Both are direct consequences of the round-1 F1 fix (uncaching
hasRestrictedPagesInWorkspace):
- F5: that EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM page_access WHERE workspace_id=?) now runs
per-request on every whole-workspace list endpoint (global search + suggest,
favorites, notifications, recent, created-by), and page_access only had a
space_id index → a seq scan in the common zero-restriction case. Added
idx_page_access_workspace_id to the perf migration (up + down) so it's an
index-only existence probe.
- F6: the DomainMiddleware workspace cache invalidation was untested — the
int-spec passed `{}` for cacheManager, so bustWorkspaceCache's `del` threw into
its own try/catch and never ran. Added a Map-backed cache double with a working
del and two tests: updateSetting busts WORKSPACE_SELF_HOSTED; updateSharingSettings
busts WORKSPACE_SELF_HOSTED + WORKSPACE_BY_HOST(hostname). A missed/mismatched
bust key now fails the suite instead of letting a stale security-relevant
workspace row (enforceSso/status) outlive the mutation.
Gate: server tsc 0; workspace-repo-update-setting + page-permission-workspace-filter
int-specs pass on real Postgres (the new index applies via global-setup).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- F1 [medium — the substantive one]: hasRestrictedPagesInWorkspace is now UNCACHED
(a plain EXISTS per call, like its sibling hasRestrictedPagesInSpace). Caching it
(even 5s) reintroduced an access-control leak the space path never had: a
concurrent whole-workspace read in the insert->commit window of the FIRST
restricted page could re-populate `false` under withCache (read-then-set, no
del-during-read guard) and override the insert-time bust, leaking that page to
unauthorized users for up to the TTL. Uncaching removes both the DB/cache
asymmetry and the TOCTOU race; the space path already accepts this per-call cost.
Reverted the now-unnecessary insertPageAccess cache-bust and removed the dead
HAS_RESTRICTED_PAGES_IN_WORKSPACE cache key.
- F2 [test]: page-permission-workspace-filter.int-spec.ts (real PG) — the
short-circuit returns the full input set with zero restrictions AND filters out
the page the user can't reach when a restriction is present (proving the authz
behavior is unchanged), the 0->1 transition flips immediately, and the flag is
per-workspace scoped.
- F3 [doc]: documented the deploy-time write-lock in the migration header — the
non-CONCURRENT GIN trigram builds take a SHARE lock that blocks writes on
pages/users/… for minutes on a large tenant; run in a maintenance window or
build CONCURRENTLY out-of-band for big installs.
- F4 [doc]: corrected the jwt.strategy comment — the reused req.raw.workspace is
the middleware's selectAll superset (not "the exact row this query returns"),
harmless because AuthWorkspace already preferred that object.
Gate: server tsc 0; the new int-spec 3/3 on real Postgres.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
One migration + targeted hot-path fixes. API behavior 1:1 (schema change = added
indexes + a byte-identical f_unaccent function-body swap, see below).
- Trigram + composite indexes (20260705T120000-perf-indexes.ts): GIN trigram on
LOWER(f_unaccent(title/name)) for pages/users/groups (the /search/suggest
leading-wildcard LIKE did a seq scan per keystroke — EXPLAIN now confirms
Bitmap Index Scan on idx_pages_title_trgm), + page_history(page_id,id DESC),
comments(page_id,id). DEVIATION (verified byte-identical): PG18 cannot inline
the two-arg f_unaccent body during index creation, so up() swaps it to the
schema-qualified single-arg `SELECT public.unaccent($1)` — same dictionary,
identical output for all inputs, so the tsvector trigger + main @@ search stay
consistent with NO reindex; down() restores the exact two-arg body.
- Auth path: jwt.strategy reuses req.raw.workspace when workspaceId matches (the
middleware already validated it) instead of re-querying; domain.middleware
caches the workspace lookup (withCache 15s, invalidated in all 8 WorkspaceRepo
mutators, with a Date reviver for the JSON-serialized cache). USER + SESSION
caching DEFERRED — the invalidation surface (role change doesn't revoke
sessions; revocation includes background jobs) can't be safely covered, and a
missed hook on a security path is worse than the win.
- AI re-embed coalescing: aiQueue.add gets {jobId: embed-<id>, delay: 30s} so
active editing collapses to one job (worker reads current page state).
- filterAccessiblePageIds: hasRestrictedPagesInWorkspace short-circuit skips the
recursive-ancestor CTE when a workspace has zero restricted pages (wired from
search/favorites/notifications/recent/created-by). EXISTS on the same pageAccess
table the CTE anti-joins → no false-positive / no access leak. Busts the cache
on insertPageAccess so a 0->1 restricted transition takes effect immediately
(review F1).
- Small: syncTransclusion guarded by a family-node probe (both old+new content, so
the removal path is preserved); mention notifications enqueue only when the set
gained a member; redis maintainLock clears a prior interval (leak fix).
Skipped as risky (flagged): global ValidationPipe transform change; a pool-wide
statement_timeout (would kill long CREATE INDEX migrations on the same pool).
NOTE: kept the trash query's `content` select — the trash UI reads page.content
for its preview modal (review F3, would have regressed).
Gate: server tsc 0; jest page-permission/auth/search/persistence 15 suites pass;
migration up+down+idempotency verified on real PG18 with EXPLAIN confirming index
use. No new deps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- F1: document AI_CHAT_DEFERRED_TOOLS in .env.example (AI_* section) — default
ON = deferred loading (compact catalog + loadTools), =false restores the old
"all tools always active" behavior.
- F2: integration test of the ON path in ai-chat-stream.int-spec.ts — a deferred
tool activated via loadTools is active on the SAME turn's next step but a fresh
turn starts cold (CORE + loadTools only), proving the per-turn activatedTools
Set does not leak across turns/chats. Drives the real streamText loop with a
MockLanguageModelV3 and inspects recorded per-step activeTools-filtered tools.
- F3: replace the magic toHaveLength(28) in tool-tiers.spec.ts with a two-way
partition against the LIVE in-app toolset (AiChatToolsService.forUser keys):
every non-core tool must appear in buildInAppDeferredCatalog and every catalog
entry must map to a real non-core tool — so a future tool forgotten in
INLINE_TOOL_TIERS fails the suite instead of silently vanishing from the agent.
No production logic change (mechanism was already reviewed correct).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The in-app AI agent shipped all ~41 tool schemas on every model step. This
adds a two-tier catalog: core tools (frequent or one-line) stay always-active;
the rest are advertised as a compact catalog and their full schema is fetched
on demand via the loadTools meta-tool, wired through ai@6 prepareStep's
per-step activeTools.
- tools/tool-tiers.ts: CORE_TOOL_KEYS, INLINE_TOOL_TIERS, applyLoadTools,
catalog builders (+ tool-tiers.spec.ts, 13 cases).
- ai-chat.service.ts prepareAgentStep: returns activeTools =
[...CORE_TOOL_KEYS, loadTools, ...activatedTools]; per-turn activated Set.
- ai-chat.prompt.ts: buildToolCatalogBlock renders the deferred catalog.
- mcp/tool-specs.ts: tier + catalogLine metadata (external snake_case /mcp
transport unchanged).
- EnvironmentService.isAiChatDeferredToolsEnabled(): AI_CHAT_DEFERRED_TOOLS,
default ON per issue intent (kill-switch =false restores old behavior).
Gate: server ai-chat 631/631, tool-tiers 13/13, mcp 472/472, tsc clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
F4 [critical] — the anti-join `DELETE … WHERE NOT EXISTS(child)` was still racy
under Postgres READ COMMITTED: a reply INSERT holds FOR KEY SHARE on the parent;
the DELETE's start snapshot doesn't see the uncommitted child (NOT EXISTS true),
blocks on the reply's lock, and when the reply commits the parent was only LOCKED
(not modified) so EvalPlanQual does NOT re-check → the DELETE proceeds and CASCADE
destroys the just-committed reply. Replaced with a transaction: SELECT the parent
FOR UPDATE (conflicts with the reply's FOR KEY SHARE → serializes the concurrent
reply), re-check for a child with a FRESH statement in the same tx (a new RC
snapshot sees a just-committed reply), delete only if still childless (return 1)
else return 0 (caller resolves). The FOR UPDATE lock is held to end-of-tx so no
reply can insert between the re-check and the delete. Signature unchanged, so the
service + its mocked unit tests are untouched; docstrings updated.
F5 [warning] — the client Dismiss button was gated only on canComment, but the
server now gates dismiss on owner-or-space-admin, so a non-owner non-admin saw a
button the server 403s. `canShowDismiss` now also requires
`isOwnerOrAdmin = currentUser?.user?.id === comment.creatorId || userSpaceRole ===
"admin"` (the same gate the comment delete-menu already uses); threaded into both
call sites.
F6 [warning] — added a REAL-DB int-spec
(apps/server/test/integration/comment-delete-if-childless.int-spec.ts, + a
createComment seeder): (a) childless → returns 1, row gone; (b) committed reply →
returns 0, parent+reply survive; (c) CONCURRENCY — a second connection inserts a
reply (FOR KEY SHARE) and commits mid-operation while deleteCommentIfChildless
blocks on FOR UPDATE → asserts it returns 0 and both rows survive (a blind
anti-join would lose the reply here). Ran against live Postgres — 3/3 pass.
server tsc clean; comment jest 53 + int-spec 3 (live Postgres) pass. client tsc
clean; comment vitest 56 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tail of #244. Three items:
1. Coverage-gate (main). develop had no coverage tooling at all. Added
@vitest/coverage-v8@4.1.6 (pinned to the vitest already in use) to the three
vitest packages — git-sync, editor-ext (which also gains its missing direct
`vitest` devDep), apps/client — and enabled v8 coverage with per-package
thresholds (no root vitest config exists, so per-package is the only
meaningful scope). v8 provider is chosen deliberately: istanbul broke on the
ESM `@docmost/editor-ext` barrel; v8 collects native runtime coverage and
never re-parses ESM. `enabled: true` wires the gate into the plain `test`
script, so `pnpm -r test` (the CI entrypoint) enforces it without a manual
`--coverage`. Thresholds set ~4-5 pts below measured current coverage so the
gate PASSES today and FAILS on regression (verified: forcing lines=95 on
editor-ext exits 1). `all: false` — coverage counts test-touched files;
documented in the configs (with `all: true` the many untested type/barrel
files would sink the % and make the gate meaningless).
Measured→threshold (S/B/F/L): git-sync 91.78/79.16/76.76/92.46 → 88/75/72/88;
editor-ext 58.58/48.1/64.96/58.91 → 54/44/60/54; client 59.93/58/48.47/59.39
→ 55/53/44/55. All exit 0.
2. acceptInvitation atomicity int-spec. New
apps/server/test/integration/workspace-accept-invitation-atomicity.int-spec.ts
(+ createDefaultGroup/createInvitation seeders in test/integration/db.ts per
its convention). Wires the real WorkspaceInvitationService with real
User/Group/GroupUser repos against the test Kysely, stubbing only the
post-commit collaborators. Asserts the invariant protected by
users_email_workspace_id_unique: (a) two CONCURRENT accepts → exactly one
fulfilled, one BadRequestException('Invitation already accepted'), membership
count == 1, invitation consumed; (b) repeated sequential accept → still one
membership; (c) the survivor is in the workspace default group (whole-tx, no
torn state). Ran against real Postgres+Redis: 3/3 pass.
3. turn-end decision unit test. `decideTurnEnd` does not exist as a symbol; the
turn-end logic lives in chat-thread.tsx's onFinish handler. Added a focused
block to the existing chat-thread.test.tsx (matching its hoisted-mock style):
clean finish → flush queued (continue); abort/disconnect/error → queue
preserved (end) with the correct notice; parent notified on every terminal
outcome. 8 passed (3 existing + 5 new).
Verified: git-sync 712, editor-ext 247, client 888 (all with the gate, exit 0);
int-spec 3/3 (real Postgres); tsc --noEmit clean for client + server;
pnpm install --frozen-lockfile consistent (lockfile additive).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The agent rebuilds context from DB each turn and didn't know the user manually
edited the open page since its last response, so it could overwrite those edits.
Add a per-turn ephemeral <page_changed> note in the system prompt (twin of
INTERRUPT_NOTE, self-clearing) carrying a unified Markdown diff of what changed
since the END of the agent's previous turn.
- New ai_chat_page_snapshots table (migration + hand-declared db.d.ts/entity
types) storing the page Markdown per (chat,page) at each turn's end.
- Pure computePageChange util (whitespace-normalized unified diff via the
existing jsdiff dep, 6KB cap + getPage hint).
- Turn start: if the open page's updatedAt moved past the snapshot, diff current
vs snapshot; non-empty -> PAGE_CHANGED_NOTE in the safety sandwich.
- Turn end: upsert the snapshot on EVERY terminal path (onFinish/onError/onAbort,
once) so the agent's own edits are excluded by construction even on aborted
turns.
All best-effort (never breaks/latency-regresses a turn); fast path when updatedAt
is unchanged. Server-only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
F17: the header's content-clause literal omitted the [[:space:]]* tolerance;
copy page.repo.ts's exact '"type"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"text"' (jsonb::text
renders a space after the colon, which is why the tolerance exists).
F16: remove expect(ttl).toBeGreaterThan(0) — the twin of the F15 removal;
expect(ttl).toBe(120) strictly subsumes it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
F14: the lockstep int-spec header still described the pre-F6 two-clause set with
'iff' — add the content-JSON text-node clause so it matches embeddablePredicate.
F15: remove the redundant expect(ttl).toBeLessThanOrEqual(120) that followed
expect(ttl).toBe(120).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
F11: PRE_SEED_TTL_SECONDS 45->120 (= client REINDEX_POLL_CAP_MS). At concurrency
1 a queued reindex can wait past the old 45s; if the pre-seed expired while
pending, getMasked fell back to the COUNT and reported done, so the client
stopped polling and missed the climb. Tie the pre-seed TTL to the client cap.
F12: extend the lockstep integration spec — insertPage takes content; a
text_content=null + text-node-content page is IN and a math-only page is OUT,
pinning the structural "type":"text" clause (and the jsonb space-after-colon).
F13: list all three embeddable clauses in the reindex JSDoc/inline comments.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Delete the now-orphaned PageRepo.getIdsByWorkspace (its only caller,
reindexWorkspace, switched to getEmbeddablePageIds). Its docstring still
claimed "Used by the RAG bulk reindex"; re-grep confirmed zero callers.
- ai-settings.service.reindex(): if aiQueue.add() throws (Redis hiccup/
shutdown) the worker never runs so its finally->clear() never fires,
leaving the seeded progress record stuck for the full 1h TTL (button
stuck "reindexing: 0 of N"). Roll back the seed THIS call wrote
(seeded flag, only when get() was null) before re-throwing, so a
concurrent active run's record is never wiped. Add tests for both the
clear-on-throw and the don't-clear-a-concurrent-run paths.
- Add an integration spec (real Postgres) proving getEmbeddablePageIds'
WHERE stays in lockstep with countEmbeddablePages: seeds every boundary
case and asserts the returned id set equals the count.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Additive test coverage across server, editor-ext, client and mcp.
#192 — AiChatService.stream integration (Section 3, against real Postgres):
- new apps/server/test/integration/ai-chat-stream.int-spec.ts drives the real
streamText through a seeded ai/test MockLanguageModelV3 and a real Node
ServerResponse, covering: onError persists an assistant error record
(status 'error' + partial answer + provider cause in metadata); external MCP
client closed exactly once on BOTH onFinish and onError; anti-tamper —
history is rebuilt from the DB transcript, not from body.messages.
#206 — red-team findings (most already fixed+tested in #212):
- mdrt-2 (UNFIXED, data loss): turndown.dataloss.test.ts documents that
pageBreak / transclusionReference / mention are silently dropped on Markdown
export (characterization + it.fails for the desired survive-export contract).
- persist-6 (UNFIXED, data loss): persistence-store.spec.ts adds an it.failing
documenting that a momentarily-empty live doc overwrites non-empty content
(left unfixed — a store-side empty-guard is a behaviour change).
#204 — test-strategy plan, highest-priority subset:
- Phase 1: mcp-clients.lease.spec.ts covers the external MCP client
lease/refcount/eviction lifecycle (leak / premature-close / double-close).
- Phase 2 data-integrity pure functions: editor-ext table-utils
(transpose/moveRow/convert round-trip) and math tokenizer false-positive
guard; client emoji-menu (+ it.fails for the unguarded localStorage
JSON.parse bug), sort-cells, normalizeTableColumnWidths; mcp htmlEmbed/
pageBreak markdown data-loss + footnote-diff; server export
getInternalLinkPageName extensionless-path bug — FIXED (small/clear) + tested.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses review on PR #227.
- setAlias confirmed-reassign branch: DELETE the target page's existing
alias row(s) BEFORE retargeting `byName` onto the page, instead of after.
The new partial unique index `(workspace_id, page_id)` is non-deferrable
and checked at each statement, so retargeting first momentarily left two
rows for the page -> immediate 23505 -> rolled-back tx surfaced as a
misleading "Alias already taken" (regressing a previously-working swap onto
a page that already had its own alias). The reordered branch needs no
trailing self-heal. JSDoc updated to describe the real ordering.
- catch block: the postgres@3.x driver exposes the violated index as
`err.constraint_name` (with `.constraint` as a fallback). Map
`share_aliases_workspace_id_alias_unique` -> "Alias already taken" and the
new `share_aliases_workspace_id_page_id_unique` -> a distinct ALIAS_PAGE_RACE
outcome (a concurrent same-page write, not a name clash). Always log the
constraint name on any 23505 so the race is diagnosable.
- migration 20260627T120000: document that the dedup DELETE is intended,
irreversible data loss (old duplicate `/l/<old>` links start 404ing after
upgrade; `down()` cannot restore the rows). Same note added to CHANGELOG
[Unreleased] Fixed.
Tests:
- integration: confirmed reassign onto a page that ALREADY has its own alias
(RED before the reorder); migration up() dedup scoping across pages and a
second workspace; mid-transaction error -> BadRequest with clean rollback.
- unit: constraint_name distinguishing (alias index, page_id index, fallback
`.constraint`, no-info default) and non-unique error -> BadRequest; retarget
test now asserts delete-before-update order.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Editing an existing share alias (e.g. slug `te` -> `ted`) failed to update
the displayed `/l/<alias>` link: `setAlias()` looked the requested slug up by
name and, if free, INSERTed a brand-new row, leaving the page with multiple
alias rows. The modal then read via `findByPageId().executeTakeFirst()` with no
`ORDER BY`, so Postgres returned an arbitrary (in practice the oldest, stale)
row. Every edit also spawned an orphan row that kept a live `/l/<old>` link
forever. Regression of #205.
Enforce the invariant "a page has EXACTLY ONE custom address":
- `setAlias()` now resolves the page's current alias row and RENAMES it in
place when the requested name is free (insert only when the page has none),
keeps the same-name no-op and the cross-page 409 `ALIAS_REASSIGN_REQUIRED`
+ confirmed-retarget flow, and after any successful write DELETEs all other
alias rows for the page (self-heal). Runs in one transaction so the page is
never transiently empty or duplicated.
- repo: add `updateAlias` (rename) and `deleteOthersForPage`; make
`findByPageId` deterministic with `ORDER BY created_at DESC, id DESC`.
- migration: dedup existing rows (keep newest per page) + a PARTIAL unique
index `(workspace_id, page_id) WHERE page_id IS NOT NULL` so dangling
aliases still coexist while live ones are one-per-page.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address the PR #202 review (approve-with-comments). The only actionable
non-blocking item was the test-coverage suggestion: the source switch in
AiChatService.handle from findRecent(chatId, ws, 50) to findAllByChat(chatId,
ws) was not pinned by a test. handle() is a streaming method the project marks
as not unit-testable, so cover the behavioral guarantee it now relies on at the
repo/integration level — seed a chat of 60 messages and assert the default
findAllByChat (exactly how handle calls it) returns the FULL transcript in
chronological order, including the first turn the old 50-window would have
dropped.
Also document the behavior change under CHANGELOG [Unreleased] -> Changed.
The two stability items (token-budget trim before streamText; O(N) history
rebuild per turn) are deferred: the reviewer flagged both as non-blocking
conscious trade-offs aligned with the PR's stated goal, and the trim is a
larger architecture change out of scope for this follow-up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
attach-1: when the same attachmentId was referenced by more than one page
in a duplicated subtree, the per-attachmentId map held only a single copy
entry, so the last page processed clobbered the others. The downstream
ownership guard (`attachment.pageId !== oldPageId`) then matched at most one
page and skipped the lone DB row entirely: no blob copied, no new row, every
copy's image 404'd. Key the map to a list of entries and copy one blob/row
per referencing page; drop the now-incorrect ownership guard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
getPageBreadCrumbs (ancestor CTE) and forceDelete (descendant CTE) used
withRecursive + unionAll with no CYCLE clause or depth cap. If a parent/child
cycle already exists in the data (e.g. one slipped in via the #7 TOCTOU race),
both queries loop forever — hang / statement timeout. Worse, the move guard
itself runs the ancestor CTE, so a cycle would disable the very guard meant to
prevent it (#207#8).
Add a depth counter bounded by MAX_PAGE_TREE_DEPTH to both recursive CTEs; the
walk stops at the cap, so a cycle yields a bounded result instead of hanging.
Real page trees are only a few levels deep, so the cap never truncates a
legitimate result. getPageBreadCrumbs selects an explicit column list (not
selectAll) so the internal depth counter never leaks into the breadcrumb shape.
Adds an integration test that seeds an A<->B cycle directly and asserts both
getPageBreadCrumbs and forceDelete return bounded / complete under a short
connection-level statement_timeout instead of hanging.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The server-side move cycle guard (getPageBreadCrumbs) and the move UPDATE ran
as two separate, unlocked statements. Two concurrent moves ("A under B" and
"B under A") could each read the same pre-write acyclic snapshot, both pass the
guard, then persist A.parentPageId=B AND B.parentPageId=A — a parent/child
cycle (TOCTOU, #207#7).
Run the cycle check and the UPDATE inside one transaction (executeTx) guarded
by a per-space advisory lock (pg_advisory_xact_lock, held until COMMIT) so all
moves within a space serialize: the second mover blocks until the first commits
and then sees the freshly written parent, so its guard rejects the cycle.
getPageBreadCrumbs gains an optional trx so the check runs on the locked snapshot.
Adds an integration test driving two opposing concurrent movePage calls and
asserting no cycle ever persists and exactly one move is rejected. Updates the
movePage unit-test stubs for the new transactional path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Approve-with-comments re-review; no blockers. All 7 actionable points (8 is a
forward-looking architecture note — recommendation A, keep as-is):
1. chat-markdown.util spec: restore parity coverage of the removed client spec —
tool error state (+ errorText), unknown-tool fallback (`Ran tool <name>` en /
`Выполнил инструмент <name>` ru), and the circular-output stringify catch.
2. findAllByChat row cap is now testable (injectable limit) + an int-spec proves
truncation on a modest volume.
3. Stability: the per-step durability updates are SERIALIZED via a promise chain
(stepUpdateChain) so they commit in step order — onlyIfStreaming already
closed the finalize race, this closes inter-step ordering.
4. findAllByChat keeps the NEWEST messages on truncation (order DESC + reverse,
like findRecent) and logs a warning with chatId, instead of silently dropping
the newest tail.
5. The LABELS parity comment already references the real path (tool-parts.tsx /
toolLabelKey) — confirmed accurate.
6. Removed the redundant 'off-by-one boundary' test (strict subset of the two
adjacent prepareAgentStep cases).
7. Extracted the terminal-finalize dispatch into a shared `applyFinalize`, used
by BOTH the service's finalizeAssistant and its test — the test now exercises
the real path, not a copy, so a production drift fails it.
Verified: server build + 325 ai-chat unit + 6 integration; prettier clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The re-review's blocking/structural points (lease leak, dup-id guard test,
body-before-title test, CHANGELOG, pg18, shared jsonb decoder) were already
addressed in commit 24264ef; this adds the 4 genuinely-new coverage requests:
- pt 6: `scrollToReference(id, index?)` exercised against a live editor DOM —
selects the index-th `sup[data-footnote-ref][data-id]` occurrence, falls back
to the first for out-of-range, returns false for an empty id (scrollIntoView
stubbed). (#168)
- pt 7: export `backlinkLabel` and pin the base-26 carry boundary
(25->z, 26->aa, 27->ab, 51->az, 52->ba). (#168)
- pt 8: integration fail-open — a PRESENT-but-corrupt tool_allowlist (jsonb
string scalar holding non-array JSON) reads back as null ("no restriction"),
covering normalizeRow's degrade branch. (#159 #172/#173)
- pt 9: getFootnoteRefCount cache invalidation — adding a `[^a]` reference bumps
the cached count 2 -> 3. (#168)
Verified: editor-ext footnote 23; client structure 7 + tsc; server int 8.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
15-point review of the persistent-history PR. Architecture decisions: crash
recovery = recency threshold; tool-label duplication = leave as-is.
Must-fix:
1. Boot-sweep bounded by recency. sweepStreaming now also requires
`updatedAt < now() - SWEEP_STREAMING_STALE_MS` (10 min), so a fresh replica's
startup sweep can't abort a turn another replica is actively streaming
(multi-instance deploy). Int-spec: a FRESH 'streaming' row is NOT swept, a
STALE one IS.
2. Restore export during the FIRST streaming turn of a new chat (#174). The
server chatId is now adopted EARLY (in-place, on the start-chunk metadata) via
a new `onServerChatId` callback wired through use-chat-session → chat-thread,
so `activeChatId` is set at turn start and the Copy button is live mid-first-
turn (canExport = !!activeChatId). Hook tests for early/in-place/no-op adopt.
3. Cover finalizeAssistant's fallback-insert branch: extracted pure
`planFinalizeAssistant(assistantId)` (update when id present, insert when the
upfront insert failed) + a dispatch harness test for both arms.
Tests: onModuleInit lifecycle spec (sweep called; throw → resolves + warns);
int-spec updatedAt assertion → toBeGreaterThan.
Cleanups: cap findAllByChat at 5000 rows; upfront-insert-failure log carries
chatId+workspaceId; removed the now-dead buildPartialAssistantRecord (only the
spec consumed it; shapes still pinned by the flushAssistant suite); controller
passes `lang: dto.lang` (normalizeLang handles undefined); dropped a no-op
`?? undefined` in errorOf; documented the content-column semantics change
(concatenated step text, UI renders from metadata.parts); CHANGELOG [Unreleased]
entry (#183, #174); reworded the stale LABELS parity comment.
Verified: server build + 323 ai-chat unit + 5 integration; client tsc + 160
ai-chat unit; prettier clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Admins can now give each EXTERNAL MCP server a free-text instruction ("how/
when to use this server's tools") that the agent receives in its SYSTEM
PROMPT next to the tool descriptions — porting the built-in SERVER_INSTRUCTIONS
idea to admin-configured servers. Trusted, admin-authored text (like a system
prompt); NON-secret, so unlike headersEnc it IS returned in views/forms.
- Migration: nullable `instructions text` on ai_mcp_servers (old rows = null =
no guidance). Table type + repo insert/update (blank/whitespace -> null via
blankToNull). DTO `@MaxLength(4000)`. Service threads it through
McpServerView/toView.
- mcp-clients: `McpServerInstruction { serverName, toolPrefix, instructions }`
threaded through the toolset/cache/lease. Guidance is built ONLY for a server
that actually connected AND contributed >=1 callable tool (the allowlist may
filter all of them out) AND has non-blank text — so a guide never appears for
tools the agent cannot call. Cached with the toolset, so an edit is picked up
next turn via the existing CRUD cache invalidation.
- System prompt: `buildMcpToolingBlock` renders an <mcp_tooling> block INSIDE
the safety sandwich (after context, before the trailing SAFETY_FRAMEWORK) so
it informs tool choice but cannot override the rules; each section is headed
by the server's `prefix_*` namespace. Empty/blank -> block omitted. The
caller (ai-chat.service) now builds the external toolset BEFORE the prompt and
passes external.instructions; client-handle lifecycle (close-once) unchanged.
- Client: instructions field in types + a Textarea (autosize, maxLength 4000)
in the MCP-server form with a namespace-prefix hint; i18n (en/ru).
Tests across every layer (prompt block placement + both SAFETY copies; view
blank->null; buildEntry includes guidance only for connected+>=1-tool+non-blank;
DTO MaxLength; repo + integration round-trip; service wiring). Delegated impl
reviewed (APPROVE); applied the import-type follow-up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
PR #172 fixed the jsonb double-encoding for `tool_allowlist` but the same
class of bug, and the same re-derived workaround, remained elsewhere.
1. model_config (agent roles): jsonbObject still used the buggy `::jsonb`
bind, so `ai_agent_roles.model_config` round-tripped as a jsonb STRING
SCALAR. The read-path `typeof === 'object'` check then failed and the
model override was SILENTLY dropped (role fell back to the default model).
Fixed to `::text::jsonb` and added `parseModelConfig` + `normalizeRow` so
every read self-heals already-corrupted rows (no migration).
2. Centralized the write workaround as `jsonbBind()` in database/utils.ts —
one implementation with one explanation of the quirk — replacing the
per-repo `jsonbArray` (mcp) and `jsonbObject` (roles).
3. Integration coverage (the fix is a DB round-trip a unit test cannot see;
the read-side parser MASKS a write regression): new
ai-mcp-server-repo.int-spec asserts `jsonb_typeof(tool_allowlist)='array'`
after insert + heals a seeded string-scalar row; ai-agent-roles-repo
int-spec gains the same for `model_config` (`'object'` + heal).
4. Updated the stale `ai-mcp-servers.types.ts` comment (the driver returns a
JSON string for legacy rows; the repo normalizes every read).
5. Fail-open logging: a corrupt tool_allowlist degrades to "no restriction"
(agent gets ALL tools) — normalizeRow now warns (server id only, never
contents) so the silent widening leaves a trace.
6. Simplified parseToolAllowlist (normalize the string once, then a single
array-of-strings check) — identical behaviour, all 12 cases still pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review caught a real race: onStepFinish fires `updateStreaming()` fire-and-
forget (not awaited), so the FINAL step's streaming UPDATE and the terminal
`finalizeAssistant` UPDATE run as two concurrent statements on different pool
connections — commit order is not guaranteed. If the late streaming update
lands AFTER finalize, the completed row is clobbered back to status='streaming'
with no usage/finishReason, and the next startup sweep then mis-marks the
finished turn 'aborted'. Green unit/integration tests don't reproduce a
cross-connection race.
Fix: scope the per-step update with `onlyIfStreaming` → SQL `WHERE
status='streaming'`. Once finalize has set a terminal status the late update
matches zero rows and no-ops, regardless of commit order; finalize runs
unguarded so it always wins. A cheap `if (finalized) return` short-circuit
avoids most wasted queries, but the SQL guard is the authoritative fix (the
flag can be set after a query is already in flight).
Integration test: finalize to 'completed', then a late onlyIfStreaming update
is a no-op — status/content/usage preserved.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The chat lived in inconsistent paradigms (in-memory stream + client export vs.
DB-as-context), which made export flaky and lost the assistant answer if the
process died mid-turn. Make the DB the single source of truth.
A. STEP-GRANULAR DURABILITY (server)
- ai_chat_messages gains a nullable `status` column (migration; NULL = legacy =
completed). The assistant row is now INSERTED UPFRONT as `status:'streaming'`
and UPDATEd on every onStepFinish with all finished steps (text + tool calls +
tool RESULTS), then finalized once to completed/error/aborted on the terminal
callback. So a process death mid-turn keeps every finished step; a startup
sweep (OnModuleInit → sweepStreaming) flips any dangling 'streaming' row to
'aborted'. The write path no longer depends on a live socket.
- Pure exported `flushAssistant(steps, inProgressText, status, extra?)` builds
the persist payload (metadata.parts byte-identical to the old builder), so a
future background worker can call the same path. AiChatMessageRepo gains
`update`, `sweepStreaming`, and `findAllByChat`.
- consumeStream drain, external-MCP client close-once, SSE heartbeat preserved.
B. SERVER-SIDE EXPORT
- New pure `chat-markdown.util.ts` renders Markdown from DB rows ONLY (server
port of the client builder). Because A persists the in-progress row, the
export now includes an interrupted turn up to its last finished step (flagged
"still generating"). `POST /ai-chat/export` (owner-gated via assertOwnedChat,
workspace-scoped) returns it; `lang` accepts a full client locale tag
('en-US'/'ru-RU') and is normalized server-side (normalizeLang) — a strict
@IsIn(['en','ru']) DTO rejected the real client's i18n.language with a 400,
caught in real-browser testing.
- Client: handleCopy calls the endpoint; `canExport = !!activeChatId`. The whole
liveThreadRef/liveStateRef/onLiveContentChange/hasLiveContent hybrid (and the
client chat-markdown util + test) is removed — the server is now authoritative.
Tests: flushAssistant unit (status shapes + parts parity), chat-markdown.util
unit (incl. legacy NULL-status + interrupted note + ru + normalizeLang locale
tags), controller export wiring + owner-gate, integration update/sweepStreaming.
Verified: server build + 318 ai-chat unit + 3 integration; client tsc + 157
ai-chat unit; and END-TO-END in a real browser — a chat turn persists mid-stream
and the Copy button exports the DB-sourced markdown (showing the in-progress
row), HTTP 200 after the locale fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements two architecture follow-ups from the multi-aspect review.
1. Shared, zod-agnostic tool-spec registry (packages/mcp/src/tool-specs.ts)
for the 14 AI tools whose name + schema + model-facing description are
genuinely identical across the standalone MCP server and the in-app
AI-SDK chat. Both layers consume it (registerShared in index.ts;
sharedTool in ai-chat-tools.service.ts) and keep their own execute/auth.
- Zod-agnostic builders (z) => ZodRawShape bridge the zod v3 (mcp) vs
zod v4 (server) split; the registry imports no zod.
- Folds in the documented edit_page_text drift-bug fix: the stale
"strip-and-retry tolerated" claim is gone; canonical wording states a
formatting-only change is refused into failed[].
- Sibling-tool references in shared descriptions are transport-neutral so
one description is correct for both snake_case (MCP) and camelCase
(in-app) tool names.
- Loader fail-fast guard for a stale @docmost/mcp build.
- The ~17 intentionally-divergent tools (security guardrails, tuned UX)
stay per-layer, untouched.
- Rebuilt committed mcp artifacts (also regenerates a previously stale
build/lib/docmost-schema.js to match its already-committed source).
2. Formalize apps/server/test/integration/db.ts as the canonical
integration-test seed factory (module doc + a shortId helper); the
hand-written minimal seeders are kept on purpose, decoupled from the
app service-layer side effects.
Verified: server tsc + lint clean, mcp build clean; mcp unit tests 261 pass,
ai-chat-tools.service 16 pass, public-share-chat-tools 8 pass, ai-chat suite
224 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Builds the deferred integration tests from docs/backlog/feature-test-coverage-
deferred.md that needed real infra (a test Postgres + real Redis) which the repo
lacked. Runs against an isolated, auto-created docmost_test database and Redis
logical DB 15 — never the dev data.
Harness (apps/server/test/integration/, run via new `pnpm --filter server test:int`
=> jest --config test/jest-integration.json; default unit `jest` is untouched and
excludes these via the *.int-spec.ts name + rootDir):
- db.ts: buildTestDb() mirrors database.module.ts exactly (PostgresJSDialect,
CamelCasePlugin, bigint to:20/from:[20,1700] parsing) + minimal seed helpers.
- global-setup.ts: DROP/CREATE docmost_test, CREATE EXTENSION vector, migrate to
latest via Kysely Migrator (fails loud on any errored migration).
- global-teardown.ts: closes the pool.
Coverage (5 suites, 16 tests, all green against live PG+Redis):
- WorkspaceRepo.updateSetting: jsonb-merge persists htmlEmbed without clobbering
sibling ai/sharing namespaces (the kill-switch write half).
- AiAgentRoleRepo: soft-delete exclusion, cross-workspace tenant isolation,
duplicate (name,workspace) -> 23505, name reusable after softDelete (partial
unique index WHERE deleted_at IS NULL), same name across workspaces allowed.
- page_template_references: deleting either source or referenced page cascades
the link row (onDelete cascade) — real FK, not mocked.
- PublicShareWorkspaceLimiter vs REAL Redis: real ioredis EVAL of the sliding-
window Lua — max boundary (3 admit / 4th deny), re-admit after the window
slides, same-ms distinct members. Catches Lua bugs a FakeRedis cannot.
- AiChatRepo.findByCreator: role-badge join (enabled->badge; soft-deleted or
disabled role -> null).
Review: APPROVE; applied its two hardening suggestions (fail loud on errored
migration result even without a top-level error; TEST_REDIS_URL override + ping
preflight). tsc clean; unit run excludes int-spec (verified).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
agent_coder
claude code agent 227
agent_coder