Files
gitmost/apps/client/src/features/ai-chat/utils/markdown.test.ts
claude_code f63719a21c fix(share): neutralize own-origin absolute links in public-share AI chat
isExternalHttpUrl treated any http(s):// URL as external, so an absolute link
back to the app's own host (e.g. https://self/p/{uuid}, /settings/members)
emitted by the assistant stayed clickable on the anonymous share, leaking
internal UUIDs/structure and pointing at auth-gated routes. Classify a link as
external only when its host differs from window.location.host; unparseable URLs
are treated as internal (fail-closed). Tests cover own-origin absolute (flag
on -> inert), external host (kept with safe rel/target), dangerous schemes, and
no behavior change for the internal chat (flag off).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-21 01:20:11 +03:00

118 lines
4.9 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { renderChatMarkdown } from "@/features/ai-chat/utils/markdown.ts";
/**
* Tests for the internal-link neutralization used by the anonymous public
* share. Now that the share renders the assistant's MARKDOWN (not plain text),
* internal app links (e.g. `[page](/p/{uuid})`) would otherwise become clickable
* `<a href="/p/...">`, leaking internal UUIDs/structure and linking to auth-gated
* routes. With the flag ON those links are made inert (href removed) while the
* visible text and the rest of the markdown formatting are preserved; genuinely
* EXTERNAL http(s) links (a DIFFERENT host than the app's own origin) are kept
* with a safe rel/target, while absolute links back to our OWN origin are
* neutralized too. With the flag OFF (internal default) links keep their href so
* the authenticated chat is unchanged.
*/
/** Parse the rendered HTML and return the first <a> element (or null). */
function firstAnchor(html: string): HTMLAnchorElement | null {
const doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(html, "text/html");
return doc.querySelector("a");
}
describe("renderChatMarkdown — internal link neutralization", () => {
it("makes an internal link inert when the flag is ON (no href, text kept)", () => {
const html = renderChatMarkdown("[x](/p/abc)", {
neutralizeInternalLinks: true,
});
const a = firstAnchor(html);
expect(a).not.toBeNull();
expect(a!.hasAttribute("href")).toBe(false);
expect(a!.hasAttribute("target")).toBe(false);
// Visible link text is preserved.
expect(a!.textContent).toBe("x");
});
it("neutralizes bare-fragment links when the flag is ON", () => {
const html = renderChatMarkdown("[here](#section)", {
neutralizeInternalLinks: true,
});
const a = firstAnchor(html);
expect(a).not.toBeNull();
expect(a!.hasAttribute("href")).toBe(false);
});
it("keeps an external http(s) link with a safe rel/target when the flag is ON", () => {
const html = renderChatMarkdown("[y](https://example.com/x)", {
neutralizeInternalLinks: true,
});
const a = firstAnchor(html);
expect(a).not.toBeNull();
expect(a!.getAttribute("href")).toBe("https://example.com/x");
expect(a!.getAttribute("rel")).toBe("noopener noreferrer nofollow");
expect(a!.getAttribute("target")).toBe("_blank");
});
it("neutralizes an absolute link to our OWN origin when the flag is ON", () => {
// An LLM can emit an absolute URL back at our own host (e.g.
// `http://self/p/{uuid}`); it is internal and must be made inert just like a
// relative `/p/...` link, not kept clickable as if it were external.
const ownOrigin = `${window.location.origin}/p/abc`;
const html = renderChatMarkdown(`[x](${ownOrigin})`, {
neutralizeInternalLinks: true,
});
const a = firstAnchor(html);
expect(a).not.toBeNull();
expect(a!.hasAttribute("href")).toBe(false);
expect(a!.hasAttribute("target")).toBe(false);
expect(a!.textContent).toBe("x");
});
it("neutralizes dangerous/unsafe schemes when the flag is ON", () => {
// javascript:, data:, and protocol-relative `//...` must never stay
// clickable on the anonymous share — they are not genuinely external
// http(s) links to a different host, so the href is dropped (or sanitized
// away entirely by DOMPurify).
for (const markdown of [
"[a](javascript:alert(1))",
"[b](data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>)",
"[c](//evil.com/x)",
]) {
const html = renderChatMarkdown(markdown, {
neutralizeInternalLinks: true,
});
const a = firstAnchor(html);
// Either the anchor was stripped of its href, or DOMPurify removed the
// unsafe href outright; in both cases nothing dangerous remains.
if (a !== null) {
expect(a.hasAttribute("href")).toBe(false);
expect(a.hasAttribute("target")).toBe(false);
}
}
});
it("keeps internal links clickable when the flag is OFF (internal default)", () => {
const html = renderChatMarkdown("[x](/p/abc)");
const a = firstAnchor(html);
expect(a).not.toBeNull();
expect(a!.getAttribute("href")).toBe("/p/abc");
});
it("keeps an absolute own-origin link clickable when the flag is OFF (internal default)", () => {
const ownOrigin = `${window.location.origin}/p/abc`;
const html = renderChatMarkdown(`[x](${ownOrigin})`);
const a = firstAnchor(html);
expect(a).not.toBeNull();
expect(a!.getAttribute("href")).toBe(ownOrigin);
});
it("does not leave a global DOMPurify hook that affects a later internal render", () => {
// A neutralizing render first, then an internal render: the internal link
// must survive (the hook is removed after the share render).
renderChatMarkdown("[x](/p/abc)", { neutralizeInternalLinks: true });
const html = renderChatMarkdown("[x](/p/abc)");
const a = firstAnchor(html);
expect(a!.getAttribute("href")).toBe("/p/abc");
});
});