- make addTreeNode receivers idempotent (invalidateOnCreatePage guard +
buildTree dedup) so the author's self-echo no longer duplicates the node
- broadcast realtime tree updates for bulk copy/duplicate and import via a
root refetch: PAGE_CREATED now carries spaceId and the WS listener falls
back to refetchRootTreeNodeEvent when no per-node snapshot is present
- remove the now-dead client-relay inbound path (isTreeEvent/handleTreeEvent)
that remained a stale-restriction-cache attack surface
- honest string|null cast for a root move's parent id
- add tests: buildTree dedup; onPageCreated per-node vs refetch branching
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolve conflicts with the independently-merged ai-agent-roles feature:
- ai-chat.module.ts: keep BOTH AiAgentRolesModule and the public-share
wiring (Share/Search modules, PublicShareChatController, services).
- ai.service.ts: take develop's getChatModel ChatModelOverride superset,
which already covers the public-share model-id-only override.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up fixes on the agent-roles feature:
- ai.service: a cross-driver override to the ollama driver (when the
workspace driver is not ollama) now fails with an explicit 503 instead
of silently reusing the workspace base URL, which belongs to a different
provider. Same-driver ollama and openai/gemini overrides are unchanged.
- migration: add a partial unique index on (workspace_id, name) WHERE
deleted_at IS NULL so role names are unique per workspace without
soft-deleted rows blocking re-creation; map Postgres 23505 to a 409
ConflictException on create/update.
- dto: validate the role id as @IsUUID instead of @IsString.
- roles list: do not expose instructions/modelConfig to non-admin members.
The list endpoint now returns a picker view (id/name/emoji/description/
enabled) to members and the full view only to admins (same gate as the
CRUD endpoints). Client IAiRole fields made optional accordingly.
Adds tests for the cross-driver-ollama throw, the 23505->409 mapping, and
the non-admin picker-view security invariant.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Integrate the already-merged step-limit work from develop. Only conflict was
ai-chat.service.spec.ts: both sides appended a describe block and edited the
import line. Resolved as a union — keep compactToolOutput + the assistantParts/
serializeSteps/rowToUiMessage suites (this branch) AND the prepareAgentStep
suite (develop), importing all symbols from ai-chat.service.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds explicit isIpAllowed cases for the CGNAT, ULA (fd00::/8) and IPv4-mapped
IPv6 loopback (::ffff:127.0.0.1) sample addresses from the parallel
safety-coverage branch. The mapped-loopback case is genuinely new (the existing
table only covered the mapped *private* variant); CGNAT and ULA ranges were
already covered with other samples and are kept here as explicit regression
guards for these specific addresses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Behaviour change (split out of the test commit per review, and now covered).
Both the stream onError log line and the error text streamed to the client were
formatted by separate inline blocks that only emitted "<status>: <message>".
Route both through the shared describeProviderError() so formatting stays in one
place.
BEHAVIOUR CHANGE: describeProviderError additionally appends a single-line,
300-char-truncated snippet of the provider responseBody/text. So the log line
AND the user-facing stream error now include that snippet (e.g. the HTML error
page from a misconfigured endpoint), which previously neither did. This is
intentional — it makes a misconfigured external endpoint diagnosable — and is
safe: the API key travels in the Authorization header and is never echoed in
the response body (see the util's docstring). A `fallback` param is added so
each call site keeps its own default ('AI stream error' for the stream).
Adds ai-error.util.spec.ts covering the formatter, including the appended /
truncated body snippet, so this behaviour is no longer untested.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Behaviour change (split out of the test commit per review).
In AI SDK v6 the useChat `onFinish` callback does NOT fire when the stream
errors. A brand-new chat whose very first turn fails would therefore never run
the post-turn path: the chat list was not invalidated and the client never
adopted the server-created chat id — so the failed chat only appeared in
history after a manual refresh (the server already creates the row and stores
the error message). Running the same `onTurnFinished()` handler on `onError`
makes the failed chat show up immediately. The error itself is still surfaced
to the user via the existing `error` state.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Unit tests for the safety-critical paths: crypto secret-box (round-trip,
tamper detection, wrong key), the SSRF guard (blocked ranges + DNS-rebinding),
the ai-chat tools service, the page-embedding repo, and the
assistant-parts/serialization helpers. Those server helpers (assistantParts,
rowToUiMessage, serializeSteps) are exported ONLY for the tests — no runtime
change.
Also: keyboard a11y on the chat history header and conversation rows
(role/tabIndex/Enter+Space), and DRY refactors that move shared logic into one
place (isToolPart -> tool-parts util; buildInitialValues in the MCP form).
The behaviour-changing edits that previously rode along in this commit are
split out into the following two commits, per review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Port two refinements from the GLM variant onto the Claude base:
- prepareAgentStep: add a comment note that AI SDK v7 renames the per-step
`system` field to `instructions` (v6 ^6.0.134 still uses `system`), so it
gets updated correctly on the next SDK bump.
- ai-chat.service.spec: add an explicit off-by-one boundary test for
prepareAgentStep, expressed via MAX_AGENT_STEPS instead of a hardcoded 18/19
so it tracks the constant if the cap changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Expand all kept the menu open (closeMenuOnClick={false}) while Collapse all
closed it. Make both close on click for consistent behavior, and drop the
now-pointless in-menu isExpanding loading state.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- extract collectAllIds / collectBranchIds into tree/utils and use them in
space-tree.tsx instead of inline closures
- drop the duplicate SidebarPageTreeDto, reuse the existing SidebarPageDto
for the /pages/tree endpoint
- type the getSpaceTree client call as api.post<{ items: IPage[] }>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Make the denser page-tree layout opt-in instead of hardcoded, so row
density can be toggled per deployment via the COMPACT_PAGE_TREE runtime
config flag.
- doc-tree: extract ROW_HEIGHT_STANDARD (32) / ROW_HEIGHT_COMPACT (26);
default the virtualizer row stride to STANDARD density.
- client: isCompactPageTreeEnabled() in lib/config (reads
COMPACT_PAGE_TREE, default true); used by space-tree and shared-tree
to choose the row height.
- server: EnvironmentService.isCompactPageTreeEnabled() and expose
COMPACT_PAGE_TREE through the window runtime config (static.module).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Release-cycle audit flagged WsService.invalidateSpaceRestrictionCache and
WsTreeService.notifyPageRestricted/notifyPermissionGranted as never-wired dead
code. Investigation: this community fork has NO page-permission grant/revoke/
restrict mutation site (the page-access repo mutators have zero callers — that
flow is EE / not yet built), so there is nothing to wire them into.
- Keep invalidateSpaceRestrictionCache (it's the one-line correctness primitive
the future permission-mutation path must call to avoid the 30s stale-cache
window) but document exactly that + add a test that it deletes only the
space-scoped cache key.
- Remove the untested, security-adjacent dead methods notifyPageRestricted /
notifyPermissionGranted and their now-orphaned helpers emitToUsers /
emitToSpaceExceptUsers (no remaining references; build confirms). A future
permission-change realtime feature can reintroduce them wired + tested.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Release-cycle review: the per-workspace cost cap was fixed-window + per-instance
(allowed ~2x at a window boundary and K*cap behind K instances) on an anonymous
endpoint that spends the owner's provider budget. Rewrite it as a sliding-window,
CLUSTER-WIDE Redis limiter: one atomic Lua EVAL does ZREMRANGEBYSCORE (age out)
-> ZCARD -> ZADD with PEXPIRE, so concurrent instances share one budget and the
true rate over any trailing window is <= cap. Fails OPEN on a Redis error (logged)
— it's a cost backstop, not access control (the funnel gates + per-IP throttle
still apply), so a Redis blip must not take the assistant offline. Per-IP @Throttle
kept; commented that it needs an XFF-rewriting trusted proxy to be meaningful.
Extract deriveShareAccess (resolvedShareId===requestedShareId + isSharingAllowed +
!restricted, equality-only, never widening) and filterShareTranscript into pure
helpers, and add tests: limiter sliding-window + boundary-burst + fail-open;
access derivation; and red-team boundary locks (cross-share/cross-workspace swap
rejected, forged shareId can't widen tool scope, transcript injection filtered).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Release-cycle test audit: the /mcp auth's constant-time token guard, IP keying,
ACCESS-type pinning, and brute-force message coupling were untested. Extract
behavior-preserving pure helpers so they're testable and cover them:
- sharedTokenMatches: length-mismatch early-returns before timingSafeEqual
(which throws on unequal lengths); equal-length uses timingSafeEqual; array
header -> first element; non-string -> false.
- clientIp: req.ip > socket > first XFF hop > 'unknown' (limiter keying).
- bindAccessJwtVerifier: verifyJwt pinned to JwtType.ACCESS (rejects REFRESH).
- CREDENTIALS_MISMATCH_MESSAGE single source of truth shared by
verifyUserCredentials and isCredentialsFailure, so a reworded auth error can't
silently disable the /mcp brute-force counter.
- verifyUserCredentials no-side-effect contract asserted via a TS-AST spec
(AuthService can't load under jest): its body has no createSessionAndToken/
audit/updateLastLogin while login() has all three.
Extractions are behavior-preserving (reviewed); class delegates to the helpers,
dead code + unused imports removed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Release-cycle test audit found the role feature's security-critical paths
untested. Adds real unit tests (against the actual functions):
- resolveRoleForRequest invariants: role comes from chat.roleId not body.roleId
(no per-turn swap), lookup scoped to workspace.id, disabled/soft-deleted role
-> null, new-chat uses body.roleId, stale chatId falls back.
- CASL admin gate: non-admin create/update/delete -> Forbidden and service not
called; admin delegates with workspace.id; list() is member-reachable.
- roleModelOverride: unknown driver dropped (never reaches getChatModel's
throwing default), valid override passes through, blanks ignored.
- getChatModel override success path (cross-driver fetch + decrypt; chatModel-
only reuse), and service update/remove cross-workspace 'not found' guards +
modelConfig tri-state.
Tiny fix: findByCreator badge left-join now also requires enabled=true, so a
disabled role (downgraded to universal by resolveRoleForRequest) no longer shows
a misleading chat-list badge.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Release-cycle review: update() re-read the role via findById (filters
deleted_at IS NULL) and passed it straight to toView(updated as AiAgentRole).
A concurrent soft-delete between the UPDATE and the re-fetch makes findById
return undefined, and toView(undefined) dereferences row.id -> opaque 500. Add
the same 'Role not found' guard remove() already uses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Comments panel was sparse: 12px inner/outer paddings per thread, a
16px gap between avatar and body, body text at the global 16px ProseMirror
size. On a narrow aside column this ate vertical space - few comments per
screen, lots of air.
Tighten strictly inside features/comment (the shared aside frame is left
untouched, so TOC/Details tabs keep their padding):
- Thread Paper: p='sm'->p='xs', mb='sm'->mb='xs' (12->10px).
- Reply-editor Divider: my={4}->my={2}.
- CommentListItem outer Box: pb='xs'->pb={6}; the header Group
(avatar + body) gains gap='xs' (16->10px).
- Font hierarchy: author name sm->xs (14->12px, fw=500 kept), selection
quote sm->xs; comment body via a scoped CSS override on
.commentEditor .ProseMirror: font-size sm (14px) + line-height 1.4,
margin-top 10->4. The page editor is unaffected (the override is
scoped to the comment editor module).
- Selection quote padding 8->6, margin-top 4->2.
- Dropped the unused .wrapper rule (no references).
Release-cycle review found two move-path issues:
- Remote moves were placed at index:0 (broadcastPageMoved hardcodes index:0),
so every observer rendered the moved node at the TOP of its new siblings
until refetch. Client moveTreeNode now places by fractional position
(treeModel.placeByPosition, mirroring addTreeNode/insertByPosition) and
applies the payload's pageData (title->name, icon, hasChildren) so receivers
keep the node correct.
- Moving a page under a restricted ancestor left a stale named node (title/
slugId/icon) in the trees of users who lost visibility. broadcastPageMoved
now derives one FRESH hasRestrictedAncestor decision and drives both paths
from it: when restricted, the move goes to authorized users only
(emitToAuthorizedUsers, not the space-cache-gated emitTreeEvent) and a
compensating deleteTreeNode goes to the unauthorized complement (same fresh
getUserIdsWithPageAccess set) — disjoint, no stale-cache window. Non-restricted
moves are unchanged (one moveTreeNode to the room).
Follow-up (noted): invalidateSpaceRestrictionCache is still unwired at
permission-mutation sites; the open-space fast path can lag up to the 30s TTL,
but the move/delete consistency above no longer depends on it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The PasswordInput for each endpoint API key (Chat / LLM, Embeddings,
Voice / STT) used to show Mantine's built-in visibility toggle (the
'eye') plus a separate 'Clear' link below the field. The eye is useless
here: the key field is a write-only buffer, the stored key never loads
back (the server only returns hasApiKey), so clicking the eye reveals an
empty buffer.
Replace it with a Clear ActionIcon in the field's right section. Passing
a custom rightSection suppresses the built-in eye (Mantine). The Clear
action appears ONLY when a key is stored AND the buffer is empty
(has*ApiKey && form.values.*ApiKey.length === 0); as soon as the user
starts typing a new key, the rightSection falls back to undefined and
the default eye returns - now it is useful (verify what was typed).
After Clear, the handler sets has*ApiKey=false, so the rightSection
flips back too. Self-consistent.
The old Stack wrapper and Anchor 'Clear' link are gone; Anchor is
removed from the @mantine/core import (no remaining usages). The Clear
icon-only button carries type='button' (never submits) and an
aria-label. The two-column 'Model | API key' layout and the write-only
buffer/handler semantics are unchanged.
The header dot on each AI endpoint card (Chat / LLM, Embeddings, Voice /
STT) used to reflect the last 'Test endpoint' probe result - green/red/
gray. That was misleading: a configured-and-enabled endpoint showed GRAY
until someone manually clicked 'Test endpoint'. The dot now reads as the
endpoint's health at a glance, derived synchronously from the live form
values + the workspace feature toggle - never from a network probe.
Four-state model (resolveCardStatus):
ready (green) - configured AND enabled
configured (yellow) - configured but the feature toggle is OFF
off (gray) - not configured (nothing to enable)
warning (orange) - enabled but not configured (a real misconfig:
the feature is on but will not work; surfaced
instead of hidden under gray)
'configured' = model field non-empty AND a base URL available (own OR
inherited from chat for embeddings/STT). The API key is optional - local
servers (Ollama, speaches) work without one. Source of truth is the live
form.values so the dot reacts as the admin types; the persistent feature
toggles drive the enabled axis. The 'Test endpoint' probe result stays
as text under the button - it just no longer paints the dot.
A Tooltip with a human-readable label wraps the dot so the state is not
color-only (colorblind-friendly). resolveCardStatus is exported and
covered by a Vitest spec (4 cases, including the misconfig branch).
Release-cycle review found the /mcp Basic path skipped the controller's
pre-token gates and over-eagerly minted sessions:
- SSO/MFA bypass (blocker): the Basic path called AuthService.login/
verifyUserCredentials directly, but validateSsoEnforcement + the lazy EE MFA
gate live in AuthController.login. Now enforceBasicLoginGate runs in the Basic
branch BEFORE any token is minted: validateSsoEnforcement(workspace) (reject
on enforced SSO) and the same lazy-require MFA check the controller uses
(reject MFA users -> 'use a Bearer access token'). No EE module bundled (this
fork) -> no MFA gate, identical to the controller; a throw from the check
fails closed (no token). Bearer/service-account paths are not gated (those
JWTs are minted post-gate).
- Non-init session mint: isSessionInit is now (no mcp-session-id) AND the body
is a real JSON-RPC initialize (isInitializeRequestBody). A header-less
non-initialize request takes the side-effect-free verifyCredentials path -> no
user_sessions row, no USER_LOGIN audit, no lastLoginAt bump.
- FailedLoginLimiter.sweep() now runs on an unref'd 60s interval, cleared on
module destroy (was never scheduled -> unbounded Map growth under XFF rotation).
- Subsequent (non-init) valid login no longer resets the global per-email brute
bucket (only per-IP / per-IP+email); the email backstop is reset only on a
deliberate init login.
Note: in a hypothetical EE build, checkMfaRequirements is called with no
FastifyReply (we only read requirement flags); a res-dereferencing EE impl would
surface as a clean rejection (fail-closed), not a bypass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Release-cycle red-team found getShareForPage joins only the shares table, so it
does not exclude restricted descendants. The public share VIEW (getSharedPage)
compensates with hasRestrictedAncestor, but the assistant's getSharePage tool
and the controller funnel did not — so an anonymous caller could read a
restricted descendant's content (tool) or surface its title into the system
prompt (funnel) within an includeSubPages share.
- getSharePage: after the share-membership check and before returning content,
reject with the generic 'not part of this published share' message when
hasRestrictedAncestor(page.id) is true (page.id is the resolved UUID, so
slugId inputs work). Inject PagePermissionRepo.
- funnel: resolve the OPENED page to its UUID and treat a restricted opened page
as not-in-share (same uniform 404, fail closed if unresolvable) so its title
never reaches buildShareSystemPrompt.
search/list already exclude restricted subtrees (getPageAndDescendantsExcludingRestricted),
so these were the only two bypasses. Generic messages keep restricted
indistinguishable from not-in-share.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The sidebar page tree only updated on other clients when a change was made
via the UI tree, in an open tab, within a ~50ms client relay window — API/MCP/
AI/import changes never propagated. Move the source of truth to the server.
Server:
- Enrich PageEvent with thin TreeNodeSnapshot(s) so the WS listener never reads
the DB (avoids the in-transaction visibility race). insertPage fills the
create snapshot from its returning() row; removePage ships only the deleted
subtree ROOT (client treeModel.remove drops descendants); restorePage carries
spaceId.
- New PAGE_MOVED event from movePage with old/new parent + position + snapshot
(generic PAGE_UPDATED stays for content/rename).
- WsService.emitTreeEvent mirrors emitCommentEvent (per-space restriction gate:
spaceHasRestrictions -> hasRestrictedAncestor -> broadcastToAuthorizedUsers);
author NOT excluded so non-UI creators see their own page (receiver is
idempotent).
- WsTreeService.broadcastPageCreated/Deleted/Moved + broadcastRefetchRoot;
new PageWsListener (create/delete/move/restore) registered in WsModule.
Client:
- Remove the client relay (emit + setTimeout(50)) from create/move/delete;
keep optimistic local updates. Make the optimistic create insert id-idempotent
(find-then-skip) so the now-fast server addTreeNode broadcast can't race it
into a duplicate row. addTreeNode inserts by fractional position among loaded
siblings (consistent order across clients).
Restore uses refetchRootTreeNodeEvent (robust for subtree re-attach). Rename/icon
updateOne and cross-space move realtime are deferred (commented as follow-ups).
Implements docs/backlog/realtime-tree-server-authoritative.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lets an unauthenticated viewer of a published share ask an AI scoped strictly
to that share's page tree. The authenticated agent is untouched; the security
boundary is the tool scope (no identity), and nothing is persisted.
Server:
- workspace toggle settings.ai.publicShareAssistant (default off) +
optional settings.ai.provider.publicShareChatModel (cheap model id; reuses
the chat driver/baseUrl/key). getChatModel(workspaceId, override) substitutes
only the model id, falling back to chatModel.
- POST /api/shares/ai/stream (@Public, SSE). Guardrail funnel, each failing
before streaming: toggle off -> 404; share missing/wrong-workspace/sharing
off -> 404; pageId not in share tree -> 404; provider unconfigured -> 503;
per-IP (5/min) and per-workspace (300/h, IP-independent) rate limits -> 429.
Uniform 404s never confirm a private page's existence.
- forShare read-only in-process toolset: searchSharePages (existing shareId
FTS branch, no spaceId/userId), getSharePage (getShareForPage gate +
share.id check, content via the public sanitizer), listSharePages. No write/
comment/history/cross-space/external-MCP tools.
- Locked share system prompt + immutable safety block; stepCountIs(5).
- /shares/page-info exposes an aiAssistant flag (gated behind isSharingAllowed).
Client: an ephemeral, text-only Ask-AI widget on the public shared page,
shown only when the flag is set; useChat -> /api/shares/ai/stream,
credentials omit. Admin toggle + model field in Settings -> AI.
Also adds a jest moduleNameMapper for src/-rooted imports (fixes pre-existing
unresolvable specs; additive).
Implements docs/public-share-assistant-plan.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The embedded MCP server acted as a single service account; now each /mcp
session authenticates as the current user, so tools run under that user's
CASL and edits attribute to them.
- HTTP Basic (chosen path): Authorization: Basic email:password, validated
server-side via AuthService; the session carries the issued user JWT (not
the raw password). Password may contain ':' (split on first only).
- Bearer fallback: Authorization: Bearer <access JWT>, verified as ACCESS and
additionally checked for an active session + non-disabled user (matching
JwtStrategy), so revoked/disabled users are rejected.
- Service account stays as an optional fallback (no creds + env configured).
- packages/mcp createMcpHttpHandler accepts a per-request config resolver
(back-compat: static config / stdio unchanged); identity is bound to the
mcp-session-id at init and re-validated from the caller's own credentials on
every request (anti session-fixation: a guessed session id can't be reused
without matching creds).
- A full login (session + audit) happens only once at session init; later
requests re-verify credentials via a new non-side-effecting
AuthService.verifyUserCredentials (no session/audit spam).
- Failed-login limiter (5/60s, keyed per-IP, per-IP+email, and per-email so IP
rotation can't brute one account) since direct login bypasses the controller
throttler. Only real credential failures count.
- MCP_TOKEN shared guard moved off Authorization to an X-MCP-Token header
(timing-safe compare); credsConfigured 503 gate replaced by a clear 401.
- No secrets logged; all auth resolved before res.hijack() so failures return
clean 401 JSON. .env.example marks the service account optional.
Implements docs/backlog/mcp-per-user-auth.md (variant L).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reusable, workspace-shared agent roles for the built-in AI chat. A role is
a named persona (system-prompt instructions) + optional model override; a
chat is bound to a role at creation and applies it every turn.
Backend:
- migration 20260620T120000: ai_agent_roles table + ai_chats.role_id
(FK ON DELETE SET NULL); hand-merged types into db.d.ts/entity.types.ts
(db.d.ts is hand-curated here, full codegen would clobber it).
- core/ai-chat/roles: CRUD module. list = any workspace member; create/
update/delete = admin (Manage Settings ability, like ai-settings/mcp).
All repo queries scoped by workspace_id; soft-delete (deleted_at).
- buildSystemPrompt gains roleInstructions: role REPLACES the persona base
(admin prompt / DEFAULT_PROMPT) but SAFETY_FRAMEWORK + context are always
still appended.
- stream(): role resolved from ai_chats.role_id for existing chats (never
the request body -> no per-turn role swap); body.roleId only on creation.
Disabled (enabled=false) and soft-deleted roles fall back to universal.
- getChatModel(workspaceId, override): role model_config can swap model id /
driver; a driver without configured creds throws 503 with a clear message
naming the driver+role, resolved BEFORE response hijack.
Client:
- new-chat role picker (enabled roles only, default Universal assistant),
roleId sent only on the first message; role badge (emoji+name) in the chat
header and conversation list; admin Agent-roles management section in
Settings -> AI (add/edit/delete, MCP-form pattern).
Tests: ai-chat.prompt.spec (role layering + safety always present, incl.
jailbreak); ai.service.spec (override on unconfigured driver -> 503).
Implements docs/ai-agent-roles-plan.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A narrow research question could burn all 8 steps on tool calls and end the
turn with no assistant text (empty turn). Two changes:
- MAX_AGENT_STEPS = 20 (was a magic stepCountIs(8)) so multi-search turns
aren't cut off mid-investigation.
- prepareStep reserves the LAST allowed step for a text-only synthesis:
toolChoice 'none' + a FINAL_STEP_INSTRUCTION appended to (not replacing)
the system prompt, so a tool-heavy turn always ends with a real answer.
Logic extracted into the pure, exported prepareAgentStep(stepNumber, system)
for unit testing; earlier steps return undefined (default behavior).
Implements docs/backlog/ai-chat-step-limit-and-forced-final-answer.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a server-authoritative whole-tree endpoint and sidebar menu commands
so a deep space tree can be expanded in one request instead of a per-level
BFS storm.
Server:
- POST /pages/tree (SidebarPageTreeDto: spaceId | pageId), same CASL space
scoping as /sidebar-pages. Returns the whole space tree / subtree as a flat
list in the sidebar item shape (id, slugId, title, icon, position,
parentPageId, spaceId, hasChildren, canEdit), ordered by position
(collate C byte order), content never fetched.
- page.service.getSidebarPagesTree reproduces getSidebarPages' two-branch
permission model: open space -> spaceCanEdit; restricted space -> seed the
full descendant set then prune via filterAccessibleTreePages +
filterAccessiblePageIdsWithPermissions (keeps restricted-but-granted pages,
prunes inaccessible subtrees). hasChildren is derived from the final
filtered set so it can never reveal inaccessible children.
- page.repo.getSpaceDescendants: recursive CTE seeded by space roots.
Client:
- SpaceTree is forwardRef exposing expandAll/collapseAll/isExpanding;
expandAll fetches the whole tree once, replaces current-space nodes, opens
every branch (current space only), aborts on space switch, surfaces real
errors; collapseAll collapses only current-space ids (shared open-map).
- SpaceMenu gains Expand all / Collapse all items (no admin gate).
Implements docs/backlog/tree-expand-collapse-all.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
These import paths relied on the private EE module that was deleted from
the repo. In the community build they either threw 'enterprise license'
(DOCX/PDF) or silently no-op'd (Confluence). The frontend buttons were
already removed in 38064064; this cleans up the dead backend stubs.
- import.service.ts: drop processDocx/processPdf methods, their dispatcher
branches, the pageId computation + insertPage spread, and the now-unused
moduleRef param/ModuleRef import
- file-import-task.service.ts: drop the Confluence branch and the now-unused
moduleRef param/ModuleRef import
- import.controller.ts: restrict file extensions to .md/.html and zip
sources to generic/notion; update the error message accordingly
- file.utils.ts: remove Confluence from the FileImportSource enum
- features.ts: remove the unused CONFLUENCE_IMPORT/DOCX_IMPORT/PDF_IMPORT
feature keys
The isConfluenceImport logic in import-attachment.service.ts is intentionally
left in place (real shared attachment-parsing code, not a stub); its removal
is a separate, riskier refactor.
The two catch blocks in importPage() threw an opaque "Error processing file
content" / "Failed to create imported page" BadRequest, hiding the real cause
from the HTTP response. This made a production 400 regression impossible to
diagnose without server log access, and violated the project convention that
errors must never be swallowed.
Extract `${err.name}: ${err.message}` into both the log (full err object kept
for the stack) and the thrown BadRequestException. Inner processMarkdown/
processHTML rethrowing catches and the EE processDocx/processPdf license
catches are left unchanged.
Local reproduction of the happy-dom 14->20 theory failed (full import chain
+ 22 edge cases pass on happy-dom@20.8.9), so the root cause is still pending
the now-visible reason from a recurring 400. Diagnostic script test-import.tsx
added; backlog doc updated with findings.
- Remove automatic panel opening in handleAddComment
- Remove automatic panel opening in handleAddReadOnlyComment
- Keep panel open on click for existing comments in editor
Reduce DocTree row stride from 32px to 26px for a denser sidebar tree,
and fix the selection/hover highlight that looked unbalanced at the
tighter spacing.
Root causes:
- The virtualized <li> had no explicit height, so `.node`'s height:100%
collapsed to content height; combined with the asymmetric
`[role="treeitem"] { padding-bottom: 2px }` rule, row content was
pushed to the top of the highlight pill (icon glued to the top edge).
- NodeMenu / CreateNode action icons used the default Mantine ActionIcon
size (md = 28px), overflowing the tighter 26px row stride onto
neighbouring rows.
Changes:
- doc-tree.tsx: rowHeight 32 -> 26; give each row <li> a definite
height = rowHeight.
- tree.module.css: rowWrapper fills the slot (height:100%); node pill is
inset and vertically centered (height: calc(100% - 4px)); drop the
asymmetric [role="treeitem"] padding-bottom.
- space-tree-node-menu.tsx / space-tree-row.tsx: action icons size={20}.
- share.module.css: drop now-dead .treeNode padding-bottom override.
Verified in an isolated browser harness: highlight content is centered
(2.8/2.8px) and nothing overflows the row stride.
Reduce the recent/favorites/created-by-me list tables from
verticalSpacing="sm" (12px Td padding) to a numeric 6px, removing
~12px of extra height per row so the home page lists pack closer
together. The shared RecentChanges table also drives the space home
view, so both stay consistent.
Drop the Overview home link that sat between the space switcher and
the Pages section in the authenticated space sidebar. Remove the JSX
block and clean up the now-unused imports (UnstyledButton, IconHome,
useLocation, getSpaceUrl) and the local `location` variable.
Reduce DocTree default rowHeight from 32px to 26px so sidebar page
tree rows pack closer together. The virtualizer uses rowHeight as the
row stride (estimateSize + translateY), and row content is only ~22px
tall, so the previous 32px left an ~8px gap between nodes. Both the
space tree and the shared (public) tree inherit the default, so both
become denser and stay consistent.
Rework the space sidebar:
- remove the "New page" and "Search" menu items (search stays in the app
header; page creation stays via the "+" button in the Pages section)
- move "Space settings" into a gear icon next to the current space name
- drop the searchable space popover and render all spaces as an
always-visible grid of fixed-width cards (icon + name), several per row,
sorted alphabetically, with the active space highlighted
- always inject the active space into the grid so it stays highlightable
even when the user has more than the 100-space API page limit
The shared SpaceSelect component is left untouched (still used by the
move/copy page modals).
list_pages gains an opt-in `tree` parameter on both surfaces (the
@docmost/mcp server tool and the AI-chat agent tool), which share the
same DocmostClient.listPages. Default behavior (recent-by-updatedAt flat
list) is unchanged.
- client.ts: listPages(spaceId?, limit=50, tree=false); when tree is
true it requires spaceId (throws a specific error otherwise), walks the
sidebar tree via the existing bounded/cycle-safe enumerateSpacePages,
and returns a nested tree; limit is ignored in tree mode.
- lib/tree.ts: new pure buildPageTree() — lean nodes { id, slugId, title,
children? }, children sorted by position (code-unit order), orphans
promoted to roots, cycle-safe.
- index.ts + ai-chat-tools.service.ts: expose `tree` in the tool schemas
and descriptions; docmost-client.loader.ts: mirror the new signature.
- tests: add packages/mcp/test/unit/tree.test.mjs (nesting, ordering,
lean shape, orphan promotion, cycle/self-reference safety).
- rebuild @docmost/mcp (build/ is tracked and loaded at runtime).
Wrap the logo link and the APP_VERSION text into a single bottom-aligned
Group so they read as one lockup ("gitmost v0.9..."). Move the version
styling into a new .brandVersion CSS class: shrink it from 12px to 10px,
keep the dimmed color and selectability, and lift it via margin-bottom so
its text baseline sits on the wordmark baseline of the 30px desktop logo
(derived from the logo SVG geometry). Drop the redundant lh prop.
The transcript force-scrolled to the bottom on every streamed delta because
the auto-scroll effect ran unconditionally whenever the messages array identity
changed. Scrolling up to read earlier messages was impossible — each token
yanked the view back down.
Implement a "stick to bottom" pattern in MessageList:
- track whether the viewport is pinned to the bottom via a scroll listener
(pinnedToBottomRef, BOTTOM_THRESHOLD = 40px);
- only auto-scroll while pinned; a freshly sent user message always re-pins;
- attach the scroll listener via a [hasScrollArea] dependency so a brand-new
empty chat (whose ScrollArea mounts only after the first message) wires it up;
- guard the effect's own scrollTop write (programmaticScrollRef) so it is not
misread as a user scroll.
The floating AI-chat header badge summed metadata.usage (AI SDK
totalUsage, all steps) across every assistant row, showing the
cumulative tokens SPENT — which grows each turn as history is re-sent.
Replace it with the conversation's CURRENT context size.
- server: persist metadata.contextTokens in streamText onFinish from the
final-step `usage` (inputTokens + outputTokens ≈ current context
window occupancy); keep usage: totalUsage for back-compat/fallback
- client: derive the badge from the most recent assistant row's
contextTokens (fallback to that row's usage total for older chats)
instead of summing all rows
- types: add metadata.contextTokens to IAiChatMessageRow
- i18n: rename badge label "Tokens used in this chat" -> "Current
context size" (en-US)
No DB migration needed (metadata is a JSON column).
