Hardening follow-ups from PR #526 review (no defect fixes):
- DO1: add auth.controller.spec tests for the collab-token handler, the
arm-seam of the anti-laundering defense. Assert getCollabToken is invoked
with { apiKeyId } only when the SIGNED req.raw marks an api_key principal,
and undefined otherwise (session, missing apiKeyId, or a spoofed body).
Verified non-vacuous: nulling the ternary reddens the ARMED test.
- DO2: document the API_KEYS_ENABLED kill-switch in .env.example next to the
other feature flags (default ON; strict true/false; OFF denies api-key auth
and 404s the management endpoints).
- DO3: remove dead bindAccessJwtVerifier (+ its now-orphaned AccessJwtVerifier
interface and its dedicated spec block); prod switched to
bindMcpBearerVerifier. verifyBearerAccess is retained (still used).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
agent_coder
d42ca8dc57