Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
claude_code 204cf9dfe7 test(sandbox): address PR #250 round-4 review — SSRF accept-path tests, MCP structuredContent (#243)
Mandatory (test-coverage):
- internal-file-urls.test: pin the SSRF/traversal ACCEPT path of
  resolveInternalFilePath (the sole guard for content-controlled `src`): an
  absolute/protocol-relative URL has its foreign host dropped and only an
  /api/files/ pathname survives (http://evil.com/api/files/x/y.png -> /files/x/y.png),
  while a host-dropped path that escapes /api/files/ (https://evil.com/api/auth/whoami)
  or a backslash-traversal (/api/files\..\auth\whoami) is rejected. Locks the
  behavior so a future prefix-only refactor cannot silently open a bypass.

Suggestions:
- index.ts: the stash_page MCP tool now returns structuredContent
  { uri, sha256, size, images } alongside the resource_link, so the MCP output
  matches the documented shape (clients get the blob's sha256/ETag and the
  mirror counts, not just the link). No outputSchema registered. Rebuilt build/.
- new stash-page-mcp-result.test: server round-trip via InMemoryTransport asserts
  both the resource_link and the structuredContent mirror.
- internal-file-urls.test: cover the new URL parse-failure catch branch
  (http://[ -> "Invalid internal file src").
- environment.service.spec: assert getPositiveIntEnv warns once per key and
  independently across keys (the invalidPositiveIntWarned dedup).

Tests: packages/mcp 383 pass; apps/server sandbox/environment/mcp 235 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-28 20:58:36 +03:00
claude_code aff58646d1 refactor(sandbox): address PR #250 round-3 review — dead import, env validation, uuid validator, docs (#243)
Must-fix:
- mcp.module: drop the now-dead EnvironmentModule import (and its stale
  comment). McpService no longer injects EnvironmentService; EnvironmentModule
  is @Global and imported at the app root, so DI still resolves.

Stability:
- environment.service: route getSandboxTtlMs + the three SANDBOX_MAX_*_BYTES
  caps through a shared getPositiveIntEnv() helper that warns once per key and
  falls back to the default on a non-integer or <= 0 value (previously the byte
  caps did a bare parseInt, so SANDBOX_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES=0 made every stash_page
  fail against a 0-byte cap). TTL behavior is unchanged.

Simplification:
- sandbox.controller: replace the homemade UUID_RE with the project's shared
  `uuid` validator (import { validate as isValidUUID } from 'uuid'), matching
  the attachment routes; update the spec fixtures to valid v4 UUIDs.
- mcp.service: inline the single-caller one-liner buildSandboxConfig() to
  this.sandboxStore.asSink() at the wiring site.

Docs:
- CHANGELOG: add an [Unreleased] > Added entry for #243 (stash_page tool,
  anonymous GET /api/sb/:id, five SANDBOX_* env vars).
- AGENTS.md: note that GET /api/sb/:id is in the workspace-gate preHandler's
  excludedPaths and is fully tokenless, unlike /api/files/public/... which
  still resolves a workspace and needs an attachment JWT.

Tests: cap-getter validation (0/-5/abc -> default, valid -> parsed), updated
UUID fixtures. apps/server jest sandbox/environment/mcp: 233 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-28 20:21:31 +03:00
claude_code 8842bc8bf3 fix(sandbox): address PR #250 follow-up review — XSS hardening, eviction reconcile, doc sync (#243)
Security (must-fix):
- sandbox.controller: the anonymous GET /api/sb/:id response now sets
  X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, a restrictive CSP, and Content-Disposition=
  attachment for any mime outside a raster-image allowlist (png/jpeg/gif/webp/
  avif). entry.mime is attacker-controlled, so an evil.svg/evil.html could
  otherwise execute script inline on the Docmost origin (stored XSS). Mirrors
  the public attachment route's hardening.

Stability:
- client.stashPage: reconcile mirrors AFTER the final document put, not only
  before it. The doc blob is the newest entry and FIFO eviction drops the
  oldest = this stash's own images, so the stored doc could reference an
  evicted blob (consumer 404) and over-report images.mirrored. A bounded loop
  now reverts doc-put-evicted mirrors, drops the stale doc blob, and re-puts
  until stable. Regenerated packages/mcp/build/.
- sandbox.controller: emit Cache-Control on the 304 branch too (ttlSeconds is
  computed before the conditional check).

Docs:
- Bump the MCP tool count 39 -> 40 across all READMEs and AGENTS.md (the
  registry now exposes exactly 40 tools).

Refactor:
- SandboxStore.asSink() centralizes the {put,has,evict} sink + uri<->id
  mapping; the embedded-MCP and in-app agent-tools wiring sites share it.

Tests:
- security headers (inline vs attachment, nosniff, CSP), 304 Cache-Control,
  putAndLink URL form, has()/remove(), asSink() round-trip, getSandboxPublicUrl
  (trailing-slash trim + APP_URL fallback), and a stash test where the doc put
  itself evicts a mirrored image.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-28 19:08:06 +03:00
claude_code 6eb335d5e3 fix(sandbox): address PR #250 review — SSRF guard, eviction safety, cleanup (#243)
Security:
- stash_page: reject path-traversal / percent-encoded srcs before the authed
  loopback fetch (resolveInternalFilePath), closing an SSRF/exfiltration hole
  where a crafted node.attrs.src could read an arbitrary internal GET endpoint
  into the anonymous sandbox.

Stability:
- stash_page: revert + recount mirrors FIFO-evicted by a later put in the same
  stash (no dangling sandbox refs, honest images.mirrored/failed); free image
  blobs if the final document put throws.
- Reject/clamp non-positive SANDBOX_TTL_MS to the 1h default (warn once).
- Log mirror failures unconditionally (console.warn, no blob bodies).

Cleanup / architecture:
- Remove dead expiresAt from SandboxPutResult.
- Centralize the /api/sb route in SANDBOX_ROUTE_SEGMENT/SANDBOX_API_PATH and
  move URL composition into SandboxStore.putAndLink; drop the duplicated sink
  closures and the now-unused EnvironmentService injection from McpService and
  AiChatToolsService.
- Un-export isInternalFileUrl; document the process-local (instance-bound)
  sandbox limitation in the tool description and .env.example.

Docs/tests:
- README/README.ru: 38 -> 39 tools + stash_page entry.
- Add traversal/normalize/recursion unit tests, stash self-eviction +
  doc-put-throw + empty/octet-stream mock tests, controller If-None-Match
  (wildcard/weak/list) + Cache-Control tests, and SANDBOX_TTL_MS validation
  tests. Regenerate packages/mcp/build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-28 18:02:46 +03:00
claude code agent 227 c486750b2a test-infra: re-enable 16 disabled server suites (jest DI + lib0 ESM) (#56)
16 suites were disabled via testPathIgnorePatterns due to two root causes: lib0
ESM not transformed (the @hocuspocus/server -> lib0/decoding.js chain) and stock
'should be defined' specs built via Test.createTestingModule without providers.
Add lib0 to transformIgnorePatterns; convert the 14 DI placeholders to direct
new X(...) instantiation with stub deps (keeping a real construct smoke test);
re-enable the suites. Also updates the public-share limiter test to assert the
fail-closed behavior from #62 (surfaced now that the suite runs). Full server
suite: 67 passed, 689 tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-21 03:40:40 +03:00
Philipinho 186c4f5f5c move environment module to integrations 2024-03-21 20:09:25 +00:00