Files
gitmost/apps/server/src/core/api-key/api-key.controller.ts
T
agent_coder d3a049d176 feat(api-key): core-модуль выдачи и валидации api-ключей + kill-switch
Форк не несёт EE-модуль ee/api-key, поэтому api_key-токен сегодня отвергается на
любом /api/*. Вводим core-модуль:

- ApiKeyRepo (kysely): insert/findById/findByCreator/findAllInWorkspace/
  softDelete/touchLastUsed, фильтр deleted_at IS NULL.
- ApiKeyService.create — mint-then-insert: сперва uuid7 id, затем чеканка JWT
  без exp, затем строка (сбой чеканки → строки нет; потерянный ответ →
  осиротевшая строка видна в list и самолечится). Токен отдаётся один раз, в
  таблице не хранится.
- ApiKeyService.validate — единый валидатор для jwt.strategy И /mcp. Владелец
  истины о сроке/отзыве — строка api_keys, не JWT. Любой определённый негатив
  (нет строки / expired / disabled / workspace mismatch / kill-switch off) →
  единый bare-401 (анти-enumeration); инфра-ошибка пробрасывается (→5xx), не
  маскируется. Без кэша — немедленная ревокация. last_used_at троттлится 1ч,
  fire-and-forget.
- REST create/list/revoke: create — self + UserThrottlerGuard; list/revoke —
  admin (CASL Manage на API) видит/отзывает все ключи воркспейса, член — только
  свои. api_key-принципал отвергается на всех трёх (токен не управляет
  токенами — GitHub-PAT-семантика). Аудит API_KEY_CREATED/DELETED + структурный
  лог с apiKeyId и IP.
- jwt.strategy: прямой вызов ApiKeyService.validate вместо динамического
  EE-require; штампует req.raw.authType='api_key' и apiKeyId для гварда выше.
- Kill-switch API_KEYS_ENABLED: дефолт ON (деплой без переменной не убивает
  агентов), строгий парс @IsIn(['true','false']) (=0/=off падают на boot, а не
  молча значат «включено»), boot-лог состояния. off → validate deny и
  эндпоинты 404.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 00:57:15 +03:00

202 lines
6.4 KiB
TypeScript

import {
Body,
Controller,
ForbiddenException,
HttpCode,
HttpStatus,
Inject,
Logger,
NotFoundException,
Post,
Req,
UseGuards,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { Throttle } from '@nestjs/throttler';
import { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
import { ApiKeyService } from './api-key.service';
import { ApiKeyRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/api-key/api-key.repo';
import { CreateApiKeyDto } from './dto/create-api-key.dto';
import { RevokeApiKeyDto } from './dto/revoke-api-key.dto';
import { AuthUser } from '../../common/decorators/auth-user.decorator';
import { AuthWorkspace } from '../../common/decorators/auth-workspace.decorator';
import { JwtAuthGuard } from '../../common/guards/jwt-auth.guard';
import { User, Workspace } from '@docmost/db/types/entity.types';
import WorkspaceAbilityFactory from '../casl/abilities/workspace-ability.factory';
import {
WorkspaceCaslAction,
WorkspaceCaslSubject,
} from '../casl/interfaces/workspace-ability.type';
import { AuditEvent, AuditResource } from '../../common/events/audit-events';
import {
AUDIT_SERVICE,
IAuditService,
} from '../../integrations/audit/audit.service';
import { EnvironmentService } from '../../integrations/environment/environment.service';
import { UserThrottlerGuard } from '../../integrations/throttle/user-throttler.guard';
import { AUTH_THROTTLER } from '../../integrations/throttle/throttler-names';
@UseGuards(JwtAuthGuard)
@Controller('api-keys')
export class ApiKeyController {
private readonly logger = new Logger(ApiKeyController.name);
constructor(
private readonly apiKeyService: ApiKeyService,
private readonly apiKeyRepo: ApiKeyRepo,
private readonly workspaceAbility: WorkspaceAbilityFactory,
private readonly environmentService: EnvironmentService,
@Inject(AUDIT_SERVICE) private readonly auditService: IAuditService,
) {}
// Kill-switch OFF: the issuance surface disappears entirely (404), not a 403 —
// it must look like the feature does not exist.
private assertEnabled(): void {
if (!this.environmentService.isApiKeysEnabled()) {
throw new NotFoundException();
}
}
// A token cannot manage tokens (GitHub-PAT semantics): an api-key principal is
// refused on the management surface, so a leaked key cannot mint a replacement
// or revoke the keys that would lock it out (closes post-revocation laundering).
private rejectApiKeyPrincipal(req: FastifyRequest): void {
if ((req.raw as { authType?: string }).authType === 'api_key') {
throw new ForbiddenException('API keys cannot manage API keys');
}
}
private clientIp(req: FastifyRequest): string {
return req.ip ?? req.socket?.remoteAddress ?? 'unknown';
}
@HttpCode(HttpStatus.OK)
@UseGuards(JwtAuthGuard, UserThrottlerGuard)
@Throttle({ [AUTH_THROTTLER]: { limit: 10, ttl: 60_000 } })
@Post('create')
async create(
@Body() dto: CreateApiKeyDto,
@AuthUser() user: User,
@Req() req: FastifyRequest,
) {
this.assertEnabled();
this.rejectApiKeyPrincipal(req);
// undefined -> service default (1 year); null -> unlimited; string -> Date.
const expiresAt =
dto.expiresAt === undefined
? undefined
: dto.expiresAt === null
? null
: new Date(dto.expiresAt);
const { token, key } = await this.apiKeyService.create(
user,
dto.name,
expiresAt,
);
this.auditService.log({
event: AuditEvent.API_KEY_CREATED,
resourceType: AuditResource.API_KEY,
resourceId: key.id,
});
// The durable trail lives in container logs (AUDIT_SERVICE is a Noop in this
// build). No token material — the JWT is only ever returned in the response.
this.logger.log(
`API key created: id=${key.id} name=${JSON.stringify(
key.name,
)} actor=${user.id} expiresAt=${
key.expiresAt ? new Date(key.expiresAt).toISOString() : 'never'
} ip=${this.clientIp(req)}`,
);
// Return the token ONCE (never retrievable again) and the computed expiry so
// the caller/UI can surface "expires <date>" (the year-default time-bomb
// early-warning).
return {
token,
apiKey: {
id: key.id,
name: key.name,
expiresAt: key.expiresAt,
createdAt: key.createdAt,
},
};
}
@HttpCode(HttpStatus.OK)
@Post('list')
async list(
@AuthUser() user: User,
@AuthWorkspace() workspace: Workspace,
@Req() req: FastifyRequest,
) {
this.assertEnabled();
this.rejectApiKeyPrincipal(req);
const ability = this.workspaceAbility.createForUser(user, workspace);
// Admin (CASL Manage on API): every key in the workspace, attributed to its
// creator (closes "a leaked key of a departed employee is invisible"). A
// member sees only their own.
const keys = ability.can(
WorkspaceCaslAction.Manage,
WorkspaceCaslSubject.API,
)
? await this.apiKeyRepo.findAllInWorkspace(workspace.id)
: await this.apiKeyRepo.findByCreator(user.id, workspace.id);
return keys.map((k) => ({
id: k.id,
name: k.name,
expiresAt: k.expiresAt,
lastUsedAt: k.lastUsedAt,
createdAt: k.createdAt,
creator: k.creator,
}));
}
@HttpCode(HttpStatus.OK)
@Post('revoke')
async revoke(
@Body() dto: RevokeApiKeyDto,
@AuthUser() user: User,
@AuthWorkspace() workspace: Workspace,
@Req() req: FastifyRequest,
) {
this.assertEnabled();
this.rejectApiKeyPrincipal(req);
const key = await this.apiKeyRepo.findById(dto.id, workspace.id);
// Uniform 404 for a missing/already-revoked key regardless of who asks — no
// existence oracle for keys the caller may not own.
if (!key) {
throw new NotFoundException();
}
const ability = this.workspaceAbility.createForUser(user, workspace);
const canManageAll = ability.can(
WorkspaceCaslAction.Manage,
WorkspaceCaslSubject.API,
);
// Admin may revoke any key in the workspace; a member only their own.
if (!canManageAll && key.creatorId !== user.id) {
throw new ForbiddenException();
}
await this.apiKeyService.revoke(key.id, workspace.id);
this.auditService.log({
event: AuditEvent.API_KEY_DELETED,
resourceType: AuditResource.API_KEY,
resourceId: key.id,
});
this.logger.log(
`API key revoked: id=${key.id} name=${JSON.stringify(
key.name,
)} actor=${user.id} ip=${this.clientIp(req)}`,
);
return { success: true };
}
}