Security:
- stash_page: reject path-traversal / percent-encoded srcs before the authed
loopback fetch (resolveInternalFilePath), closing an SSRF/exfiltration hole
where a crafted node.attrs.src could read an arbitrary internal GET endpoint
into the anonymous sandbox.
Stability:
- stash_page: revert + recount mirrors FIFO-evicted by a later put in the same
stash (no dangling sandbox refs, honest images.mirrored/failed); free image
blobs if the final document put throws.
- Reject/clamp non-positive SANDBOX_TTL_MS to the 1h default (warn once).
- Log mirror failures unconditionally (console.warn, no blob bodies).
Cleanup / architecture:
- Remove dead expiresAt from SandboxPutResult.
- Centralize the /api/sb route in SANDBOX_ROUTE_SEGMENT/SANDBOX_API_PATH and
move URL composition into SandboxStore.putAndLink; drop the duplicated sink
closures and the now-unused EnvironmentService injection from McpService and
AiChatToolsService.
- Un-export isInternalFileUrl; document the process-local (instance-bound)
sandbox limitation in the tool description and .env.example.
Docs/tests:
- README/README.ru: 38 -> 39 tools + stash_page entry.
- Add traversal/normalize/recursion unit tests, stash self-eviction +
doc-put-throw + empty/octet-stream mock tests, controller If-None-Match
(wildcard/weak/list) + Cache-Control tests, and SANDBOX_TTL_MS validation
tests. Regenerate packages/mcp/build.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add an ephemeral, process-local blob store so the in-app agent (and the
embedded MCP) can hand a large page document and its images to an external
consumer WITHOUT routing the bytes through the model context or Docmost auth.
- SandboxStore (@Injectable singleton): Map<uuid,{buf,mime,sha256,expiresAt}>
in RAM only. put() picks a per-blob cap by mime (image vs doc), enforces a
total-bytes RAM guard with oldest-first eviction, and stamps a TTL; get()
lazily expires. sha256 computed at put() doubles as the strong ETag. An
unref'd sweep interval clears expired entries and is cleared on destroy.
- GET /api/sb/:uuid anonymous controller: serves raw bytes with Content-Type,
Content-Length and ETag=sha256; 404 on missing/expired/non-UUID (anti-
traversal), 304 on a matching If-None-Match. No tokens, no 401 — the
capability is the unguessable UUID + short TTL + TLS. Auth-exempt the same
way as /api/files/public (no JwtAuthGuard) plus an /api/sb entry in main.ts's
workspace-resolution preHandler so a remote consumer with no workspace host
is not rejected.
- stash_page tool in both layers (MCP resource_link + in-app {uri,size,sha256,
images}). client.stashPage serializes the get_page_json shape, mirrors every
INTERNAL file/image src (type-agnostic, covers drawio/excalidraw/video/file)
into the sandbox under Docmost auth and rewrites src to the sandbox URL;
external http(s) srcs are left untouched; dedup by src; a failed image fetch
is counted, never aborts the doc.
- SANDBOX_PUBLIC_URL / SANDBOX_TTL_MS / SANDBOX_MAX_BYTES /
SANDBOX_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES / SANDBOX_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES wired through the
environment service + validation + .env.example.
- SandboxModule (@Global) provides the shared store to the controller,
McpService and AiChatToolsService (same instance for put and get).
Tests: SandboxStore (round-trip, sha256, TTL lazy + sweep, caps, eviction),
SandboxController (200+ETag+CT+CL, 404 missing/expired/non-UUID, 304), and a
mock-HTTP stashPage test (mirror+rewrite internal, keep external, dedup, failed
image counted, returns only a link). Interoperates with the vvzvlad/habr-mcp
consumer's anonymous-GET + sha256-ETag + resource_link contract.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements two architecture follow-ups from the multi-aspect review.
1. Shared, zod-agnostic tool-spec registry (packages/mcp/src/tool-specs.ts)
for the 14 AI tools whose name + schema + model-facing description are
genuinely identical across the standalone MCP server and the in-app
AI-SDK chat. Both layers consume it (registerShared in index.ts;
sharedTool in ai-chat-tools.service.ts) and keep their own execute/auth.
- Zod-agnostic builders (z) => ZodRawShape bridge the zod v3 (mcp) vs
zod v4 (server) split; the registry imports no zod.
- Folds in the documented edit_page_text drift-bug fix: the stale
"strip-and-retry tolerated" claim is gone; canonical wording states a
formatting-only change is refused into failed[].
- Sibling-tool references in shared descriptions are transport-neutral so
one description is correct for both snake_case (MCP) and camelCase
(in-app) tool names.
- Loader fail-fast guard for a stale @docmost/mcp build.
- The ~17 intentionally-divergent tools (security guardrails, tuned UX)
stay per-layer, untouched.
- Rebuilt committed mcp artifacts (also regenerates a previously stale
build/lib/docmost-schema.js to match its already-committed source).
2. Formalize apps/server/test/integration/db.ts as the canonical
integration-test seed factory (module doc + a shortId helper); the
hand-written minimal seeders are kept on purpose, decoupled from the
app service-layer side effects.
Verified: server tsc + lint clean, mcp build clean; mcp unit tests 261 pass,
ai-chat-tools.service 16 pass, public-share-chat-tools 8 pass, ai-chat suite
224 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
