Merge remote-tracking branch 'gitea/develop' into feat/492-incremental-render

This commit is contained in:
2026-07-12 05:34:07 +03:00
69 changed files with 4069 additions and 430 deletions
+10
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@@ -251,6 +251,16 @@ MCP_DOCMOST_PASSWORD=
# Default 120000 (2 min).
# AI_MCP_CALL_TIMEOUT_MS=120000
# Kill-switch for the agent API-key feature (#501). Default ON when unset — a
# deploy that never sets it must NOT silently kill every agent. STRICT parse:
# only the literals `true` / `false` are accepted; a typo like `=0`/`=off`/`=False`
# FAILS AT BOOT by design (never silently read as "enabled"), so the switch is
# guaranteed to actually flip when an operator flips it during an incident. When
# set to `false`: all api-key auth is DENIED (every api-key token is rejected) and
# the api-key management endpoints return 404. The resolved state is logged at boot
# (`API keys: ENABLED/DISABLED (API_KEYS_ENABLED=...)`) so it is verifiable per deploy.
# API_KEYS_ENABLED=true
# Max JSON/urlencoded request body size (bytes). Fastify's 1 MiB default is too
# small for a long AI-chat research turn: the client resends the FULL message
# history (every tool call + search result) on each turn, so a deep conversation's
+7
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@@ -226,6 +226,13 @@ jobs:
- name: Build mcp
run: pnpm --filter @docmost/mcp build
# apps/server imports @docmost/token-estimate at runtime (history-budget.ts,
# #490); its dist/ is gitignored and `test:e2e` type-checks + runs the code,
# so build it here or tsc fails with TS2307 Cannot find module
# '@docmost/token-estimate' (mirrors the editor-ext / mcp build steps above).
- name: Build token-estimate
run: pnpm --filter @docmost/token-estimate build
- name: Run migrations
run: pnpm --filter ./apps/server migration:latest
+8
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@@ -159,6 +159,14 @@ jobs:
- name: Build prosemirror-markdown
run: pnpm --filter @docmost/prosemirror-markdown build
# @docmost/token-estimate is a shared workspace package the client vitest
# suite resolves via its dist build (main: ./dist/index.js); dist/ is
# gitignored and `pnpm -r test` does NOT honour nx `dependsOn: ^build`, so
# build it before the recursive test run or the client suite fails with
# "Failed to resolve import '@docmost/token-estimate'" (#490).
- name: Build token-estimate
run: pnpm --filter @docmost/token-estimate build
- name: Run unit tests
run: pnpm -r test
+26
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@@ -135,6 +135,13 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
new resync path re-reads the live anchor so the suggestion applies against the
current text, and orphaned anchors (whose marked run was deleted) are
reconciled rather than left blocking. (#496)
- **Save intentional page versions.** Press `Cmd/Ctrl+S` (or use the page menu)
to save a named version of a page. The history panel now distinguishes
intentional versions (a "Saved" / "Agent version" badge) from automatic
snapshots, dims autosaves, and offers an "Only versions" filter. Automatic
snapshots switched from a fixed interval to a trailing idle-flush with a
max-wait ceiling, and a boundary snapshot is pinned whenever the editing source
changes (e.g. a person's edits followed by the AI agent). (#370)
- **Place several images side by side in a row.** A new "Inline (side by
side)" alignment mode in the image bubble menu renders consecutive inline
@@ -385,6 +392,25 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
`@docmost/token-estimate` package) so they can never diverge. Deferred-tool
activation is also cached in the chat metadata to avoid re-resolving it each
turn. (#490)
- **Cyrillic (and any non-ASCII) draw.io labels no longer turn into mojibake
when a diagram is opened in the draw.io editor.** Agent-created diagrams
(`drawioCreate`) and Confluence-imported diagrams stored their model in the
SVG's `content=` attribute as base64; the draw.io editor decodes that via
Latin-1 `atob` (no UTF-8 step), so every non-ASCII char (e.g. `Старт-бит`,
`ё`, ``) split into garbage and the editor's autosave then persisted the
corrupted model, breaking the page preview too. Both write paths
(`buildDrawioSvg`, the import service's `createDrawioSvg`) now write `content=`
as XML-entity-escaped mxfile XML — draw.io's own native form, decoded by the
DOM as UTF-8 — so labels open intact. The decoder reads both the new
entity-encoded form and the old base64 form, so existing diagrams still open.
*Healing pre-fix diagrams:* only a diagram that still holds its original
(correct-UTF-8) base64 — i.e. one not yet opened/autosaved in the draw.io
editor — can be repaired in place by `drawioGet` → `drawioUpdate` with the
same XML (rewrites the attachment in the new form); no migration script is
needed. A diagram that was already opened in the editor persisted the
mojibake at rest, so `drawioGet` reads the already-corrupted text and
`drawioUpdate` faithfully rewrites it — that text is lost and is not
recoverable by a rewrite. (#507)
- **A chat with one malformed message part no longer 500s on every turn, and a
failed send no longer duplicates the user's message.** Incoming client parts
are now whitelisted to `text` (a forged tool-result part can no longer reach
+8
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@@ -59,6 +59,14 @@ COPY --from=builder /app/packages/mcp/data /app/packages/mcp/data
COPY --from=builder /app/packages/prosemirror-markdown/build /app/packages/prosemirror-markdown/build
COPY --from=builder /app/packages/prosemirror-markdown/package.json /app/packages/prosemirror-markdown/package.json
# apps/server imports @docmost/token-estimate (workspace:*) at runtime
# (history-budget.ts, #490). tsc emits only dist/ and dist/ is gitignored, so the
# prod install would resolve a broken workspace symlink and the server would die
# with ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND on the first history-budget call. Ship the built
# package + its manifest, mirroring prosemirror-markdown above.
COPY --from=builder /app/packages/token-estimate/dist /app/packages/token-estimate/dist
COPY --from=builder /app/packages/token-estimate/package.json /app/packages/token-estimate/package.json
# Copy root package files
COPY --from=builder /app/package.json /app/package.json
COPY --from=builder /app/pnpm*.yaml /app/
+131
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@@ -206,6 +206,137 @@ start the new migrations apply on top of your existing schema (`CREATE EXTENSION
existing pages are indexed on their next edit. pgvector is still required for the migration to
apply at all.
## Local embeddings server
The AI agent's semantic (RAG) search needs an **embeddings model**. Instead of paying a cloud
provider (e.g. OpenAI `text-embedding-3-*`) to embed every page, you can run a small open-weights
model yourself with Hugging Face
[Text Embeddings Inference](https://github.com/huggingface/text-embeddings-inference) (TEI), which
serves an OpenAI-compatible `/v1/embeddings` endpoint. `intfloat/multilingual-e5-small` is a good
default: multilingual, 384-dim, and comfortable on CPU (~1–2 GB RAM, 1–2 vCPU). Point Gitmost at it
under **Workspace settings → AI → Embeddings**.
### Option A — local (same Docker network as Gitmost)
Run TEI as a container on the network Gitmost is already on. The port is never published, so the
endpoint stays internal and needs no authentication.
```yaml
services:
embeddings:
image: ghcr.io/huggingface/text-embeddings-inference:cpu-1.9 # pin version; use a cuda-* tag for GPU
container_name: embeddings
restart: unless-stopped
networks:
- gitmost_net # same network Gitmost is on
command:
- "--model-id"
- "intfloat/multilingual-e5-small"
- "--auto-truncate" # clamp over-long inputs instead of returning 413
volumes:
- tei-models:/data # weights are downloaded once and cached here
networks:
gitmost_net:
external: true # the network Gitmost already uses
volumes:
tei-models:
```
Gitmost settings (**Workspace settings → AI → Embeddings**):
| Field | Value |
|-------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Model | `intfloat/multilingual-e5-small` |
| Base URL | `http://embeddings:80/v1/` |
| Embedding API key | — (leave empty) |
> `embeddings` is the container name — Gitmost resolves it over DNS inside the Docker network.
> The port is not published, so the endpoint is reachable only by containers on that network and
> no authorization is required.
### Option B — separate host (public via Traefik + Let's Encrypt)
This assumes the host already runs Traefik with an ACME resolver (the example below uses
`letsEncrypt`, the `websecure` entrypoint and a shared `docker_main_net` network). Replace the
domain / network / resolver with your own.
**DNS:** add an A record `embeddings.example.com` → the IP of your Traefik host (same
challenge / port 80 as the rest of your sites).
```yaml
services:
embeddings:
image: ghcr.io/huggingface/text-embeddings-inference:cpu-1.9 # pin version; cuda-* tag for GPU
container_name: embeddings
restart: unless-stopped
networks:
- docker_main_net # the network Traefik is attached to
command:
- "--model-id"
- "intfloat/multilingual-e5-small"
- "--auto-truncate"
- "--api-key"
- "sk-emb-REPLACE_WITH_YOUR_KEY"
volumes:
- tei-models:/data
labels:
traefik.enable: "true"
traefik.http.routers.embeddings.rule: "Host(`embeddings.example.com`)"
traefik.http.routers.embeddings.entrypoints: "websecure"
traefik.http.routers.embeddings.tls: "true"
traefik.http.routers.embeddings.tls.certresolver: "letsEncrypt"
traefik.http.routers.embeddings.service: "embeddings"
traefik.http.services.embeddings.loadbalancer.server.port: "80"
# TEI enforces the Bearer key itself; Traefik only rate-limits to protect the CPU
traefik.http.routers.embeddings.middlewares: "embeddings-rl"
traefik.http.middlewares.embeddings-rl.ratelimit.average: "20"
traefik.http.middlewares.embeddings-rl.ratelimit.burst: "40"
traefik.http.middlewares.embeddings-rl.ratelimit.period: "1s"
networks:
docker_main_net:
external: true
volumes:
tei-models:
```
Gitmost settings (**Workspace settings → AI → Embeddings**):
| Field | Value |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Model | `intfloat/multilingual-e5-small` |
| Base URL | `https://embeddings.example.com/v1/` |
| Embedding API key | your `sk-emb-…` |
Check it from outside:
```bash
curl -s https://embeddings.example.com/v1/embeddings \
-H "Authorization: Bearer sk-emb-REPLACE_WITH_YOUR_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"model":"intfloat/multilingual-e5-small","input":"query: hello"}' \
| python3 -c 'import sys,json;print("dims:",len(json.load(sys.stdin)["data"][0]["embedding"]))'
# -> dims: 384
```
### Embeddings server notes
- **Vector dimension is 384.** If this Gitmost was previously embedded with a different model
(e.g. `text-embedding-3-large` = 3072-dim), the old pgvector rows won't match the new dimension —
clear the existing embeddings / re-index before switching. Gitmost only compares vectors of the
same dimension, so mixed-dimension rows are silently ignored rather than searched.
- **First start downloads the weights** (hundreds of MB) from `huggingface.co` into the
`tei-models` volume; every start after that reads from the volume.
- **Pin the version.** Pin the image, and optionally the model: add `--revision <commit-sha>` to
`command` (the sha is on the model's page on Hugging Face).
- **Air-gapped / no egress:** seed the `tei-models` volume ahead of time and add
`environment: [HF_HUB_OFFLINE=1]`.
- **GPU:** use the cuda tag of the same release (e.g.
`ghcr.io/huggingface/text-embeddings-inference:cuda-1.9`) and start the container with `gpus: all`.
## Features
- Real-time collaboration
+131
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@@ -193,6 +193,137 @@ dump/restore, существующий каталог данных переис
> неизменным и бэкапьте вместе с базой данных.
## Локальный сервер эмбеддингов
Семантическому (RAG) поиску AI-агента нужна **модель эмбеддингов**. Вместо оплаты облачного
провайдера (например, OpenAI `text-embedding-3-*`) за эмбеддинг каждой страницы можно запустить
небольшую open-weights модель у себя через Hugging Face
[Text Embeddings Inference](https://github.com/huggingface/text-embeddings-inference) (TEI) — он
отдаёт OpenAI-совместимый эндпоинт `/v1/embeddings`. Хороший дефолт — `intfloat/multilingual-e5-small`:
многоязычная, 384-мерная, комфортно работает на CPU (~1–2 ГБ RAM, 1–2 vCPU). Пропишите её в
**Настройки воркспейса → AI → Эмбеддинги**.
### Вариант A — локально (та же Docker-сеть, что и Gitmost)
Запустите TEI контейнером в той же сети, где уже работает Gitmost. Порт наружу не публикуется,
поэтому эндпоинт остаётся внутренним и не требует авторизации.
```yaml
services:
embeddings:
image: ghcr.io/huggingface/text-embeddings-inference:cpu-1.9 # pin version; use a cuda-* tag for GPU
container_name: embeddings
restart: unless-stopped
networks:
- gitmost_net # same network Gitmost is on
command:
- "--model-id"
- "intfloat/multilingual-e5-small"
- "--auto-truncate" # clamp over-long inputs instead of returning 413
volumes:
- tei-models:/data # weights are downloaded once and cached here
networks:
gitmost_net:
external: true # the network Gitmost already uses
volumes:
tei-models:
```
Настройки Gitmost (**Настройки воркспейса → AI → Эмбеддинги**):
| Поле | Значение |
|-------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Model | `intfloat/multilingual-e5-small` |
| Base URL | `http://embeddings:80/v1/` |
| Embedding API key | — (оставить пустым) |
> `embeddings` — имя контейнера, Gitmost резолвит его по DNS внутри Docker-сети.
> Наружу порт не публикуется, эндпоинт доступен только контейнерам этой сети, поэтому
> авторизация не нужна.
### Вариант B — на отдельном хосте (наружу через Traefik + Let's Encrypt)
Предполагается, что на хосте уже есть Traefik с ACME-резолвером (в примере ниже — `letsEncrypt`,
entrypoint `websecure`, общая сеть `docker_main_net`). Замените домен / сеть / резолвер на свои.
**DNS:** заведите A-запись `embeddings.example.com` → IP хоста с Traefik (тот же challenge / порт 80,
что и у остальных сайтов).
```yaml
services:
embeddings:
image: ghcr.io/huggingface/text-embeddings-inference:cpu-1.9 # pin version; cuda-* tag for GPU
container_name: embeddings
restart: unless-stopped
networks:
- docker_main_net # the network Traefik is attached to
command:
- "--model-id"
- "intfloat/multilingual-e5-small"
- "--auto-truncate"
- "--api-key"
- "sk-emb-REPLACE_WITH_YOUR_KEY"
volumes:
- tei-models:/data
labels:
traefik.enable: "true"
traefik.http.routers.embeddings.rule: "Host(`embeddings.example.com`)"
traefik.http.routers.embeddings.entrypoints: "websecure"
traefik.http.routers.embeddings.tls: "true"
traefik.http.routers.embeddings.tls.certresolver: "letsEncrypt"
traefik.http.routers.embeddings.service: "embeddings"
traefik.http.services.embeddings.loadbalancer.server.port: "80"
# TEI enforces the Bearer key itself; Traefik only rate-limits to protect the CPU
traefik.http.routers.embeddings.middlewares: "embeddings-rl"
traefik.http.middlewares.embeddings-rl.ratelimit.average: "20"
traefik.http.middlewares.embeddings-rl.ratelimit.burst: "40"
traefik.http.middlewares.embeddings-rl.ratelimit.period: "1s"
networks:
docker_main_net:
external: true
volumes:
tei-models:
```
Настройки Gitmost (**Настройки воркспейса → AI → Эмбеддинги**):
| Поле | Значение |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Model | `intfloat/multilingual-e5-small` |
| Base URL | `https://embeddings.example.com/v1/` |
| Embedding API key | ваш `sk-emb-…` |
Проверка снаружи:
```bash
curl -s https://embeddings.example.com/v1/embeddings \
-H "Authorization: Bearer sk-emb-REPLACE_WITH_YOUR_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"model":"intfloat/multilingual-e5-small","input":"query: hello"}' \
| python3 -c 'import sys,json;print("dims:",len(json.load(sys.stdin)["data"][0]["embedding"]))'
# -> dims: 384
```
### Заметки про сервер эмбеддингов
- **Размерность вектора — 384.** Если раньше этот Gitmost эмбеддился другой моделью
(например, `text-embedding-3-large` = 3072-dim), старые строки в pgvector не совпадут по
размерности — очистите существующие эмбеддинги / переиндексируйте перед переключением. Gitmost
сравнивает только вектора одной размерности, поэтому строки другой размерности не участвуют в
поиске, а не ломают его.
- **Первый старт тянет веса** (сотни МБ) с `huggingface.co` в том `tei-models`; дальше — из тома.
- **Пин версии.** Пиньте образ, а при желании и модель: добавьте в `command` `--revision <commit-sha>`
(sha берётся со страницы модели на Hugging Face).
- **Без egress (air-gapped):** засейте том `tei-models` заранее и добавьте
`environment: [HF_HUB_OFFLINE=1]`.
- **GPU:** возьмите cuda-тег того же релиза (например,
`ghcr.io/huggingface/text-embeddings-inference:cuda-1.9`) и запустите контейнер с `gpus: all`.
## Возможности
- Совместная работа в реальном времени
@@ -1418,5 +1418,14 @@
"The commented text changed since this suggestion was made; it was not applied.": "The commented text changed since this suggestion was made; it was not applied.",
"Dismiss": "Dismiss",
"Suggestion dismissed": "Suggestion dismissed",
"Failed to dismiss suggestion": "Failed to dismiss suggestion"
"Failed to dismiss suggestion": "Failed to dismiss suggestion",
"Save version": "Save version",
"Ctrl+S": "Ctrl+S",
"Version saved": "Version saved",
"Already saved as the latest version": "Already saved as the latest version",
"Agent version": "Agent version",
"Boundary": "Boundary",
"Autosave": "Autosave",
"Only versions": "Only versions",
"No saved versions yet.": "No saved versions yet."
}
@@ -1433,5 +1433,14 @@
"The commented text changed since this suggestion was made; it was not applied.": "Прокомментированный текст изменился после создания предложения; оно не было применено.",
"Dismiss": "Не применять",
"Suggestion dismissed": "Предложение отклонено",
"Failed to dismiss suggestion": "Не удалось отклонить предложение"
"Failed to dismiss suggestion": "Не удалось отклонить предложение",
"Save version": "Сохранить версию",
"Ctrl+S": "Ctrl+S",
"Version saved": "Версия сохранена",
"Already saved as the latest version": "Уже сохранено как последняя версия",
"Agent version": "Версия агента",
"Boundary": "Граница",
"Autosave": "Автосейв",
"Only versions": "Только версии",
"No saved versions yet.": "Пока нет сохранённых версий."
}
@@ -3,11 +3,20 @@ import { atom } from "jotai";
// import would drag the whole @tiptap/core engine into the eager graph of every
// shell component that reads one of these atoms.
import type { Editor } from "@tiptap/core";
import type { HocuspocusProvider } from "@hocuspocus/provider";
import { PageEditMode } from "@/features/user/types/user.types.ts";
import type { DictationUnavailableReason } from "@/features/dictation/dictation-status";
export const pageEditorAtom = atom<Editor | null>(null);
// #370 — the active page's collab provider, published by the page editor so the
// header menu can emit the "save-version" stateless signal (Cmd+S / button).
// Null when the page is read-only / collab isn't connected. A typed initial
// value (rather than an explicit generic) keeps jotai's overload resolution on
// the writable PrimitiveAtom branch.
const initialCollabProvider: HocuspocusProvider | null = null;
export const collabProviderAtom = atom(initialCollabProvider);
export const titleEditorAtom = atom<Editor | null>(null);
export const readOnlyEditorAtom = atom<Editor | null>(null);
@@ -31,11 +31,18 @@ import { useAtom, useAtomValue, useSetAtom } from "jotai";
import useCollaborationUrl from "@/features/editor/hooks/use-collaboration-url";
import { currentUserAtom } from "@/features/user/atoms/current-user-atom";
import {
collabProviderAtom,
currentPageEditModeAtom,
dictationAvailabilityAtom,
pageEditorAtom,
yjsConnectionStatusAtom,
} from "@/features/editor/atoms/editor-atoms";
import { notifications } from "@mantine/notifications";
import {
VERSION_SAVED_MESSAGE_TYPE,
type VersionSavedMessage,
saveVersionPending,
} from "@/features/page-history/version-messages";
import { asideStateAtom } from "@/components/layouts/global/hooks/atoms/sidebar-atom";
import {
activeCommentIdAtom,
@@ -124,6 +131,7 @@ export default function PageEditor({
const [currentUser] = useAtom(currentUserAtom);
const [, setEditor] = useAtom(pageEditorAtom);
const setCollabProvider = useSetAtom(collabProviderAtom);
const [, setAsideState] = useAtom(asideStateAtom);
const [, setActiveCommentId] = useAtom(activeCommentIdAtom);
const [showCommentPopup, setShowCommentPopup] = useAtom(showCommentPopupAtom);
@@ -181,6 +189,24 @@ export default function PageEditor({
const onStatelessHandler = ({ payload }: onStatelessParameters) => {
try {
const message = JSON.parse(payload);
// #370 — a version was saved somewhere; live-refresh the history panel
// on every client. Only the client that pressed Save (tracked by the
// module-level flag) shows the confirmation toast.
if (message?.type === VERSION_SAVED_MESSAGE_TYPE) {
const versionMsg = message as VersionSavedMessage;
queryClient.invalidateQueries({
queryKey: ["page-history-list"],
});
if (saveVersionPending.current) {
saveVersionPending.current = false;
notifications.show({
message: versionMsg.alreadySaved
? t("Already saved as the latest version")
: t("Version saved"),
});
}
return;
}
if (message?.type !== "page.updated" || !message.updatedAt) return;
const pageData = queryClient.getQueryData<IPage>(["pages", slugId]);
if (pageData) {
@@ -238,12 +264,16 @@ export default function PageEditor({
local.on("synced", onLocalSyncedHandler);
providersRef.current = { socket, local, remote };
// #370 — publish the provider so the header menu can emit save-version.
setCollabProvider(remote);
setProvidersReady(true);
} else {
setCollabProvider(providersRef.current.remote);
setProvidersReady(true);
}
// Only destroy on final unmount
return () => {
setCollabProvider(null);
providersRef.current?.socket.destroy();
providersRef.current?.remote.destroy();
providersRef.current?.local.destroy();
@@ -1,4 +1,11 @@
import { Text, Group, UnstyledButton, Avatar, Tooltip } from "@mantine/core";
import {
Text,
Group,
UnstyledButton,
Avatar,
Tooltip,
Badge,
} from "@mantine/core";
import { CustomAvatar } from "@/components/ui/custom-avatar.tsx";
import { AgentAvatarStack } from "@/components/ui/agent-avatar-stack.tsx";
import { formattedDate } from "@/lib/time";
@@ -7,36 +14,59 @@ import clsx from "clsx";
import { IPageHistory } from "@/features/page-history/types/page.types";
import { memo, useCallback } from "react";
import { useSetAtom } from "jotai";
import { useTranslation } from "react-i18next";
import { historyAtoms } from "@/features/page-history/atoms/history-atoms.ts";
const MAX_VISIBLE_AVATARS = 5;
/**
* #370 — map a snapshot's intentionality tier to its badge. `version: true`
* marks the intentional points (manual / agent); autosaves (boundary / idle /
* legacy null) are non-versions and get dimmed in the list.
*/
type HistoryKindMeta = { labelKey: string; color: string; version: boolean };
export function historyKindMeta(kind?: string | null): HistoryKindMeta {
switch (kind) {
case "manual":
return { labelKey: "Saved", color: "blue", version: true };
case "agent":
return { labelKey: "Agent version", color: "violet", version: true };
case "boundary":
return { labelKey: "Boundary", color: "gray", version: false };
default: // "idle" | null | undefined (legacy autosave)
return { labelKey: "Autosave", color: "gray", version: false };
}
}
interface HistoryItemProps {
historyItem: IPageHistory;
index: number;
onSelect: (id: string, index: number) => void;
onHover?: (id: string, index: number) => void;
// The previous snapshot for diff/restore is resolved by id from the FULL list
// in the parent (resolvePrevSnapshotId), so the item only needs to report its
// own id — never a list index (which would be the filtered-view index).
onSelect: (id: string) => void;
onHover?: (id: string) => void;
onHoverEnd?: () => void;
isActive: boolean;
}
const HistoryItem = memo(function HistoryItem({
historyItem,
index,
onSelect,
onHover,
onHoverEnd,
isActive,
}: HistoryItemProps) {
const setHistoryModalOpen = useSetAtom(historyAtoms);
const { t } = useTranslation();
const kindMeta = historyKindMeta(historyItem.kind);
const handleClick = useCallback(() => {
onSelect(historyItem.id, index);
}, [onSelect, historyItem.id, index]);
onSelect(historyItem.id);
}, [onSelect, historyItem.id]);
const handleMouseEnter = useCallback(() => {
onHover?.(historyItem.id, index);
}, [onHover, historyItem.id, index]);
onHover?.(historyItem.id);
}, [onHover, historyItem.id]);
const contributors = historyItem.contributors;
const hasContributors = contributors && contributors.length > 0;
@@ -49,8 +79,20 @@ const HistoryItem = memo(function HistoryItem({
onMouseEnter={handleMouseEnter}
onMouseLeave={onHoverEnd}
className={clsx(classes.history, { [classes.active]: isActive })}
// #370 — dim autosnapshots so intentional versions stand out.
style={{ opacity: kindMeta.version ? 1 : 0.55 }}
>
<Text size="sm">{formattedDate(new Date(historyItem.createdAt))}</Text>
<Group gap={6} wrap="nowrap" justify="space-between">
<Text size="sm">{formattedDate(new Date(historyItem.createdAt))}</Text>
<Badge
size="xs"
radius="sm"
variant={kindMeta.version ? "filled" : "light"}
color={kindMeta.color}
>
{t(kindMeta.labelKey)}
</Badge>
</Group>
<Group gap={6} wrap="nowrap" mt={4}>
{hasContributors ? (
@@ -2,14 +2,16 @@ import {
usePageHistoryListQuery,
prefetchPageHistory,
} from "@/features/page-history/queries/page-history-query";
import HistoryItem from "@/features/page-history/components/history-item";
import HistoryItem, {
historyKindMeta,
} from "@/features/page-history/components/history-item";
import {
activeHistoryIdAtom,
activeHistoryPrevIdAtom,
historyAtoms,
} from "@/features/page-history/atoms/history-atoms";
import { useAtom, useSetAtom } from "jotai";
import { useCallback, useEffect, useMemo, useRef } from "react";
import { useCallback, useEffect, useMemo, useRef, useState } from "react";
import {
Button,
ScrollArea,
@@ -17,9 +19,12 @@ import {
Divider,
Loader,
Center,
Switch,
Text,
} from "@mantine/core";
import { useTranslation } from "react-i18next";
import { useHistoryRestore } from "@/features/page-history/hooks";
import { resolvePrevSnapshotId } from "@/features/page-history/utils/resolve-prev-snapshot";
const PREFETCH_DELAY_MS = 150;
@@ -47,6 +52,22 @@ function HistoryList({ pageId }: Props) {
[pageHistoryData],
);
// #370 — "only versions" filter: hide autosnapshots (idle/boundary/legacy
// null), keep only intentional points (manual/agent). Filtering is over the
// already-loaded pages; the diff/restore still targets the true previous
// snapshot, so items carry their index within the FULL list.
const [onlyVersions, setOnlyVersions] = useState(false);
// Reuse historyKindMeta().version — the SAME predicate the badge (HistoryItem)
// uses to mark intentional points — so the "Only versions" filter and the badge
// can never drift apart when a future intentional kind is added.
const visibleItems = useMemo(
() =>
onlyVersions
? historyItems.filter((item) => historyKindMeta(item.kind).version)
: historyItems,
[historyItems, onlyVersions],
);
const loadMoreRef = useRef<HTMLDivElement>(null);
const prefetchTimeoutRef = useRef<ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null>(null);
@@ -60,11 +81,13 @@ function HistoryList({ pageId }: Props) {
}, []);
const handleHover = useCallback(
(historyId: string, index: number) => {
(historyId: string) => {
clearPrefetchTimeout();
prefetchTimeoutRef.current = setTimeout(() => {
prefetchPageHistory(historyId);
const prevId = historyItems[index + 1]?.id;
// The true previous snapshot in the FULL list (not the previous visible
// one under the "only versions" filter).
const prevId = resolvePrevSnapshotId(historyItems, historyId);
if (prevId) {
prefetchPageHistory(prevId);
}
@@ -78,9 +101,11 @@ function HistoryList({ pageId }: Props) {
}, [clearPrefetchTimeout]);
const handleSelect = useCallback(
(id: string, index: number) => {
(id: string) => {
setActiveHistoryId(id);
setActiveHistoryPrevId(historyItems[index + 1]?.id ?? "");
// Baseline = true previous snapshot in the FULL list, so the "only
// versions" filter never diffs/restores against the wrong item.
setActiveHistoryPrevId(resolvePrevSnapshotId(historyItems, id));
},
[historyItems, setActiveHistoryId, setActiveHistoryPrevId],
);
@@ -128,12 +153,27 @@ function HistoryList({ pageId }: Props) {
return (
<div>
<Group px="xs" py={6} justify="flex-end">
<Switch
size="xs"
checked={onlyVersions}
onChange={(e) => setOnlyVersions(e.currentTarget.checked)}
label={t("Only versions")}
/>
</Group>
<ScrollArea h={620} w="100%" type="scroll" scrollbarSize={5}>
{historyItems.map((historyItem, index) => (
{onlyVersions && visibleItems.length === 0 && (
<Center py="md">
<Text size="sm" c="dimmed">
{t("No saved versions yet.")}
</Text>
</Center>
)}
{visibleItems.map((historyItem) => (
<HistoryItem
key={historyItem.id}
historyItem={historyItem}
index={index}
onSelect={handleSelect}
onHover={handleHover}
onHoverEnd={clearPrefetchTimeout}
@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ export interface IPageHistory {
updatedAt: string;
lastUpdatedBy: IPageHistoryUser;
contributors?: IPageHistoryUser[];
// #370 — intentionality tier: 'manual'/'agent' are versions (intentional
// points), 'idle'/'boundary' are autosnapshots; null/undefined = legacy
// autosave. Derived server-side, drives the history badge + "versions" filter.
kind?: "manual" | "agent" | "idle" | "boundary" | null;
// Provenance markers copied off the page row when the snapshot was saved.
// `'agent'` marks a version written by the AI agent; `lastUpdatedAiChatId`
// (when present) deep-links to the chat that produced the edit.
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
import { resolvePrevSnapshotId } from "./resolve-prev-snapshot";
// #370 F4 — the risky client path: with the "only versions" filter active, diff
// and restore must still baseline against the TRUE previous snapshot in the FULL
// list, never the previous VISIBLE version (which would skip the autosnapshots
// between two versions). These pin that the resolution is by FULL-list order.
describe("resolvePrevSnapshotId", () => {
// Newest-first, as the history list stores it: a version, then two autosaves,
// then an older version.
const full = [
{ id: "v2", kind: "manual" },
{ id: "a2", kind: "idle" },
{ id: "a1", kind: "boundary" },
{ id: "v1", kind: "manual" },
{ id: "a0", kind: null },
];
it("returns the immediate FULL-list successor, not the previous visible version", () => {
// Selecting v2 while filtered to versions-only must baseline against a2 (the
// real chronological predecessor), NOT v1 (the previous visible version).
expect(resolvePrevSnapshotId(full, "v2")).toBe("a2");
});
it("resolves an autosnapshot's predecessor by full-list order", () => {
expect(resolvePrevSnapshotId(full, "a1")).toBe("v1");
});
it("returns '' for the oldest item (no predecessor)", () => {
expect(resolvePrevSnapshotId(full, "a0")).toBe("");
});
it("returns '' for an id not in the list", () => {
expect(resolvePrevSnapshotId(full, "missing")).toBe("");
});
it("does not depend on a filtered subset — same result whatever is visible", () => {
// The helper only ever sees the full list; a filtered view cannot change the
// baseline it computes.
expect(resolvePrevSnapshotId(full, "v1")).toBe("a0");
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
/**
* #370 — resolve the TRUE previous snapshot for a history item.
*
* The history panel can be filtered to "only versions" (manual/agent), but diff
* and restore must always compare against the immediately-preceding snapshot in
* the FULL, unfiltered list — NOT the previous VISIBLE item. Comparing against
* the previous visible version would silently skip the autosnapshots between two
* versions and diff/restore the wrong baseline.
*
* Given the full (newest-first) list and an item id, this returns the id of the
* item right after it in the full list (its chronological predecessor), or "" if
* it is the oldest / not found. Pure and list-order-preserving so it can be unit
* tested without mounting the component.
*/
export function resolvePrevSnapshotId(
fullItems: ReadonlyArray<{ id: string }>,
id: string,
): string {
const index = fullItems.findIndex((item) => item.id === id);
if (index === -1) return "";
return fullItems[index + 1]?.id ?? "";
}
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
/**
* #370 — page-version stateless wire formats. Kept in one place so the client
* emitter (Save hotkey / button) and the client listener (page-editor) agree
* with the server (PersistenceExtension) on the message shapes.
*/
/** Client → server: "save a version now". The server derives the tier
* (manual/agent) from the signed connection actor, never from this payload. */
export const SAVE_VERSION_MESSAGE_TYPE = "save-version";
/** Server → all clients: a version was saved (or promoted / already existed). */
export const VERSION_SAVED_MESSAGE_TYPE = "version.saved";
export interface VersionSavedMessage {
type: typeof VERSION_SAVED_MESSAGE_TYPE;
historyId: string;
kind: "manual" | "agent";
/** True when the latest snapshot was already a manual version (a no-op save). */
alreadySaved: boolean;
}
/**
* Cross-component coordination flag so only the client that pressed Save shows
* the confirmation toast, while every other client silently refreshes its
* history panel on the broadcast. A module-level ref avoids stale-closure
* pitfalls in the editor's long-lived stateless handler.
*/
export const saveVersionPending = { current: false };
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import {
IconArrowRight,
IconArrowsHorizontal,
IconClockHour4,
IconDeviceFloppy,
IconDots,
IconEye,
IconEyeOff,
@@ -17,7 +18,7 @@ import {
IconTrash,
IconWifiOff,
} from "@tabler/icons-react";
import React, { useEffect, useRef, useState } from "react";
import React, { useCallback, useEffect, useRef, useState } from "react";
import { useAsideTriggerProps } from "@/hooks/use-toggle-aside.tsx";
import { useAtom, useAtomValue } from "jotai";
import { historyAtoms } from "@/features/page-history/atoms/history-atoms.ts";
@@ -39,9 +40,14 @@ import { Trans, useTranslation } from "react-i18next";
import ExportModal from "@/components/common/export-modal";
import { convertProseMirrorToMarkdown } from "@docmost/prosemirror-markdown/browser";
import {
collabProviderAtom,
pageEditorAtom,
yjsConnectionStatusAtom,
} from "@/features/editor/atoms/editor-atoms.ts";
import {
SAVE_VERSION_MESSAGE_TYPE,
saveVersionPending,
} from "@/features/page-history/version-messages.ts";
import { formattedDate } from "@/lib/time.ts";
import { PageEditModeToggle } from "@/features/user/components/page-state-pref.tsx";
import MovePageModal from "@/features/page/components/move-page-modal.tsx";
@@ -72,9 +78,34 @@ export default function PageHeaderMenu({ readOnly }: PageHeaderMenuProps) {
});
const isDeleted = !!page?.deletedAt;
const [workspace] = useAtom(workspaceAtom);
const collabProvider = useAtomValue(collabProviderAtom);
// Community public-sharing entry point (replaces the removed EE PageShareModal)
const workspaceSharingDisabled = workspace?.settings?.sharing?.disabled === true;
// #370 — explicit "save a version" (Cmd+S / Save button). One path for the
// human; the server derives the tier from the signed actor. Readers can't save
// (the button is hidden and the collab connection is read-only server-side).
const handleSaveVersion = useCallback(() => {
if (readOnly || !collabProvider) return;
// Flag this client as the initiator so only it shows the confirmation toast;
// a safety timeout clears it if no broadcast comes back (e.g. offline).
saveVersionPending.current = true;
window.setTimeout(() => {
saveVersionPending.current = false;
}, 5000);
collabProvider.sendStateless(
JSON.stringify({ type: SAVE_VERSION_MESSAGE_TYPE }),
);
}, [readOnly, collabProvider]);
// mod+S must also block the browser's "Save page" dialog. `triggerOnContent-
// Editable` + empty ignore-list so it fires while typing in the editor/title.
useHotkeys(
[["mod+S", handleSaveVersion, { preventDefault: true }]],
[],
true,
);
useHotkeys(
[
[
@@ -133,15 +164,16 @@ export default function PageHeaderMenu({ readOnly }: PageHeaderMenuProps) {
</ActionIcon>
</Tooltip>
<PageActionMenu readOnly={readOnly} />
<PageActionMenu readOnly={readOnly} onSaveVersion={handleSaveVersion} />
</>
);
}
interface PageActionMenuProps {
readOnly?: boolean;
onSaveVersion?: () => void;
}
function PageActionMenu({ readOnly }: PageActionMenuProps) {
function PageActionMenu({ readOnly, onSaveVersion }: PageActionMenuProps) {
const { t } = useTranslation();
const [, setHistoryModalOpen] = useAtom(historyAtoms);
const clipboard = useClipboard({ timeout: 500 });
@@ -303,6 +335,20 @@ function PageActionMenu({ readOnly }: PageActionMenuProps) {
</Group>
</Menu.Item>
{!readOnly && (
<Menu.Item
leftSection={<IconDeviceFloppy size={16} />}
onClick={onSaveVersion}
rightSection={
<Text size="xs" c="dimmed">
{t("Ctrl+S")}
</Text>
}
>
{t("Save version")}
</Menu.Item>
)}
<Menu.Item
leftSection={<IconHistory size={16} />}
onClick={openHistoryModal}
@@ -281,10 +281,12 @@ const SpaceTree = forwardRef<SpaceTreeApi, SpaceTreeProps>(function SpaceTree(
setOpenTreeNodes((prev) => ({ ...prev, [id]: isOpen }));
if (isOpen) {
const node = treeModel.find(data, id) as SpaceTreeNode | null;
if (
node?.hasChildren &&
(!node.children || node.children.length === 0)
) {
// Same "unloaded branch" predicate the realtime insert paths use
// (`isUnloadedBranch`) so the lazy-load gate and the realtime inserts
// (`insertByPosition` / `placeByPosition`) can never disagree about what
// counts as unloaded (#525). Note: local raw `insert` (DnD/create-page)
// does not yet route through it — see #525 follow-up.
if (treeModel.isUnloadedBranch(node)) {
const fetched = await fetchAllAncestorChildren({
pageId: id,
spaceId: node.spaceId,
@@ -74,6 +74,48 @@ describe("treeModel.isDescendant", () => {
});
});
// #525: the single "is this branch unloaded?" predicate shared by the lazy-load
// gate and the insert paths. Unloaded == server says hasChildren but none are
// present locally (canonical form `children: []`, also `undefined`). A parent
// without hasChildren is genuinely empty, not unloaded.
describe("treeModel.isUnloadedBranch", () => {
type PH = TreeNode<{ name: string; hasChildren?: boolean }>;
it("true for hasChildren + empty array (canonical unloaded form)", () => {
const n: PH = { id: "p", name: "P", hasChildren: true, children: [] };
expect(treeModel.isUnloadedBranch(n)).toBe(true);
});
it("true for hasChildren + undefined children", () => {
const n: PH = { id: "p", name: "P", hasChildren: true };
expect(treeModel.isUnloadedBranch(n)).toBe(true);
});
it("false for hasChildren + already-loaded children", () => {
const n: PH = {
id: "p",
name: "P",
hasChildren: true,
children: [{ id: "c", name: "C" }],
};
expect(treeModel.isUnloadedBranch(n)).toBe(false);
});
it("false for a genuinely-empty parent (no hasChildren)", () => {
expect(
treeModel.isUnloadedBranch({
id: "p",
name: "P",
hasChildren: false,
children: [],
} as PH),
).toBe(false);
expect(
treeModel.isUnloadedBranch({ id: "p", name: "P" } as PH),
).toBe(false);
});
it("false for null/undefined", () => {
expect(treeModel.isUnloadedBranch(null)).toBe(false);
expect(treeModel.isUnloadedBranch(undefined)).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("treeModel.visible", () => {
it("returns only root nodes when no openIds", () => {
const v = treeModel.visible(fixture, new Set());
@@ -197,43 +239,64 @@ describe("treeModel.insertByPosition", () => {
]);
});
// #159 #1: inserting/moving a node under a parent whose children are NOT
// loaded (`children === undefined`, e.g. a collapsed page) must NOT materialize
// a partial `[node]` list — that would defeat the lazy-load gate and hide the
// parent's other real children. The node is left to be lazy-loaded; only
// `hasChildren` is flagged so the chevron appears.
it("does NOT materialize a child under an UNLOADED parent (children undefined)", () => {
type PH = TreeNode<{
name: string;
position?: string;
hasChildren?: boolean;
}>;
type PH = TreeNode<{
name: string;
position?: string;
hasChildren?: boolean;
}>;
// #159 #1 / #525: inserting/moving a node under an UNLOADED parent must NOT
// materialize a partial `[node]` list — that would defeat the lazy-load gate and
// hide the parent's other real children. The canonical unloaded form here is
// `children: []` + `hasChildren: true` (from `pageToTreeNode` /
// `pruneCollapsedChildren`), which the pre-#525 `=== undefined` guard MISSED.
// The node is left to be lazy-loaded; the chevron stays enabled.
it("does NOT materialize a child under an UNLOADED parent (children: [], hasChildren: true)", () => {
const tree: PH[] = [
{ id: "p", name: "P", position: "a0", hasChildren: false }, // children: undefined
{ id: "p", name: "P", position: "a0", hasChildren: true, children: [] },
];
const node: PH = { id: "x", name: "X", position: "a1" };
const t = treeModel.insertByPosition(tree, "p", node);
const parent = treeModel.find(t, "p");
// The node was NOT inserted (children stay unloaded -> lazy-load fetches the
// full set, including this node, on expand).
expect(parent?.children).toBeUndefined();
// full set, including this node, on expand). MUTATION: the pre-#525 predicate
// `children === undefined` does not fire for `[]`, so it would insert `[x]`
// here and reredden this expectation.
expect(parent?.children).toEqual([]);
expect(treeModel.find(t, "x")).toBeNull();
// ...but the chevron is enabled so the user can expand to load it.
// ...and the chevron stays enabled so the user can expand to load it.
expect((parent as PH).hasChildren).toBe(true);
});
it("DOES insert under a LOADED-but-empty parent (children: [])", () => {
type PH = TreeNode<{
name: string;
position?: string;
hasChildren?: boolean;
}>;
it("does NOT materialize a child under an UNLOADED parent (children undefined, hasChildren: true)", () => {
const tree: PH[] = [
{ id: "p", name: "P", position: "a0", hasChildren: true }, // children: undefined
];
const node: PH = { id: "x", name: "X", position: "a1" };
const t = treeModel.insertByPosition(tree, "p", node);
const parent = treeModel.find(t, "p");
expect(parent?.children).toBeUndefined();
expect(treeModel.find(t, "x")).toBeNull();
expect((parent as PH).hasChildren).toBe(true);
});
it("DOES insert under a genuinely-empty parent (children: [], hasChildren: false)", () => {
const tree: PH[] = [
{ id: "p", name: "P", position: "a0", hasChildren: false, children: [] },
];
const node: PH = { id: "x", name: "X", position: "a1" };
const t = treeModel.insertByPosition(tree, "p", node);
// A loaded (empty) child list is complete, so the node IS inserted.
// No server children (`hasChildren: false`), so materializing the first child
// is correct — nothing is hidden.
expect(treeModel.find(t, "p")?.children?.map((n) => n.id)).toEqual(["x"]);
});
it("DOES insert under a genuinely-empty parent (children undefined, hasChildren: false)", () => {
const tree: PH[] = [
{ id: "p", name: "P", position: "a0", hasChildren: false }, // children: undefined
];
const node: PH = { id: "x", name: "X", position: "a1" };
const t = treeModel.insertByPosition(tree, "p", node);
expect(treeModel.find(t, "p")?.children?.map((n) => n.id)).toEqual(["x"]);
});
@@ -43,6 +43,26 @@ export const treeModel = {
};
},
// A branch is "unloaded" when the server says it HAS children (`hasChildren`)
// but none are present locally. The canonical unloaded form in this codebase
// is `children: []` (produced by `pageToTreeNode` and by `pruneCollapsedChildren`
// resetting collapsed branches), NOT `children: undefined` — so a predicate that
// only checks `=== undefined` misses the real case and materializes a misleading
// partial list (#525). This is the SINGLE source of truth for "should a
// fetch/materialize be deferred?", shared by the lazy-load gate (`handleToggle`)
// and the realtime insert paths (`insertByPosition` / `placeByPosition`), so they
// can never drift apart again. (The local raw `insert` primitive and its DnD/
// create-page callers do NOT yet route through this predicate — see #525
// follow-up.) A parent WITHOUT `hasChildren` is genuinely empty
// (no server children) — inserting its first child is correct, not deferred.
isUnloadedBranch<T extends object>(
node: TreeNode<T> | null | undefined,
): boolean {
if (!node) return false;
const hasChildren = (node as { hasChildren?: boolean }).hasChildren === true;
return hasChildren && (node.children == null || node.children.length === 0);
},
isDescendant<T extends object>(
tree: TreeNode<T>[],
ancestorId: string,
@@ -127,14 +147,15 @@ export const treeModel = {
}
const parent = treeModel.find(tree, parentId);
// The parent is in the tree but its children have NOT been lazy-loaded yet
// (`children === undefined`, distinct from a loaded-but-empty `[]`). Inserting
// (`hasChildren` set + children absent/empty — see `isUnloadedBranch`; the
// canonical unloaded form is `children: []`, NOT just `undefined`). Inserting
// here would MATERIALIZE a misleading partial child list (`[node]`) that
// defeats the lazy-load gate — which fetches only when children are
// absent/empty — so the parent's OTHER real children would never load and the
// moved/added node would be the only one shown (a silent data loss, #159 #1).
// Instead, leave the children unloaded and just flag `hasChildren` so the
// chevron appears; expanding fetches the FULL set (including this node).
if (parent && parent.children === undefined) {
if (parent && treeModel.isUnloadedBranch(parent)) {
return treeModel.update(
tree,
parentId,
@@ -82,17 +82,19 @@ describe("applyMoveTreeNode", () => {
]);
});
it("does NOT create a partial child list when the destination is loaded-but-collapsed (children unloaded) — keeps it lazy-loadable (#159)", () => {
// `dstCollapsed` is in the tree but its children were never lazy-loaded
// (children === undefined). The OLD behavior inserted `src` as the ONLY
// child ([src]), which defeated the lazy-load gate and HID the parent's
// other real children. Now the move leaves children unloaded (so expanding
// fetches the FULL set, including src) and just flags hasChildren.
it("does NOT create a partial child list when the destination is loaded-but-collapsed (children unloaded) — keeps it lazy-loadable (#159 #525)", () => {
// `dstCollapsed` is in the tree but its children were never lazy-loaded. The
// CANONICAL unloaded form here is `hasChildren: true` + `children: []` (from
// `pageToTreeNode` / `pruneCollapsedChildren`), NOT `children: undefined`.
// The pre-#525 predicate (`children === undefined`) missed this form and
// inserted `src` as the ONLY child ([src]), defeating the lazy-load gate and
// HIDING the parent's other real children. Now the move leaves children
// unloaded (so expanding fetches the FULL set, including src).
const tree: SpaceTreeNode[] = [
node("dstCollapsed", {
position: "a0",
hasChildren: false,
children: undefined as unknown as SpaceTreeNode[],
hasChildren: true,
children: [],
}),
node("src", { position: "a9" }),
];
@@ -105,9 +107,10 @@ describe("applyMoveTreeNode", () => {
pageData: {},
});
const dst = treeModel.find(next, "dstCollapsed");
// Children stay unloaded -> the lazy-load gate fetches the FULL set (incl.
// src) on expand, rather than showing a misleading partial [src] list.
expect(dst?.children).toBeUndefined();
// Children stay unloaded ([] not materialized to [src]) -> the lazy-load gate
// fetches the FULL set (incl. src) on expand. MUTATION: the pre-#525
// `=== undefined` predicate would insert [src] here and redden this.
expect(dst?.children).toEqual([]);
expect(dst?.hasChildren).toBe(true);
// src moved away from its old root slot (it lives under dstCollapsed
// server-side and reappears when the parent is expanded/loaded).
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import { TransclusionService } from '../core/page/transclusion/transclusion.serv
import { TransclusionModule } from '../core/page/transclusion/transclusion.module';
import { StorageModule } from '../integrations/storage/storage.module';
import { EnvironmentModule } from '../integrations/environment/environment.module';
import { ApiKeyModule } from '../core/api-key/api-key.module';
@Module({
providers: [
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ import { EnvironmentModule } from '../integrations/environment/environment.modul
exports: [CollaborationGateway],
imports: [
TokenModule,
ApiKeyModule,
WatcherModule,
StorageModule.forRootAsync({
imports: [EnvironmentModule],
+30 -4
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,36 @@
export const HISTORY_INTERVAL = 5 * 60 * 1000;
export const HISTORY_FAST_INTERVAL = 60 * 1000;
export const HISTORY_FAST_THRESHOLD = 5 * 60 * 1000;
// #348 — debounce window for the per-page RAG re-embed job. Repeated saves
// within this window collapse to a single delayed job (coalesced by a stable
// jobId), so active editing does not pile up expensive re-embeds (external API
// + page_embeddings rewrite, concurrency 1). The worker reads the CURRENT page
// state at run time, so the last content within the window wins.
export const EMBED_DEBOUNCE_MS = 30 * 1000;
/**
* #370 — page-history intentionality tiers. Domain of `page_history.kind`.
* - 'manual' / 'agent' → Tier 1 versions (intentional points)
* - 'idle' / 'boundary' → Tier 0 autosnapshots (safety net)
* A legacy `null` kind is treated as an autosave.
*/
export type PageHistoryKind = 'manual' | 'agent' | 'idle' | 'boundary';
/**
* #370 — trailing idle-flush windows. A page's pending idle snapshot is
* re-armed on every store and fires this long after edits go quiet, so a burst
* of edits collapses into a single autosnapshot instead of one-per-store. Human
* sessions are noisier and less risky, so they flush less often than the agent.
*/
export const IDLE_INTERVAL_USER = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 60m
export const IDLE_INTERVAL_AGENT = 15 * 60 * 1000; // 15m
/**
* #370 — max-wait ceiling for the idle flush. Pure trailing debounce starves the
* safety net: hocuspocus stores at least every ~45s, so a CONTINUOUS editing
* session would re-arm the trailing timer forever and never take an idle
* snapshot until edits finally go quiet (up to IDLE_INTERVAL_USER = 60m). This
* ceiling bounds the actual wait from the FIRST edit of a burst, so an idle
* snapshot fires at least this often during a long unbroken session — restoring
* a recovery point cadence closer to the old heuristic without one-per-store
* noise. Mirrors hocuspocus's own maxDebounce idea.
*/
export const IDLE_MAX_WAIT_USER = 10 * 60 * 1000; // 10m
export const IDLE_MAX_WAIT_AGENT = 5 * 60 * 1000; // 5m
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ describe('AuthenticationExtension.onAuthenticate', () => {
let pageRepo: { findById: jest.Mock };
let spaceMemberRepo: { getUserSpaceRoles: jest.Mock };
let pagePermissionRepo: { canUserEditPage: jest.Mock };
let apiKeyService: { validate: jest.Mock };
// Build the hocuspocus onAuthenticate payload. connectionConfig.readOnly
// starts false; the extension flips it to true on a read-only downgrade.
@@ -79,12 +80,15 @@ describe('AuthenticationExtension.onAuthenticate', () => {
}),
};
apiKeyService = { validate: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ user: {}, workspace: {} }) };
ext = new AuthenticationExtension(
tokenService as any,
userRepo as any,
pageRepo as any,
spaceMemberRepo as any,
pagePermissionRepo as any,
apiKeyService as any,
);
// Silence the extension's logger (it warns/debugs on denial branches).
jest.spyOn(ext['logger'], 'warn').mockImplementation(() => undefined);
@@ -231,4 +235,73 @@ describe('AuthenticationExtension.onAuthenticate', () => {
// No internal ai_chats row for an MCP/service-account collab edit → null.
expect(ctx.aiChatId).toBeNull();
});
// --- #501: api-key laundering guard (fail-closed discriminator) ----------
describe('api-key laundering guard', () => {
it('api_key principal → row-checks the key on connect (valid key proceeds)', async () => {
tokenService.verifyJwt.mockResolvedValue(
buildJwt({ principal: 'api_key', apiKeyId: 'key-1' }),
);
const data = buildData();
await ext.onAuthenticate(data as any);
expect(apiKeyService.validate).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(apiKeyService.validate).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ apiKeyId: 'key-1', type: JwtType.API_KEY }),
);
});
it('REVOKED api_key → Unauthorized on connect, BEFORE any page/user lookup', async () => {
tokenService.verifyJwt.mockResolvedValue(
buildJwt({ principal: 'api_key', apiKeyId: 'key-1' }),
);
// The shared validator denies a revoked key.
apiKeyService.validate.mockRejectedValue(new UnauthorizedException());
await expect(ext.onAuthenticate(buildData() as any)).rejects.toThrow(
UnauthorizedException,
);
// No new collab connection: the key check gates before page access.
expect(pageRepo.findById).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('api_key principal missing apiKeyId → Unauthorized (malformed)', async () => {
tokenService.verifyJwt.mockResolvedValue(buildJwt({ principal: 'api_key' }));
await expect(ext.onAuthenticate(buildData() as any)).rejects.toThrow(
UnauthorizedException,
);
expect(apiKeyService.validate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('session principal → NO api-key check (session-backed, incl. internal agent)', async () => {
tokenService.verifyJwt.mockResolvedValue(buildJwt({ principal: 'session' }));
await ext.onAuthenticate(buildData() as any);
expect(apiKeyService.validate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('claimless token WITHIN the grace window → trusted (legacy pre-rollout)', async () => {
// Default rolloutAt = now, so we are inside the grace window.
tokenService.verifyJwt.mockResolvedValue(buildJwt()); // no principal
await expect(ext.onAuthenticate(buildData() as any)).resolves.toBeDefined();
expect(apiKeyService.validate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('claimless token AFTER the grace window → Unauthorized (fail-closed)', async () => {
// Move the rollout reference far into the past so the grace has elapsed.
(ext as any).rolloutAt = Date.now() - 25 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
tokenService.verifyJwt.mockResolvedValue(buildJwt()); // no principal
await expect(ext.onAuthenticate(buildData() as any)).rejects.toThrow(
UnauthorizedException,
);
});
it('infra error from the api-key row-check propagates (not masked)', async () => {
tokenService.verifyJwt.mockResolvedValue(
buildJwt({ principal: 'api_key', apiKeyId: 'key-1' }),
);
const boom = new Error('db down');
apiKeyService.validate.mockRejectedValue(boom);
await expect(ext.onAuthenticate(buildData() as any)).rejects.toBe(boom);
});
});
});
@@ -14,20 +14,37 @@ import { findHighestUserSpaceRole } from '@docmost/db/repos/space/utils';
import { SpaceRole } from '../../common/helpers/types/permission';
import { isUserDisabled } from '../../common/helpers';
import { getPageId } from '../collaboration.util';
import { JwtCollabPayload, JwtType } from '../../core/auth/dto/jwt-payload';
import {
JwtApiKeyPayload,
JwtCollabPayload,
JwtType,
} from '../../core/auth/dto/jwt-payload';
import { resolveProvenance } from '../../common/decorators/auth-provenance.decorator';
import { observeCollabAuth } from '../../integrations/metrics/metrics.registry';
import { ApiKeyService } from '../../core/api-key/api-key.service';
// Max lifetime of a collab token (generateCollabToken uses expiresIn '24h'). Used
// as the rollout grace window below: once this long has elapsed since this
// process started serving the #501 code, every STILL-VALID collab token was
// necessarily minted post-rollout and MUST carry the `principal` discriminator,
// so a claimless one is a bug and is rejected (fail-closed) rather than trusted.
const COLLAB_TOKEN_GRACE_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
@Injectable()
export class AuthenticationExtension implements Extension {
private readonly logger = new Logger(AuthenticationExtension.name);
// Reference instant for the claimless-rejection grace window. Overridable so a
// unit test can drive the pre-/post-grace boundary without wall-clock waits.
protected rolloutAt = Date.now();
constructor(
private tokenService: TokenService,
private userRepo: UserRepo,
private pageRepo: PageRepo,
private readonly spaceMemberRepo: SpaceMemberRepo,
private readonly pagePermissionRepo: PagePermissionRepo,
private readonly apiKeyService: ApiKeyService,
) {}
async onAuthenticate(data: onAuthenticatePayload) {
@@ -54,6 +71,36 @@ export class AuthenticationExtension implements Extension {
throw new UnauthorizedException('Invalid collab token');
}
// #501 — fail-closed api-key laundering guard. A collab token minted by an
// api-key principal carries principal='api_key' + apiKeyId; re-check the key
// on connect so a REVOKED key gets NO new collab connections (a collab token
// outlives its 24h, but a revoked key can no longer open fresh ones). An
// api-key token missing its apiKeyId is malformed → reject. A claimless token
// (no recognized principal) is trusted only DURING the rollout grace window
// (a legacy pre-rollout session token, which api keys could never mint);
// once the grace has elapsed every valid token must carry the discriminator,
// so a claimless one is a bug and is rejected (not silently trusted for 24h).
const principal = jwtPayload.principal;
if (principal === 'api_key') {
if (!jwtPayload.apiKeyId) {
throw new UnauthorizedException();
}
// Row-check via the SHARED validator: throws Unauthorized on a revoked/
// expired/disabled key; an infra error propagates (not masked). No new
// connection for a dead key.
await this.apiKeyService.validate({
sub: jwtPayload.sub,
workspaceId: jwtPayload.workspaceId,
apiKeyId: jwtPayload.apiKeyId,
type: JwtType.API_KEY,
} as JwtApiKeyPayload);
} else if (principal !== 'session') {
// Unrecognized/absent discriminator: reject once past the grace window.
if (Date.now() - this.rolloutAt >= COLLAB_TOKEN_GRACE_MS) {
throw new UnauthorizedException();
}
}
const userId = jwtPayload.sub;
const workspaceId = jwtPayload.workspaceId;
@@ -1,84 +1,93 @@
import { computeHistoryJob, resolveSource } from './persistence.extension';
import {
computeHistoryJob,
resolveSource,
} from './persistence.extension';
import {
HISTORY_FAST_INTERVAL,
HISTORY_FAST_THRESHOLD,
HISTORY_INTERVAL,
IDLE_INTERVAL_AGENT,
IDLE_INTERVAL_USER,
IDLE_MAX_WAIT_AGENT,
IDLE_MAX_WAIT_USER,
} from '../constants';
// A fixed clock + fixed createdAt make pageAge deterministic.
const NOW = 1_700_000_000_000;
const PAGE_ID = '550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000';
// Build a minimal page whose age (NOW - createdAt) is exactly `ageMs`.
const pageAged = (ageMs: number) => ({
id: PAGE_ID,
createdAt: new Date(NOW - ageMs),
});
const page = { id: PAGE_ID };
describe('computeHistoryJob', () => {
it('agent edit → delay MUST be 0 and job id is source-keyed', () => {
// INVARIANT (§15 H2 / persistence.extension): the agent delay MUST stay 0.
// The worker re-reads the page row at run time, so any non-zero delay risks
// snapshotting content a later human edit has already overwritten. This is
// the load-bearing assertion of this spec — do not relax it.
const { jobId, delay } = computeHistoryJob(pageAged(0), 'agent', NOW);
expect(delay).toBe(0);
expect(jobId).toBe(`${PAGE_ID}-agent`);
});
it('agent edit on an OLD page is still delay 0 (age never applies to agents)', () => {
// Even when the page is far older than the fast threshold, the agent path
// must short-circuit to 0 — age-based debounce is a human-only concern.
const { jobId, delay } = computeHistoryJob(
pageAged(HISTORY_FAST_THRESHOLD + 60_000),
'agent',
NOW,
);
expect(delay).toBe(0);
expect(jobId).toBe(`${PAGE_ID}-agent`);
});
it('human edit on a YOUNG page (age < threshold) → fast interval, bare job id', () => {
const { jobId, delay } = computeHistoryJob(
pageAged(HISTORY_FAST_THRESHOLD - 1),
'user',
NOW,
);
expect(delay).toBe(HISTORY_FAST_INTERVAL);
describe('computeHistoryJob (#370 — shared trailing idle pipeline)', () => {
it('human edit → user idle window, bare page.id job', () => {
// Humans and the agent now share ONE idle job per page (jobId = page.id).
// The agent's old delay=0 fast path is GONE — intentional agent points now
// arrive via the explicit save-version signal, not a zero-delay snapshot.
const { jobId, delay } = computeHistoryJob(page, 'user');
expect(delay).toBe(IDLE_INTERVAL_USER);
expect(jobId).toBe(PAGE_ID);
});
it('human edit on an OLD page (age > threshold) → standard interval', () => {
const { jobId, delay } = computeHistoryJob(
pageAged(HISTORY_FAST_THRESHOLD + 1),
'user',
NOW,
);
expect(delay).toBe(HISTORY_INTERVAL);
it('agent edit → agent idle window (shorter), still the bare page.id job', () => {
const { jobId, delay } = computeHistoryJob(page, 'agent');
expect(delay).toBe(IDLE_INTERVAL_AGENT);
// No `-agent` suffix anymore: the agent joins the common idle pipeline.
expect(jobId).toBe(PAGE_ID);
});
it('boundary: pageAge EXACTLY === threshold takes the slow branch (the `<` is strict)', () => {
// Off-by-one guard: the condition is `pageAge < HISTORY_FAST_THRESHOLD`, so
// an age of exactly the threshold is NOT "fast" — it must use HISTORY_INTERVAL.
const { delay } = computeHistoryJob(
pageAged(HISTORY_FAST_THRESHOLD),
'user',
NOW,
);
expect(delay).toBe(HISTORY_INTERVAL);
it('agent flushes sooner than a human', () => {
expect(IDLE_INTERVAL_AGENT).toBeLessThan(IDLE_INTERVAL_USER);
});
it('treats any non-"agent" source string as human', () => {
// resolveSource only ever yields 'agent' | 'user', but guard the contract:
// the agent branch keys strictly on === 'agent'.
const { jobId, delay } = computeHistoryJob(pageAged(0), 'user', NOW);
expect(delay).toBe(HISTORY_FAST_INTERVAL);
it('treats any non-"agent" source string as human (keys strictly on === agent)', () => {
const { jobId, delay } = computeHistoryJob(page, 'user');
expect(delay).toBe(IDLE_INTERVAL_USER);
expect(jobId).toBe(PAGE_ID);
});
// #370 review round-1 WARNING: the max-wait ceiling prevents autosnapshot
// starvation during a continuous editing session (the trailing timer would
// otherwise re-arm forever and never fire).
describe('max-wait ceiling', () => {
const T0 = 1_000_000; // arbitrary fixed epoch for deterministic tests
it('once a burst is armed, delay clamps to the remaining max-wait budget', () => {
// 1 minute into the burst the USER interval (60m) far exceeds the remaining
// max-wait budget (10m - 1m = 9m), so the delay is clamped DOWN to that
// remaining budget — the full interval is NOT used once a ceiling applies.
const { delay } = computeHistoryJob(page, 'user', T0, T0 + 60_000);
expect(delay).toBe(IDLE_MAX_WAIT_USER - 60_000);
});
it('never waits longer than the max-wait budget from the burst start', () => {
// A store arriving right at the ceiling → delay 0 (fire promptly).
const { delay } = computeHistoryJob(
page,
'user',
T0,
T0 + IDLE_MAX_WAIT_USER,
);
expect(delay).toBe(0);
});
it('past the ceiling never returns a negative delay', () => {
const { delay } = computeHistoryJob(
page,
'user',
T0,
T0 + IDLE_MAX_WAIT_USER + 5 * 60_000,
);
expect(delay).toBe(0);
});
it('the agent ceiling is shorter than the user ceiling', () => {
expect(IDLE_MAX_WAIT_AGENT).toBeLessThan(IDLE_MAX_WAIT_USER);
const { delay } = computeHistoryJob(
page,
'agent',
T0,
T0 + IDLE_MAX_WAIT_AGENT,
);
expect(delay).toBe(0);
});
it('without a burstStart there is no ceiling (backward-compatible)', () => {
expect(computeHistoryJob(page, 'user').delay).toBe(IDLE_INTERVAL_USER);
expect(computeHistoryJob(page, 'agent').delay).toBe(IDLE_INTERVAL_AGENT);
});
});
});
describe('resolveSource (truth table)', () => {
@@ -40,11 +40,12 @@ describe('PersistenceExtension.onStoreDocument — Approach-A boundary snapshot'
let pageHistoryRepo: {
saveHistory: jest.Mock;
findPageLastHistory: jest.Mock;
updateHistoryKind: jest.Mock;
};
let aiQueue: { add: jest.Mock };
let historyQueue: { add: jest.Mock };
let historyQueue: { add: jest.Mock; remove: jest.Mock };
let notificationQueue: { add: jest.Mock };
let collabHistory: { addContributors: jest.Mock };
let collabHistory: { addContributors: jest.Mock; popContributors: jest.Mock };
let transclusionService: {
syncPageTransclusions: jest.Mock;
syncPageReferences: jest.Mock;
@@ -93,13 +94,22 @@ describe('PersistenceExtension.onStoreDocument — Approach-A boundary snapshot'
pageHistoryRepo = {
saveHistory: jest.fn().mockImplementation(async () => {
callOrder.push('saveHistory');
return { id: 'history-1' };
}),
findPageLastHistory: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(null),
updateHistoryKind: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
};
aiQueue = { add: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
historyQueue = { add: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
historyQueue = {
add: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
// #370 — enqueuePageHistory now removes any pending idle job before re-adding.
remove: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
};
notificationQueue = { add: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
collabHistory = { addContributors: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
collabHistory = {
addContributors: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
popContributors: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
};
transclusionService = {
syncPageTransclusions: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
syncPageReferences: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
@@ -165,6 +175,50 @@ describe('PersistenceExtension.onStoreDocument — Approach-A boundary snapshot'
expect(pageRepo.updatePage.mock.calls[0][0].lastUpdatedSource).toBe('user');
});
// #370 review round-1 SUGGESTION: the boundary was GENERALIZED from a
// user→agent special-case to ANY lastUpdatedSource transition. These pin the
// generalized behaviour it was rebuilt for.
describe('generalized boundary — any source transition', () => {
// Same persisted page but with an explicit prior source.
const pageWithPriorSource = (prior: string | null) => ({
...persistedHumanPage('NEW CONTENT'),
lastUpdatedSource: prior,
});
it('agent→user transition fires the boundary (pins the prior agent revision)', async () => {
const document = ydocFor(doc('NEW CONTENT'));
pageRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(pageWithPriorSource('agent'));
pageHistoryRepo.findPageLastHistory.mockResolvedValue(null);
await ext.onStoreDocument(buildData(document, 'user') as any);
expect(pageHistoryRepo.saveHistory).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(callOrder).toEqual(['saveHistory', 'updatePage']);
expect(pageRepo.updatePage.mock.calls[0][0].lastUpdatedSource).toBe('user');
});
it('git→user transition fires the boundary (git-sync overwrite is a source change)', async () => {
const document = ydocFor(doc('NEW CONTENT'));
pageRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(pageWithPriorSource('git'));
pageHistoryRepo.findPageLastHistory.mockResolvedValue(null);
await ext.onStoreDocument(buildData(document, 'user') as any);
expect(pageHistoryRepo.saveHistory).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(callOrder).toEqual(['saveHistory', 'updatePage']);
});
it('a null prior source (first-ever edit) does NOT fire the boundary', async () => {
const document = ydocFor(doc('NEW CONTENT'));
pageRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(pageWithPriorSource(null));
await ext.onStoreDocument(buildData(document, 'agent') as any);
expect(pageHistoryRepo.saveHistory).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(pageRepo.updatePage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
});
it('idempotency: unchanged content → no updatePage, no history, no queues', async () => {
// The Y.Doc content equals the persisted content deeply → early skip.
// A Y.Doc round-trip normalizes attrs (e.g. paragraph indent), so derive
@@ -479,4 +533,231 @@ describe('PersistenceExtension.onStoreDocument — Approach-A boundary snapshot'
// Contributors keyed by the UUID so they match the PAGE_HISTORY job (page.id).
expect(collabHistory.addContributors.mock.calls[0][0]).toBe(PAGE_ID);
});
// #370 — explicit save-version (Cmd+S / agent save tool) over the stateless
// seam. The tier is derived from the SIGNED connection actor, the store path
// is reused, and promote-not-dup avoids duplicating heavy content rows.
describe('save-version (#370)', () => {
const emitSave = (document: any, actor: 'user' | 'agent') =>
ext.onStateless({
connection: {
readOnly: false,
context: { user: { id: USER_ID, name: 'Alice' }, actor },
} as any,
documentName: `page.${PAGE_ID}`,
document: document as any,
payload: JSON.stringify({ type: 'save-version' }),
} as any);
// findById returns a page whose content already equals the live doc, so the
// store path is a no-op and we isolate the versioning decision.
const pageMatchingDoc = (document: any) => ({
...persistedHumanPage('IGNORED'),
content: TiptapTransformer.fromYdoc(document, 'default'),
});
it('human save with no prior snapshot → writes a manual version + broadcasts', async () => {
const document = ydocFor(doc('VERSION ME'));
pageRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(pageMatchingDoc(document));
pageHistoryRepo.findPageLastHistory.mockResolvedValue(null);
await emitSave(document, 'user');
expect(pageHistoryRepo.saveHistory).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(pageHistoryRepo.saveHistory.mock.calls[0][1]).toEqual(
expect.objectContaining({ kind: 'manual' }),
);
// The pending idle autosnapshot is cancelled by the explicit version.
expect(historyQueue.remove).toHaveBeenCalledWith(PAGE_ID);
const msg = JSON.parse(
(document as any).broadcastStateless.mock.calls[(document as any).broadcastStateless.mock.calls.length - 1][0],
);
expect(msg).toMatchObject({
type: 'version.saved',
kind: 'manual',
alreadySaved: false,
});
});
it('agent save derives kind=agent from the signed actor', async () => {
const document = ydocFor(doc('AGENT VERSION'));
pageRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(pageMatchingDoc(document));
pageHistoryRepo.findPageLastHistory.mockResolvedValue(null);
await emitSave(document, 'agent');
expect(pageHistoryRepo.saveHistory.mock.calls[pageHistoryRepo.saveHistory.mock.calls.length - 1][1]).toEqual(
expect.objectContaining({ kind: 'agent' }),
);
});
it('promote-not-dup: latest snapshot is an autosave with identical content → upgrades in place', async () => {
const document = ydocFor(doc('SAME'));
const page = pageMatchingDoc(document);
pageRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(page);
pageHistoryRepo.findPageLastHistory.mockResolvedValue({
id: 'auto-1',
content: page.content,
kind: 'idle',
});
await emitSave(document, 'user');
// No heavy new content row — the existing autosave is promoted to manual.
expect(pageHistoryRepo.updateHistoryKind).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'auto-1',
'manual',
expect.anything(),
);
expect(pageHistoryRepo.saveHistory).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
const msg = JSON.parse(
(document as any).broadcastStateless.mock.calls[(document as any).broadcastStateless.mock.calls.length - 1][0],
);
expect(msg).toMatchObject({ historyId: 'auto-1', alreadySaved: false });
});
it('no-op when the latest snapshot is already a manual version of this content', async () => {
const document = ydocFor(doc('ALREADY SAVED'));
const page = pageMatchingDoc(document);
pageRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(page);
pageHistoryRepo.findPageLastHistory.mockResolvedValue({
id: 'ver-1',
content: page.content,
kind: 'manual',
});
await emitSave(document, 'user');
expect(pageHistoryRepo.updateHistoryKind).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(pageHistoryRepo.saveHistory).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
const msg = JSON.parse(
(document as any).broadcastStateless.mock.calls[(document as any).broadcastStateless.mock.calls.length - 1][0],
);
expect(msg).toMatchObject({ alreadySaved: true, kind: 'manual' });
});
it('a read-only connection cannot save a version', async () => {
const document = ydocFor(doc('READER'));
pageRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(pageMatchingDoc(document));
await ext.onStateless({
connection: {
readOnly: true,
context: { user: { id: USER_ID }, actor: 'user' },
} as any,
documentName: `page.${PAGE_ID}`,
document: document as any,
payload: JSON.stringify({ type: 'save-version' }),
} as any);
expect(pageHistoryRepo.saveHistory).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(pageHistoryRepo.updateHistoryKind).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
// #370 F8-twin — a COMMIT abort (serialization/deadlock/conn-drop) rejects
// OUTSIDE the tx callback, AFTER the destructive popContributors (SPOP) and
// saveHistory ran but the INSERT rolled back. onStateless has no retry, so
// the outer catch MUST re-add (SADD) the popped set or attribution is lost
// irrecoverably. MUTATION: drop the outer catch → addContributors is never
// called → this reddens.
it('restores popped contributors when the commit aborts after the callback', async () => {
const document = ydocFor(doc('VERSION ME'));
pageRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(pageMatchingDoc(document));
// No matching snapshot → fresh version branch → pops contributors.
pageHistoryRepo.findPageLastHistory.mockResolvedValue(null);
collabHistory.popContributors.mockResolvedValue(['u1', 'u2']);
// A db whose commit REJECTS after the callback body resolved: the SPOP and
// saveHistory already ran, then the tx aborts. onStoreDocument's flush uses
// the same db but its content matches (no-op branch) and its own retry loop
// swallows the throw, so only the versioning tx exercises the restore.
const commitFailingDb = {
transaction: () => ({
execute: async (fn: (trx: any) => Promise<any>) => {
await fn(trxStub);
throw new Error('commit aborted (serialization_failure)');
},
}),
};
const ext2 = new PersistenceExtension(
pageRepo as any,
pageHistoryRepo as any,
commitFailingDb as any,
aiQueue as any,
historyQueue as any,
notificationQueue as any,
collabHistory as any,
transclusionService as any,
);
jest.spyOn(ext2['logger'], 'debug').mockImplementation(() => undefined);
jest.spyOn(ext2['logger'], 'warn').mockImplementation(() => undefined);
jest.spyOn(ext2['logger'], 'error').mockImplementation(() => undefined);
await expect(
ext2.onStateless({
connection: {
readOnly: false,
context: { user: { id: USER_ID, name: 'Alice' }, actor: 'user' },
} as any,
documentName: `page.${PAGE_ID}`,
document: document as any,
payload: JSON.stringify({ type: 'save-version' }),
} as any),
).rejects.toThrow();
// Attribution preserved: the popped set is SADD-restored, keyed by the page
// UUID it was popped under.
expect(collabHistory.addContributors).toHaveBeenCalledWith(PAGE_ID, [
'u1',
'u2',
]);
});
// #370 #260 — for a `page.<slugId>` document the idle job is armed under the
// page UUID (computeHistoryJob's jobId = page.id), so the supersede-remove
// must target page.id, not the raw slugId doc-name id, or it silently misses.
it('cancels the superseded idle job by the page UUID for a slugId doc', async () => {
const SLUG = 'slug-1'; // persistedHumanPage.slugId
const document = ydocFor(doc('VERSION ME'));
pageRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(pageMatchingDoc(document));
pageHistoryRepo.findPageLastHistory.mockResolvedValue(null);
await ext.onStateless({
connection: {
readOnly: false,
context: { user: { id: USER_ID, name: 'Alice' }, actor: 'user' },
} as any,
documentName: `page.${SLUG}`,
document: document as any,
payload: JSON.stringify({ type: 'save-version' }),
} as any);
// remove() keyed by the UUID (the real jobId), never the slugId.
expect(historyQueue.remove).toHaveBeenCalledWith(PAGE_ID);
expect(historyQueue.remove).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith(SLUG);
});
});
// #370 — the in-memory idle-burst marker must be dropped on doc unload (like
// its sibling per-document maps) or it grows unbounded for every page that was
// edited but never manually saved. MUTATION: drop the afterUnloadDocument
// delete → the entry survives → this reddens.
describe('idleBurstStart housekeeping', () => {
it('afterUnloadDocument clears the idle-burst marker armed by a store', async () => {
const document = ydocFor(doc('EDIT'));
pageRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(persistedHumanPage('EDIT'));
await ext.onStoreDocument(buildData(document, 'user') as any);
const map = ext['idleBurstStart'] as Map<string, number>;
// Keyed by documentName (buildData uses `page.${PAGE_ID}`).
expect(map.has(`page.${PAGE_ID}`)).toBe(true);
await ext.afterUnloadDocument({
documentName: `page.${PAGE_ID}`,
} as any);
expect(map.has(`page.${PAGE_ID}`)).toBe(false);
});
});
});
@@ -37,9 +37,11 @@ import { Page } from '@docmost/db/types/entity.types';
import { CollabHistoryService } from '../services/collab-history.service';
import {
EMBED_DEBOUNCE_MS,
HISTORY_FAST_INTERVAL,
HISTORY_FAST_THRESHOLD,
HISTORY_INTERVAL,
IDLE_INTERVAL_AGENT,
IDLE_INTERVAL_USER,
IDLE_MAX_WAIT_AGENT,
IDLE_MAX_WAIT_USER,
PageHistoryKind,
} from '../constants';
import { TransclusionService } from '../../core/page/transclusion/transclusion.service';
import {
@@ -56,6 +58,16 @@ import { hasTransclusionFamilyNodes } from '../../core/page/transclusion/utils/t
*/
export const INTENTIONAL_CLEAR_MESSAGE_TYPE = 'intentional-clear';
/**
* #370 — wire format of the client→server "save a version" signal. Sent by the
* human (Cmd+S / Save button) and by the agent's explicit save tool over the
* SAME stateless channel. The intentionality tier ('manual' vs 'agent') is
* derived SERVER-SIDE from the signed connection actor, never from this
* payload, so a version's type is unforgeable. The document is taken from the
* connection (not the payload), so the signal cannot be aimed at another page.
*/
export const SAVE_VERSION_MESSAGE_TYPE = 'save-version';
/**
* #251 — how long an intentional-clear signal stays "pending" before it is
* ignored. The signal is set on the clearing keystroke but consumed by the
@@ -92,35 +104,39 @@ export function resolveSource(
}
/**
* Compute the BullMQ job id + delay for a page-history snapshot job. Pure so
* the data-loss-sensitive timing arithmetic is unit-testable; `now` is injected
* (caller passes `Date.now()`) for determinism.
* #370 — compute the BullMQ job id + delay for a page's trailing idle-flush
* autosnapshot. Pure so the timing is unit-testable.
*
* - Agent edits: delay 0 and a source-keyed job id `${page.id}-agent`. The
* delay MUST stay 0 — the worker re-reads the page row at run time, so any
* delay risks reading content a later human edit has already overwritten
* (mis-tagged snapshot). 0 minimizes that window. The `-agent` suffix keeps
* the job from coalescing with the bare-page.id human job.
* - Human edits: age-based debounce so rapid human edits coalesce into one
* snapshot; job id is the bare `page.id`.
*
* BullMQ forbids ':' in custom job ids (Redis key separator), so '-' is used;
* page.id is a UUID, so `${page.id}-agent` cannot collide with a human job.
* Both humans and the agent now share ONE idle pipeline (the agent's old
* `delay=0` fast path is gone — intentional agent points arrive via the
* explicit save-version signal instead). The job id is the bare `page.id`, so a
* page has at most one pending idle job; the caller removes-and-re-adds it on
* every store to keep it debounced to the trailing edge of an edit burst. The
* window differs by source only: the agent flushes sooner than a human.
*/
export function computeHistoryJob(
page: Pick<Page, 'id' | 'createdAt'>,
page: Pick<Page, 'id'>,
source: string,
now: number,
// Epoch ms of the FIRST edit in the current burst (when the pending idle job
// was first armed). Used to enforce the max-wait ceiling so a continuous
// editing session cannot re-arm the trailing timer forever. `now` is injectable
// for tests; both default to a live clock / no ceiling when omitted.
burstStart?: number,
now: number = Date.now(),
): { jobId: string; delay: number } {
const isAgent = source === 'agent';
const pageAge = now - new Date(page.createdAt).getTime();
const delay = isAgent
? 0
: pageAge < HISTORY_FAST_THRESHOLD
? HISTORY_FAST_INTERVAL
: HISTORY_INTERVAL;
const jobId = isAgent ? `${page.id}-agent` : page.id;
return { jobId, delay };
const interval = isAgent ? IDLE_INTERVAL_AGENT : IDLE_INTERVAL_USER;
const maxWait = isAgent ? IDLE_MAX_WAIT_AGENT : IDLE_MAX_WAIT_USER;
let delay = interval;
if (burstStart !== undefined) {
// Time already elapsed since the burst's first edit; the snapshot must fire
// no later than `maxWait` after that, so shrink the trailing delay to the
// remaining budget (never negative, so BullMQ fires it promptly).
const remaining = burstStart + maxWait - now;
delay = Math.max(0, Math.min(interval, remaining));
}
return { jobId: page.id, delay };
}
@Injectable()
@@ -132,6 +148,28 @@ export class PersistenceExtension implements Extension {
// coalescing window" per document and OR it across all edits in the window,
// so the snapshot is marked 'agent' regardless of who wrote last.
private agentTouched: Map<string, boolean> = new Map();
// #370 — epoch ms of the FIRST edit in the current idle-flush burst. Keyed by
// documentName (like its sibling per-document maps above), NOT by page.id, so
// it can be cleaned in afterUnloadDocument alongside `contributors` /
// `agentTouched` / `intentionalClear` when the doc unloads — otherwise any page
// that was edited but never manually saved (the common case) would keep its
// entry forever and the Map would grow unbounded in this long-lived process.
// Set when the pending idle job is first armed (empty entry), read to enforce
// the max-wait ceiling in computeHistoryJob, and cleared on doc unload or when
// a manual save cancels the idle job so the next burst starts a fresh window.
//
// Single-process assumption (like `contributors` / `agentTouched` above): this
// lives only in THIS collab process's memory. A restart, or a page's ownership
// moving to another node, loses the burst-start marker. Consequence: a burst
// that spans the restart looks like a fresh burst to the surviving process, so
// its max-wait ceiling is re-anchored to the first post-restart edit — a single
// continuous session straddling a restart can therefore wait up to ~2× the cap
// for its idle snapshot (once for the lost pre-restart window, once for the new
// one). Bounded and benign (it only DELAYS a safety-net autosnapshot; manual
// saves are unaffected and the next quiet period always flushes), but the
// assumption and its consequence are recorded here so no one mistakes the
// in-memory marker for a durable, cross-process guarantee.
private idleBurstStart: Map<string, number> = new Map();
// #251 — per-document "intentional clear pending" flags. Keyed by
// documentName, value = expiry timestamp (ms). Set by onStateless when the
// client reports a deliberate clear; consumed once by the next
@@ -363,20 +401,19 @@ export class PersistenceExtension implements Extension {
//this.logger.debug('Contributors error:' + err?.['message']);
}
// Approach A — boundary snapshot before the agent's first edit.
// When this store is the agent's and the page's currently persisted
// state was authored by a human, pin that human state as its own
// history version BEFORE the agent overwrites it. `page` still holds
// the OLD content/provenance here, so saveHistory(page) captures the
// pre-agent state tagged 'user'. The agent's new content is
// snapshotted later by the debounced PAGE_HISTORY job ('agent'). Skip
// if the prior state is already agent-authored (boundary already
// pinned on the user->agent transition), if the page is effectively
// empty, or if the latest existing snapshot already equals this human
// state (avoid duplicates).
// #370 — boundary snapshot on ANY source transition. When the store
// flips the page's provenance (user↔agent↔git), pin the OUTGOING
// state as its own history version BEFORE the incoming source
// overwrites it. `page` still holds the OLD content/provenance here,
// so saveHistory(page) captures the pre-transition state tagged with
// its own source, kind='boundary'. The incoming content is snapshotted
// later by the debounced idle job. Skip if the page is effectively
// empty or if the latest existing snapshot already equals this state
// (the shared isDeepStrictEqual gate — avoids duplicates). Generalizing
// beyond the old user→agent special-case also covers git-sync for free.
if (
lastUpdatedSource === 'agent' &&
page.lastUpdatedSource !== 'agent'
page.lastUpdatedSource &&
page.lastUpdatedSource !== lastUpdatedSource
) {
// pageHistory.pageId is uuid-typed; use page.id (never the doc-name
// slugId) so a `page.<slugId>` doc cannot throw 22P02 here (#260).
@@ -384,15 +421,13 @@ export class PersistenceExtension implements Extension {
page.id,
{ includeContent: true, trx },
);
const humanBaselineMissing =
const baselineMissing =
!lastHistory ||
!isDeepStrictEqual(lastHistory.content, page.content);
if (
!isEmptyParagraphDoc(page.content as any) &&
humanBaselineMissing
) {
if (!isEmptyParagraphDoc(page.content as any) && baselineMissing) {
await this.pageHistoryRepo.saveHistory(page, {
contributorIds: page.contributorIds ?? undefined,
kind: 'boundary',
trx,
});
}
@@ -522,7 +557,7 @@ export class PersistenceExtension implements Extension {
{ jobId: `embed-${page.id}`, delay: EMBED_DEBOUNCE_MS },
);
await this.enqueuePageHistory(page, lastUpdatedSource);
await this.enqueuePageHistory(page, documentName, lastUpdatedSource);
}
// #402 — report the serialized size for the store histogram's size_bucket.
@@ -554,6 +589,14 @@ export class PersistenceExtension implements Extension {
return; // unrelated / malformed stateless message
}
// #370 — explicit "save a version" (human Cmd+S / agent save tool). Edit
// rights are already enforced by the readOnly reject above (a reader can't
// create a version), exactly as intentional-clear requires.
if (message?.type === SAVE_VERSION_MESSAGE_TYPE) {
await this.handleSaveVersion(data);
return;
}
if (message?.type !== INTENTIONAL_CLEAR_MESSAGE_TYPE) return;
this.intentionalClear.set(
@@ -562,6 +605,160 @@ export class PersistenceExtension implements Extension {
);
}
/**
* #370 — persist an intentional version from the live in-memory ydoc.
*
* One stateless path serves BOTH the human and the agent; the tier is derived
* SERVER-SIDE from the signed connection actor ('agent' → 'agent', anything
* else → 'manual'), so the version type cannot be spoofed by the client. We
* take the fresh ydoc from the collab process memory and run it through the
* EXISTING store path first (so pages.content/ydoc reflect the exact content
* being versioned — a REST endpoint would race the up-to-10s-stale page row),
* then snapshot it into page_history with the intentional kind.
*
* Promote-not-dup: if the latest history row already holds this exact content
* and it is an autosave (idle/boundary/legacy-null), upgrade its kind in place
* instead of duplicating a heavy content row; if it is already 'manual', it is
* a no-op (the client shows an "already saved" toast). Otherwise a fresh
* version row is written, popping the aggregated contributors from Redis.
*/
private async handleSaveVersion(data: onStatelessPayload): Promise<void> {
const { connection, document, documentName } = data;
const context = connection?.context;
const pageId = getPageId(documentName);
// Unforgeable: 'agent' only for a signed agent connection, else 'manual'.
const kind: PageHistoryKind =
context?.actor === 'agent' ? 'agent' : 'manual';
// Flush the live ydoc through the normal store path so the page row + ydoc
// hold exactly what we are about to version (also fires the idle enqueue we
// supersede below, plus any source-transition boundary). onStoreDocument
// only needs document/documentName/context.
await this.onStoreDocument({
document,
documentName,
context,
} as onStoreDocumentPayload);
let result:
| { historyId: string; kind: PageHistoryKind; alreadySaved: boolean }
| undefined;
// #370 F8-twin — the contributor set popped from Redis (destructive SPOP)
// must be restored if the version row does not durably land. The inner
// try/catch below only covers a throw INSIDE the callback; but executeTx
// COMMITS after the callback, so a commit-abort (serialization/deadlock/
// connection drop — the transient class the epic retries in the processor)
// rejects OUTSIDE the callback, after saveHistory already ran and the SPOP
// already happened, while the INSERT rolls back. onStateless does NOT retry,
// so an unrestored pop is a one-shot irrecoverable attribution loss (the
// processor got exactly this fix: poppedForRestore + an outer catch). We
// track the popped set here (keyed by the page UUID it was popped by — never
// the doc-name id, which may be a slugId, #260) and restore it in the outer
// catch. addContributors is an idempotent Redis SADD, so a double-restore is
// harmless. versionedPageId is also reused below to remove the superseded
// idle job by its real jobId (page.id).
let poppedForRestore: string[] = [];
let versionedPageId: string | undefined;
try {
await executeTx(this.db, async (trx) => {
const page = await this.pageRepo.findById(pageId, {
withLock: true,
includeContent: true,
trx,
});
if (!page) return;
versionedPageId = page.id;
// Never version an effectively-empty page (mirrors the processor's
// first-history guard); there is nothing intentional to pin.
if (isEmptyParagraphDoc(page.content as any)) return;
const lastHistory = await this.pageHistoryRepo.findPageLastHistory(
page.id,
{ includeContent: true, trx },
);
if (
lastHistory &&
isDeepStrictEqual(lastHistory.content, page.content)
) {
// Content is already snapshotted. Promote-not-dup.
if (lastHistory.kind === 'manual') {
result = {
historyId: lastHistory.id,
kind: 'manual',
alreadySaved: true,
};
return;
}
await this.pageHistoryRepo.updateHistoryKind(
lastHistory.id,
kind,
trx,
);
result = { historyId: lastHistory.id, kind, alreadySaved: false };
return;
}
// Fresh version row. Pop the contributors aggregated since the last
// snapshot (SPOP); restore them if the write fails so they aren't lost.
const contributorIds = await this.collabHistory.popContributors(
page.id,
);
poppedForRestore = contributorIds;
try {
const saved = await this.pageHistoryRepo.saveHistory(page, {
contributorIds,
kind,
trx,
});
result = { historyId: saved.id, kind, alreadySaved: false };
} catch (err) {
await this.collabHistory.addContributors(page.id, contributorIds);
poppedForRestore = [];
throw err;
}
});
} catch (err) {
// A throw here means the tx did NOT commit (callback threw, or the commit
// itself failed and rolled back). If we popped contributors and the inner
// catch did not already restore them, restore now so attribution is not
// lost — onStateless has no retry to recover it. Restore by the page UUID
// the pop was keyed under (versionedPageId is always set before the pop).
if (poppedForRestore.length && versionedPageId) {
await this.collabHistory.addContributors(
versionedPageId,
poppedForRestore,
);
}
throw err;
}
// Housekeeping: this explicit version supersedes the page's pending idle
// autosnapshot, so cancel it and end the current idle burst so the next edit
// starts a fresh max-wait window. Remove the idle job by its REAL jobId
// (page.id UUID — computeHistoryJob arms it under page.id), not the raw
// doc-name id which may be a slugId for a `page.<slugId>` doc (#260), or the
// remove silently misses. The burst marker is keyed by documentName (like its
// sibling per-document maps), and is also cleaned in afterUnloadDocument.
if (versionedPageId) {
await this.historyQueue.remove(versionedPageId).catch(() => undefined);
}
this.idleBurstStart.delete(documentName);
if (result) {
document.broadcastStateless(
JSON.stringify({
type: 'version.saved',
historyId: result.historyId,
kind: result.kind,
alreadySaved: result.alreadySaved,
}),
);
}
}
async onChange(data: onChangePayload) {
const documentName = data.documentName;
const userId = data.context?.user?.id;
@@ -586,6 +783,10 @@ export class PersistenceExtension implements Extension {
this.contributors.delete(documentName);
this.agentTouched.delete(documentName);
this.intentionalClear.delete(documentName);
// #370 — drop the idle-burst marker with the other per-document maps so it
// cannot accumulate across the process lifetime for never-manually-saved
// pages. The pending idle job (if any) is a self-expiring BullMQ delayed job.
this.idleBurstStart.delete(documentName);
}
private consumeContributors(documentName: string): string[] {
@@ -617,19 +818,80 @@ export class PersistenceExtension implements Extension {
private async enqueuePageHistory(
page: Page,
documentName: string,
lastUpdatedSource: string,
): Promise<void> {
// Job id + delay arithmetic lives in the pure `computeHistoryJob` (see its
// doc comment for the agent-delay-0 / age-based-debounce invariants).
// #370 — trailing idle debounce with a max-wait ceiling. One pending idle
// job per page (jobId = page.id); on every store we remove the pending
// delayed job and re-add it, so the snapshot lands `delay` after edits go
// quiet rather than once per store (precedent: workspace.service.ts).
// remove() on a delayed job simply deletes it (0 if absent, no throw); if the
// job is already ACTIVE and the remove is a no-op, the add still de-dups and
// the processor's isDeepStrictEqual gate collapses the duplicate content.
//
// The FIRST arm of a burst records `burstStart`; computeHistoryJob shrinks
// the delay to the remaining max-wait budget from that point, so a continuous
// session cannot re-arm the trailing timer forever and starve the snapshot.
// A burst marker older than THIS TIER's max-wait means the previous idle job
// has already fired — start a fresh window instead of firing immediately on
// the next edit. Must use the SAME source-specific max-wait computeHistoryJob
// uses (agent 5m / user 10m): a hardcoded USER ceiling would leave an agent
// burst's marker stale for 5..10m, forcing delay=0 on every store in that
// window and writing one idle row per store — exactly the per-store bloat the
// debounce exists to prevent, on the continuous-agent path.
const maxWait =
lastUpdatedSource === 'agent' ? IDLE_MAX_WAIT_AGENT : IDLE_MAX_WAIT_USER;
const now = Date.now();
// Keyed by documentName (see the map declaration) so afterUnloadDocument can
// clean it; the queue jobId stays page.id (computeHistoryJob) as required.
let burstStart = this.idleBurstStart.get(documentName);
if (burstStart === undefined || now - burstStart >= maxWait) {
burstStart = now;
this.idleBurstStart.set(documentName, burstStart);
}
const { jobId, delay } = computeHistoryJob(
page,
lastUpdatedSource,
Date.now(),
burstStart,
now,
);
// remove-then-add trailing-debounce idiom, and its ONE race. We delete the
// pending delayed job and re-add it under the same jobId so the timer resets
// to the trailing edge of the burst. The race is the small window between
// these two awaits: if the delayed job's `delay` elapses in that gap it goes
// ACTIVE, and then:
// - remove() on an active/locked job is a no-op (BullMQ won't yank a job a
// worker holds), and our `.catch(() => undefined)` swallows that too; and
// - add() with a jobId that already exists (the now-active job's id) is
// DROPPED by BullMQ — a duplicate add is a no-op.
// So this store fails to re-arm the trailing job: the just-fired snapshot
// captured content up to the moment it went active, and THIS edit is left
// without a pending trailing job. It is bounded and self-healing — the NEXT
// store re-arms a fresh delayed job (the id is free again once the active job
// completes / removeOnComplete frees it), and the processor's
// isDeepStrictEqual gate collapses any content-identical duplicate. The only
// uncovered case is when the racing store was the LAST in the session: the
// tail edits made after the job went active get NO trailing snapshot until
// the next edit re-arms one. That is an acceptable safety-net gap (a manual
// Save, a source-transition boundary, or simply the next edit all still cover
// it), which is why the reviewer accepts documenting it here rather than
// adding a post-add "did the add actually arm a job?" re-check.
//
// NOTE — do NOT "unify" this with the neighbouring embed-debounce idiom
// (aiQueue.add of PAGE_CONTENT_UPDATED above): that one uses a STABLE jobId
// and NO remove(), relying purely on BullMQ coalescing a repeated add under
// the same id, because a re-embed only needs to eventually run once on the
// latest content and re-anchoring its delay on every keystroke is undesirable.
// THIS idiom deliberately removes-then-adds precisely to PUSH the delay back
// to the trailing edge on every store (a true debounce), which coalescing
// alone cannot do. Collapsing them would silently change the history cadence.
await this.historyQueue.remove(jobId).catch(() => undefined);
await this.historyQueue.add(
QueueJob.PAGE_HISTORY,
{ pageId: page.id } as IPageHistoryJob,
{ pageId: page.id, kind: 'idle' } as IPageHistoryJob,
{ jobId, delay },
);
}
@@ -66,6 +66,15 @@ describe('HistoryProcessor.process', () => {
notificationQueue = { add: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
generalQueue = { add: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
// #370 F3 — the processor now serializes its find+save under a page-row lock
// via executeTx. A db whose transaction().execute(fn) runs fn with a trx stub
// drives the real executeTx() helper without a database.
const db = {
transaction: () => ({
execute: (fn: (trx: any) => Promise<any>) => fn({ __trx: true }),
}),
};
// WorkerHost's constructor reads `this.worker`; passing repos positionally
// matches the constructor and avoids the Nest DI container.
proc = new HistoryProcessor(
@@ -73,6 +82,7 @@ describe('HistoryProcessor.process', () => {
pageRepo as any,
collabHistory as any,
watcherService as any,
db as any,
notificationQueue as any,
generalQueue as any,
);
@@ -126,15 +136,26 @@ describe('HistoryProcessor.process', () => {
await proc.process(buildJob());
expect(collabHistory.popContributors).toHaveBeenCalledWith(PAGE_ID);
// #370 F3/F9 — the snapshot decision runs under a page-row lock. Pin the lock
// structurally so a refactor that drops withLock/trx (silently reintroducing
// the TOCTOU double-insert) turns this red. The tx stub is { __trx: true }.
expect(pageRepo.findById).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
PAGE_ID,
expect.objectContaining({ withLock: true, trx: { __trx: true } }),
);
// #370 F7 — addPageWatchers MUST receive the trx, or its FK-check runs on a
// separate connection and self-deadlocks against our FOR UPDATE. Asserting
// the trx arg here is exactly what would have caught that regression.
expect(watcherService.addPageWatchers).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
['u1', 'u2'],
PAGE_ID,
SPACE_ID,
WORKSPACE_ID,
{ __trx: true },
);
expect(pageHistoryRepo.saveHistory).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ id: PAGE_ID }),
{ contributorIds: ['u1', 'u2'] },
{ contributorIds: ['u1', 'u2'], kind: 'idle', trx: { __trx: true } },
);
expect(generalQueue.add).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
QueueJob.PAGE_BACKLINKS,
@@ -186,6 +207,48 @@ describe('HistoryProcessor.process', () => {
]);
});
it('COMMIT failure (throw outside the tx callback) → contributors RESTORED', async () => {
// #370 F8 — a commit-time failure throws OUTSIDE the callback, so the inner
// try/catch does not run; the outer catch must restore the popped set (else a
// BullMQ retry writes an unattributed version). Use a db whose execute() runs
// the callback THEN throws, simulating a commit abort.
pageHistoryRepo.findPageLastHistory.mockResolvedValue({
content: { type: 'doc', content: [] },
});
const commitFail = {
transaction: () => ({
execute: async (fn: (trx: any) => Promise<any>) => {
await fn({ __trx: true }); // callback succeeds (saveHistory ok)
throw new Error('commit aborted'); // ...but the COMMIT fails
},
}),
};
const procCommitFail = new HistoryProcessor(
pageHistoryRepo as any,
pageRepo as any,
collabHistory as any,
watcherService as any,
commitFail as any,
notificationQueue as any,
generalQueue as any,
);
jest
.spyOn(procCommitFail['logger'], 'error')
.mockImplementation(() => undefined);
await expect(procCommitFail.process(buildJob())).rejects.toThrow(
'commit aborted',
);
// The inner catch did NOT run (save succeeded), so only the outer catch can
// restore — assert it did.
expect(collabHistory.addContributors).toHaveBeenCalledWith(PAGE_ID, [
'u1',
'u2',
]);
// And the post-snapshot queue work must NOT have run (we rethrew).
expect(generalQueue.add).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('backlinks + notification queue failures are swallowed (history still committed)', async () => {
pageHistoryRepo.findPageLastHistory.mockResolvedValue({
content: { type: 'doc', content: [] },
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ import { isDeepStrictEqual } from 'node:util';
import { CollabHistoryService } from '../services/collab-history.service';
import { WatcherService } from '../../core/watcher/watcher.service';
import { isEmptyParagraphDoc } from '../collaboration.util';
import { InjectKysely } from 'nestjs-kysely';
import { KyselyDB } from '@docmost/db/types/kysely.types';
import { executeTx } from '@docmost/db/utils';
@Processor(QueueName.HISTORY_QUEUE)
export class HistoryProcessor extends WorkerHost implements OnModuleDestroy {
@@ -29,6 +32,7 @@ export class HistoryProcessor extends WorkerHost implements OnModuleDestroy {
private readonly pageRepo: PageRepo,
private readonly collabHistory: CollabHistoryService,
private readonly watcherService: WatcherService,
@InjectKysely() private readonly db: KyselyDB,
@InjectQueue(QueueName.NOTIFICATION_QUEUE) private notificationQueue: Queue,
@InjectQueue(QueueName.GENERAL_QUEUE) private generalQueue: Queue,
) {
@@ -41,6 +45,9 @@ export class HistoryProcessor extends WorkerHost implements OnModuleDestroy {
try {
const { pageId } = job.data;
// Read the page WITHOUT a lock first, only to bail early on the two cheap
// no-write cases (page gone / empty first snapshot) without opening a
// transaction. The authoritative check-then-write happens locked below.
const page = await this.pageRepo.findById(pageId, {
includeContent: true,
});
@@ -51,40 +58,109 @@ export class HistoryProcessor extends WorkerHost implements OnModuleDestroy {
return;
}
const lastHistory = await this.pageHistoryRepo.findPageLastHistory(
pageId,
{ includeContent: true },
);
// #370 F3 — the snapshot decision (findPageLastHistory → saveHistory) must
// be serialized against manual-save/boundary writers, which run under a
// page-row lock in onStoreDocument. Without it, this processor and a
// concurrent manual-save each read the same lastHistory (MVCC), both see
// content != lastHistory, and both insert — producing two page_history rows
// with IDENTICAL content (one 'idle', one 'manual'), defeating
// promote-not-dup and the version-vs-autosave split. Taking the same
// page-row lock makes the second writer observe the first's committed row so
// the isDeepStrictEqual gate collapses the duplicate. Only the read+write
// is transacted; the post-snapshot queue work stays outside.
let contributorIds: string[] = [];
let snapshotWritten = false;
let lastHistoryContent: unknown;
// #370 F8 — the contributor set popped from Redis (destructive SPOP) must be
// restored if the snapshot does not durably land. The inner try/catch only
// covers a throw INSIDE the callback; a COMMIT failure (connection drop,
// serialization/deadlock abort on commit — the transient class the epic
// already retries) throws OUTSIDE it, rolling the snapshot back while the
// pop is already gone. We track the popped set here and restore it in the
// outer catch so a BullMQ retry re-attributes the version. addContributors
// is an idempotent Redis SADD, so a double-restore is harmless.
let poppedForRestore: string[] = [];
if (!lastHistory && isEmptyParagraphDoc(page.content as any)) {
this.logger.debug(
`Skipping first history for page ${pageId}: empty content`,
);
await this.collabHistory.clearContributors(pageId);
try {
await executeTx(this.db, async (trx) => {
const lockedPage = await this.pageRepo.findById(pageId, {
includeContent: true,
withLock: true,
trx,
});
if (!lockedPage) return;
const lastHistory = await this.pageHistoryRepo.findPageLastHistory(
pageId,
{ includeContent: true, trx },
);
lastHistoryContent = lastHistory?.content;
if (!lastHistory && isEmptyParagraphDoc(lockedPage.content as any)) {
this.logger.debug(
`Skipping first history for page ${pageId}: empty content`,
);
return;
}
if (
lastHistory &&
isDeepStrictEqual(lastHistory.content, lockedPage.content)
) {
return; // already snapshotted at this content — nothing to write
}
contributorIds = await this.collabHistory.popContributors(pageId);
poppedForRestore = contributorIds;
try {
// Pass `trx` so the watcher insert's FK check (FOR KEY SHARE on
// pages[pageId]) runs on the SAME connection that already holds the
// FOR UPDATE lock from findById — otherwise it takes the FK lock on a
// separate pool connection and self-deadlocks against our own tx.
await this.watcherService.addPageWatchers(
contributorIds,
pageId,
lockedPage.spaceId,
lockedPage.workspaceId,
trx,
);
// #370 — every job on this queue is a trailing idle-flush autosnapshot.
await this.pageHistoryRepo.saveHistory(lockedPage, {
contributorIds,
kind: job.data.kind ?? 'idle',
trx,
});
snapshotWritten = true;
this.logger.debug(`History created for page: ${pageId}`);
} catch (err) {
await this.collabHistory.addContributors(pageId, contributorIds);
poppedForRestore = [];
throw err;
}
});
} catch (err) {
// A throw here means the tx did NOT commit (callback threw, or the commit
// itself failed and rolled back). If we popped contributors and the inner
// catch did not already restore them, restore now so the retry keeps
// attribution. snapshotWritten is irrelevant: it is set before commit, so
// it can be true even when the commit rolled the snapshot back.
if (poppedForRestore.length) {
await this.collabHistory.addContributors(pageId, poppedForRestore);
}
throw err;
}
// No snapshot written (page vanished / empty-first / unchanged content) →
// clear the contributor set for the skip cases and stop.
if (!snapshotWritten) {
if (!lastHistoryContent && isEmptyParagraphDoc(page.content as any)) {
await this.collabHistory.clearContributors(pageId);
}
return;
}
if (
!lastHistory ||
!isDeepStrictEqual(lastHistory.content, page.content)
) {
const contributorIds = await this.collabHistory.popContributors(pageId);
try {
await this.watcherService.addPageWatchers(
contributorIds,
pageId,
page.spaceId,
page.workspaceId,
);
await this.pageHistoryRepo.saveHistory(page, { contributorIds });
this.logger.debug(`History created for page: ${pageId}`);
} catch (err) {
await this.collabHistory.addContributors(pageId, contributorIds);
throw err;
}
{
const mentions = extractMentions(page.content);
const pageMentions = extractPageMentions(mentions);
const internalLinkSlugIds = extractInternalLinkSlugIds(page.content);
@@ -102,7 +178,7 @@ export class HistoryProcessor extends WorkerHost implements OnModuleDestroy {
);
});
if (contributorIds.length > 0 && lastHistory?.content) {
if (contributorIds.length > 0 && lastHistoryContent) {
await this.notificationQueue
.add(QueueJob.PAGE_UPDATED, {
pageId,
@@ -190,10 +190,11 @@ export function stepBudgetWarning(stepNumber: number): string {
//
// `system` is the in-scope system prompt; we CONCATENATE so the original
// persona/context is preserved — a bare `system` override would REPLACE the
// whole system prompt for the step. `activatedTools` is PER-TURN mutable state
// owned by the streaming loop (a closure Set grown by loadTools); it is passed
// in (not module-global, not persisted) so this stays a pure function of its
// arguments.
// whole system prompt for the step. `activatedTools` is a closure Set grown by
// loadTools and owned by the streaming loop; the caller seeds it from and
// persists it to the chat's metadata across turns (#490), but this function only
// READS the Set it is handed, so it stays a pure function of its arguments (not
// module-global).
//
// NOTE: at AI SDK v7 the per-step `system` field is renamed to `instructions`.
// On v6 (`^6.0.134`) `system` is the correct field — adjust when bumping.
@@ -1417,10 +1418,11 @@ export class AiChatService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
const baseTools = { ...external.tools, ...docmostTools };
// Deferred tool loading state (#332), scoped to THIS streaming loop:
// - `activatedTools` is per-TURN mutable state — a fresh closure Set created
// per streamText call, NOT module-global and NOT persisted, so a new turn
// starts cold. loadTools.execute adds to it; prepareAgentStep reads it to
// widen `activeTools` on the NEXT step.
// - `activatedTools` is a fresh closure Set per streamText call (not
// module-global), SEEDED from the chat's persisted metadata.activatedTools
// (#490, just below) so activation carries across turns. loadTools.execute
// adds to it; prepareAgentStep reads it to widen `activeTools` on the NEXT
// step; turn end persists it back.
// - `validDeferredNames` = every tool that is NOT core (the in-app deferred
// tools + ALL external MCP tools), computed from the ACTUAL toolset so an
// external tool is loadable by its namespaced name. loadTools rejects any
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
import { ForbiddenException, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
import { ApiKeyController } from './api-key.controller';
import {
WorkspaceCaslAction,
WorkspaceCaslSubject,
} from '../casl/interfaces/workspace-ability.type';
/**
* Authorization contract for the /api-keys management surface.
*
* - A token cannot manage tokens (an api_key PRINCIPAL is 403 on every method)
* GitHub-PAT semantics closing post-revocation laundering.
* - admin (CASL Manage on API) sees/revokes all workspace keys; a member only
* their own.
* - kill-switch OFF -> the surface 404s (looks like the feature does not exist).
*/
function makeController(over: any = {}) {
const apiKeyService = {
create: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
token: 'tok',
key: { id: 'k1', name: 'n', expiresAt: null, createdAt: new Date() },
}),
revoke: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
...(over.apiKeyService ?? {}),
};
const apiKeyRepo = {
findAllInWorkspace: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
findByCreator: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
findById: jest.fn(),
...(over.apiKeyRepo ?? {}),
};
const workspaceAbility = {
createForUser: jest.fn().mockReturnValue({
can: (_a: any, _s: any) => over.canManage ?? false,
}),
...(over.workspaceAbility ?? {}),
};
const environmentService = {
isApiKeysEnabled: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(over.enabled ?? true),
...(over.environmentService ?? {}),
};
const auditService = { log: jest.fn() };
const controller = new ApiKeyController(
apiKeyService as any,
apiKeyRepo as any,
workspaceAbility as any,
environmentService as any,
auditService as any,
);
return {
controller,
apiKeyService,
apiKeyRepo,
workspaceAbility,
environmentService,
auditService,
};
}
const user = { id: 'u-1', workspaceId: 'ws-1' } as any;
const workspace = { id: 'ws-1' } as any;
const reqAccess = () => ({ raw: {}, ip: '1.2.3.4', socket: {} }) as any;
const reqApiKey = () =>
({ raw: { authType: 'api_key', apiKeyId: 'k-self' }, ip: '1.2.3.4', socket: {} }) as any;
describe('ApiKeyController — a token cannot manage tokens', () => {
it('403 on create for an api_key principal', async () => {
const { controller, apiKeyService } = makeController();
await expect(
controller.create({ name: 'x' } as any, user, reqApiKey()),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ForbiddenException);
expect(apiKeyService.create).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('403 on list for an api_key principal', async () => {
const { controller } = makeController();
await expect(
controller.list(user, workspace, reqApiKey()),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ForbiddenException);
});
it('403 on revoke for an api_key principal', async () => {
const { controller } = makeController();
await expect(
controller.revoke({ id: 'k1' } as any, user, workspace, reqApiKey()),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ForbiddenException);
});
});
describe('ApiKeyController — kill-switch OFF → 404', () => {
it('create/list/revoke all 404 when disabled', async () => {
const { controller } = makeController({ enabled: false });
await expect(
controller.create({ name: 'x' } as any, user, reqAccess()),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotFoundException);
await expect(
controller.list(user, workspace, reqAccess()),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotFoundException);
await expect(
controller.revoke({ id: 'k1' } as any, user, workspace, reqAccess()),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotFoundException);
});
});
describe('ApiKeyController — list scoping', () => {
it('admin (Manage on API) lists ALL workspace keys', async () => {
const { controller, apiKeyRepo } = makeController({ canManage: true });
await controller.list(user, workspace, reqAccess());
expect(apiKeyRepo.findAllInWorkspace).toHaveBeenCalledWith('ws-1');
expect(apiKeyRepo.findByCreator).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('member lists ONLY their own keys', async () => {
const { controller, apiKeyRepo } = makeController({ canManage: false });
await controller.list(user, workspace, reqAccess());
expect(apiKeyRepo.findByCreator).toHaveBeenCalledWith('u-1', 'ws-1');
expect(apiKeyRepo.findAllInWorkspace).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe('ApiKeyController — revoke scoping', () => {
it("member cannot revoke another user's key (403)", async () => {
const { controller, apiKeyRepo, apiKeyService } = makeController({
canManage: false,
});
apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue({
id: 'k1',
creatorId: 'someone-else',
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
});
await expect(
controller.revoke({ id: 'k1' } as any, user, workspace, reqAccess()),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ForbiddenException);
expect(apiKeyService.revoke).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('member CAN revoke their own key', async () => {
const { controller, apiKeyRepo, apiKeyService } = makeController({
canManage: false,
});
apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue({
id: 'k1',
creatorId: 'u-1',
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
});
await controller.revoke({ id: 'k1' } as any, user, workspace, reqAccess());
expect(apiKeyService.revoke).toHaveBeenCalledWith('k1', 'ws-1');
});
it("admin CAN revoke another user's key", async () => {
const { controller, apiKeyRepo, apiKeyService } = makeController({
canManage: true,
});
apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue({
id: 'k1',
creatorId: 'someone-else',
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
});
await controller.revoke({ id: 'k1' } as any, user, workspace, reqAccess());
expect(apiKeyService.revoke).toHaveBeenCalledWith('k1', 'ws-1');
});
it('404 when the key does not exist', async () => {
const { controller, apiKeyRepo } = makeController({ canManage: true });
apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
await expect(
controller.revoke({ id: 'k1' } as any, user, workspace, reqAccess()),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotFoundException);
});
});
describe('ApiKeyController — create emits audit + returns token once', () => {
it('logs API_KEY_CREATED and returns the token + computed expiry', async () => {
const { controller, auditService } = makeController();
const res = await controller.create(
{ name: 'ci' } as any,
user,
reqAccess(),
);
expect(res.token).toBe('tok');
expect(res.apiKey).toMatchObject({ id: 'k1', name: 'n' });
expect(auditService.log).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ event: 'api_key.created' }),
);
});
});
// Sanity: the CASL subject used is the workspace API subject.
it('uses WorkspaceCaslSubject.API with the Manage action', () => {
expect(WorkspaceCaslSubject.API).toBe('api_key');
expect(WorkspaceCaslAction.Manage).toBeDefined();
});
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
import {
Body,
Controller,
ForbiddenException,
HttpCode,
HttpStatus,
Inject,
Logger,
NotFoundException,
Post,
Req,
UseGuards,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { Throttle } from '@nestjs/throttler';
import { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
import { ApiKeyService } from './api-key.service';
import { ApiKeyRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/api-key/api-key.repo';
import { CreateApiKeyDto } from './dto/create-api-key.dto';
import { RevokeApiKeyDto } from './dto/revoke-api-key.dto';
import { AuthUser } from '../../common/decorators/auth-user.decorator';
import { AuthWorkspace } from '../../common/decorators/auth-workspace.decorator';
import { JwtAuthGuard } from '../../common/guards/jwt-auth.guard';
import { User, Workspace } from '@docmost/db/types/entity.types';
import WorkspaceAbilityFactory from '../casl/abilities/workspace-ability.factory';
import {
WorkspaceCaslAction,
WorkspaceCaslSubject,
} from '../casl/interfaces/workspace-ability.type';
import { AuditEvent, AuditResource } from '../../common/events/audit-events';
import {
AUDIT_SERVICE,
IAuditService,
} from '../../integrations/audit/audit.service';
import { EnvironmentService } from '../../integrations/environment/environment.service';
import { UserThrottlerGuard } from '../../integrations/throttle/user-throttler.guard';
import { AUTH_THROTTLER } from '../../integrations/throttle/throttler-names';
@UseGuards(JwtAuthGuard)
@Controller('api-keys')
export class ApiKeyController {
private readonly logger = new Logger(ApiKeyController.name);
constructor(
private readonly apiKeyService: ApiKeyService,
private readonly apiKeyRepo: ApiKeyRepo,
private readonly workspaceAbility: WorkspaceAbilityFactory,
private readonly environmentService: EnvironmentService,
@Inject(AUDIT_SERVICE) private readonly auditService: IAuditService,
) {}
// Kill-switch OFF: the issuance surface disappears entirely (404), not a 403 —
// it must look like the feature does not exist.
private assertEnabled(): void {
if (!this.environmentService.isApiKeysEnabled()) {
throw new NotFoundException();
}
}
// A token cannot manage tokens (GitHub-PAT semantics): an api-key principal is
// refused on the management surface, so a leaked key cannot mint a replacement
// or revoke the keys that would lock it out (closes post-revocation laundering).
private rejectApiKeyPrincipal(req: FastifyRequest): void {
if ((req.raw as { authType?: string }).authType === 'api_key') {
throw new ForbiddenException('API keys cannot manage API keys');
}
}
private clientIp(req: FastifyRequest): string {
return req.ip ?? req.socket?.remoteAddress ?? 'unknown';
}
@HttpCode(HttpStatus.OK)
@UseGuards(JwtAuthGuard, UserThrottlerGuard)
@Throttle({ [AUTH_THROTTLER]: { limit: 10, ttl: 60_000 } })
@Post('create')
async create(
@Body() dto: CreateApiKeyDto,
@AuthUser() user: User,
@Req() req: FastifyRequest,
) {
this.assertEnabled();
this.rejectApiKeyPrincipal(req);
// undefined -> service default (1 year); null -> unlimited; string -> Date.
const expiresAt =
dto.expiresAt === undefined
? undefined
: dto.expiresAt === null
? null
: new Date(dto.expiresAt);
const { token, key } = await this.apiKeyService.create(
user,
dto.name,
expiresAt,
);
this.auditService.log({
event: AuditEvent.API_KEY_CREATED,
resourceType: AuditResource.API_KEY,
resourceId: key.id,
});
// The durable trail lives in container logs (AUDIT_SERVICE is a Noop in this
// build). No token material — the JWT is only ever returned in the response.
this.logger.log(
`API key created: id=${key.id} name=${JSON.stringify(
key.name,
)} actor=${user.id} expiresAt=${
key.expiresAt ? new Date(key.expiresAt).toISOString() : 'never'
} ip=${this.clientIp(req)}`,
);
// Return the token ONCE (never retrievable again) and the computed expiry so
// the caller/UI can surface "expires <date>" (the year-default time-bomb
// early-warning).
return {
token,
apiKey: {
id: key.id,
name: key.name,
expiresAt: key.expiresAt,
createdAt: key.createdAt,
},
};
}
@HttpCode(HttpStatus.OK)
@Post('list')
async list(
@AuthUser() user: User,
@AuthWorkspace() workspace: Workspace,
@Req() req: FastifyRequest,
) {
this.assertEnabled();
this.rejectApiKeyPrincipal(req);
const ability = this.workspaceAbility.createForUser(user, workspace);
// Admin (CASL Manage on API): every key in the workspace, attributed to its
// creator (closes "a leaked key of a departed employee is invisible"). A
// member sees only their own.
const keys = ability.can(
WorkspaceCaslAction.Manage,
WorkspaceCaslSubject.API,
)
? await this.apiKeyRepo.findAllInWorkspace(workspace.id)
: await this.apiKeyRepo.findByCreator(user.id, workspace.id);
return keys.map((k) => ({
id: k.id,
name: k.name,
expiresAt: k.expiresAt,
lastUsedAt: k.lastUsedAt,
createdAt: k.createdAt,
creator: k.creator,
}));
}
@HttpCode(HttpStatus.OK)
@Post('revoke')
async revoke(
@Body() dto: RevokeApiKeyDto,
@AuthUser() user: User,
@AuthWorkspace() workspace: Workspace,
@Req() req: FastifyRequest,
) {
this.assertEnabled();
this.rejectApiKeyPrincipal(req);
const key = await this.apiKeyRepo.findById(dto.id, workspace.id);
// Uniform 404 for a missing/already-revoked key regardless of who asks — no
// existence oracle for keys the caller may not own.
if (!key) {
throw new NotFoundException();
}
const ability = this.workspaceAbility.createForUser(user, workspace);
const canManageAll = ability.can(
WorkspaceCaslAction.Manage,
WorkspaceCaslSubject.API,
);
// Admin may revoke any key in the workspace; a member only their own.
if (!canManageAll && key.creatorId !== user.id) {
throw new ForbiddenException();
}
await this.apiKeyService.revoke(key.id, workspace.id);
this.auditService.log({
event: AuditEvent.API_KEY_DELETED,
resourceType: AuditResource.API_KEY,
resourceId: key.id,
});
this.logger.log(
`API key revoked: id=${key.id} name=${JSON.stringify(
key.name,
)} actor=${user.id} ip=${this.clientIp(req)}`,
);
return { success: true };
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { ApiKeyService } from './api-key.service';
import { ApiKeyController } from './api-key.controller';
import { TokenModule } from '../auth/token.module';
// Core (non-EE) API-key feature: issuance REST endpoints + the shared validator
// consumed by jwt.strategy (REST) and McpService (the /mcp Bearer router).
// DatabaseModule (global) provides ApiKeyRepo/UserRepo/WorkspaceRepo; CaslModule
// (global) provides WorkspaceAbilityFactory; TokenModule provides TokenService
// (the no-exp api-key signer). ApiKeyService is exported so AuthModule (for
// jwt.strategy) and McpModule (for the /mcp router) can inject it directly,
// replacing the absent EE `ee/api-key` dynamic require.
@Module({
imports: [TokenModule],
controllers: [ApiKeyController],
providers: [ApiKeyService],
exports: [ApiKeyService],
})
export class ApiKeyModule {}
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
import { UnauthorizedException } from '@nestjs/common';
import { ApiKeyService } from './api-key.service';
import { JwtType } from '../auth/dto/jwt-payload';
/**
* Security contract for ApiKeyService.validate the single validator shared by
* jwt.strategy (REST) and the /mcp Bearer router.
*
* Invariants under test:
* - Anti-enumeration: every DEFINITE deny (missing/revoked/expired row, disabled
* user, workspace mismatch, kill-switch off) throws the SAME bare
* UnauthorizedException an agent cannot distinguish expired from revoked.
* - deny-on-decision / 5xx-on-infra: an UNEXPECTED (infra) error PROPAGATES as
* itself ( 5xx), never masked as a 401.
* - Expiry is read from the ROW, never a JWT exp claim.
* - No validate cache (each call re-reads the row immediate revocation).
*/
const APP_SECRET = 'secret';
function makeDeps(over: Partial<Record<string, any>> = {}) {
const apiKeyRepo = {
findById: jest.fn(),
insert: jest.fn(),
softDelete: jest.fn(),
touchLastUsed: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
...(over.apiKeyRepo ?? {}),
};
const userRepo = {
findById: jest.fn(),
...(over.userRepo ?? {}),
};
const workspaceRepo = {
findById: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'ws-1' }),
...(over.workspaceRepo ?? {}),
};
const tokenService = {
generateApiToken: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue('minted.jwt.token'),
...(over.tokenService ?? {}),
};
const environmentService = {
isApiKeysEnabled: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(true),
getApiKeysEnabledRaw: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(undefined),
getAppSecret: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(APP_SECRET),
...(over.environmentService ?? {}),
};
const service = new (ApiKeyService as unknown as new (...a: any[]) => ApiKeyService)(
apiKeyRepo,
userRepo,
workspaceRepo,
tokenService,
environmentService,
);
return { service, apiKeyRepo, userRepo, workspaceRepo, tokenService, environmentService };
}
const payload = (over: Record<string, any> = {}) => ({
sub: 'u-1',
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
apiKeyId: 'key-1',
type: JwtType.API_KEY,
...over,
});
const activeRow = (over: Record<string, any> = {}) => ({
id: 'key-1',
name: 'k',
creatorId: 'u-1',
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
expiresAt: null,
lastUsedAt: null,
deletedAt: null,
...over,
});
const activeUser = (over: Record<string, any> = {}) => ({
id: 'u-1',
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
deactivatedAt: null,
deletedAt: null,
isAgent: false,
...over,
});
describe('ApiKeyService.validate', () => {
it('returns { user, workspace } for a valid active key', async () => {
const { service, apiKeyRepo, userRepo } = makeDeps();
apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeRow());
userRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeUser());
const res = await service.validate(payload() as any);
expect(res.user).toMatchObject({ id: 'u-1' });
expect(res.workspace).toMatchObject({ id: 'ws-1' });
// Loads isAgent so downstream provenance does not silently degrade.
expect(userRepo.findById).toHaveBeenCalledWith('u-1', 'ws-1', {
includeIsAgent: true,
});
});
// --- Anti-enumeration: every deny is the SAME bare 401 -------------------
const denyCases: Array<[string, (d: ReturnType<typeof makeDeps>) => void]> = [
[
'missing/orphaned row',
(d) => d.apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(undefined),
],
[
'revoked (soft-deleted → findById returns undefined)',
(d) => d.apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(undefined),
],
[
'expired (expires_at in the past)',
(d) => {
d.apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(
activeRow({ expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() - 1000) }),
);
d.userRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeUser());
},
],
[
'disabled user',
(d) => {
d.apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeRow());
d.userRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(
activeUser({ deactivatedAt: new Date() }),
);
},
],
[
'user not found',
(d) => {
d.apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeRow());
d.userRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
},
],
[
'creator/sub mismatch',
(d) => {
d.apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeRow({ creatorId: 'other' }));
d.userRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeUser());
},
],
[
'workspace row missing',
(d) => {
d.apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeRow());
d.userRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeUser());
d.workspaceRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
},
],
[
'kill-switch OFF',
(d) => d.environmentService.isApiKeysEnabled.mockReturnValue(false),
],
[
'malformed payload (missing apiKeyId)',
() => undefined,
],
];
it.each(denyCases)(
'throws a bare UnauthorizedException with NO message for: %s',
async (label, arrange) => {
const deps = makeDeps();
arrange(deps);
const p =
label === 'malformed payload (missing apiKeyId)'
? (payload({ apiKeyId: undefined }) as any)
: (payload() as any);
const err = await deps.service.validate(p).catch((e) => e);
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(UnauthorizedException);
// Anti-enumeration: identical, class-less message for every failure mode.
expect(err.message).toBe('Unauthorized');
},
);
it('kill-switch OFF denies BEFORE any DB read', async () => {
const { service, apiKeyRepo, environmentService } = makeDeps();
environmentService.isApiKeysEnabled.mockReturnValue(false);
await expect(service.validate(payload() as any)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
UnauthorizedException,
);
expect(apiKeyRepo.findById).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
// --- Infra error propagates (5xx), NOT masked as 401 ---------------------
it('PROPAGATES an infra (DB) error instead of masking it as 401', async () => {
const { service, apiKeyRepo } = makeDeps();
const boom = new Error('connection terminated');
apiKeyRepo.findById.mockRejectedValue(boom);
await expect(service.validate(payload() as any)).rejects.toBe(boom);
});
// --- No cache: revocation is immediate on the next call ------------------
it('re-reads the row on every call (no validate cache → immediate revocation)', async () => {
const { service, apiKeyRepo, userRepo } = makeDeps();
apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeRow());
userRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeUser());
await service.validate(payload() as any);
// Now the key is revoked (row invisible) — the very next call denies.
apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
await expect(service.validate(payload() as any)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
UnauthorizedException,
);
expect(apiKeyRepo.findById).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
});
// --- last_used_at is throttled + fire-and-forget -------------------------
it('touches last_used_at when stale and skips when fresh', async () => {
const { service, apiKeyRepo, userRepo } = makeDeps();
userRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeUser());
// Stale (never used) -> touch.
apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeRow({ lastUsedAt: null }));
await service.validate(payload() as any);
expect(apiKeyRepo.touchLastUsed).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
// Fresh (used 1 minute ago) -> skip.
apiKeyRepo.touchLastUsed.mockClear();
apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(
activeRow({ lastUsedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 60_000) }),
);
await service.validate(payload() as any);
expect(apiKeyRepo.touchLastUsed).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('a failing last_used_at touch never fails the request', async () => {
const { service, apiKeyRepo, userRepo } = makeDeps();
apiKeyRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeRow({ lastUsedAt: null }));
userRepo.findById.mockResolvedValue(activeUser());
apiKeyRepo.touchLastUsed.mockRejectedValue(new Error('write failed'));
await expect(service.validate(payload() as any)).resolves.toMatchObject({
user: { id: 'u-1' },
});
});
});
describe('ApiKeyService.create (mint-then-insert, no exp)', () => {
it('mints the JWT BEFORE inserting the row and returns the token once', async () => {
const { service, apiKeyRepo, tokenService } = makeDeps();
const order: string[] = [];
tokenService.generateApiToken.mockImplementation(async () => {
order.push('mint');
return 'tok';
});
apiKeyRepo.insert.mockImplementation(async (row: any) => {
order.push('insert');
return { ...row, createdAt: new Date() };
});
const user = { id: 'u-1', workspaceId: 'ws-1' } as any;
const res = await service.create(user, 'my key');
expect(order).toEqual(['mint', 'insert']);
expect(res.token).toBe('tok');
// The id is generated before minting and reused for the row.
const mintArg = tokenService.generateApiToken.mock.calls[0][0];
const insertArg = apiKeyRepo.insert.mock.calls[0][0];
expect(mintArg.apiKeyId).toBe(insertArg.id);
});
it('applies the 1-year default when expiresAt is undefined', async () => {
const { service, apiKeyRepo } = makeDeps();
apiKeyRepo.insert.mockImplementation(async (row: any) => row);
const user = { id: 'u-1', workspaceId: 'ws-1' } as any;
await service.create(user, 'k');
const insertArg = apiKeyRepo.insert.mock.calls[0][0];
const days =
(insertArg.expiresAt.getTime() - Date.now()) / (24 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
expect(days).toBeGreaterThan(364);
expect(days).toBeLessThan(367);
});
it('honors an explicit null (unlimited)', async () => {
const { service, apiKeyRepo } = makeDeps();
apiKeyRepo.insert.mockImplementation(async (row: any) => row);
const user = { id: 'u-1', workspaceId: 'ws-1' } as any;
await service.create(user, 'k', null);
expect(apiKeyRepo.insert.mock.calls[0][0].expiresAt).toBeNull();
});
it('does NOT insert a row when minting fails (mint-then-insert → inert)', async () => {
const { service, apiKeyRepo, tokenService } = makeDeps();
tokenService.generateApiToken.mockRejectedValue(new Error('mint failed'));
const user = { id: 'u-1', workspaceId: 'ws-1' } as any;
await expect(service.create(user, 'k')).rejects.toThrow('mint failed');
expect(apiKeyRepo.insert).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
import {
Injectable,
Logger,
OnModuleInit,
UnauthorizedException,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { v7 as uuid7 } from 'uuid';
import { ApiKeyRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/api-key/api-key.repo';
import { UserRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/user/user.repo';
import { WorkspaceRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/workspace/workspace.repo';
import { TokenService } from '../auth/services/token.service';
import { EnvironmentService } from '../../integrations/environment/environment.service';
import { JwtApiKeyPayload } from '../auth/dto/jwt-payload';
import { ApiKey, User, Workspace } from '@docmost/db/types/entity.types';
import { isUserDisabled } from '../../common/helpers';
// Default lifetime for a new key when the caller does not specify one: 1 year.
// The owner runs a homelab where agents live for years; forcing rotation is
// operational pain, so an explicit `null` (unlimited) is also allowed.
const DEFAULT_LIFETIME_MS = 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
// last_used_at is a best-effort forensics stamp, not an access record; we only
// refresh it when it is older than this to avoid a write on every request. The
// 1h resolution is a deliberate constant (forensics granularity, not accounting).
const LAST_USED_THROTTLE_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000;
/**
* Core API-key lifecycle service. Owns minting (create), the single validator
* shared by BOTH the REST jwt.strategy path and the /mcp Bearer path (validate),
* and revocation (revoke). The `api_keys` ROW is the sole source of truth for a
* key's lifetime and revocation never the JWT, which carries no `exp` claim.
*/
@Injectable()
export class ApiKeyService implements OnModuleInit {
private readonly logger = new Logger(ApiKeyService.name);
constructor(
private readonly apiKeyRepo: ApiKeyRepo,
private readonly userRepo: UserRepo,
private readonly workspaceRepo: WorkspaceRepo,
private readonly tokenService: TokenService,
private readonly environmentService: EnvironmentService,
) {}
onModuleInit() {
// Boot log so the kill-switch state after each deploy is verifiable in logs.
const enabled = this.environmentService.isApiKeysEnabled();
const raw = this.environmentService.getApiKeysEnabledRaw();
this.logger.log(
`API keys: ${enabled ? 'ENABLED' : 'DISABLED'} (API_KEYS_ENABLED=${
raw ?? 'unset'
})`,
);
}
/**
* Mint a new key for `user`. mint-then-insert ordering (R1):
* 1. generate the id first it must be in the JWT payload before the row.
* 2. mint the JWT (no `exp` claim). A mint failure aborts before any row is
* written (inert), so a half-created key cannot exist.
* 3. insert the row last. A lost response leaves an orphaned row that is
* visible in `list` and self-heals (the user revokes it).
* The token is returned ONCE and never stored the JWT is self-contained, so
* no token material lives in the table.
*
* `expiresAt`: `undefined` -> default 1 year; `null` -> unlimited (explicit);
* a Date -> that instant (a past date is rejected at the DTO layer).
*/
async create(
user: User,
name: string,
expiresAt?: Date | null,
): Promise<{ token: string; key: ApiKey }> {
const resolvedExpiresAt =
expiresAt === undefined
? new Date(Date.now() + DEFAULT_LIFETIME_MS)
: expiresAt;
const apiKeyId = uuid7();
const token = await this.tokenService.generateApiToken({
apiKeyId,
user,
workspaceId: user.workspaceId,
});
const key = await this.apiKeyRepo.insert({
id: apiKeyId,
name,
creatorId: user.id,
workspaceId: user.workspaceId,
expiresAt: resolvedExpiresAt,
});
return { token, key };
}
/**
* The single validator for an api-key principal, shared by jwt.strategy and the
* /mcp Bearer router. Returns `{ user, workspace }` (the same shape the access
* path returns) so the AuthUser/AuthWorkspace decorators and MCP identity work
* unchanged.
*
* Failure semantics (R4, anti-enumeration): a DEFINITE negative fact feature
* disabled, missing/revoked/expired row, workspace mismatch, disabled user
* throws a bare `UnauthorizedException` (a single generic 401 for every case;
* an agent cannot distinguish expired from revoked, and its reaction is
* identical). An UNEXPECTED (infra) error is NOT caught here: it propagates so
* the surface returns 5xx, never a masked 401 (deny-on-decision / 5xx-on-infra).
* There is NO validate cache: it is 23 PK lookups (~1ms), two orders of
* magnitude cheaper than the bcrypt it replaces; a cache would only add a
* Date-serialization trap and a revocation lag. Revocation is immediate.
*/
async validate(
payload: JwtApiKeyPayload,
): Promise<{ user: User; workspace: Workspace }> {
// Kill-switch OFF: deny unconditionally (same generic 401). Note the
// endpoints additionally 404 at the controller; here we deny the token.
if (!this.environmentService.isApiKeysEnabled()) {
throw new UnauthorizedException();
}
if (!payload?.apiKeyId || !payload?.sub || !payload?.workspaceId) {
throw new UnauthorizedException();
}
const row = await this.apiKeyRepo.findById(
payload.apiKeyId,
payload.workspaceId,
);
// Absent row = revoked (soft-deleted, invisible to findById), orphaned
// (creator/workspace cascade-deleted), or never existed. All terminal deny.
if (!row) {
throw new UnauthorizedException();
}
// Expiry is read from the ROW, never an `exp` JWT claim.
if (row.expiresAt && row.expiresAt.getTime() <= Date.now()) {
throw new UnauthorizedException();
}
const user = await this.userRepo.findById(
payload.sub,
payload.workspaceId,
{ includeIsAgent: true },
);
if (!user || isUserDisabled(user)) {
throw new UnauthorizedException();
}
// The key acts only as its creator (defence in depth against a token whose
// signed `sub` ever drifted from the row's owner).
if (row.creatorId !== user.id) {
throw new UnauthorizedException();
}
const workspace = await this.workspaceRepo.findById(payload.workspaceId);
if (!workspace) {
throw new UnauthorizedException();
}
// Best-effort, throttled, fire-and-forget forensics stamp AFTER all checks.
this.touchLastUsed(row);
return { user, workspace };
}
/**
* Revoke (soft-delete) a key. Authorization/ownership is decided by the caller
* (the controller, via CASL); this only performs the terminal write. Idempotent:
* a second revoke is a no-op (the row is already invisible).
*/
async revoke(id: string, workspaceId: string): Promise<void> {
await this.apiKeyRepo.softDelete(id, workspaceId);
}
// Throttled best-effort last_used_at bump: skip if it was touched within the
// window; otherwise fire-and-forget so a stamp write never fails or slows the
// request (mirrors SessionActivityService.trackActivity).
private touchLastUsed(row: ApiKey): void {
const last = row.lastUsedAt ? new Date(row.lastUsedAt).getTime() : 0;
if (Date.now() - last < LAST_USED_THROTTLE_MS) return;
void this.apiKeyRepo.touchLastUsed(row.id).catch((err) => {
this.logger.warn(
`Failed to update api_key last_used_at for ${row.id}: ${
(err as Error)?.message ?? err
}`,
);
});
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
import {
IsDateString,
IsNotEmpty,
IsOptional,
IsString,
MaxLength,
registerDecorator,
ValidationOptions,
} from 'class-validator';
/**
* `expiresAt` must be strictly in the future. Skips validation for `null`
* (explicit "unlimited") and `undefined` (server applies the 1-year default),
* so only an actually-supplied date is range-checked. Rejecting a PAST date at
* the DTO layer means a caller cannot mint an already-dead key.
*/
function IsFutureDateString(options?: ValidationOptions) {
return function (object: object, propertyName: string) {
registerDecorator({
name: 'isFutureDateString',
target: object.constructor,
propertyName,
options: {
message: 'expiresAt must be a date in the future',
...options,
},
validator: {
validate(value: unknown) {
if (value === null || value === undefined) return true;
if (typeof value !== 'string') return false;
const t = Date.parse(value);
return !Number.isNaN(t) && t > Date.now();
},
},
});
};
}
export class CreateApiKeyDto {
@IsString()
@IsNotEmpty()
@MaxLength(255)
name: string;
// undefined -> default 1 year (applied server-side); null -> unlimited
// (explicit); an ISO date string -> that instant, which must be in the future.
@IsOptional()
@IsDateString()
@IsFutureDateString()
expiresAt?: string | null;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
import { IsUUID } from 'class-validator';
export class RevokeApiKeyDto {
@IsUUID()
id: string;
}
@@ -20,3 +20,71 @@ describe('AuthController', () => {
expect(controller).toBeDefined();
});
});
// The collab-token handler is the ARM-SEAM of the #501 anti-laundering defense:
// it derives the api-key origin args ({ apiKeyId }) from the SIGNED-derived
// `req.raw` fields (stamped by jwt.strategy) and threads them into the collab
// token mint, forcing principal='api_key' so a later key revoke rejects NEW
// collab connections. A regression here (reading `body`, dropping `apiKeyId`,
// or inverting the ternary) would silently mint api-key requests as
// principal='session' and reopen the laundering hole with a green suite. These
// tests pin the EXACT args the controller passes to authService.getCollabToken.
describe('AuthController.collabToken arms the api-key origin (#501)', () => {
let controller: AuthController;
let getCollabToken: jest.Mock;
const user = { id: 'u-1', workspaceId: 'ws-1' } as any;
const workspace = { id: 'ws-1' } as any;
beforeEach(() => {
getCollabToken = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ token: 'ct' });
controller = new AuthController(
{ getCollabToken } as any, // authService
{} as any, // sessionService
{} as any, // environmentService
{} as any, // moduleRef
{} as any, // auditService
);
});
it('threads { apiKeyId } when req.raw marks an api_key principal (ARMED)', async () => {
const req = { raw: { authType: 'api_key', apiKeyId: 'k-1' } } as any;
await controller.collabToken(user, workspace, req);
expect(getCollabToken).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(getCollabToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith(user, 'ws-1', {
apiKeyId: 'k-1',
});
});
it('passes undefined for a normal session request (NOT armed)', async () => {
const req = { raw: {} } as any;
await controller.collabToken(user, workspace, req);
expect(getCollabToken).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(getCollabToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith(user, 'ws-1', undefined);
});
it('does NOT arm when api_key authType lacks an apiKeyId', async () => {
const req = { raw: { authType: 'api_key' } } as any;
await controller.collabToken(user, workspace, req);
expect(getCollabToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith(user, 'ws-1', undefined);
});
it('reads the SIGNED req.raw, never a spoofable client body', async () => {
// A client-supplied body claiming api_key must be ignored: only the
// jwt.strategy-stamped req.raw can arm the api-key origin.
const req = {
raw: {},
body: { authType: 'api_key', apiKeyId: 'attacker' },
} as any;
await controller.collabToken(user, workspace, req);
expect(getCollabToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith(user, 'ws-1', undefined);
});
});
+13 -1
View File
@@ -207,8 +207,20 @@ export class AuthController {
async collabToken(
@AuthUser() user: User,
@AuthWorkspace() workspace: Workspace,
@Req() req: FastifyRequest,
) {
return this.authService.getCollabToken(user, workspace.id);
// Thread the api-key origin (#501): when the requester authenticated with an
// api key (jwt.strategy stamped req.raw.authType/apiKeyId), the minted collab
// token carries principal='api_key' + apiKeyId so a later revoke of the key
// rejects NEW collab connections. A normal session request mints a
// principal='session' token. Reading the SIGNED-derived req.raw fields (never
// a client body) keeps it unspoofable.
const raw = req.raw as { authType?: string; apiKeyId?: string };
const apiKey =
raw.authType === 'api_key' && raw.apiKeyId
? { apiKeyId: raw.apiKeyId }
: undefined;
return this.authService.getCollabToken(user, workspace.id, apiKey);
}
@SkipThrottle({ [AUTH_THROTTLER]: true })
+5 -1
View File
@@ -5,9 +5,13 @@ import { JwtStrategy } from './strategies/jwt.strategy';
import { WorkspaceModule } from '../workspace/workspace.module';
import { SignupService } from './services/signup.service';
import { TokenModule } from './token.module';
import { ApiKeyModule } from '../api-key/api-key.module';
@Module({
imports: [TokenModule, WorkspaceModule],
// ApiKeyModule supplies ApiKeyService, injected into JwtStrategy so an
// api_key Bearer/cookie token is validated directly (replacing the absent EE
// `ee/api-key` dynamic require).
imports: [TokenModule, WorkspaceModule, ApiKeyModule],
controllers: [AuthController],
providers: [AuthService, SignupService, JwtStrategy],
exports: [SignupService, AuthService],
@@ -33,6 +33,17 @@ export type JwtPayload = {
aiChatId?: string | null;
};
// The AUTH-PRINCIPAL kind behind a collab token — distinct from `actor`
// (provenance). Stamped into EVERY newly-minted collab token (#501): 'session'
// for a normal user/session (incl. the internal AI agent, which is session-
// backed), 'api_key' when the token was minted by an api-key principal (an
// external MCP agent). The discriminator keys on the token's ORIGIN, so the
// collab seam can re-check a revoked api key on connect and reject a claimless
// token after the rollout grace window. NOT keyed on `actor:'agent'` — the
// internal agent is 'agent' but session-backed, so it must stay on the no-check
// path.
export type CollabPrincipal = 'session' | 'api_key';
export type JwtCollabPayload = {
sub: string;
workspaceId: string;
@@ -44,6 +55,13 @@ export type JwtCollabPayload = {
// Nullable: an external MCP agent has no internal ai_chats row, so it carries
// an 'agent' actor with a null aiChatId.
aiChatId?: string | null;
// Auth-principal discriminator (#501). Present on every post-rollout token;
// its absence on a still-valid token past the grace window is treated as an
// error, not trust (fail-closed).
principal?: CollabPrincipal;
// Only when principal === 'api_key': the minting key's id, so the collab seam
// can row-check (and reject) a revoked key on connect.
apiKeyId?: string;
};
export type JwtExchangePayload = {
@@ -375,10 +375,20 @@ export class AuthService {
}
}
async getCollabToken(user: User, workspaceId: string) {
async getCollabToken(
user: User,
workspaceId: string,
// Origin of the request minting this collab token (#501). When the caller is
// an api-key principal, its apiKeyId is threaded into the token so the collab
// seam can re-check the key on connect (closing api-key -> long-lived-collab
// laundering). Absent for a normal session/human request.
apiKey?: { apiKeyId: string },
) {
const token = await this.tokenService.generateCollabToken(
user,
workspaceId,
undefined,
apiKey,
);
return { token };
}
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import { ForbiddenException, UnauthorizedException } from '@nestjs/common';
import * as jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
import { TokenService } from './token.service';
import { JwtType } from '../dto/jwt-payload';
@@ -213,4 +214,175 @@ describe('TokenService.generateCollabToken', () => {
aiChatId: 'chat-456',
});
});
// #501 fail-closed discriminator: EVERY collab token carries a principal.
it("defaults principal to 'session' with NO apiKeyId (normal/internal-agent path)", async () => {
const { service, jwtService } = makeTokenService();
await service.generateCollabToken(makeUser() as never, 'ws-1');
const [payload] = jwtService.sign.mock.calls[0];
expect(payload.principal).toBe('session');
expect(payload).not.toHaveProperty('apiKeyId');
});
it("the internal agent (provenance, NO apiKey) still gets principal='session'", async () => {
const { service, jwtService } = makeTokenService();
await service.generateCollabToken(
makeUser() as never,
'ws-1',
{ actor: 'agent', aiChatId: 'chat-1' },
);
const [payload] = jwtService.sign.mock.calls[0];
// Keyed on api-key ORIGIN, not actor: an is_agent session token is 'session'.
expect(payload.principal).toBe('session');
expect(payload).not.toHaveProperty('apiKeyId');
});
it("stamps principal='api_key' + apiKeyId when minted by an api-key principal", async () => {
const { service, jwtService } = makeTokenService();
await service.generateCollabToken(
makeUser() as never,
'ws-1',
undefined,
{ apiKeyId: 'key-9' },
);
const [payload] = jwtService.sign.mock.calls[0];
expect(payload.principal).toBe('api_key');
expect(payload.apiKeyId).toBe('key-9');
});
});
/**
* API-key token minting MUST carry NO `exp` claim the ONLY source of truth for
* a key's lifetime/revocation is its `api_keys` row, checked on every request.
*
* This is a LIVE-bug regression: the shared JwtService is registered with a
* global `signOptions.expiresIn` (default '90d') that merges into every sign(),
* so an api-key minted through it silently gets exp=now+90d and an "unlimited"
* key dies in 90 days. TokenService.generateApiToken mints through a dedicated
* no-expiry signer instead. These tests construct the REAL signer (a real secret
* via the stubbed EnvironmentService) and decode the produced JWT to assert the
* observable property: no `exp`.
*/
describe('TokenService.generateApiToken (no exp claim ever)', () => {
const APP_SECRET_LOCAL = 'apikey-secret';
function makeRealSignerService() {
// Give the SHARED jwtService a global expiresIn so a regression (minting
// through it) would show up as an exp claim — the exact live bug.
const { JwtService } = require('@nestjs/jwt');
const sharedJwt = new JwtService({
secret: APP_SECRET_LOCAL,
signOptions: { expiresIn: '90d', issuer: 'Docmost' },
});
const environmentService = {
getAppSecret: () => APP_SECRET_LOCAL,
};
const service = new (TokenService as unknown as new (
...args: unknown[]
) => TokenService)(sharedJwt, environmentService);
return { service };
}
const user = makeUser({ id: 'svc-1', workspaceId: 'ws-1' });
it('mints an api-key JWT with NO exp claim and issuer Docmost', async () => {
const { service } = makeRealSignerService();
const token = await service.generateApiToken({
apiKeyId: 'key-1',
user: user as never,
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
});
const decoded = jwt.decode(token) as Record<string, unknown>;
// The observable security property: no expiry lives in the JWT.
expect(decoded.exp).toBeUndefined();
expect(decoded).toMatchObject({
sub: 'svc-1',
apiKeyId: 'key-1',
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
type: JwtType.API_KEY,
iss: 'Docmost',
});
});
it('demonstrates the live bug it guards: the SHARED signer WOULD add exp', () => {
const { JwtService } = require('@nestjs/jwt');
const sharedJwt = new JwtService({
secret: APP_SECRET_LOCAL,
signOptions: { expiresIn: '90d', issuer: 'Docmost' },
});
// Even with empty per-call options the global expiresIn merges in.
const leaky = sharedJwt.sign({ sub: 'x', type: JwtType.API_KEY }, {});
expect((jwt.decode(leaky) as Record<string, unknown>).exp).toBeDefined();
});
it('refuses to mint for a disabled user', async () => {
const { service } = makeRealSignerService();
await expect(
service.generateApiToken({
apiKeyId: 'key-1',
user: makeUser({ deactivatedAt: new Date() }) as never,
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
}),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ForbiddenException);
});
});
/**
* verifyJwtOneOf is the type-routing primitive: verify the signature once and
* assert the token type is on an explicit allowlist. It must NOT degrade into a
* "return whatever type" helper a token whose type is off the allowlist is
* rejected with the same generic error as a single-type mismatch.
*/
describe('TokenService.verifyJwtOneOf (allowlist type-routing)', () => {
it('returns the payload when the type is on the allowlist', async () => {
const verifyAsync = jest
.fn()
.mockResolvedValue({ type: JwtType.API_KEY, sub: 'u-1' });
const { service } = makeTokenService({ verifyAsync });
const payload = await service.verifyJwtOneOf(token123(), [
JwtType.ACCESS,
JwtType.API_KEY,
]);
expect(payload).toMatchObject({ type: JwtType.API_KEY, sub: 'u-1' });
expect(verifyAsync).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
it('accepts the OTHER allowed type too', async () => {
const verifyAsync = jest
.fn()
.mockResolvedValue({ type: JwtType.ACCESS, sub: 'u-1' });
const { service } = makeTokenService({ verifyAsync });
await expect(
service.verifyJwtOneOf(token123(), [JwtType.ACCESS, JwtType.API_KEY]),
).resolves.toMatchObject({ type: JwtType.ACCESS });
});
it('rejects a token whose type is OFF the allowlist (confused-deputy guard)', async () => {
const verifyAsync = jest
.fn()
.mockResolvedValue({ type: JwtType.COLLAB, sub: 'u-1' });
const { service } = makeTokenService({ verifyAsync });
await expect(
service.verifyJwtOneOf(token123(), [JwtType.ACCESS, JwtType.API_KEY]),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(UnauthorizedException);
});
it('verifies the signature exactly ONCE', async () => {
const verifyAsync = jest
.fn()
.mockResolvedValue({ type: JwtType.ACCESS });
const { service } = makeTokenService({ verifyAsync });
await service.verifyJwtOneOf(token123(), [JwtType.ACCESS]);
expect(verifyAsync).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
});
function token123(): string {
return 'a.b.c';
}
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import {
UnauthorizedException,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { JwtService } from '@nestjs/jwt';
import type { StringValue } from 'ms';
import { EnvironmentService } from '../../../integrations/environment/environment.service';
import {
JwtApiKeyPayload,
@@ -62,6 +61,12 @@ export class TokenService {
// token carries no actor/aiChatId and is treated as 'user' downstream.
// aiChatId is nullable for an external agent with no internal ai_chats row.
provenance?: { actor: 'agent'; aiChatId: string | null },
// Optional api-key origin (#501). When the collab token is minted by an
// api-key principal (an external MCP agent), the caller passes the key id so
// the token carries principal='api_key' + apiKeyId and the collab seam can
// re-check the key on connect. Absent -> principal='session' (a normal
// user/session, including the internal session-backed AI agent).
apiKey?: { apiKeyId: string },
): Promise<string> {
if (isUserDisabled(user)) {
throw new ForbiddenException();
@@ -71,6 +76,10 @@ export class TokenService {
sub: user.id,
workspaceId,
type: JwtType.COLLAB,
// Fail-closed discriminator on EVERY minted token: 'api_key' when minted by
// an api-key principal, else 'session'.
principal: apiKey ? 'api_key' : 'session',
...(apiKey ? { apiKeyId: apiKey.apiKeyId } : {}),
...(provenance
? { actor: provenance.actor, aiChatId: provenance.aiChatId }
: {}),
@@ -123,9 +132,8 @@ export class TokenService {
apiKeyId: string;
user: User;
workspaceId: string;
expiresIn?: StringValue | number;
}): Promise<string> {
const { apiKeyId, user, workspaceId, expiresIn } = opts;
const { apiKeyId, user, workspaceId } = opts;
if (isUserDisabled(user)) {
throw new ForbiddenException();
}
@@ -137,7 +145,32 @@ export class TokenService {
type: JwtType.API_KEY,
};
return this.jwtService.sign(payload, expiresIn ? { expiresIn } : {});
// API-key tokens carry NO `exp` claim EVER — the ONLY source of truth for a
// key's lifetime and revocation is its `api_keys` row (checked on every
// request), not the JWT. This CANNOT use `this.jwtService`: TokenModule
// registers it with a global `signOptions.expiresIn` (JWT_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN,
// default '90d'), which merges into EVERY sign() call — even `sign(payload,
// {})` — and `{ expiresIn: undefined }` THROWS rather than stripping it
// (verified empirically). So an "unlimited" key minted through the shared
// signer would silently get exp=now+90d and die in 90 days regardless of its
// row. We mint through a dedicated no-expiry signer, re-stamping only
// `issuer: 'Docmost'` for claim parity with the shared signer.
return this.apiKeyJwtService().sign(payload);
}
// Lazily-built JWT signer for API-key tokens: same APP_SECRET, same 'Docmost'
// issuer, but WITHOUT the global `expiresIn` — so minted API-key tokens have no
// `exp` claim. Built once and cached. Verification still goes through the
// shared verifier (same secret); `verifyAsync` does not require an `exp`.
private _apiKeyJwtService?: JwtService;
private apiKeyJwtService(): JwtService {
if (!this._apiKeyJwtService) {
this._apiKeyJwtService = new JwtService({
secret: this.environmentService.getAppSecret(),
signOptions: { issuer: 'Docmost' },
});
}
return this._apiKeyJwtService;
}
async generatePdfRenderToken(
@@ -177,4 +210,31 @@ export class TokenService {
return payload;
}
/**
* Verify a token's signature ONCE and assert its `type` is one of `allowed`.
*
* This is the type-routing primitive for surfaces that legitimately accept
* more than one token type on the same Bearer slot (the /mcp Bearer path
* accepts both an ACCESS and an API_KEY token). It is deliberately NOT a
* "verify-and-return-whatever-type" helper that would be a reusable
* confused-deputy footgun (any caller could then feed an attachment/collab
* token where an access token is expected). An explicit allowlist preserves
* the type-pinning property of `verifyJwt`: a token whose `type` is not in the
* allowlist is rejected with the SAME generic error as a type mismatch, and
* the signature is verified exactly once (no double-verify).
*/
async verifyJwtOneOf(token: string, allowed: JwtType[]) {
const payload = await this.jwtService.verifyAsync(token, {
secret: this.environmentService.getAppSecret(),
});
if (!allowed.includes(payload.type)) {
throw new UnauthorizedException(
'Invalid JWT token. Token type does not match.',
);
}
return payload;
}
}
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ describe('JwtStrategy — provenance derivation', () => {
const userSessionRepo: any = { findActiveById: jest.fn() };
const sessionActivityService: any = { trackActivity: jest.fn() };
const environmentService: any = { getAppSecret: () => 'test-secret' };
const moduleRef: any = {};
// ACCESS-path tests never touch the api-key seam; a bare stub suffices.
const apiKeyService: any = { validate: jest.fn() };
const strategy = new JwtStrategy(
userRepo,
@@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ describe('JwtStrategy — provenance derivation', () => {
userSessionRepo,
sessionActivityService,
environmentService,
moduleRef,
apiKeyService,
);
return { strategy, userRepo };
}
@@ -122,25 +123,29 @@ describe('JwtStrategy — provenance derivation', () => {
});
/**
* Provenance derivation on the API-KEY path (jwt.strategy.validateApiKey, #486).
* Provenance derivation on the API-KEY path (jwt.strategy.validateApiKey, #486
* + #501).
*
* The access-token path stamped provenance; the API-key path returned early
* WITHOUT it, so an is_agent API key's REST writes recorded no 'agent' marker.
* The API-key payload carries no signed claim, so provenance is resolved from the
* SERVER-SIDE user returned by ApiKeyService.validateApiKey: isAgent -> 'agent',
* SERVER-SIDE user returned by ApiKeyService.validate: isAgent -> 'agent',
* otherwise 'user'; aiChatId is always null (an API key has no ai_chats row).
*
* The enterprise ApiKeyService is not bundled in the OSS build, so the strategy
* loads it through an overridable `resolveApiKeyService` seam that we stub here.
* #501 wires the CORE ApiKeyService (the EE `ee/api-key` module is absent in the
* fork) directly into the strategy no dynamic require. The strategy also stamps
* `req.raw.authType='api_key'` + `req.raw.apiKeyId` for the "a token cannot manage
* tokens" guard on the /api-keys surface.
*/
describe('JwtStrategy — API-key provenance derivation (#486)', () => {
function makeApiKeyStrategy(validateApiKeyImpl: (p: any) => Promise<any>) {
describe('JwtStrategy — API-key provenance derivation (#486/#501)', () => {
function makeApiKeyStrategy(validateImpl: (p: any) => Promise<any>) {
const userRepo: any = { findById: jest.fn() };
const workspaceRepo: any = { findById: jest.fn() };
const userSessionRepo: any = { findActiveById: jest.fn() };
const sessionActivityService: any = { trackActivity: jest.fn() };
const environmentService: any = { getAppSecret: () => 'test-secret' };
const moduleRef: any = {};
const validate = jest.fn(validateImpl);
const apiKeyService: any = { validate };
const strategy = new JwtStrategy(
userRepo,
@@ -148,14 +153,9 @@ describe('JwtStrategy — API-key provenance derivation (#486)', () => {
userSessionRepo,
sessionActivityService,
environmentService,
moduleRef,
apiKeyService,
);
// Stub the EE ApiKeyService seam (the real module is not in the OSS build).
const validateApiKey = jest.fn(validateApiKeyImpl);
jest
.spyOn(strategy as any, 'resolveApiKeyService')
.mockReturnValue({ validateApiKey });
return { strategy, validateApiKey };
return { strategy, validate };
}
const makeReq = () => ({ raw: {} as Record<string, any> });
@@ -166,22 +166,23 @@ describe('JwtStrategy — API-key provenance derivation (#486)', () => {
type: JwtType.API_KEY,
});
it("stamps actor='agent' for an is_agent API key (from the validated user)", async () => {
it("stamps actor='agent' + authType/apiKeyId for an is_agent API key", async () => {
const validated = {
user: { id: 'svc-1', isAgent: true },
workspace: { id: 'ws-1' },
};
const { strategy, validateApiKey } = makeApiKeyStrategy(
async () => validated,
);
const { strategy, validate } = makeApiKeyStrategy(async () => validated);
const req = makeReq();
const result = await strategy.validate(req, apiKeyPayload() as any);
expect(validateApiKey).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(validate).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(req.raw.actor).toBe('agent');
// API keys carry no internal ai_chats row -> null.
expect(req.raw.aiChatId).toBeNull();
// Principal-kind markers for the management-surface guard.
expect(req.raw.authType).toBe('api_key');
expect(req.raw.apiKeyId).toBe('key-1');
// The validated auth object is returned unchanged (req.user shape preserved).
expect(result).toBe(validated);
});
@@ -197,25 +198,19 @@ describe('JwtStrategy — API-key provenance derivation (#486)', () => {
expect(req.raw.actor).toBe('user');
expect(req.raw.aiChatId).toBeNull();
expect(req.raw.authType).toBe('api_key');
});
it('throws Unauthorized (and stamps nothing) when the EE module is missing', async () => {
const userRepo: any = { findById: jest.fn() };
const strategy = new JwtStrategy(
userRepo,
{ findById: jest.fn() } as any,
{ findActiveById: jest.fn() } as any,
{ trackActivity: jest.fn() } as any,
{ getAppSecret: () => 'test-secret' } as any,
{} as any,
);
// EE not bundled: the seam returns null.
jest.spyOn(strategy as any, 'resolveApiKeyService').mockReturnValue(null);
it('propagates a validate() rejection and stamps nothing', async () => {
const { strategy } = makeApiKeyStrategy(async () => {
throw new UnauthorizedException();
});
const req = makeReq();
await expect(
strategy.validate(req, apiKeyPayload() as any),
).rejects.toThrow(UnauthorizedException);
expect(req.raw.actor).toBeUndefined();
expect(req.raw.authType).toBeUndefined();
});
});
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
import { Injectable, Logger, UnauthorizedException } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Injectable, UnauthorizedException } from '@nestjs/common';
import { PassportStrategy } from '@nestjs/passport';
import { Strategy } from 'passport-jwt';
import { EnvironmentService } from '../../../integrations/environment/environment.service';
@@ -9,20 +9,18 @@ import { UserSessionRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/session/user-session.repo';
import { SessionActivityService } from '../../session/session-activity.service';
import { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
import { extractBearerTokenFromHeader, isUserDisabled } from '../../../common/helpers';
import { ModuleRef } from '@nestjs/core';
import { resolveProvenance } from '../../../common/decorators/auth-provenance.decorator';
import { ApiKeyService } from '../../api-key/api-key.service';
@Injectable()
export class JwtStrategy extends PassportStrategy(Strategy, 'jwt') {
private logger = new Logger('JwtStrategy');
constructor(
private userRepo: UserRepo,
private workspaceRepo: WorkspaceRepo,
private userSessionRepo: UserSessionRepo,
private sessionActivityService: SessionActivityService,
private readonly environmentService: EnvironmentService,
private moduleRef: ModuleRef,
private readonly apiKeyService: ApiKeyService,
) {
super({
jwtFromRequest: (req: FastifyRequest) => {
@@ -102,12 +100,17 @@ export class JwtStrategy extends PassportStrategy(Strategy, 'jwt') {
}
private async validateApiKey(req: any, payload: JwtApiKeyPayload) {
const apiKeyService = this.resolveApiKeyService();
if (!apiKeyService) {
throw new UnauthorizedException('Enterprise API Key module missing');
}
// The fork ships the core `ApiKeyService` (the EE `ee/api-key` module is
// absent). `validate` throws a bare UnauthorizedException on any definite
// deny (missing/revoked/expired row, disabled user, kill-switch off) and
// propagates infra errors (→ 5xx) rather than masking them as a 401.
const result = await this.apiKeyService.validate(payload);
const result = await apiKeyService.validateApiKey(payload);
// Stamp the principal kind + key id so the /api-keys management surface can
// enforce "a token cannot manage tokens". Done in this branch because it
// returns before the shared ACCESS-path stamping below.
req.raw.authType = 'api_key';
req.raw.apiKeyId = payload.apiKeyId;
// Stamp the agent-edit provenance for the API-KEY path too (#486). Unlike the
// access-token path above, it CANNOT be resolved before this point: the
@@ -119,32 +122,10 @@ export class JwtStrategy extends PassportStrategy(Strategy, 'jwt') {
// SERVER-SIDE user (never a client field), so an 'agent' badge is unspoofable
// — mirroring the access-token path. Passing `null` for the claim means the
// actor is decided solely by user.isAgent.
const provenance = resolveProvenance((result as any)?.user, null);
const provenance = resolveProvenance(result.user, null);
req.raw.actor = provenance.actor;
req.raw.aiChatId = provenance.aiChatId;
return result;
}
/**
* Resolve the enterprise ApiKeyService, or `null` when the EE module is not
* bundled in this build (community build). Extracted as an overridable seam so
* the API-key provenance stamping can be unit-tested without the EE package
* present (docmost is OSS + a separate EE bundle; `require` of the EE path
* throws here). Any load/resolve error is treated as "module missing".
*/
protected resolveApiKeyService(): {
validateApiKey: (payload: JwtApiKeyPayload) => Promise<unknown>;
} | null {
try {
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
const ApiKeyModule = require('./../../../ee/api-key/api-key.service');
return this.moduleRef.get(ApiKeyModule.ApiKeyService, { strict: false });
} catch (err) {
this.logger.debug(
'API Key module requested but enterprise module not bundled in this build',
);
return null;
}
}
}
+2
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import {
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { UserModule } from './user/user.module';
import { AuthModule } from './auth/auth.module';
import { ApiKeyModule } from './api-key/api-key.module';
import { WorkspaceModule } from './workspace/workspace.module';
import { PageModule } from './page/page.module';
import { AttachmentModule } from './attachment/attachment.module';
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ import { ClsMiddleware } from 'nestjs-cls';
imports: [
UserModule,
AuthModule,
ApiKeyModule,
WorkspaceModule,
PageModule,
AttachmentModule,
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ import { AiProviderCredentialsRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/ai-chat/ai-provider
import { AiMcpServerRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/ai-chat/ai-mcp-server.repo';
import { AiAgentRoleRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/ai-agent-roles/ai-agent-roles.repo';
import { PageEmbeddingRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/ai-chat/page-embedding.repo';
import { ApiKeyRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/api-key/api-key.repo';
import { PageListener } from '@docmost/db/listeners/page.listener';
import { PostgresJSDialect } from 'kysely-postgres-js';
import * as postgres from 'postgres';
@@ -131,6 +132,7 @@ import { firstSqlToken } from '../integrations/metrics/metrics.constants';
AiMcpServerRepo,
AiAgentRoleRepo,
PageEmbeddingRepo,
ApiKeyRepo,
PageListener,
],
exports: [
@@ -167,6 +169,7 @@ import { firstSqlToken } from '../integrations/metrics/metrics.constants';
AiMcpServerRepo,
AiAgentRoleRepo,
PageEmbeddingRepo,
ApiKeyRepo,
],
})
export class DatabaseModule implements OnApplicationBootstrap {
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
import { type Kysely } from 'kysely';
/**
* #370 page-versioning intentionality tier on a history snapshot.
*
* Adds `page_history.kind`, the three-tier "how intentional was this snapshot"
* marker that lets versions (intentional points) be told apart from autosaves:
* - 'manual' a human explicitly saved a version (Cmd+S / Save button)
* - 'agent' the AI agent explicitly saved a version
* - 'idle' trailing idle-flush autosnapshot (safety net)
* - 'boundary' autosnapshot pinned on a source transition (useragentgit)
*
* Nullable with NO default (mirrors last_updated_source in the agent-provenance
* migration): legacy rows predate the marker and read back as `null`, which the
* client renders as a plain autosave. Stored as a short varchar to stay
* forward-compatible without an enum migration.
*/
export async function up(db: Kysely<any>): Promise<void> {
await db.schema
.alterTable('page_history')
.addColumn('kind', 'varchar(20)', (col) => col)
.execute();
}
export async function down(db: Kysely<any>): Promise<void> {
await db.schema.alterTable('page_history').dropColumn('kind').execute();
}
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
import { Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import { InjectKysely } from 'nestjs-kysely';
import { KyselyDB, KyselyTransaction } from '@docmost/db/types/kysely.types';
import { DB, Users } from '@docmost/db/types/db';
import { dbOrTx } from '@docmost/db/utils';
import { ApiKey, InsertableApiKey } from '@docmost/db/types/entity.types';
import { jsonObjectFrom } from 'kysely/helpers/postgres';
import { ExpressionBuilder } from 'kysely';
// Public-facing shape: the api_keys row plus a compact creator attribution used
// by the admin list (the workspace-wide view attributes each key to its author).
export type ApiKeyWithCreator = ApiKey & {
creator: Pick<Users, 'id' | 'name' | 'email' | 'avatarUrl'> | null;
};
@Injectable()
export class ApiKeyRepo {
constructor(@InjectKysely() private readonly db: KyselyDB) {}
// Compact creator attribution embedded in the admin list rows. A nested
// subquery (jsonObjectFrom) keeps it one round-trip; the token material is
// never stored, so nothing sensitive is joined in.
private withCreator(eb: ExpressionBuilder<DB, 'apiKeys'>) {
return jsonObjectFrom(
eb
.selectFrom('users')
.select(['users.id', 'users.name', 'users.email', 'users.avatarUrl'])
.whereRef('users.id', '=', 'apiKeys.creatorId'),
).as('creator');
}
async findById(
id: string,
workspaceId: string,
trx?: KyselyTransaction,
): Promise<ApiKey | undefined> {
const db = dbOrTx(this.db, trx);
return db
.selectFrom('apiKeys')
.selectAll()
.where('id', '=', id)
.where('workspaceId', '=', workspaceId)
// Convention (soft-delete): a revoked key is invisible to reads.
.where('deletedAt', 'is', null)
.executeTakeFirst();
}
async findByCreator(
creatorId: string,
workspaceId: string,
): Promise<ApiKeyWithCreator[]> {
return this.db
.selectFrom('apiKeys')
.selectAll('apiKeys')
.select((eb) => this.withCreator(eb))
.where('creatorId', '=', creatorId)
.where('workspaceId', '=', workspaceId)
.where('deletedAt', 'is', null)
.orderBy('createdAt', 'desc')
.execute() as unknown as Promise<ApiKeyWithCreator[]>;
}
async findAllInWorkspace(
workspaceId: string,
): Promise<ApiKeyWithCreator[]> {
return this.db
.selectFrom('apiKeys')
.selectAll('apiKeys')
.select((eb) => this.withCreator(eb))
.where('workspaceId', '=', workspaceId)
.where('deletedAt', 'is', null)
.orderBy('createdAt', 'desc')
.execute() as unknown as Promise<ApiKeyWithCreator[]>;
}
async insert(
insertable: InsertableApiKey,
trx?: KyselyTransaction,
): Promise<ApiKey> {
const db = dbOrTx(this.db, trx);
return db
.insertInto('apiKeys')
.values(insertable)
.returningAll()
.executeTakeFirst();
}
// Soft-delete = revoke. Terminal: the row stays for forensics but is invisible
// to every read above, so validate() denies it immediately (no grace window).
async softDelete(id: string, workspaceId: string): Promise<void> {
await this.db
.updateTable('apiKeys')
.set({ deletedAt: new Date(), updatedAt: new Date() })
.where('id', '=', id)
.where('workspaceId', '=', workspaceId)
.where('deletedAt', 'is', null)
.execute();
}
// Throttled best-effort forensics stamp. Not on the critical path: callers
// fire-and-forget and swallow errors, so it never fails a request.
async touchLastUsed(id: string): Promise<void> {
await this.db
.updateTable('apiKeys')
.set({ lastUsedAt: new Date() })
.where('id', '=', id)
.where('deletedAt', 'is', null)
.execute();
}
}
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import { jsonArrayFrom, jsonObjectFrom } from 'kysely/helpers/postgres';
import { ExpressionBuilder, sql } from 'kysely';
import { DB } from '@docmost/db/types/db';
import { resolveAgentProvenance } from '../agent-provenance';
import { PageHistoryKind } from '../../../collaboration/constants';
/**
* Role-resolution subquery for a page-history row's bound AI chat (#300). Joins
@@ -46,6 +47,9 @@ export class PageHistoryRepo {
'lastUpdatedById',
'lastUpdatedSource',
'lastUpdatedAiChatId',
// #370 — intentionality tier ('manual' | 'agent' | 'idle' | 'boundary');
// null on legacy rows (= autosave). Selected so callers can read/promote it.
'kind',
'contributorIds',
'spaceId',
'workspaceId',
@@ -85,9 +89,15 @@ export class PageHistoryRepo {
async saveHistory(
page: Page,
opts?: { contributorIds?: string[]; trx?: KyselyTransaction },
): Promise<void> {
await this.insertPageHistory(
opts?: {
contributorIds?: string[];
// #370 — intentionality tier for this snapshot. Omitted → null (legacy
// autosave semantics). Callers derive it server-side, never from a client.
kind?: PageHistoryKind;
trx?: KyselyTransaction;
},
): Promise<PageHistory> {
return await this.insertPageHistory(
{
pageId: page.id,
slugId: page.slugId,
@@ -99,6 +109,7 @@ export class PageHistoryRepo {
// Copy the provenance marker off the page row, as for lastUpdatedById.
lastUpdatedSource: page.lastUpdatedSource,
lastUpdatedAiChatId: page.lastUpdatedAiChatId,
kind: opts?.kind ?? null,
contributorIds: opts?.contributorIds,
spaceId: page.spaceId,
workspaceId: page.workspaceId,
@@ -107,6 +118,25 @@ export class PageHistoryRepo {
);
}
/**
* #370 promote an existing snapshot's intentionality tier in place. Used by
* the manual-save "promote-not-dup" path: when the latest history row already
* holds the exact content being versioned, we upgrade its `kind` instead of
* duplicating a heavy content row.
*/
async updateHistoryKind(
pageHistoryId: string,
kind: PageHistoryKind,
trx?: KyselyTransaction,
): Promise<void> {
const db = dbOrTx(this.db, trx);
await db
.updateTable('pageHistory')
.set({ kind })
.where('id', '=', pageHistoryId)
.execute();
}
async findPageHistoryByPageId(pageId: string, pagination: PaginationOptions) {
const query = this.db
.selectFrom('pageHistory')
+1
View File
@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ export interface PageHistory {
createdAt: Generated<Timestamp>;
icon: string | null;
id: Generated<string>;
kind: string | null;
lastUpdatedAiChatId: string | null;
lastUpdatedById: string | null;
lastUpdatedSource: string | null;
@@ -70,6 +70,23 @@ export class EnvironmentService {
return this.configService.get<string>('JWT_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN', '90d');
}
// Kill-switch for the agent API-key feature. Default ON (unset -> enabled): a
// deploy that never sets the variable must NOT silently kill every agent. The
// parse is STRICT — the value is validated by environment.validation to be
// exactly 'true' or 'false' (or absent), so a typo like `=0`/`=off`/`=False`
// fails at boot rather than being read as "enabled" (which would leave an
// operator who yanked the switch during an incident with it still on). When
// OFF: validate() denies every api-key token and the issuance endpoints 404.
isApiKeysEnabled(): boolean {
return this.configService.get<string>('API_KEYS_ENABLED', 'true') !== 'false';
}
// Raw value (or undefined) for the boot log, so the state after each deploy is
// verifiable in container logs: `API keys: ENABLED/DISABLED (API_KEYS_ENABLED=...)`.
getApiKeysEnabledRaw(): string | undefined {
return this.configService.get<string>('API_KEYS_ENABLED');
}
getCookieExpiresIn(): Date {
const expiresInStr = this.getJwtTokenExpiresIn();
let msUntilExpiry: number;
@@ -103,6 +103,15 @@ export class EnvironmentVariables {
@IsString()
TYPESENSE_LOCALE: string;
// Agent API-key kill-switch. Optional (absent -> default ON). STRICT: only the
// literals 'true'/'false' are accepted, so `=0`/`=off`/`=False` fail at boot
// instead of being silently read as "enabled" — the switch must actually flip
// when an operator flips it. See EnvironmentService.isApiKeysEnabled.
@IsOptional()
@IsIn(['true', 'false'])
@IsString()
API_KEYS_ENABLED: string;
@IsOptional()
@ValidateIf((obj) => obj.AI_DRIVER)
@IsIn(['openai', 'openai-compatible', 'gemini', 'ollama'])
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
// p-limit and @sindresorhus/slugify are ESM-only and not in jest's transform
// allowlist; both are irrelevant to createDrawioSvg (a pure fs + string method),
// so they are mocked out to keep the module graph loadable under ts-jest.
jest.mock('p-limit', () => ({
__esModule: true,
default: () => (fn: () => unknown) => fn(),
}));
jest.mock('@sindresorhus/slugify', () => ({
__esModule: true,
default: (input: string) => String(input),
}));
import { promises as fs } from 'fs';
import * as os from 'os';
import * as path from 'path';
import { ImportAttachmentService } from './import-attachment.service';
/**
* Unit test for ImportAttachmentService.createDrawioSvg (issue #507).
*
* The Confluence import wraps a `.drawio` file into a `.drawio.svg` attachment.
* The `content=` payload MUST be the mxfile XML entity-escaped (draw.io's native
* form), NOT base64 draw.io's editor decodes a base64 content= via Latin-1
* atob, mangling every non-ASCII char into mojibake. createDrawioSvg touches no
* injected dependency, so the service is built with placeholder deps.
*/
describe('ImportAttachmentService.createDrawioSvg (#507)', () => {
const service = new ImportAttachmentService(
{} as any,
{} as any,
{} as any,
);
const call = (p: string): Promise<Buffer> =>
(service as any).createDrawioSvg(p);
let tmpDir: string;
beforeAll(async () => {
tmpDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'drawio-507-'));
});
afterAll(async () => {
await fs.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
const writeDrawio = async (name: string, xml: string): Promise<string> => {
const p = path.join(tmpDir, name);
await fs.writeFile(p, xml, 'utf-8');
return p;
};
it('writes content= as entity-encoded XML, not base64', async () => {
const drawio =
'<mxfile host="Confluence"><diagram name="Схема — ёж">' +
'<mxGraphModel><root><mxCell id="0"/>' +
'<mxCell id="2" value="Старт-бит" vertex="1" parent="0"/>' +
'</root></mxGraphModel></diagram></mxfile>';
const p = await writeDrawio('cyrillic.drawio', drawio);
const svg = (await call(p)).toString('utf-8');
const content = /content="([^"]*)"/.exec(svg)?.[1];
expect(content).toBeDefined();
// Entity-encoded XML form, starting with &lt;mxfile — never a base64 blob.
expect(content).toMatch(/^&lt;mxfile/);
expect(content).toContain('&lt;');
// Non-ASCII survives as raw UTF-8, with no Latin-1 mojibake.
expect(content).toContain('Старт-бит');
expect(content).toContain('Схема — ёж');
expect(content).not.toContain('Ð');
// Decoding the attribute (un-escaping) yields the original drawio file.
const decoded = content!
.replace(/&lt;/g, '<')
.replace(/&gt;/g, '>')
.replace(/&quot;/g, '"')
.replace(/&amp;/g, '&');
expect(decoded).toBe(drawio);
});
it('encodes literal tab/newline/CR as numeric char-refs, not literal control chars (#507 F1)', async () => {
// A literal tab/newline/CR inside the mxfile XML would be collapsed to a
// single space by XML attribute-value normalization when the draw.io editor
// reads content=, silently flattening multi-line labels and tab-bearing
// values. They must be emitted as numeric char-refs instead.
const drawio =
'<mxfile><diagram name="p">' +
'<mxGraphModel><root><mxCell id="0"/>' +
'<mxCell id="2" value="col1\tcol2" style="html=1;\nshadow=0" vertex="1" parent="0"/>' +
'<mxCell id="3" value="Line1\nLine2\rLine3" vertex="1" parent="0"/>' +
'</root></mxGraphModel></diagram></mxfile>';
const p = await writeDrawio('ctrl.drawio', drawio);
const svg = (await call(p)).toString('utf-8');
const content = /content="([^"]*)"/.exec(svg)?.[1];
expect(content).toBeDefined();
// No literal control chars survive in the attribute value.
expect(content).not.toMatch(/[\t\n\r]/);
// They round-trip as numeric char-refs.
expect(content).toContain('&#x9;');
expect(content).toContain('&#xa;');
expect(content).toContain('&#xd;');
// Decoding (char-refs back to literal, entities back) recovers the file.
const decoded = content!
.replace(/&lt;/g, '<')
.replace(/&gt;/g, '>')
.replace(/&quot;/g, '"')
.replace(/&#39;/g, "'")
.replace(/&#x9;/gi, '\t')
.replace(/&#xa;/gi, '\n')
.replace(/&#xd;/gi, '\r')
.replace(/&amp;/g, '&');
expect(decoded).toBe(drawio);
});
it('escapes XML metacharacters in the drawio payload', async () => {
const drawio = '<mxfile><diagram name="a &amp; b">"q" &lt;x&gt;</diagram></mxfile>';
const p = await writeDrawio('meta.drawio', drawio);
const svg = (await call(p)).toString('utf-8');
const content = /content="([^"]*)"/.exec(svg)?.[1];
expect(content).toBeDefined();
// The attribute value must contain no bare `<`, `>` or `"` that would break
// out of the content="..." attribute or the SVG element.
expect(content).not.toMatch(/[<>"]/);
const decoded = content!
.replace(/&lt;/g, '<')
.replace(/&gt;/g, '>')
.replace(/&quot;/g, '"')
.replace(/&amp;/g, '&');
expect(decoded).toBe(drawio);
});
});
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import { createReadStream } from 'node:fs';
import { promises as fs } from 'fs';
import { Readable } from 'stream';
import { getMimeType, sanitizeFileName } from '../../../common/helpers';
import { htmlEscape } from '../../../common/helpers/html-escaper';
import { v7 } from 'uuid';
import { FileTask } from '@docmost/db/types/entity.types';
import { getAttachmentFolderPath } from '../../../core/attachment/attachment.utils';
@@ -849,7 +850,12 @@ export class ImportAttachmentService {
): Promise<Buffer> {
try {
const drawioContent = await fs.readFile(drawioPath, 'utf-8');
const drawioBase64 = Buffer.from(drawioContent).toString('base64');
// Write the mxfile XML XML-entity-escaped (draw.io's native content= form),
// NOT base64. draw.io's editor decodes a base64 content= via Latin-1 atob
// (no UTF-8 step), turning every non-ASCII char (Cyrillic, ё, —) into
// mojibake; the entity-encoded form is decoded by the DOM as UTF-8 and
// opens intact. Docmost's own decoder reads both forms.
const drawioEscaped = this.xmlEscapeContent(drawioContent);
let imageElement = '';
// If we have a PNG, include it in the SVG
@@ -875,7 +881,7 @@ export class ImportAttachmentService {
width="600"
height="400"
viewBox="0 0 600 400"
content="${drawioBase64}">${imageElement}</svg>`;
content="${drawioEscaped}">${imageElement}</svg>`;
return Buffer.from(svgContent, 'utf-8');
} catch (error) {
@@ -884,6 +890,24 @@ export class ImportAttachmentService {
}
}
/**
* Escape a string so it is safe as the value of a double-quoted XML attribute
* (the `content=` payload of a `.drawio.svg`). The shared `htmlEscape` covers
* `& < > " '` (a strict superset of what this attribute needs; the extra `'`
* escape is harmless in a `"`-delimited value). On top of that, the numeric
* char-refs for tab/newline/CR are required: a literal tab/newline/CR inside
* an attribute value is collapsed to a single space by XML attribute-value
* normalization on DOM read (both our decoder and the real draw.io editor),
* silently flattening multi-line labels and tab-bearing values. Char-refs
* survive that normalization (#507).
*/
private xmlEscapeContent(s: string): string {
return htmlEscape(s)
.replace(/\t/g, '&#x9;')
.replace(/\n/g, '&#xa;')
.replace(/\r/g, '&#xd;');
}
private async uploadWithRetry(opts: {
abs: string;
storageFilePath: string;
@@ -304,37 +304,102 @@ export function clientIp(req: ClientIpRequest): string {
return 'unknown';
}
// Minimal structural shape of the TokenService.verifyJwt method we depend on,
// so this module never imports the concrete TokenService (heavy graph).
export interface AccessJwtVerifier {
verifyJwt: (
token: string,
type: JwtType,
) => Promise<{
sub?: string;
email?: string;
workspaceId?: string;
sessionId?: string;
}>;
}
/**
* Bind a TokenService-like verifier into a one-arg `verifyJwt(token)` that
* ALWAYS enforces `JwtType.ACCESS`. This is the single place where the /mcp
* Bearer path pins the token type: a Bearer access token must be verified AS an
* access token (not refresh/exchange/collab/etc.), so the type literal is fixed
* here rather than at the call site. McpService.verifyMcpBearer delegates to
* this, keeping the `JwtType.ACCESS` choice testable without the heavy graph.
*/
export function bindAccessJwtVerifier(
tokenService: AccessJwtVerifier,
): (token: string) => Promise<{
// The decoded payload shared by the /mcp Bearer allowlist. Carries the `type`
// discriminator and the API-key `apiKeyId`, on top of the access-token fields.
export interface McpBearerPayload {
type?: JwtType;
sub?: string;
email?: string;
workspaceId?: string;
sessionId?: string;
}> {
return (token: string) => tokenService.verifyJwt(token, JwtType.ACCESS);
apiKeyId?: string;
}
// Minimal structural shape of the TokenService.verifyJwtOneOf method.
export interface OneOfJwtVerifier {
verifyJwtOneOf: (
token: string,
allowed: JwtType[],
) => Promise<McpBearerPayload>;
}
/**
* Bind a TokenService-like verifier into a one-arg `verifyJwtOneOf(token)` that
* pins the /mcp Bearer ALLOWLIST to exactly {ACCESS, API_KEY}. This is the single
* place the /mcp Bearer path pins the token type: the /mcp Bearer slot
* legitimately accepts either an ACCESS token (a
* human's session token) OR an API_KEY token (an agent's key), but NOTHING else
* (collab/exchange/attachment/etc. are rejected with the generic type error).
* The allowlist is fixed here rather than at the call site, and the signature is
* verified exactly once (see verifyMcpBearer).
*/
export function bindMcpBearerVerifier(
tokenService: OneOfJwtVerifier,
): (token: string) => Promise<McpBearerPayload> {
return (token: string) =>
tokenService.verifyJwtOneOf(token, [JwtType.ACCESS, JwtType.API_KEY]);
}
// Deps for the /mcp Bearer router. `verifyJwtOneOf` is the one-arg verifier bound
// above (allowlist {ACCESS, API_KEY}); the ACCESS-specific revocation/disabled
// deps mirror BearerVerifyDeps; `validateApiKey` is the SHARED api-key row-check.
export interface McpBearerDeps
extends Omit<BearerVerifyDeps, 'verifyJwt'> {
verifyJwtOneOf: (token: string) => Promise<McpBearerPayload>;
// Row-check for an API_KEY principal — the SAME validator REST uses. Throws
// UnauthorizedException on a definite deny; PROPAGATES an infra error (→ 5xx),
// never masking it as a 401. Not a login attempt: the Basic limiter is not
// involved on this path.
validateApiKey: (payload: McpBearerPayload) => Promise<unknown>;
}
/**
* Verify a /mcp Bearer token that may be an ACCESS token OR an API_KEY token, and
* route by type. The signature is verified EXACTLY ONCE (verifyJwtOneOf); the
* result is reused so the ACCESS branch does not re-verify.
*
* - API_KEY -> bind to THIS instance's workspace FIRST (a token for another
* workspace is rejected), THEN run the shared `validateApiKey` row-check.
* No session/limiter involvement (an API key is not a login).
* - ACCESS -> the unchanged `verifyBearerAccess` (session-active + not-disabled
* checks), fed a closure over the already-verified payload so "verify once"
* and "helper unchanged" coexist.
*
* Throws UnauthorizedException on any auth failure (uniform generic message no
* enumeration of why); propagates an infra error from `validateApiKey` as itself.
*/
export async function verifyMcpBearer(
token: string,
deps: McpBearerDeps,
): Promise<{ sub?: string; email?: string }> {
const generic = 'Invalid or expired token';
const payload = await deps.verifyJwtOneOf(token);
if (payload.type === JwtType.API_KEY) {
if (!payload.sub || !payload.workspaceId) {
throw new UnauthorizedException(generic);
}
// Instance-binding (mirrors verifyBearerAccess): reject an API_KEY token
// minted for a different workspace before touching the DB.
if (
deps.expectedWorkspaceId &&
payload.workspaceId !== deps.expectedWorkspaceId
) {
throw new UnauthorizedException(generic);
}
// Shared row-check. A definite deny throws Unauthorized; an infra error
// propagates (→ 5xx), which the caller must NOT convert to a 401.
await deps.validateApiKey(payload);
return { sub: payload.sub };
}
// ACCESS: reuse verifyBearerAccess WITHOUT re-verifying the signature.
return verifyBearerAccess(token, {
verifyJwt: async () => payload,
expectedWorkspaceId: deps.expectedWorkspaceId,
findUser: deps.findUser,
findActiveSession: deps.findActiveSession,
});
}
// Minimal shapes for the Bearer revocation/disabled check. Kept structural so
@@ -728,18 +793,24 @@ export async function resolveMcpSessionConfig(
};
}
// --- 2) fallback A: Bearer access-JWT (user-supplied token) ---
// --- 2) fallback A: Bearer JWT (user-supplied ACCESS or agent API_KEY) ---
const bearer = extractBearer(authHeader);
if (bearer) {
let payload: { sub?: string; email?: string };
try {
payload = await deps.verifyAccessJwt(bearer);
} catch (err) {
const message =
err instanceof Error && err.message
? err.message
: 'Invalid or expired token';
throw new UnauthorizedException(message);
// Anti-enumeration (Bearer leg): EVERY auth failure surfaces the SAME
// generic 401 — expired/revoked/wrong-type/unknown are indistinguishable
// to the caller (its reaction is identical either way). But an UNEXPECTED
// (infra) error is NOT an auth verdict: rethrow it AS ITSELF so the surface
// maps it to 5xx (mapAuthResultToResponse), never masking a DB/Redis
// outage as a bad token. verifyMcpBearer throws UnauthorizedException on a
// definite deny and lets an infra error from validateApiKey propagate.
if (err instanceof UnauthorizedException) {
throw new UnauthorizedException('Invalid or expired token');
}
throw err;
}
return {
config: { apiUrl, getToken: async () => bearer },
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ function makeService(opts: {
undefined as never, // userRepo
undefined as never, // userSessionRepo
moduleRef as never, // moduleRef (read by the MFA branch)
undefined as never, // apiKeyService (unused by the login-gate path)
undefined as never, // sandboxStore (unused by the login-gate path)
);
// Stop the constructor's unref'd sweep timer leaking across tests.
@@ -4,13 +4,16 @@ import { McpService } from './mcp.service';
import { DatabaseModule } from '@docmost/db/database.module';
import { AuthModule } from '../../core/auth/auth.module';
import { TokenModule } from '../../core/auth/token.module';
import { ApiKeyModule } from '../../core/api-key/api-key.module';
// Community MCP feature: the server itself serves the Model Context Protocol
// over HTTP at /mcp. DatabaseModule (global) provides WorkspaceRepo. AuthModule
// supplies AuthService (per-user HTTP-Basic login validation) and TokenModule
// supplies TokenService (Bearer access-JWT verification for the token fallback).
// supplies TokenService (Bearer JWT verification for the token path). ApiKeyModule
// supplies ApiKeyService (the shared api-key row-check for the API_KEY Bearer
// branch, so an agent authenticates with a key instead of the bcrypt Basic path).
@Module({
imports: [DatabaseModule, AuthModule, TokenModule],
imports: [DatabaseModule, AuthModule, TokenModule, ApiKeyModule],
controllers: [McpController],
providers: [McpService],
})
@@ -6,9 +6,10 @@ import {
isCredentialsFailure,
isInitializeRequestBody,
verifyBearerAccess,
verifyMcpBearer,
bindMcpBearerVerifier,
sharedTokenMatches,
clientIp,
bindAccessJwtVerifier,
extractBearer,
decideBasicGate,
mapAuthResultToResponse,
@@ -524,13 +525,28 @@ describe('resolveMcpSessionConfig', () => {
expect(resolved.identity).toBe('bearer:user-9');
});
it('Bearer invalid -> specific 401 from verifyAccessJwt', async () => {
it('Bearer invalid -> UNIFORM generic 401 (anti-enumeration, reason not leaked)', async () => {
// #501: the Bearer leg no longer surfaces the specific reason. Whether the
// token is expired, revoked, wrong-type or unknown, the caller sees ONE bare
// 'Invalid or expired token' — an agent's reaction is identical, and a leaked
// class would be an enumeration oracle.
const verifyAccessJwt = jest
.fn()
.mockRejectedValue(new UnauthorizedException('jwt expired'));
await expect(
resolveMcpSessionConfig('Bearer expired', makeDeps({ verifyAccessJwt })),
).rejects.toThrow('jwt expired');
).rejects.toThrow('Invalid or expired token');
});
it('Bearer INFRA error -> propagates (NOT masked as 401)', async () => {
// A non-UnauthorizedException (e.g. a DB outage in the api-key row-check) is
// not an auth verdict: it must propagate so the surface maps it to 5xx.
const verifyAccessJwt = jest
.fn()
.mockRejectedValue(new Error('connection terminated'));
await expect(
resolveMcpSessionConfig('Bearer x', makeDeps({ verifyAccessJwt })),
).rejects.toThrow('connection terminated');
});
it('no creds + env service account configured -> service-account config', async () => {
@@ -1001,48 +1017,104 @@ describe('clientIp (XFF-fallback precedence, item 5)', () => {
});
});
describe('bindAccessJwtVerifier enforces JwtType.ACCESS (item 3)', () => {
it('calls TokenService.verifyJwt with JwtType.ACCESS as the second argument', async () => {
// Mock TokenService: assert the type literal is pinned to ACCESS so swapping
// to REFRESH (or omitting the type) breaks this test.
const verifyJwt = jest
describe('bindMcpBearerVerifier pins the {ACCESS, API_KEY} allowlist (#501)', () => {
it('calls verifyJwtOneOf with exactly [ACCESS, API_KEY]', async () => {
const verifyJwtOneOf = jest
.fn()
.mockResolvedValue({ sub: 'user-1', workspaceId: 'ws-1' });
const verify = bindAccessJwtVerifier({ verifyJwt });
.mockResolvedValue({ type: JwtType.API_KEY, sub: 'u-1' });
await bindMcpBearerVerifier({ verifyJwtOneOf })('the.jwt');
expect(verifyJwtOneOf).toHaveBeenCalledWith('the.jwt', [
JwtType.ACCESS,
JwtType.API_KEY,
]);
// Pin the concrete enum values too.
expect(verifyJwtOneOf.mock.calls[0][1]).toEqual(['access', 'api_key']);
});
});
await verify('the.access.jwt');
expect(verifyJwt).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(verifyJwt).toHaveBeenCalledWith('the.access.jwt', JwtType.ACCESS);
// Pin the real enum value too, so renaming/repointing the enum member is caught.
expect(verifyJwt.mock.calls[0][1]).toBe('access');
describe('verifyMcpBearer routes by token type (#501)', () => {
const accessDeps = (over: any = {}) => ({
verifyJwtOneOf: jest.fn(),
expectedWorkspaceId: 'ws-1',
findUser: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ deactivatedAt: null }),
findActiveSession: jest
.fn()
.mockResolvedValue({ userId: 'u-1', workspaceId: 'ws-1' }),
validateApiKey: jest.fn(),
...over,
});
it('passes through the verified payload', async () => {
const payload = { sub: 'user-9', email: 'u@e.com', workspaceId: 'ws-1' };
const verifyJwt = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(payload);
await expect(
bindAccessJwtVerifier({ verifyJwt })('t'),
).resolves.toBe(payload);
it('API_KEY -> row-checks via validateApiKey and does NOT touch session/limiter', async () => {
const deps = accessDeps({
verifyJwtOneOf: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
type: JwtType.API_KEY,
sub: 'svc-1',
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
apiKeyId: 'k-1',
}),
validateApiKey: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ user: { id: 'svc-1' } }),
});
const res = await verifyMcpBearer('tok', deps);
expect(deps.validateApiKey).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
// No session lookup on the api-key path (not a login).
expect(deps.findActiveSession).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(res).toEqual({ sub: 'svc-1' });
});
// The Bearer revocation/disabled checks (verifyBearerAccess) are covered above;
// this binds the ACCESS-type enforcement that verifyMcpBearer wires in.
it('feeds verifyBearerAccess so the whole Bearer chain enforces ACCESS', async () => {
const verifyJwt = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
sub: 'user-1',
it('API_KEY for ANOTHER workspace -> rejected before the row-check', async () => {
const deps = accessDeps({
verifyJwtOneOf: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
type: JwtType.API_KEY,
sub: 'svc-1',
workspaceId: 'ws-OTHER',
apiKeyId: 'k-1',
}),
validateApiKey: jest.fn(),
});
await expect(verifyMcpBearer('tok', deps)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
UnauthorizedException,
);
expect(deps.validateApiKey).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('API_KEY infra error from validateApiKey PROPAGATES (not masked)', async () => {
const boom = new Error('db down');
const deps = accessDeps({
verifyJwtOneOf: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
type: JwtType.API_KEY,
sub: 'svc-1',
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
apiKeyId: 'k-1',
}),
validateApiKey: jest.fn().mockRejectedValue(boom),
});
await expect(verifyMcpBearer('tok', deps)).rejects.toBe(boom);
});
it('ACCESS -> runs the session/disabled checks and does NOT call validateApiKey', async () => {
const deps = accessDeps({
verifyJwtOneOf: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
type: JwtType.ACCESS,
sub: 'u-1',
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
sessionId: 'sess-1',
email: 'u@e.com',
}),
});
const res = await verifyMcpBearer('tok', deps);
expect(deps.findActiveSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith('sess-1');
expect(deps.validateApiKey).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(res).toEqual({ sub: 'u-1', email: 'u@e.com' });
});
it('verifies the signature exactly ONCE (single verifyJwtOneOf, no re-verify)', async () => {
const verifyJwtOneOf = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
type: JwtType.ACCESS,
sub: 'u-1',
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
sessionId: 'sess-1',
});
const res = await verifyBearerAccess('t', {
verifyJwt: bindAccessJwtVerifier({ verifyJwt }),
findUser: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ deactivatedAt: null }),
findActiveSession: jest
.fn()
.mockResolvedValue({ userId: 'user-1', workspaceId: 'ws-1' }),
});
expect(verifyJwt).toHaveBeenCalledWith('t', JwtType.ACCESS);
expect(res).toEqual({ sub: 'user-1', email: undefined });
await verifyMcpBearer('tok', accessDeps({ verifyJwtOneOf }));
expect(verifyJwtOneOf).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
});
@@ -1198,6 +1270,7 @@ describe('McpService.onModuleDestroy — CollabSession teardown (#486)', () => {
{} as any,
{} as any,
{} as any,
{} as any,
);
}
+34 -25
View File
@@ -14,16 +14,17 @@ import { UserSessionRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/session/user-session.repo';
import { AuthService } from '../../core/auth/services/auth.service';
import { TokenService } from '../../core/auth/services/token.service';
import { validateSsoEnforcement } from '../../core/auth/auth.util';
import { JwtPayload } from '../../core/auth/dto/jwt-payload';
import { JwtApiKeyPayload } from '../../core/auth/dto/jwt-payload';
import { Workspace } from '@docmost/db/types/entity.types';
import { ApiKeyService } from '../../core/api-key/api-key.service';
import {
FailedLoginLimiter,
resolveMcpSessionConfig,
verifyBearerAccess,
verifyMcpBearer,
isInitializeRequestBody,
sharedTokenMatches,
clientIp,
bindAccessJwtVerifier,
bindMcpBearerVerifier,
decideBasicGate,
mapAuthResultToResponse,
DocmostMcpConfig,
@@ -105,6 +106,10 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
private readonly userRepo: UserRepo,
private readonly userSessionRepo: UserSessionRepo,
private readonly moduleRef: ModuleRef,
// Shared api-key row-check for the /mcp API_KEY Bearer branch (same validator
// REST uses). Also lets an agent authenticate to /mcp with an api key instead
// of the bcrypt Basic path, so parallel reads stop starving the limiter.
private readonly apiKeyService: ApiKeyService,
// Shared singleton in-RAM blob store backing the stash tool.
private readonly sandboxStore: SandboxStore,
) {
@@ -194,37 +199,41 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
}
}
// Bearer access-JWT verification for the /mcp token fallback. verifyJwt only
// checks signature/exp/type, but a logged-out (revoked) or disabled user can
// still hold an unexpired access JWT. JwtStrategy additionally checks the
// session is active and the user is not disabled; we mirror those exact checks
// here so the MCP Bearer path is not weaker than the normal cookie/header path.
// Bearer verification for the /mcp token path. The Bearer slot accepts EITHER
// an ACCESS token (a human session token) OR an API_KEY token (an agent's key)
// — the allowlist is pinned in bindMcpBearerVerifier. An ACCESS token is
// checked exactly as JwtStrategy does (signature/exp/type + session-active +
// not-disabled), so the MCP path is not weaker than the cookie/header path. An
// API_KEY token is HMAC-verified (microseconds) then row-checked via the shared
// ApiKeyService.validate — NOT a login attempt, so the Basic bcrypt path and
// its anti-brute-force limiter are never touched (the parallel-reads fix).
private async verifyMcpBearer(
token: string,
): Promise<{ sub?: string; email?: string }> {
// Resolve THIS instance's workspace so verifyBearerAccess can bind the
// token's `workspaceId` claim to it (mirrors JwtStrategy). The community
// build is single-workspace (findFirst), so this is the default workspace
// and the check is a no-op here; it only rejects a foreign-workspace token
// in a multi-workspace deployment. Undefined (no workspace configured) means
// no check — the credentials path would already have failed with no
// workspace, and an undefined here keeps the helper a no-op rather than
// rejecting every token.
// Resolve THIS instance's workspace so the router can bind the token's
// `workspaceId` claim to it (mirrors JwtStrategy). The community build is
// single-workspace (findFirst), so this is the default workspace and the
// check is a no-op here; it only rejects a foreign-workspace token in a
// multi-workspace deployment. Undefined (no workspace configured) means no
// check — the credentials path would already have failed with no workspace.
const instanceWorkspace = await this.workspaceRepo.findFirst();
// The revocation/disabled decision logic lives in the framework-free
// verifyBearerAccess helper (unit-testable without the heavy auth graph);
// this method only wires in the concrete TokenService + repos.
return verifyBearerAccess(token, {
// The JwtType.ACCESS enforcement lives in bindAccessJwtVerifier (a pure,
// testable seam) so the type literal cannot silently drift to REFRESH.
verifyJwt: bindAccessJwtVerifier(this.tokenService) as (
t: string,
) => Promise<JwtPayload>,
// The type-routing + revocation/disabled decision logic lives in the
// framework-free verifyMcpBearer helper (unit-testable without the heavy auth
// graph); this method only wires in the concrete TokenService + repos + the
// shared api-key validator.
return verifyMcpBearer(token, {
// The {ACCESS, API_KEY} allowlist enforcement lives in bindMcpBearerVerifier
// (a pure, testable seam) so the type set cannot silently drift.
verifyJwtOneOf: bindMcpBearerVerifier(this.tokenService),
expectedWorkspaceId: instanceWorkspace?.id,
findUser: (sub, workspaceId) =>
this.userRepo.findById(sub, workspaceId),
findActiveSession: (sessionId) =>
this.userSessionRepo.findActiveById(sessionId),
// Shared with REST: a definite deny throws Unauthorized, an infra error
// propagates (→ 5xx). The /mcp bearer catch must preserve that distinction.
validateApiKey: (payload) =>
this.apiKeyService.validate(payload as JwtApiKeyPayload),
});
}
@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ export interface IStripeSeatsSyncJob {
export interface IPageHistoryJob {
pageId: string;
// #370 — intentionality tier the worker stamps on the snapshot. All jobs on
// this queue are trailing idle-flush autosnapshots, so this is 'idle' (absent
// → treated as 'idle' by the processor).
kind?: 'idle';
}
/**
@@ -322,20 +322,21 @@ describe('AiChatService.stream [integration]', () => {
});
/**
* #332 deferred tool loading, the ON path. The riskiest property is that the
* per-turn `activatedTools` Set is created FRESH inside each stream() call, so a
* tool a previous turn activated via loadTools is NOT still active when the next
* turn starts the new turn begins "cold" (CORE + loadTools only). The unit
* tests only exercise pure prepareAgentStep with hand-fed Sets; this pins the
* real wiring end-to-end (loadTools.execute -> activatedTools -> prepareStep ->
* per-step activeTools) against the real streamText loop, and proves there is no
* cross-turn leak. We drive a MockLanguageModelV3 whose step 1 calls
* loadTools(['createPage']) and assert, via the model's recorded per-step
* CallOptions.tools (the AI SDK filters the provider tool list by activeTools),
* that the deferred tool becomes active on the SAME turn's next step but NOT on a
* fresh turn's first step.
* #332 + #490 deferred tool loading, the ON path. Turn 1 starts COLD (CORE +
* loadTools only) and activates a deferred tool via loadTools; that activation
* is PERSISTED into the chat's metadata.activatedTools (#490) so the NEXT turn
* SEEDS from it and the tool is active from the fresh turn's FIRST step the
* model never re-runs loadTools to re-activate the same tool. The unit tests
* only exercise pure prepareAgentStep with hand-fed Sets; this pins the real
* wiring end-to-end (loadTools.execute -> activatedTools -> persist -> next-turn
* seed -> prepareStep -> per-step activeTools) against the real streamText loop.
* We drive a MockLanguageModelV3 whose step 1 calls loadTools(['createPage'])
* and assert, via the model's recorded per-step CallOptions.tools (the AI SDK
* filters the provider tool list by activeTools), that the deferred tool becomes
* active on the SAME turn's next step AND, seeded from metadata, on the next
* turn's first step.
*/
describe('deferred tool loading ON — per-turn activation, no leak (#332)', () => {
describe('deferred tool loading ON — cross-turn activation persistence (#332 + #490)', () => {
// A stub deferred (non-core) tool the agent can activate. Its execute is never
// called — the model only needs to SEE it become active — but it must be a
// valid AI-SDK tool so the SDK includes it in a step's tool list once active.
@@ -451,7 +452,7 @@ describe('AiChatService.stream [integration]', () => {
} as any);
}
it('activates a deferred tool for the SAME turn, and a NEW turn starts cold (no leak)', async () => {
it('activates a deferred tool for the SAME turn, and a NEW turn SEEDS it from persisted chat metadata (#490)', async () => {
const chatId = (await createChat(db, { workspaceId, creatorId: userId })).id;
// --- Turn 1: loadTools(createPage) on step 1, then answer on step 2. ---
@@ -474,7 +475,7 @@ describe('AiChatService.stream [integration]', () => {
// Step 2 of the SAME turn sees the just-activated deferred tool.
expect(step2Tools).toContain('createPage');
// --- Turn 2 on the SAME chat: must start cold again. ---
// --- Turn 2 on the SAME chat: seeds the persisted activation (#490). ---
const model2 = new MockLanguageModelV3({
doStream: async () => ({ stream: successStream() }),
} as any);
@@ -485,9 +486,10 @@ describe('AiChatService.stream [integration]', () => {
const nextTurnFirstStep = toolNames(model2.doStreamCalls[0]);
expect(nextTurnFirstStep).toContain('loadTools');
// The activated set is per-turn: the prior turn's createPage did NOT leak,
// so the fresh turn's first step sees it deferred again.
expect(nextTurnFirstStep).not.toContain('createPage');
// #490: activation PERSISTS across turns — turn 1 wrote createPage into the
// chat's metadata.activatedTools, so the next turn seeds from it and the
// deferred tool is active from the FIRST step (no need to re-run loadTools).
expect(nextTurnFirstStep).toContain('createPage');
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
import { Queue, Worker } from 'bullmq';
import { PersistenceExtension } from '../../src/collaboration/extensions/persistence.extension';
/**
* #370 integration property of the idle-snapshot pipeline against REAL BullMQ.
*
* This is deliberately NOT a unit test of computeHistoryJob (that lives in
* compute-history-job.spec.ts). The point here is the OBSERVABLE end-to-end
* behaviour of the production `enqueuePageHistory` remove-then-add debounce
* driving a real Redis-backed delayed queue + worker (the #431#439 class: a
* locally-correct function whose queue/timer property was never exercised):
*
* - a CONTINUOUS burst of stores lasting several caps yields periodic idle
* snapshots at least one per max-wait cap, NOT one-per-store; and
* - an INTERMITTENT burst (a few stores, then quiet) yields exactly ONE
* trailing snapshot.
*
* We shrink the idle windows to milliseconds (jest.mock of collaboration
* constants) so real BullMQ delayed jobs actually promote within the test
* fake timers cannot advance Redis's own delayed-set clock, so the intervals
* must be real but tiny. The production method under test is called verbatim.
*/
// NOTE: jest.mock is hoisted above the module's const initializers, so its
// factory cannot close over MAX_WAIT_MS/INTERVAL_MS — the literals are inlined
// here and MUST stay in sync with the consts below (a single source of truth is
// impossible across the hoist boundary).
jest.mock('../../src/collaboration/constants', () => {
const actual = jest.requireActual('../../src/collaboration/constants');
return {
...actual,
IDLE_MAX_WAIT_USER: 300,
IDLE_MAX_WAIT_AGENT: 300,
IDLE_INTERVAL_USER: 1000,
IDLE_INTERVAL_AGENT: 1000,
};
});
// Mirrors the mocked IDLE_MAX_WAIT_* above (IDLE_INTERVAL_* is 1000 > this, so
// the max-wait ceiling is what actually governs the trailing delay).
const MAX_WAIT_MS = 300;
const REDIS_CONNECTION = {
host: process.env.TEST_REDIS_HOST ?? '127.0.0.1',
port: Number(process.env.TEST_REDIS_PORT ?? 6379),
};
const sleep = (ms: number) => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
describe('#370 idle-snapshot pipeline (real BullMQ)', () => {
let queue: Queue;
let worker: Worker;
let extension: PersistenceExtension;
// Every processed snapshot, tagged by pageId so the two scenarios stay isolated.
const processed: Array<{ pageId: string; kind: string; at: number }> = [];
const queueName = `history-idle-int-${randomUUID()}`;
beforeAll(async () => {
queue = new Queue(queueName, {
connection: REDIS_CONNECTION,
// Mirror the production default (BullModule.forRoot removeOnComplete): the
// enqueue idiom relies on the jobId being freed once a job completes so the
// next burst can re-arm the same id.
defaultJobOptions: { removeOnComplete: true, removeOnFail: true },
});
await queue.waitUntilReady();
worker = new Worker(
queueName,
async (job) => {
processed.push({
pageId: job.data?.pageId,
kind: job.data?.kind,
at: Date.now(),
});
},
{ connection: REDIS_CONNECTION },
);
await worker.waitUntilReady();
// Construct the real extension; only historyQueue (5th ctor arg) and the
// internal idleBurstStart map are exercised by enqueuePageHistory, so the
// other collaborators can be null — the constructor only assigns fields.
extension = new PersistenceExtension(
null as any, // pageRepo
null as any, // pageHistoryRepo
null as any, // db
null as any, // aiQueue
queue as any, // historyQueue
null as any, // notificationQueue
null as any, // collabHistory
null as any, // transclusionService
);
});
afterAll(async () => {
// Force-close and fully drain so no BullMQ background activity (delayed-set
// polling, blocking BRPOPLPUSH) bleeds into later suites in this single
// shared jest worker (maxWorkers: 1).
await worker?.close(true).catch(() => undefined);
await queue?.obliterate({ force: true }).catch(() => undefined);
await queue?.close();
// Let the redis sockets settle before the next suite starts.
await sleep(150);
});
const arm = (pageId: string) =>
(extension as any).enqueuePageHistory({ id: pageId }, 'user');
it('continuous burst over several caps → periodic idle snapshots (≥1 per cap, not one-per-store)', async () => {
const pageId = randomUUID();
const runMs = 6 * MAX_WAIT_MS; // ~6 caps of unbroken editing
// Store cadence that does NOT evenly divide the cap: real hocuspocus stores
// are not aligned to cap boundaries, so a boundary job promotes in the gap
// before the next store's remove(). A cap-aligned cadence would instead land
// a store exactly on every boundary and lose the snapshot to the documented
// remove-vs-active race — an artefact of the test clock, not the pipeline.
const stepMs = 70;
const stores = Math.floor(runMs / stepMs);
const start = Date.now();
let count = 0;
while (Date.now() - start < runMs) {
await arm(pageId);
count++;
await sleep(stepMs);
}
// Let the final armed job flush.
await sleep(2 * MAX_WAIT_MS);
const snaps = processed.filter((p) => p.pageId === pageId);
// Every autosnapshot is an idle-kind row.
expect(snaps.every((s) => s.kind === 'idle')).toBe(true);
// Periodic: at least one per cap over a multi-cap burst (lower-bounded loosely
// to stay robust; the property is "fires at least every cap", not a single
// trailing snapshot).
expect(snaps.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(3);
// But NOT one-per-store: ~`stores` stores were issued; the debounce must
// collapse them to a small multiple of the cap count, nowhere near per-store.
expect(snaps.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(Math.ceil(stores / 2));
});
it('intermittent burst (a few stores, then quiet) → exactly ONE trailing snapshot', async () => {
const pageId = randomUUID();
// A short burst well within a single cap window, then silence.
await arm(pageId);
await sleep(40);
await arm(pageId);
await sleep(40);
await arm(pageId);
// Wait comfortably past the cap so the single pending trailing job fires.
await sleep(4 * MAX_WAIT_MS);
const snaps = processed.filter((p) => p.pageId === pageId);
expect(snaps).toHaveLength(1);
expect(snaps[0].kind).toBe('idle');
});
});
+1 -1
View File
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ bucketByDay(sessions, tz):
факты ниже — ground truth, можно дозапросить файлы через gitea MCP по указанному SHA):
- `page_history.kind``varchar(20)`, NULLABLE, БЕЗ дефолта (migration
`20260705T120000-page-history-kind.ts`). Домен: `manual`/`agent`/`idle`/`boundary`;
`20260707T120000-page-history-kind.ts`). Домен: `manual`/`agent`/`idle`/`boundary`;
legacy `null` = автосейв (`collaboration/constants.ts`, `PageHistoryKind`).
- `kind` УЖЕ включён в `PageHistoryRepo.baseFields` (`page-history.repo.ts`) — читается всеми
выборками истории. `saveHistory({kind})` и `updateHistoryKind(id, kind)` существуют.
+36 -9
View File
@@ -178,10 +178,11 @@ function sliceModel(xml: string): string | null {
// --- decode chain ----------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Read the `content=` attribute out of a `.drawio.svg` string. Docmost stores a
* base64 payload there (createDrawioSvg); draw.io's own SVG export may store the
* XML entity-encoded instead. The DOM decodes entities for us, so the caller
* only has to distinguish "starts with '<'" (raw XML) from base64.
* Read the `content=` attribute out of a `.drawio.svg` string. Docmost writes
* the mxfile XML entity-encoded there (buildDrawioSvg / createDrawioSvg), which
* is also how draw.io's own SVG export stores it; older attachments stored a
* base64 payload instead. The DOM decodes entities for us, so the caller only
* has to distinguish "starts with '<'" (raw XML) from base64.
*/
export function extractContentAttr(svg: string): string {
const { doc, error } = parseXml(svg);
@@ -195,12 +196,23 @@ export function extractContentAttr(svg: string): string {
// value itself never contains a double-quote (base64 / entity-encoded XML).
const m = /content="([^"]*)"/.exec(svg);
if (m) {
// Decode the handful of XML entities a raw regex would leave encoded.
// Decode the handful of XML entities a raw regex would leave encoded. The
// numeric char-refs for tab/newline/CR MUST be decoded here too: the DOM
// path above turns them back into the literal control chars, so this
// regex fallback has to agree or the two decode paths diverge (#507).
// `&amp;` is decoded last so an escaped `&amp;#x9;` reads back as the
// literal text `&#x9;`, not a tab.
return m[1]
.replace(/&lt;/g, "<")
.replace(/&gt;/g, ">")
.replace(/&quot;/g, '"')
.replace(/&#39;/g, "'")
.replace(/&#x9;/gi, "\t")
.replace(/&#9;/g, "\t")
.replace(/&#xa;/gi, "\n")
.replace(/&#10;/g, "\n")
.replace(/&#xd;/gi, "\r")
.replace(/&#13;/g, "\r")
.replace(/&amp;/g, "&");
}
throw new Error("drawio: SVG has no content= attribute to decode");
@@ -307,9 +319,16 @@ export function encodeDrawioFile(modelXml: string, title = "Page-1"): string {
/**
* Build the `diagram.drawio.svg` attachment. Mirrors the import service's
* createDrawioSvg contract exactly:
* <svg xmlns= xmlns:xlink= content="${base64(drawioFile)}">${inner}</svg>
* <svg xmlns= xmlns:xlink= content="${xmlEscape(drawioFile)}">${inner}</svg>
* plus width/height/viewBox from the diagram bounding box and the schematic
* preview as the visible children (`inner`).
*
* The `content=` value is the mxfile XML XML-entity-escaped (draw.io's own
* native form), NOT base64. draw.io's editor decodes a base64 content= via
* Latin-1 atob (no UTF-8 step), turning every non-ASCII char (e.g. Cyrillic,
* ё, ) into mojibake; the entity-encoded form is decoded by the DOM as UTF-8
* and opens intact. Our decoder (decodeDrawioSvg) reads both forms, so old
* base64 attachments still round-trip.
*/
export function buildDrawioSvg(
modelXml: string,
@@ -318,14 +337,14 @@ export function buildDrawioSvg(
title = "Page-1",
): string {
const file = encodeDrawioFile(modelXml, title);
const base64 = Buffer.from(file, "utf-8").toString("base64");
const content = xmlEscape(file);
const w = Math.max(1, Math.round(bbox.width));
const h = Math.max(1, Math.round(bbox.height));
return (
`<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" ` +
`xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" ` +
`width="${w}" height="${h}" viewBox="0 0 ${w} ${h}" ` +
`content="${base64}">${inner}</svg>`
`content="${content}">${inner}</svg>`
);
}
@@ -334,7 +353,15 @@ function xmlEscape(s: string): string {
.replace(/&/g, "&amp;")
.replace(/</g, "&lt;")
.replace(/>/g, "&gt;")
.replace(/"/g, "&quot;");
.replace(/"/g, "&quot;")
// A literal tab/newline/CR inside an attribute value is collapsed to a
// single space by XML attribute-value normalization on DOM read (both jsdom
// here and the real draw.io editor), silently flattening multi-line labels
// and tab-bearing values. Numeric char-refs survive that normalization, so
// emit them the way draw.io's own native export does (#507).
.replace(/\t/g, "&#x9;")
.replace(/\n/g, "&#xa;")
.replace(/\r/g, "&#xd;");
}
// --- normalization + hash --------------------------------------------------
+123 -2
View File
@@ -51,6 +51,14 @@ const hasRule = (issues, rule, cellId) =>
(i) => i.rule === rule && (cellId === undefined || i.cellId === cellId),
);
// Reverse the attribute-value XML escaping used in the `content=` payload.
const unescapeAttr = (s) =>
s
.replace(/&lt;/g, "<")
.replace(/&gt;/g, ">")
.replace(/&quot;/g, '"')
.replace(/&amp;/g, "&");
// --- style parsing ---------------------------------------------------------
test("parseStyle: base stylename + key=value pairs", () => {
@@ -335,16 +343,20 @@ test("encode/build: a title with < > \" & round-trips without corrupting the SVG
// The outer content="..." attribute must not be broken by the title: the raw
// title metacharacters never appear literally in the SVG markup (they are
// base64-encoded inside content=, and escaped inside the file XML).
// entity-escaped inside content=, doubly so where the file XML already escaped
// them inside name="...").
const contentMatch = /content="([^"]*)"/.exec(svg);
assert.ok(contentMatch, "SVG has a single well-formed content= attribute");
// The diagram model still decodes losslessly despite the exotic title.
assert.equal(decodeDrawioSvg(svg), model);
// content= is now entity-encoded XML (draw.io's native form), never base64.
assert.match(contentMatch[1], /^&lt;mxfile/);
// The file XML is well-formed: the title lives in name="..." as escaped
// entities, so unescaping recovers the original title byte-for-byte.
const fileXml = Buffer.from(contentMatch[1], "base64").toString("utf-8");
const fileXml = unescapeAttr(contentMatch[1]);
const nameMatch = /<diagram id="[^"]*" name="([^"]*)">/.exec(fileXml);
assert.ok(nameMatch, "the diagram name attribute is intact and quote-safe");
const decodedTitle = nameMatch[1]
@@ -358,3 +370,112 @@ test("encode/build: a title with < > \" & round-trips without corrupting the SVG
const file = encodeDrawioFile(model, title);
assert.match(file, /name="A &lt; B &gt; C &quot; D &amp; E">/);
});
// --- #507: content= is entity-encoded XML, never base64 --------------------
// A model whose cell values carry Cyrillic, ё and an em dash — exactly the
// characters draw.io's Latin-1 atob mangles when content= is base64.
const CYRILLIC_MODEL =
"<mxGraphModel><root>" +
'<mxCell id="0"/><mxCell id="1" parent="0"/>' +
'<mxCell id="2" value="Старт-бит — ёж" style="rounded=1;html=1;" vertex="1" parent="1">' +
'<mxGeometry x="100" y="100" width="120" height="60" as="geometry"/></mxCell>' +
"</root></mxGraphModel>";
test("#507: buildDrawioSvg writes content= as entity-encoded XML (not base64)", () => {
const model = normalizeXml(CYRILLIC_MODEL);
const svg = buildDrawioSvg(model, "<g/>", { width: 200, height: 120 }, "Диаграмма");
const contentMatch = /content="([^"]*)"/.exec(svg);
assert.ok(contentMatch, "SVG has a single well-formed content= attribute");
const content = contentMatch[1];
// The content= value is the entity-encoded mxfile XML — starts with `&lt;mxfile`.
assert.match(content, /^&lt;mxfile/, "content= is entity-encoded mxfile XML");
// It must NOT be a base64 blob: base64 has no XML entities and no literal `<`.
assert.ok(content.includes("&lt;"), "content= carries XML entities, not base64");
// Cyrillic / ё / — survive verbatim in the attribute (raw UTF-8, not atob-mangled).
assert.ok(content.includes("Старт-бит — ёж"), "non-ASCII value is raw UTF-8 in content=");
assert.ok(content.includes("Диаграмма"), "non-ASCII title is raw UTF-8 in content=");
// The mojibake that base64+atob would have produced must be absent.
assert.ok(!content.includes("Ð"), "no Latin-1 mojibake in content=");
});
test("#507: Cyrillic model round-trips byte-stable through buildDrawioSvg -> decodeDrawioSvg", () => {
const model = normalizeXml(CYRILLIC_MODEL);
const svg = buildDrawioSvg(model, "<g/>", { width: 200, height: 120 }, "Заголовок — ё");
assert.equal(decodeDrawioSvg(svg), model);
});
test("#507 back-compat: an OLD base64-form .drawio.svg still decodes losslessly", () => {
const model = normalizeXml(CYRILLIC_MODEL);
// Reproduce the pre-fix write path: encodeDrawioFile -> base64 in content=.
const file = encodeDrawioFile(model, "Старая диаграмма");
const base64 = Buffer.from(file, "utf-8").toString("base64");
const svg =
`<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" content="${base64}"><g/></svg>`;
// No XML entities, purely base64 alphabet — this is the legacy form.
assert.ok(!base64.includes("<") && !base64.includes("&"));
assert.equal(decodeDrawioSvg(svg), model);
});
test("#507 negative: non-ASCII in a cell value AND in the title round-trip clean", () => {
const model = normalizeXml(CYRILLIC_MODEL);
const title = "Тест — ёмкость № 5";
const svg = buildDrawioSvg(model, "<g/>", { width: 200, height: 120 }, title);
// Model recovered byte-for-byte.
assert.equal(decodeDrawioSvg(svg), model);
// Title lands in the <diagram name="..."> of the decoded file XML, intact.
const content = /content="([^"]*)"/.exec(svg)[1];
const fileXml = unescapeAttr(content);
const nameMatch = /<diagram id="[^"]*" name="([^"]*)">/.exec(fileXml);
assert.ok(nameMatch, "diagram name attribute present");
assert.equal(unescapeAttr(nameMatch[1]), title);
});
// --- #507 F1: literal tab/newline/CR in an attribute value survive the
// content= round-trip. The whole mxfile XML lives in one content="..." attr;
// XML attribute-value normalization collapses a LITERAL tab/newline/CR to a
// single space on DOM read, so the escape must emit numeric char-refs instead.
const CTRL_MODEL =
"<mxGraphModel><root>" +
'<mxCell id="0"/><mxCell id="1" parent="0"/>' +
'<mxCell id="2" value="col1\tcol2" style="html=1;\nshadow=0" vertex="1" parent="1">' +
'<mxGeometry x="10" y="10" width="120" height="60" as="geometry"/></mxCell>' +
'<mxCell id="3" value="Line1\nLine2\rLine3" vertex="1" parent="1">' +
'<mxGeometry x="10" y="100" width="120" height="60" as="geometry"/></mxCell>' +
"</root></mxGraphModel>";
test("#507 F1: literal tab/newline/CR in a value round-trip byte-stable (DOM decode)", () => {
const svg = buildDrawioSvg(CTRL_MODEL, "<g/>", { width: 200, height: 200 });
const content = /content="([^"]*)"/.exec(svg)[1];
// The tab/newline/CR must be emitted as numeric char-refs, never as literal
// control chars (which DOM attribute-value normalization would eat).
assert.ok(
!/[\t\n\r]/.test(content),
"no literal tab/newline/CR survive in the content= attribute",
);
assert.ok(
content.includes("&#x9;") &&
content.includes("&#xa;") &&
content.includes("&#xd;"),
"tab/newline/CR are emitted as numeric char-refs",
);
// Full DOM decode recovers the model byte-for-byte, control chars intact.
assert.equal(decodeDrawioSvg(svg), CTRL_MODEL);
});
test("#507 F1: regex fallback decodes tab/newline/CR char-refs (agrees with DOM path)", () => {
const svg = buildDrawioSvg(CTRL_MODEL, "<g/>", { width: 200, height: 200 });
const content = /content="([^"]*)"/.exec(svg)[1];
// A bare `&` makes the SVG wrapper malformed, forcing extractContentAttr onto
// its regex fallback branch. That branch must decode the tab/newline/CR
// char-refs exactly like the DOM path, or the two decoders diverge.
const malformedSvg = `<svg content="${content}">&</svg>`;
assert.equal(decodeDrawioSvg(malformedSvg), CTRL_MODEL);
// The well-formed (DOM) path yields the identical result.
assert.equal(decodeDrawioSvg(svg), CTRL_MODEL);
});