WIP checkpoint of the gitmost AI-chat backend (plan stages A + B1 + B3a). The agent acts under the requesting user's JWT (Docmost CASL enforces page access); the external service-account /mcp endpoint is untouched. LLM provider config (A2-A4): - integrations/crypto: AES-256-GCM SecretBoxService (key derived from APP_SECRET, per-record salt/iv; clear error on rotation instead of crashing). - ai_provider_credentials table/repo/types: encrypted API key stored outside workspace settings/baseFields, write-only (never returned by any endpoint). - integrations/ai: per-workspace AI SDK v6 provider driver (openai/gemini/ollama), admin-gated GET(masked)/PATCH(write-only key)/Test endpoints; settings.ai.provider holds non-secret config incl. systemPrompt. Removed unused AI_* env getters (DB is the single source of truth). Chat module (A1, A5-A8): - ai_chats/ai_chat_messages repos (workspace-scoped, soft-delete, tsv never selected). - core/ai-chat: CRUD + POST /ai-chat/stream (Fastify hijack + AI SDK v6 pipeUIMessageStreamToResponse, abort on disconnect, persist user/assistant msgs). - Agent loop: streamText + stepCountIs(8); read tools searchPages/getPage via a per-request DocmostClient over loopback REST under the user's minted access token. - Gate settings.ai.chat (+ 503 when provider unconfigured); buildSystemPrompt with a non-removable safety/anti-prompt-injection framework. Per-user rate limit. Per-user auth (B1): - @docmost/mcp DocmostClient gains an additive getToken variant (carry a user JWT, re-fetch on 401) and exports DocmostClient; the email/password service-account path (external /mcp, stdio) is unchanged. Agent-edit provenance backbone (B3a): - Migration: pages/page_history (last_updated_source, last_updated_ai_chat_id) and comments (created_source, ai_chat_id, resolved_source). - Signed actor/aiChatId claim in the collab token; onAuthenticate propagates it, onStoreDocument writes it with a sticky agent marker, saveHistory copies it. Migrations auto-run on boot (additive). Write tools, frontend, RAG and external MCP servers are not in this checkpoint. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
21 lines
747 B
TypeScript
21 lines
747 B
TypeScript
import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
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import { CryptoModule } from '../crypto/crypto.module';
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import { AiService } from './ai.service';
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import { AiSettingsService } from './ai-settings.service';
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import { AiSettingsController } from './ai-settings.controller';
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/**
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* LLM driver + provider-settings unit (§6.2/§6.4).
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*
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* CryptoModule supplies SecretBoxService for API-key encryption. WorkspaceRepo,
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* AiProviderCredentialsRepo (DatabaseModule, global) and WorkspaceAbilityFactory
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* (CaslModule, global) are resolved without explicit imports.
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*/
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@Module({
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imports: [CryptoModule],
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controllers: [AiSettingsController],
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providers: [AiService, AiSettingsService],
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exports: [AiService, AiSettingsService],
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})
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export class AiModule {}
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