da15b55786
- Wording: every comment now says the stream timeouts are RAISED to a
generous-but-finite ~15-min silence timeout, not "disabled (0)" (the stale
comments contradicted the code, which uses AI_STREAM_TIMEOUT_MS, default
900000ms).
- Architecture (the load-bearing-temporary trap): the streaming fetch reached
the chat provider only by riding the "temporary DIAGNOSTIC" telemetry, so
deleting the telemetry by its own label would silently revert the timeout fix.
Legitimize it: rename ai-http-diagnostics.ts -> ai-provider-http.ts,
createDiagnosticFetch -> createInstrumentedFetch, field aiDiagnosticFetch ->
aiProviderFetch, drop the "temporary" labels, and document the chat transport
(streaming fetch + instrumentation) as one intentional construct.
- Docs: AI_STREAM_TIMEOUT_MS added to .env.example next to AI_EMBEDDING_TIMEOUT_MS.
- Tests:
- ai-provider-http.spec: createInstrumentedFetch delegates to the injected
baseFetch with the same input/init, returns the Response untouched, rethrows
the error, and defaults to global fetch — covering the baseFetch seam.
- ai-streaming-fetch.spec: the delayed-server test is now LOAD-BEARING — with
AI_STREAM_TIMEOUT_MS set below the 1.5s server delay the call actually rejects
(a lost dispatcher -> global 300s default would NOT), proving the configured
dispatcher is wired; plus the default-timeout happy path.
server tsc clean; ai-streaming-fetch / ai-provider-http / ai.service / mcp-servers
/ ai-error specs green (41).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
170 lines
7.3 KiB
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170 lines
7.3 KiB
Plaintext
# your domain, e.g https://example.com
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APP_URL=http://localhost:3000
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PORT=3000
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# --- Security / reverse proxy ---
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# The app derives the client IP (req.ip) from the `X-Forwarded-For` header via
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# Fastify `trustProxy`. That header is client-forgeable, so XFF is trusted only
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# from proxies on the configured trusted networks. Deploy this app behind a
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# trusted reverse proxy that SETS/OVERWRITES (not appends) `X-Forwarded-For`
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# with the real client IP. If XFF is trusted from an untrusted source, any
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# per-IP throttling — including the /mcp Basic brute-force limiter — can be
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# bypassed by an attacker who simply spoofs `X-Forwarded-For` to rotate IPs.
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# (The /mcp limiter keeps a global per-email key as an IP-independent backstop,
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# but the per-IP and per-IP+email keys rely on a trustworthy X-Forwarded-For.)
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#
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# TRUST_PROXY controls which proxies are trusted to set X-Forwarded-For.
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# Default (unset/empty): `loopback, linklocal, uniquelocal` — XFF is trusted
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# ONLY from private/loopback proxies, so a public-IP client cannot spoof req.ip.
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# This is the safe default for the common case where the reverse proxy runs on
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# loopback or a private network; req.ip still resolves to the real client.
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# WARNING: this changed the previous default of trust-all. If your reverse proxy
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# sits on a PUBLIC IP, the default will NOT trust its XFF and req.ip will be the
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# proxy's IP — set TRUST_PROXY accordingly. Accepted values:
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# - true restore trust-all (ONLY safe if a trusted proxy ALWAYS overwrites
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# X-Forwarded-For; otherwise clients can spoof their IP)
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# - false never trust X-Forwarded-For (req.ip is the socket peer)
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# - <int> number of trusted proxy hops in front of the app
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# - <list> comma-separated CIDR/IP list of trusted proxies, e.g.
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# `127.0.0.1, 10.0.0.0/8`
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# TRUST_PROXY=
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# APP_SECRET has a DUAL role: it signs JWTs AND derives the AES-256-GCM key that
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# encrypts stored AI-provider credentials (API keys) at rest. CONSEQUENCE: if you
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# change APP_SECRET after setup, every stored AI API key becomes undecryptable —
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# you must re-enter them in AI settings — and all existing sessions/JWTs are
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# invalidated. Choose it ONCE, keep it stable, and back it up alongside your DB.
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# minimum of 32 characters. Generate one with: openssl rand -hex 32
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APP_SECRET=REPLACE_WITH_LONG_SECRET
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JWT_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN=30d
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DATABASE_URL="postgresql://postgres:password@localhost:5432/docmost?schema=public"
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REDIS_URL=redis://127.0.0.1:6379
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# options: local | s3 | azure
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STORAGE_DRIVER=local
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# S3 driver config
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AWS_S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID=
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AWS_S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=
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AWS_S3_REGION=
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AWS_S3_BUCKET=
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AWS_S3_ENDPOINT=
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AWS_S3_FORCE_PATH_STYLE=
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# Azure Blob Storage driver config
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AZURE_STORAGE_ACCOUNT_NAME=
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AZURE_STORAGE_ACCOUNT_KEY=
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AZURE_STORAGE_CONTAINER=
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# default: 50mb
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FILE_UPLOAD_SIZE_LIMIT=
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# options: smtp | postmark
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MAIL_DRIVER=smtp
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MAIL_FROM_ADDRESS=hello@example.com
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MAIL_FROM_NAME=Docmost
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# SMTP driver config
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SMTP_HOST=127.0.0.1
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SMTP_PORT=587
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SMTP_USERNAME=
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SMTP_PASSWORD=
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SMTP_SECURE=false
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SMTP_IGNORETLS=false
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# Postmark driver config
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POSTMARK_TOKEN=
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# for custom drawio server
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DRAWIO_URL=
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# Gotenberg URL for server-side PDF export
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GOTENBERG_URL=
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DISABLE_TELEMETRY=false
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# Allow other sites to embed Docmost in an iframe.
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IFRAME_EMBED_ALLOWED=false
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# Only used when IFRAME_EMBED_ALLOWED=true. When empty, any origin is allowed.
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# Example: https://intranet.example.com,https://portal.example.com
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IFRAME_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=
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# Enable debug logging in production (default: false)
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DEBUG_MODE=false
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# Log database queries
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DEBUG_DB=false
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# Log http requests
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LOG_HTTP=false
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# MCP server (community): the embedded /mcp endpoint authenticates PER USER.
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# An MCP client authenticates with one of:
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# - HTTP Basic: `Authorization: Basic base64(email:password)` — the user's own
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# Docmost login/password. The server validates the credentials and the MCP
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# session then acts under that user's permissions (edits attributed to them).
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# - Bearer access JWT: `Authorization: Bearer <access-jwt>` (the user's
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# `authToken` cookie value). Validated as an ACCESS token.
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#
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# OPTIONAL service-account fallback. When a request carries NEITHER Basic NOR
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# Bearer credentials and these are set, the MCP session falls back to this
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# shared service account (back-compat; useful for CI/scripts). Leave BLANK to
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# require per-user credentials.
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MCP_DOCMOST_EMAIL=
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MCP_DOCMOST_PASSWORD=
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# MCP_DOCMOST_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:3000/api
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# Optional shared guard for the /mcp endpoint. When set, every /mcp request must
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# carry a matching `X-MCP-Token` header (separate from `Authorization`, which now
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# carries the per-user credentials). When unset, /mcp relies on the per-user
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# credentials above plus the workspace MCP toggle and network isolation (do not
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# expose the port publicly).
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# MCP_TOKEN=
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# MCP_SESSION_IDLE_MS=1800000
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#
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# AI-AGENT ATTRIBUTION (comments/pages written via MCP are badged as "AI"):
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# attribution is driven by a per-user `is_agent` flag on the users row. There is
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# NO admin UI/API for it — set it out-of-band with SQL. Use a DEDICATED service
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# account for the MCP fallback above and flag ONLY that account, e.g.:
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# UPDATE users SET is_agent = true WHERE email = 'mcp-bot@your-domain';
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# NEVER set is_agent on a human or shared account — every action by that account
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# (including normal human edits) would then be mis-attributed as AI.
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# Per-embedding-call timeout in milliseconds for the RAG indexer.
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# A slow/hung embeddings endpoint fails after this and the batch continues.
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# AI_EMBEDDING_TIMEOUT_MS=120000
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# Silence timeout (ms) for streaming chat/agent AI calls AND external-MCP traffic.
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# Bounds time-to-first-byte and the gap BETWEEN chunks (NOT the total turn length),
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# so an arbitrarily long turn that keeps streaming is never cut. Finite so a hung
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# provider is eventually broken instead of leaking forever. Default 900000 (15 min).
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# AI_STREAM_TIMEOUT_MS=900000
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# --- Anonymous public-share AI assistant ---
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# Opt-in per workspace (AI settings -> "public share assistant"; off by default).
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# When enabled, anonymous visitors of a published share can ask an AI about that
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# share at POST /api/shares/ai/stream. The assistant is read-only and hard-scoped
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# to the single share tree, but every call spends real tokens on the workspace
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# owner's configured AI provider.
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#
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# DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENT: the per-IP rate limit on this endpoint is only
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# effective behind a trusted reverse proxy that OVERWRITES (not appends)
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# X-Forwarded-For with the real client IP. The app runs with trustProxy, so
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# without such a proxy an attacker can rotate X-Forwarded-For to evade the
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# per-IP limit. Put this endpoint (and the app) behind a proxy you control that
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# sets X-Forwarded-For to the real client IP.
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#
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# Backstop: a cluster-wide, sliding-window cap per workspace (IP-independent,
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# keyed by the server-resolved workspace id) bounds the owner's bill even if the
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# per-IP limit is fully evaded. It is a COST backstop, not an access control, and
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# FAILS CLOSED if Redis is unavailable (an optional assistant briefly going
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# offline is safer than an unbounded bill). Override the hourly cap below
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# (default: 100 calls per workspace per rolling hour).
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# SHARE_AI_WORKSPACE_MAX_PER_HOUR=100
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#
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# Per-request output-token ceiling for the anonymous assistant (default: 512).
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# Worst-case output per accepted call = agent steps (5) × this value.
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# SHARE_AI_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS=512
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