Files
gitmost/packages/mcp/build/http.js
claude code agent 227 4a00dfc3b2 feat(mcp): per-user auth for the embedded /mcp endpoint
The embedded MCP server acted as a single service account; now each /mcp
session authenticates as the current user, so tools run under that user's
CASL and edits attribute to them.

- HTTP Basic (chosen path): Authorization: Basic email:password, validated
  server-side via AuthService; the session carries the issued user JWT (not
  the raw password). Password may contain ':' (split on first only).
- Bearer fallback: Authorization: Bearer <access JWT>, verified as ACCESS and
  additionally checked for an active session + non-disabled user (matching
  JwtStrategy), so revoked/disabled users are rejected.
- Service account stays as an optional fallback (no creds + env configured).
- packages/mcp createMcpHttpHandler accepts a per-request config resolver
  (back-compat: static config / stdio unchanged); identity is bound to the
  mcp-session-id at init and re-validated from the caller's own credentials on
  every request (anti session-fixation: a guessed session id can't be reused
  without matching creds).
- A full login (session + audit) happens only once at session init; later
  requests re-verify credentials via a new non-side-effecting
  AuthService.verifyUserCredentials (no session/audit spam).
- Failed-login limiter (5/60s, keyed per-IP, per-IP+email, and per-email so IP
  rotation can't brute one account) since direct login bypasses the controller
  throttler. Only real credential failures count.
- MCP_TOKEN shared guard moved off Authorization to an X-MCP-Token header
  (timing-safe compare); credsConfigured 503 gate replaced by a clear 401.
- No secrets logged; all auth resolved before res.hijack() so failures return
  clean 401 JSON. .env.example marks the service account optional.

Implements docs/backlog/mcp-per-user-auth.md (variant L).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-20 07:19:31 +03:00

134 lines
6.3 KiB
JavaScript

import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
import { StreamableHTTPServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/streamableHttp.js";
import { isInitializeRequest } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js";
import { createDocmostMcpServer } from "./index.js";
/**
* Build a stateful Streamable-HTTP handler for the Docmost MCP server. The
* embedding host (the gitmost NestJS server) bridges its raw Node req/res into
* `handleRequest`. One McpServer + transport is created per MCP session and
* kept alive between requests, keyed by the `mcp-session-id` header.
*
* `config` is EITHER a static `DocmostMcpConfig` (back-compat: stdio + the env
* service account, unchanged) OR a `McpConfigResolver` run once per session at
* `initialize` to bind that session to the request's identity.
*/
export function createMcpHttpHandler(config, options = {}) {
// One transport (and one McpServer) per MCP session, keyed by session id.
const transports = {};
// Last activity timestamp per session id, used for idle eviction.
const lastSeen = {};
// Anti-session-fixation: the opaque identity key bound to each session at
// initialize. A later request for that session whose key differs is rejected.
const sessionIdentity = {};
// Write a JSON-RPC error and end the response. Used for the 400/401 paths so
// every early rejection is a well-formed JSON-RPC error, not a torn response.
const sendJsonRpcError = (res, statusCode, code, message) => {
res.statusCode = statusCode;
res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/json");
res.end(JSON.stringify({
jsonrpc: "2.0",
error: { code, message },
id: null,
}));
};
// Idle session TTL (ms): a session with no activity for this long is evicted.
// Defaults to 30 min; overridable via MCP_SESSION_IDLE_MS.
const idleTtlMs = (() => {
const parsed = parseInt(process.env.MCP_SESSION_IDLE_MS ?? "", 10);
return Number.isFinite(parsed) && parsed > 0 ? parsed : 30 * 60 * 1000;
})();
// Periodically close transports idle longer than the TTL. transport.close()
// triggers its onclose, which removes it from `transports`; we also drop the
// lastSeen entry. unref() so this timer never keeps the process alive.
const sweepIntervalMs = 5 * 60 * 1000;
const sweepTimer = setInterval(() => {
const now = Date.now();
for (const sid of Object.keys(transports)) {
if (now - (lastSeen[sid] ?? 0) > idleTtlMs) {
void transports[sid].close();
delete lastSeen[sid];
delete sessionIdentity[sid];
}
}
}, sweepIntervalMs);
sweepTimer.unref();
async function handleRequest(req, res, parsedBody) {
const sessionId = req.headers["mcp-session-id"];
const method = (req.method || "GET").toUpperCase();
let transport = sessionId ? transports[sessionId] : undefined;
if (method === "POST" && !transport) {
// A new session may only be created by an initialize request without a
// session id.
if (sessionId || !isInitializeRequest(parsedBody)) {
sendJsonRpcError(res, 400, -32000, "Bad Request: no valid session ID provided");
return;
}
// Resolve the per-session config from the request (per-user identity) when
// a resolver was supplied; otherwise use the static config unchanged. The
// resolver may throw (e.g. bad credentials) — surface a clean 401, never
// a created session.
let sessionConfig;
let identity;
try {
sessionConfig =
typeof config === "function" ? await config(req) : config;
if (options.identify)
identity = await options.identify(req);
}
catch (err) {
sendJsonRpcError(res, 401, -32001, err instanceof Error ? err.message : "Unauthorized");
return;
}
transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({
sessionIdGenerator: () => randomUUID(),
onsessioninitialized: (sid) => {
transports[sid] = transport;
lastSeen[sid] = Date.now();
// Bind the resolved identity to the new session id for anti-fixation.
if (identity !== undefined)
sessionIdentity[sid] = identity;
},
});
transport.onclose = () => {
const sid = transport.sessionId;
if (sid && transports[sid])
delete transports[sid];
if (sid)
delete sessionIdentity[sid];
};
const server = createDocmostMcpServer(sessionConfig);
await server.connect(transport);
await transport.handleRequest(req, res, parsedBody);
return;
}
if (!transport) {
sendJsonRpcError(res, 400, -32000, "Bad Request: no valid session ID provided");
return;
}
// Anti-session-fixation: a request reusing an existing session id must
// present credentials/token that resolve to the SAME identity bound at
// initialize, otherwise reject with 401. This prevents hijacking another
// user's established session by replaying its session id with different
// credentials.
if (options.identify && sessionId && sessionId in sessionIdentity) {
let presented;
try {
presented = await options.identify(req);
}
catch (err) {
sendJsonRpcError(res, 401, -32001, err instanceof Error ? err.message : "Unauthorized");
return;
}
if (presented !== sessionIdentity[sessionId]) {
sendJsonRpcError(res, 401, -32001, "Credentials do not match the user that owns this MCP session.");
return;
}
}
// Routing to an existing transport: refresh its idle timestamp.
if (sessionId)
lastSeen[sessionId] = Date.now();
await transport.handleRequest(req, res, parsedBody);
}
return { handleRequest };
}