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Author SHA1 Message Date
agent_coder 5b17503df7 docs(page): explain breadcrumb ancestors need no per-ancestor permission filter (#471)
getPageBreadCrumbs returns the full ancestor chain filtered only by
deletedAt; the /breadcrumbs endpoint validates validateCanView on the
target page only. Document why this is safe rather than an accepted leak:
page restrictions inherit down the tree, so viewing a page implies the
right to view every ancestor (canUserAccessPage checks the full ancestor
chain). A hidden ancestor would already hide the target itself, making
per-ancestor filtering redundant. Owner decision: document, no logic change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 05:58:48 +03:00
4 changed files with 31 additions and 139 deletions
@@ -818,6 +818,11 @@ export class PageController {
throw new NotFoundException('Page not found');
}
// Target-only validateCanView is intentional: getPageBreadCrumbs returns
// the full ancestor chain WITHOUT per-ancestor permission filtering. Safe
// because page restrictions inherit down the tree, so any ancestor the
// caller could not view would already hide the target here — see the
// getPageBreadCrumbs docstring / #471.
await this.pageAccessService.validateCanView(page, user);
return this.pageService.getPageBreadCrumbs(page.id);
@@ -1071,6 +1071,29 @@ export class PageService {
});
}
/**
* Walk the ancestor chain of `childPageId` up to the space root, filtered
* ONLY by `deletedAt` (+ MAX_PAGE_TREE_DEPTH) — WITHOUT per-ancestor
* permission filtering. Callers that expose this to a user (the
* `/breadcrumbs` endpoint) validate `validateCanView` on the TARGET page
* only, then return the whole chain of ancestor titles (#471).
*
* This is safe — NOT a title leak — because page restrictions inherit DOWN
* the tree: to view a page the caller must hold permission on EVERY
* restricted ancestor (`validateCanView` -> `canUserAccessPage` checks the
* full ancestor chain — see page-access.service.ts / page-permission.repo.ts
* `canUserEditPage`). A restricted ancestor the caller may not see would
* therefore already hide the TARGET page itself, so every ancestor reachable
* here is one the caller is already entitled to view (content stays gated
* regardless — getPage/getNode re-check permissions).
*
* Note the guarantee is the narrow "may view a descendant => may view its
* ancestors", NOT "space membership sees every page" — restricted subtrees do
* hide pages from members. Per-ancestor permission filtering here was
* considered and declined as redundant given the inheritance invariant above
* (#471). The same chain feeds the web-UI breadcrumb bar under identical CASL
* scope.
*/
async getPageBreadCrumbs(childPageId: string, trx?: KyselyTransaction) {
const ancestors = await dbOrTx(this.db, trx)
.withRecursive('page_ancestors', (db) =>
+3 -38
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@@ -1080,43 +1080,8 @@ export interface PreparedModel {
*/
export function prepareModel(inputXml: string): PreparedModel {
const rawModel = normalizeInput(inputXml);
// Auto-strip XML comments before linting. The model routinely inserts
// `<!-- ... -->` into the diagram XML despite the prohibition in the tool
// description; a hard [no-comments] lint failure would force it to regenerate
// the whole diagram (a wasted tool call). Comments carry no diagram semantics,
// so stripping them is always safe. The linter's no-comments rule stays as a
// defense-in-depth backstop for any path that reaches it without this strip.
//
// The strip is GATED on two conditions so the regex only ever targets real
// comment nodes:
// 1. Well-formedness. Well-formed XML forbids a bare `<` inside an attribute
// value (it must be entity-escaped, e.g. `&lt;!--`), so a literal `<!--`
// cannot hide in a value. On MALFORMED input (e.g. a raw unescaped `<!--`
// inside a value on the <mxGraphModel> create/update path, which
// normalizeInput passes through unparsed) we must NOT strip: truncating
// that value would silently corrupt the author's label. We leave it intact
// and let lintModel's value-escaping / well-formed-xml rules reject it so
// the author sees the real error.
// 2. No CDATA. A CDATA section is well-formed yet its text may contain a
// literal `<!-- ... -->` that is NOT a comment node; stripping it would
// silently delete author content. Real drawio labels live in `value=`
// attributes (CDATA impossible), so excluding CDATA is free on legitimate
// models; a CDATA-bearing model with a genuine comment then falls to the
// retained no-comments lint backstop (an explicit error) rather than being
// silently corrupted.
const { error: parseError } = parseXml(rawModel);
const hasCdata = rawModel.includes("<![CDATA[");
const commentMatches =
parseError === null && !hasCdata
? (rawModel.match(/<!--[\s\S]*?-->/g) ?? [])
: [];
const commentCount = commentMatches.length;
const strippedModel =
commentCount > 0 ? rawModel.replace(/<!--[\s\S]*?-->/g, "") : rawModel;
const stripWarnings =
commentCount > 0 ? [`stripped ${commentCount} XML comment(s)`] : [];
const { cells, warnings } = lintModel(strippedModel);
const modelXml = normalizeXml(strippedModel);
const { cells, warnings } = lintModel(rawModel);
const modelXml = normalizeXml(rawModel);
const bbox = computeBBox(cells);
const cellCount = cells.filter((c) => c.id !== "0" && c.id !== "1").length;
// Geometry quality warnings (non-blocking) are appended to any structural
@@ -1127,7 +1092,7 @@ export function prepareModel(inputXml: string): PreparedModel {
cells,
bbox,
cellCount,
warnings: [...stripWarnings, ...warnings, ...quality],
warnings: [...warnings, ...quality],
hash: mxHash(modelXml),
};
}
-101
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@@ -240,107 +240,6 @@ test("prepareModel: returns bbox, cellCount, hash and lints", () => {
assert.equal(p.hash, mxHash(normalizeXml(VALID_MODEL)));
});
// --- comment auto-strip (issue #505) ---------------------------------------
// The model organically inserts `<!-- ... -->` into diagram XML. prepareModel
// (the shared path for drawioCreate/drawioUpdate/drawioEditCells) strips them
// BEFORE the lint runs and reports the count as a non-blocking warning, so the
// model never hits a hard [no-comments] error and never regenerates the diagram.
test("prepareModel: strips XML comments, lint passes, warns with the count", () => {
const m =
'<mxGraphModel><root>' +
'<!-- header comment -->' +
'<mxCell id="0"/><mxCell id="1" parent="0"/>' +
'<mxCell id="2" value="Hello" vertex="1" parent="1">' +
'<!-- inline note -->' +
'<mxGeometry x="0" y="0" width="10" height="10" as="geometry"/></mxCell>' +
'</root></mxGraphModel>';
// Would fail [no-comments] if not stripped first.
const p = prepareModel(m);
// Comments are gone from the canonical model.
assert.ok(!p.modelXml.includes("<!--"));
assert.ok(!p.modelXml.includes("header comment"));
assert.ok(!p.modelXml.includes("inline note"));
// No [no-comments] error was raised (prepareModel returned instead of throwing).
// A single strip warning naming the count (2) is present.
assert.ok(p.warnings.includes("stripped 2 XML comment(s)"));
});
test("prepareModel: zero comments emits no strip warning", () => {
const p = prepareModel(VALID_MODEL);
assert.ok(!p.warnings.some((w) => w.startsWith("stripped")));
});
test("prepareModel: an entity-escaped <!-- inside a value is NOT stripped", () => {
const m =
'<mxGraphModel><root>' +
'<mxCell id="0"/><mxCell id="1" parent="0"/>' +
'<mxCell id="2" value="a &lt;!-- x --&gt; b" vertex="1" parent="1">' +
'<mxGeometry x="0" y="0" width="10" height="10" as="geometry"/></mxCell>' +
'</root></mxGraphModel>';
const p = prepareModel(m);
// Nothing was mistaken for a comment node.
assert.ok(!p.warnings.some((w) => w.startsWith("stripped")));
// The escaped sequence survives round-trip in the value.
const cell = p.cells.find((c) => c.id === "2");
assert.equal(cell.value, "a <!-- x --> b");
});
test("prepareModel: malformed input with a raw <!-- in a value is NOT stripped (no silent truncation)", () => {
// A literal, UNescaped `<!--` inside an attribute value makes the XML
// malformed (raw `<` is illegal in a value). The comment-strip is gated on
// well-formedness, so it must NOT touch this input — otherwise the author's
// label ` secret ` would be silently deleted and the corrupt diagram accepted.
// Instead lintModel's value-escaping / well-formed-xml rules must reject it.
const m =
'<mxGraphModel><root>' +
'<mxCell id="0"/><mxCell id="1" parent="0"/>' +
'<mxCell id="2" value="a <!-- secret --> b" vertex="1" parent="1">' +
'<mxGeometry x="0" y="0" width="10" height="10" as="geometry"/></mxCell>' +
'</root></mxGraphModel>';
const issues = issuesOf(() => prepareModel(m));
// Rejected (threw DrawioLintError) rather than silently accepted.
assert.ok(issues, "expected prepareModel to reject malformed input");
// By a real content rule, not swallowed by the strip.
assert.ok(
hasRule(issues, "value-escaping", "2") || hasRule(issues, "well-formed-xml"),
`expected value-escaping/well-formed-xml, got ${JSON.stringify(issues)}`,
);
});
test("prepareModel: a <!-- --> inside a CDATA section is NOT stripped (no silent corruption)", () => {
// A CDATA section is well-formed, so the well-formedness gate alone would let
// the regex delete a literal `<!-- x -->` living inside CDATA text — silent
// content loss with a false "stripped" success. The CDATA sub-gate must skip
// the strip; the model then hits the retained no-comments backstop (an explicit
// error) instead of being silently accepted with a strip warning.
const m =
'<mxGraphModel><root>' +
'<mxCell id="0"/><mxCell id="1" parent="0"/>' +
'<mxCell id="2" vertex="1" parent="1"><mxGeometry x="0" y="0" width="10" height="10" as="geometry"/>' +
'<foo><![CDATA[keep<!-- x -->keep]]></foo></mxCell>' +
'</root></mxGraphModel>';
const issues = issuesOf(() => prepareModel(m));
// Rejected (threw), not silently accepted with a strip warning.
assert.ok(issues, "expected prepareModel to reject rather than silently strip");
// The no-comments backstop caught the literal comment sequence.
assert.ok(
hasRule(issues, "no-comments"),
`expected no-comments backstop, got ${JSON.stringify(issues)}`,
);
});
test("no-comments rule still fires when a comment reaches the linter directly", () => {
// Defense-in-depth: prepareModel strips first, but lintModel itself (the
// backstop) must still reject a raw comment-bearing model.
const m =
'<mxGraphModel><root>' +
'<!-- unstripped --><mxCell id="0"/><mxCell id="1" parent="0"/>' +
'</root></mxGraphModel>';
const issues = issuesOf(() => lintModel(m));
assert.ok(hasRule(issues, "no-comments"));
});
// --- decode chain: plain -----------------------------------------------------
test("decode chain (plain): buildDrawioSvg -> decodeDrawioSvg round-trips byte-stable", () => {