiter.
-    private readonly apiKeyService: ApiKeyService,
     // Shared singleton in-RAM blob store backing the stash tool.
     private readonly sandboxStore: SandboxStore,
   ) {
@@ -199,41 +194,37 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
     }
   }
 
-  // Bearer verification for the /mcp token path. The Bearer slot accepts EITHER
-  // an ACCESS token (a human session token) OR an API_KEY token (an agent's key)
-  // — the allowlist is pinned in bindMcpBearerVerifier. An ACCESS token is
-  // checked exactly as JwtStrategy does (signature/exp/type + session-active +
-  // not-disabled), so the MCP path is not weaker than the cookie/header path. An
-  // API_KEY token is HMAC-verified (microseconds) then row-checked via the shared
-  // ApiKeyService.validate — NOT a login attempt, so the Basic bcrypt path and
-  // its anti-brute-force limiter are never touched (the parallel-reads fix).
+  // Bearer access-JWT verification for the /mcp token fallback. verifyJwt only
+  // checks signature/exp/type, but a logged-out (revoked) or disabled user can
+  // still hold an unexpired access JWT. JwtStrategy additionally checks the
+  // session is active and the user is not disabled; we mirror those exact checks
+  // here so the MCP Bearer path is not weaker than the normal cookie/header path.
   private async verifyMcpBearer(
     token: string,
   ): Promise<{ sub?: string; email?: string }> {
-    // Resolve THIS instance's workspace so the router can bind the token's
-    // `workspaceId` claim to it (mirrors JwtStrategy). The community build is
-    // single-workspace (findFirst), so this is the default workspace and the
-    // check is a no-op here; it only rejects a foreign-workspace token in a
-    // multi-workspace deployment. Undefined (no workspace configured) means no
-    // check — the credentials path would already have failed with no workspace.
+    // Resolve THIS instance's workspace so verifyBearerAccess can bind the
+    // token's `workspaceId` claim to it (mirrors JwtStrategy). The community
+    // build is single-workspace (findFirst), so this is the default workspace
+    // and the check is a no-op here; it only rejects a foreign-workspace token
+    // in a multi-workspace deployment. Undefined (no workspace configured) means
+    // no check — the credentials path would already have failed with no
+    // workspace, and an undefined here keeps the helper a no-op rather than
+    // rejecting every token.
     const instanceWorkspace = await this.workspaceRepo.findFirst();
-    // The type-routing + revocation/disabled decision logic lives in the
-    // framework-free verifyMcpBearer helper (unit-testable without the heavy auth
-    // graph); this method only wires in the concrete TokenService + repos + the
-    // shared api-key validator.
-    return verifyMcpBearer(token, {
-      // The {ACCESS, API_KEY} allowlist enforcement lives in bindMcpBearerVerifier
-      // (a pure, testable seam) so the type set cannot silently drift.
-      verifyJwtOneOf: bindMcpBearerVerifier(this.tokenService),
+    // The revocation/disabled decision logic lives in the framework-free
+    // verifyBearerAccess helper (unit-testable without the heavy auth graph);
+    // this method only wires in the concrete TokenService + repos.
+    return verifyBearerAccess(token, {
+      // The JwtType.ACCESS enforcement lives in bindAccessJwtVerifier (a pure,
+      // testable seam) so the type literal cannot silently drift to REFRESH.
+      verifyJwt: bindAccessJwtVerifier(this.tokenService) as (
+        t: string,
+      ) => Promise<JwtPayload>,
       expectedWorkspaceId: instanceWorkspace?.id,
       findUser: (sub, workspaceId) =>
         this.userRepo.findById(sub, workspaceId),
       findActiveSession: (sessionId) =>
         this.userSessionRepo.findActiveById(sessionId),
-      // Shared with REST: a definite deny throws Unauthorized, an infra error
-      // propagates (→ 5xx). The /mcp bearer catch must preserve that distinction.
-      validateApiKey: (payload) =>
-        this.apiKeyService.validate(payload as JwtApiKeyPayload),
     });
   }
 

packages/prosemirror-markdown/src/lib/canonicalize.ts

@@ -25,22 +25,13 @@
  * drop any attr whose value equals its known schema default. A non-default
  * value (e.g. `orderedList.start: 5`) is NOT a default, so it is KEPT.
  *
- * Every entry below — with the single documented exception of the `link.internal`
- * marker (see its own bullet) — was read from `packages/docmost-client/src/lib/
+ * Every entry below was read from `packages/docmost-client/src/lib/
  * docmost-schema.ts` (the line refs are the exact `default:` declarations) and
  * confirmed to be materialized by an export→import→export round-trip:
  *   - mark `link`    target / rel  — DocmostAttributes + StarterKit link.
  *       StarterKit's link extension defaults `target: "_blank"` and
  *       `rel: "noopener noreferrer nofollow"`; both materialize on import
  *       (empirically confirmed) even when the source had only `href`.
- *   - mark `link`    internal (#522) — the ONE editor-sourced, NOT-import-
- *       materialized default here. Its source is `editor-ext/src/lib/link.ts`
- *       (default `internal: false`), not docmost-schema, and import does NOT
- *       materialize it (an imported external link leaves `internal` absent/null,
- *       never `false`). It is listed so that the editor's stored `internal:false`
- *       normalizes to the same "external" canon as absent/null (`false ≡ absent`),
- *       keeping a stored external link canonically equal to its re-import. The
- *       load-bearing `internal:true` is NON-default and therefore KEPT.
  *   - mark `comment` resolved      — docmost-schema.ts L213-214 (`default: false`).
  *   - node `orderedList` start     — provided by StarterKit's orderedList
  *       (`default: 1`); materializes on import (empirically confirmed).
@@ -65,14 +56,6 @@ const KNOWN_DEFAULTS: Record<string, Record<string, unknown>> = {
   link: {
     target: "_blank",
     rel: "noopener noreferrer nofollow",
-    // Editor-authored EXTERNAL links store `internal: false` (editor-ext link
-    // default `packages/editor-ext/src/lib/link.ts`), while an imported external
-    // link leaves `internal` absent/null. Both mean "external", so `internal:
-    // false` must normalize away exactly like `null`/absent — otherwise a stored
-    // `internal:false` link diverges from its re-import under
-    // `docsCanonicallyEqual` (false !== null). The internal marker `internal:true`
-    // is NON-default, so it is KEPT and survives canonicalization (#522 §11).
-    internal: false,
   },
   comment: {
     resolved: false,

packages/prosemirror-markdown/src/lib/index.ts

@@ -38,10 +38,6 @@ export {
   normalizeForeignMarkdown,
   normalizeAgentMarkdown,
 } from "./foreign-markdown.js";
-// Pure primitive: detect the unambiguously-internal wiki-page link path
-// (`/s/<space>/p/<slug>`) and promote such link marks to their native internal
-// form during import (#522). A strict subset of the server's INTERNAL_LINK_REGEX.
-export { isInternalPagePath, markInternalLinks } from "./internal-links.js";
 
 // The Docmost tiptap schema mirror. Exposed so consumers (and the sync
 // engine's schema-validity regression tests) can build the exact ProseMirror

packages/prosemirror-markdown/src/lib/internal-links.ts

@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Detect and mark unambiguously-internal wiki-page links during markdown import.
- *
- * WHY THIS EXISTS
- * ---------------
- * The markdown converter (`markdownToProseMirrorSync`) materializes every link
- * with StarterKit's external defaults — `internal: null`, `target: "_blank"`,
- * `rel: "noopener noreferrer nofollow"`. A markdown link that points at an
- * internal wiki page written in its host-less, root-relative form
- * (`[text](/s/<space>/p/<slugId>)`) is therefore stored as EXTERNAL: it opens in
- * a new tab, gets no hover-preview, and is invisible to the backlink graph
- * (`extractInternalLinkSlugIds` only counts links whose mark carries
- * `internal: true`). This module supplies the pure primitive that a post-walk in
- * the converter uses to promote such links to their native internal form.
- *
- * WHERE THE CANON LIVES (a strict subset, on purpose)
- * ---------------------------------------------------
- * The authoritative definition of "what is an internal link path" is the
- * server's `INTERNAL_LINK_REGEX`
- * (`apps/server/src/integrations/export/utils.ts`):
- *   /^(https?:\/\/)?([^\/]+)?(\/s\/([^\/]+)\/)?p\/([a-zA-Z0-9-]+)\/?$/
- * This package is a lower layer than the server app and cannot import it, so the
- * matcher below is a DOCUMENTED, STRICT SUBSET of that regex: it accepts only the
- * space-qualified, root-relative page path `/s/<space>/p/<slug>` (with optional
- * trailing slash). Because it is a subset, every link we mark internal here is
- * guaranteed to also satisfy the server regex, hence guaranteed backlink-able and
- * export-rewritable. A unit test pins the exact accept/reject set as the guard
- * against drift.
- *
- * FAIL-TOWARD-EXTERNAL
- * --------------------
- * We mark a link internal ONLY on an unambiguous anchored match. Any ambiguity
- * (a scheme/host, `#anchor`, `?query`, a space-less `/p/<slug>`, a relative
- * `p/<slug>`, a non-string href) leaves the link external. A false-external is a
- * soft degradation (a new tab); a false-internal would produce broken SPA
- * navigation, so "external" is the conservative default.
- *
- * Precedent for the target internal shape: the file importer already promotes
- * internal anchors (`apps/server/src/integrations/import/utils/import-formatter.ts`
- * `$a.attr('data-internal','true')`) and editor-ext reads it
- * (`packages/editor-ext/src/lib/link.ts`).
- */
-
-/**
- * Matches ONLY the space-qualified, root-relative internal page path
- * `/s/<space>/p/<slug>` (with optional trailing slash). A STRICT SUBSET of the
- * server's `INTERNAL_LINK_REGEX`:
- *   - `<space>` = `[^/]+`   (any non-slash segment, as in the server's group 4)
- *   - `<slug>`  = `[a-zA-Z0-9-]+`  (as in the server's group 5 / `extractPageSlugId`)
- * Anchored on both ends so a scheme/host, a trailing `#anchor`/`?query`, or any
- * extra path segment fails to match.
- */
-const INTERNAL_PAGE_PATH = /^\/s\/[^/]+\/p\/[a-zA-Z0-9-]+\/?$/;
-
-/**
- * True iff `href` is the unambiguous, space-qualified, root-relative internal
- * page path. Pure and side-effect-free. Non-string input returns false.
- */
-export function isInternalPagePath(href: unknown): boolean {
-  return typeof href === "string" && INTERNAL_PAGE_PATH.test(href);
-}
-
-/**
- * The native internal-link attribute overrides applied to a link mark whose href
- * is an internal page path. Mirrors the manual JSON-patch form
- * (`{internal:true, target:null, rel:null}`) and the editor-ext/file-importer
- * precedent: internal links carry no `target`/`rel` (same-tab SPA navigation).
- */
-const INTERNAL_LINK_ATTRS = { internal: true, target: null, rel: null } as const;
-
-/**
- * In-place post-walk of a finished ProseMirror doc that promotes every
- * unambiguously-internal link mark to its native internal form.
- *
- * A link that spans several text nodes (e.g. `[**bold** word](/s/x/p/abc)`)
- * stores an equivalent link mark on EACH covered text node — and a covered node
- * may carry nested marks (bold/italic) alongside the link. We therefore walk the
- * entire tree and rewrite EVERY `link` mark whose href passes
- * `isInternalPagePath`, so no covered segment is left external.
- *
- * Pure of external effects and IDEMPOTENT: re-running on an already-marked doc
- * leaves it unchanged (an internal-path href always maps to the same attrs).
- * External links are never touched — their `target:_blank`/`rel:noopener…` stay.
- *
- * The doc is mutated in place (the converter owns the freshly-built doc and
- * returns it directly); the same node reference is returned for convenience.
- */
-export function markInternalLinks<T>(node: T): T {
-  walk(node);
-  return node;
-}
-
-function walk(node: any): void {
-  if (!node || typeof node !== "object") return;
-  if (Array.isArray(node)) {
-    for (const child of node) walk(child);
-    return;
-  }
-  if (Array.isArray(node.marks)) {
-    for (const mark of node.marks) {
-      if (
-        mark &&
-        mark.type === "link" &&
-        mark.attrs &&
-        isInternalPagePath(mark.attrs.href)
-      ) {
-        mark.attrs = { ...mark.attrs, ...INTERNAL_LINK_ATTRS };
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  if (Array.isArray(node.content)) walk(node.content);
-}

packages/prosemirror-markdown/src/lib/markdown-to-prosemirror.ts

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ import { parseHtmlDocument, generateJsonWith } from "./dom-parser.js";
 import type { TokenizerExtension, RendererExtension } from "marked";
 import { docmostExtensions } from "./docmost-schema.js";
 import { parseAttachedComment } from "./attached-comment.js";
-import { markInternalLinks } from "./internal-links.js";
 import { splitFootnoteParagraphs } from "./footnote.js";
 import {
   decodeInlineMathLatex,
@@ -1095,12 +1094,7 @@ export function markdownToProseMirrorSync(markdownContent: string): any {
   const withFootnotes = assembleFootnotes(withAttrs);
   const bridged = bridgeTaskLists(withFootnotes);
   const doc = generateJsonWith(bridged, docmostExtensions);
-  // Promote unambiguously-internal wiki-page links (`[t](/s/<space>/p/<slug>)`)
-  // to their native internal form (`internal:true, target:null, rel:null`) so
-  // they get same-tab SPA navigation, hover-preview, and backlink participation.
-  // Every markdown import path funnels through here, so all of them are fixed at
-  // once; external links are left untouched (#522).
-  return markInternalLinks(stripEmptyParagraphs(doc));
+  return stripEmptyParagraphs(doc);
 }
 
 /**

packages/prosemirror-markdown/test/internal-links.test.ts

@@ -1,345 +0,0 @@
-import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
-import {
-  isInternalPagePath,
-  markInternalLinks,
-} from '../src/lib/internal-links.js';
-import { markdownToProseMirrorSync } from '../src/lib/markdown-to-prosemirror.js';
-import {
-  canonicalizeContent,
-  docsCanonicallyEqual,
-} from '../src/lib/canonicalize.js';
-
-// A LOCAL, illustrative copy of the server's INTERNAL_LINK_REGEX
-// (apps/server/src/integrations/export/utils.ts) used only to document the
-// subset boundary WITHIN this package (this layer cannot import the server).
-// It is NOT the cross-package drift guard: a hand copy can silently go stale if
-// the server regex is later narrowed. The real, mechanical drift guard lives in
-// the top layer, `apps/server/src/integrations/export/internal-link-parity.spec.ts`,
-// which imports BOTH the LIVE server `INTERNAL_LINK_REGEX` and the LIVE
-// `isInternalPagePath` and reddens if the client ever ceases to be a subset.
-const SERVER_INTERNAL_LINK_REGEX =
-  /^(https?:\/\/)?([^\/]+)?(\/s\/([^\/]+)\/)?p\/([a-zA-Z0-9-]+)\/?$/;
-
-// Walk a doc collecting every link mark (across all text nodes).
-const linkMarks = (doc: any): any[] => {
-  const out: any[] = [];
-  const walk = (n: any): void => {
-    if (!n || typeof n !== 'object') return;
-    if (Array.isArray(n)) return n.forEach(walk);
-    if (Array.isArray(n.marks))
-      for (const m of n.marks) if (m?.type === 'link') out.push(m);
-    if (Array.isArray(n.content)) walk(n.content);
-  };
-  walk(doc);
-  return out;
-};
-
-describe('isInternalPagePath', () => {
-  const ACCEPT = [
-    '/s/eng/p/abc123',
-    '/s/eng/p/abc123/', // trailing slash
-    '/s/My-Space/p/A-b-C-9', // hyphens + mixed case in both segments
-    '/s/x/p/z',
-  ];
-  const REJECT = [
-    'https://example.com/p/x', // scheme + host
-    'http://host/s/eng/p/abc', // scheme + host, even on the internal shape
-    '//host/s/eng/p/abc', // protocol-relative host
-    '/p/abc123', // space-less form (server does NOT backlink it)
-    'p/abc123', // relative
-    's/eng/p/abc123', // missing leading slash
-    '/s/eng/p/abc#section', // anchor
-    '/s/eng/p/abc?q=1', // query
-    '/s/eng/p/abc/extra', // extra segment
-    '/s//p/abc', // empty space segment
-    '/s/eng/p/', // empty slug
-    '/s/eng/p', // no slug at all
-    '/api/pages/abc', // other internal route
-    '/s/eng/x/abc', // wrong middle segment
-    '/s/a/b/p/abc', // space contains slash -> extra segment
-    '',
-  ];
-  // Structurally VALID `/s/<space>/p/<slug>` shapes whose ONLY defect is a
-  // forbidden character in the slug segment. These pin the slug charset
-  // `[a-zA-Z0-9-]` itself (not just the surrounding structure): drop them and a
-  // mutation widening the charset (e.g. adding `.`) survives the suite. Each is
-  // ALSO rejected by the server regex — documenting that the subset boundary
-  // holds precisely on the charset, not just on structure.
-  const REJECT_SLUG_CHARSET = [
-    '/s/eng/p/abc.def', // dot
-    '/s/eng/p/abc_def', // underscore
-    '/s/eng/p/abc%20', // percent-encoded space
-    '/s/eng/p/abc~x', // tilde
-  ];
-
-  it('accepts the space-qualified root-relative page path (+trailing slash)', () => {
-    for (const href of ACCEPT)
-      expect(isInternalPagePath(href), href).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  it('rejects external URLs, ambiguous, and non-page forms', () => {
-    for (const href of REJECT)
-      expect(isInternalPagePath(href), href).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  it('rejects a correctly-shaped path with a forbidden slug character', () => {
-    // Pins the slug charset itself: a mutation widening `[a-zA-Z0-9-]` reddens.
-    for (const href of REJECT_SLUG_CHARSET)
-      expect(isInternalPagePath(href), href).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  it('the forbidden-slug-char paths are rejected by the server regex too', () => {
-    // The subset boundary holds on the charset, not just the structure: none of
-    // these match the server regex, so the client must not accept them either.
-    for (const href of REJECT_SLUG_CHARSET)
-      expect(SERVER_INTERNAL_LINK_REGEX.test(href), href).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  it('rejects non-string input (fail-toward-external)', () => {
-    for (const v of [null, undefined, 123, {}, [], true])
-      expect(isInternalPagePath(v as unknown)).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  it('is a STRICT SUBSET of the server INTERNAL_LINK_REGEX', () => {
-    // Every accepted href must also satisfy the server regex (so it is
-    // guaranteed backlink-able / export-rewritable).
-    for (const href of ACCEPT)
-      expect(SERVER_INTERNAL_LINK_REGEX.test(href), href).toBe(true);
-  });
-});
-
-describe('markInternalLinks', () => {
-  const linkNode = (text: string, href: string, extraMarks: any[] = []) => ({
-    type: 'text',
-    text,
-    marks: [
-      {
-        type: 'link',
-        attrs: {
-          href,
-          internal: null,
-          title: null,
-          target: '_blank',
-          rel: 'noopener noreferrer nofollow',
-          class: null,
-        },
-      },
-      ...extraMarks,
-    ],
-  });
-
-  it('marks an internal-path link internal:true, target:null, rel:null', () => {
-    const doc = {
-      type: 'doc',
-      content: [
-        { type: 'paragraph', content: [linkNode('hi', '/s/eng/p/abc123')] },
-      ],
-    };
-    markInternalLinks(doc);
-    const m = linkMarks(doc)[0];
-    expect(m.attrs.internal).toBe(true);
-    expect(m.attrs.target).toBeNull();
-    expect(m.attrs.rel).toBeNull();
-    expect(m.attrs.href).toBe('/s/eng/p/abc123'); // href untouched
-  });
-
-  it('leaves external links untouched', () => {
-    const doc = {
-      type: 'doc',
-      content: [
-        {
-          type: 'paragraph',
-          content: [linkNode('ext', 'https://example.com/p/x')],
-        },
-      ],
-    };
-    markInternalLinks(doc);
-    const m = linkMarks(doc)[0];
-    expect(m.attrs.internal).toBeNull();
-    expect(m.attrs.target).toBe('_blank');
-    expect(m.attrs.rel).toBe('noopener noreferrer nofollow');
-  });
-
-  it('marks EVERY text node a multi-node link spans (incl. nested bold/italic)', () => {
-    // A link `[**bold** plain *ital*](/s/x/p/abc)` stores the link mark on each
-    // covered text node; some also carry bold/italic. All must become internal.
-    const bold = { type: 'bold' };
-    const italic = { type: 'italic' };
-    const doc = {
-      type: 'doc',
-      content: [
-        {
-          type: 'paragraph',
-          content: [
-            linkNode('bold', '/s/x/p/abc', [bold]),
-            linkNode(' plain ', '/s/x/p/abc'),
-            linkNode('ital', '/s/x/p/abc', [italic]),
-          ],
-        },
-      ],
-    };
-    markInternalLinks(doc);
-    const marks = linkMarks(doc);
-    expect(marks).toHaveLength(3);
-    for (const m of marks) {
-      expect(m.attrs.internal).toBe(true);
-      expect(m.attrs.target).toBeNull();
-      expect(m.attrs.rel).toBeNull();
-    }
-    // Nested bold/italic marks are preserved alongside the promoted link.
-    const nested = doc.content[0].content;
-    expect(nested[0].marks.some((m: any) => m.type === 'bold')).toBe(true);
-    expect(nested[2].marks.some((m: any) => m.type === 'italic')).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  it('is idempotent', () => {
-    const doc = {
-      type: 'doc',
-      content: [
-        { type: 'paragraph', content: [linkNode('hi', '/s/eng/p/abc')] },
-      ],
-    };
-    markInternalLinks(doc);
-    const once = JSON.stringify(doc);
-    markInternalLinks(doc);
-    expect(JSON.stringify(doc)).toBe(once);
-  });
-});
-
-describe('markdown import (full converter) — #522 acceptance', () => {
-  it('promotes an internal link and leaves an external one external', () => {
-    const doc = markdownToProseMirrorSync(
-      '[t](/s/eng/p/abc123) and [ext](https://example.com/p/x)',
-    );
-    const marks = linkMarks(doc);
-    const internal = marks.find((m) => m.attrs.href === '/s/eng/p/abc123');
-    const external = marks.find(
-      (m) => m.attrs.href === 'https://example.com/p/x',
-    );
-    expect(internal.attrs).toMatchObject({
-      internal: true,
-      target: null,
-      rel: null,
-    });
-    expect(external.attrs).toMatchObject({
-      internal: null,
-      target: '_blank',
-      rel: 'noopener noreferrer nofollow',
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('does NOT promote the space-less /p/<slug> form (documented limit)', () => {
-    const doc = markdownToProseMirrorSync('[t](/p/abc123)');
-    const m = linkMarks(doc)[0];
-    expect(m.attrs.internal).toBeNull();
-    expect(m.attrs.target).toBe('_blank');
-  });
-
-  it('the promoted link is backlink-extractable (matches server regex + true)', () => {
-    // Mirrors extractInternalLinkSlugIds: internal flag AND server-regex match.
-    const doc = markdownToProseMirrorSync('[t](/s/eng/p/my-page-abc123)');
-    const m = linkMarks(doc)[0];
-    expect(m.attrs.internal).toBe(true);
-    const match = m.attrs.href.match(SERVER_INTERNAL_LINK_REGEX);
-    expect(match).not.toBeNull();
-    // group 5 is the slug segment the server feeds to extractPageSlugId.
-    expect(match![5]).toBe('my-page-abc123');
-  });
-
-  it('comment-body markdown gets the same treatment (shared converter path)', () => {
-    // Comment bodies go through the same markdownToProseMirrorSync; a spot-check
-    // that the shared path (not a comment-only branch) does the promotion.
-    const doc = markdownToProseMirrorSync('see [here](/s/team/p/xyz789)');
-    const m = linkMarks(doc).find((x) => x.attrs.href === '/s/team/p/xyz789');
-    expect(m.attrs.internal).toBe(true);
-  });
-});
-
-describe('canonicalize — internal:false ≡ external (#522 §11)', () => {
-  it('drops editor-authored internal:false so external stays canonically equal', () => {
-    // Editor stores external links with internal:false; import leaves it absent.
-    const stored = {
-      type: 'doc',
-      content: [
-        {
-          type: 'paragraph',
-          content: [
-            {
-              type: 'text',
-              text: 'x',
-              marks: [
-                {
-                  type: 'link',
-                  attrs: {
-                    href: 'https://example.com',
-                    internal: false,
-                    target: '_blank',
-                    rel: 'noopener noreferrer nofollow',
-                  },
-                },
-              ],
-            },
-          ],
-        },
-      ],
-    };
-    const reimport = {
-      type: 'doc',
-      content: [
-        {
-          type: 'paragraph',
-          content: [
-            {
-              type: 'text',
-              text: 'x',
-              marks: [
-                {
-                  type: 'link',
-                  attrs: {
-                    href: 'https://example.com',
-                    internal: null, // import default
-                    target: '_blank',
-                    rel: 'noopener noreferrer nofollow',
-                  },
-                },
-              ],
-            },
-          ],
-        },
-      ],
-    };
-    expect(docsCanonicallyEqual(stored, reimport)).toBe(true);
-    // internal:false / target / rel all drop as defaults; only the non-default
-    // href survives.
-    const canon = canonicalizeContent(stored);
-    const mark = canon.content[0].content[0].marks[0];
-    expect(mark.attrs).toEqual({ href: 'https://example.com' });
-  });
-
-  it('keeps internal:true through canonicalization (non-default, load-bearing)', () => {
-    const doc = {
-      type: 'doc',
-      content: [
-        {
-          type: 'paragraph',
-          content: [
-            {
-              type: 'text',
-              text: 'x',
-              marks: [
-                {
-                  type: 'link',
-                  attrs: { href: '/s/x/p/abc', internal: true },
-                },
-              ],
-            },
-          ],
-        },
-      ],
-    };
-    const canon = canonicalizeContent(doc);
-    const mark = canon.content[0].content[0].marks[0];
-    expect(mark.attrs.internal).toBe(true);
-    expect(mark.attrs.href).toBe('/s/x/p/abc');
-  });
-});