Release-cycle test audit: the strip boundary was tested only via a stand-in
helper re-implemented in the spec, so a deleted/misplaced guard kept CI green
(the missing create() guard was proof). Replace it with tests against real code:
- persistence.extension.onStoreDocument: real ydoc from a rich doc (columns/
table/mention/htmlEmbed) -> non-admin strip removes only htmlEmbed, every other
node preserved (data-loss guard); admin keeps; empty fragment no-throw.
- collaboration.handler.updatePageContent: real path, user?.role gate, decoded
ydoc embed-free for non-admin, kept for admin.
- transclusion unsync: member stripped, admin preserved.
- editor-ext gains a vitest setup (was zero tests) + a markdown round-trip:
the <!--html-embed:BASE64--> marker -> htmlEmbed node with decoded source, and
hasHtmlEmbedNode matches it — pinning the marked/turndown shape the import
strip relies on. tsconfig now excludes specs from the shipped dist.
- Fail-closed identity: source-pinned contracts that the gate keys on
fileTask.creatorId (zip) / request userId (single) / callerRole (create) /
authUser.role (duplicate), and missing-user -> strip (services can't load under
jest's ESM graph; helpers replay the exact predicate).
Adds the verified-safe ^src/ jest moduleNameMapper (identical fail set).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Release-cycle test audit: the /mcp auth's constant-time token guard, IP keying,
ACCESS-type pinning, and brute-force message coupling were untested. Extract
behavior-preserving pure helpers so they're testable and cover them:
- sharedTokenMatches: length-mismatch early-returns before timingSafeEqual
(which throws on unequal lengths); equal-length uses timingSafeEqual; array
header -> first element; non-string -> false.
- clientIp: req.ip > socket > first XFF hop > 'unknown' (limiter keying).
- bindAccessJwtVerifier: verifyJwt pinned to JwtType.ACCESS (rejects REFRESH).
- CREDENTIALS_MISMATCH_MESSAGE single source of truth shared by
verifyUserCredentials and isCredentialsFailure, so a reworded auth error can't
silently disable the /mcp brute-force counter.
- verifyUserCredentials no-side-effect contract asserted via a TS-AST spec
(AuthService can't load under jest): its body has no createSessionAndToken/
audit/updateLastLogin while login() has all three.
Extractions are behavior-preserving (reviewed); class delegates to the helpers,
dead code + unused imports removed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Release-cycle test audit found the role feature's security-critical paths
untested. Adds real unit tests (against the actual functions):
- resolveRoleForRequest invariants: role comes from chat.roleId not body.roleId
(no per-turn swap), lookup scoped to workspace.id, disabled/soft-deleted role
-> null, new-chat uses body.roleId, stale chatId falls back.
- CASL admin gate: non-admin create/update/delete -> Forbidden and service not
called; admin delegates with workspace.id; list() is member-reachable.
- roleModelOverride: unknown driver dropped (never reaches getChatModel's
throwing default), valid override passes through, blanks ignored.
- getChatModel override success path (cross-driver fetch + decrypt; chatModel-
only reuse), and service update/remove cross-workspace 'not found' guards +
modelConfig tri-state.
Tiny fix: findByCreator badge left-join now also requires enabled=true, so a
disabled role (downgraded to universal by resolveRoleForRequest) no longer shows
a misleading chat-list badge.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Release-cycle review found the /mcp Basic path skipped the controller's
pre-token gates and over-eagerly minted sessions:
- SSO/MFA bypass (blocker): the Basic path called AuthService.login/
verifyUserCredentials directly, but validateSsoEnforcement + the lazy EE MFA
gate live in AuthController.login. Now enforceBasicLoginGate runs in the Basic
branch BEFORE any token is minted: validateSsoEnforcement(workspace) (reject
on enforced SSO) and the same lazy-require MFA check the controller uses
(reject MFA users -> 'use a Bearer access token'). No EE module bundled (this
fork) -> no MFA gate, identical to the controller; a throw from the check
fails closed (no token). Bearer/service-account paths are not gated (those
JWTs are minted post-gate).
- Non-init session mint: isSessionInit is now (no mcp-session-id) AND the body
is a real JSON-RPC initialize (isInitializeRequestBody). A header-less
non-initialize request takes the side-effect-free verifyCredentials path -> no
user_sessions row, no USER_LOGIN audit, no lastLoginAt bump.
- FailedLoginLimiter.sweep() now runs on an unref'd 60s interval, cleared on
module destroy (was never scheduled -> unbounded Map growth under XFF rotation).
- Subsequent (non-init) valid login no longer resets the global per-email brute
bucket (only per-IP / per-IP+email); the email backstop is reset only on a
deliberate init login.
Note: in a hypothetical EE build, checkMfaRequirements is called with no
FastifyReply (we only read requirement flags); a res-dereferencing EE impl would
surface as a clean rejection (fail-closed), not a bypass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds an htmlEmbed block node that renders and executes raw HTML/CSS/JS in the
wiki origin (e.g. an analytics tracker) — the owner-chosen variant C. Because
this is stored-XSS by design, only workspace admins/owners may get such a node
persisted; everyone executes it when reading.
- Node (editor-ext): htmlEmbed atom/isolating block; source stored base64 in
data-source for lossless HTML<->JSON round-trip. renderHTML emits only the
encoded marker (never inlines raw markup), so generateHTML/export/search are
not themselves injection vectors. Registered in BOTH client extensions and
server tiptapExtensions. Markdown round-trip via an <!--html-embed:b64-->
comment (turndown) + a marked rule.
- Client NodeView: injects source and re-creates <script> elements so they
actually run; edit modal; renders in read-only/share too. Slash item is
admin-gated (adminOnly filtered by the user's workspace role).
- SERVER ENFORCEMENT (the real control — UI gating alone is insufficient):
stripHtmlEmbedNodes() removes htmlEmbed from any document persisted by a
non-admin, applied at every write path that introduces content from an
untrusted author: collab onStoreDocument, REST/MCP/AI updatePageContent,
single-file import, zip/multi-file import, page duplication, and transclusion
unsync. Page restore introduces no new content. Public share/readonly viewers
render fetched (already-stripped) content and do NOT open a collab socket, so
the only residual is a transient broadcast window to concurrent authenticated
editors (documented).
Implements docs/arbitrary-html-embed-plan.md (variant C).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lets an unauthenticated viewer of a published share ask an AI scoped strictly
to that share's page tree. The authenticated agent is untouched; the security
boundary is the tool scope (no identity), and nothing is persisted.
Server:
- workspace toggle settings.ai.publicShareAssistant (default off) +
optional settings.ai.provider.publicShareChatModel (cheap model id; reuses
the chat driver/baseUrl/key). getChatModel(workspaceId, override) substitutes
only the model id, falling back to chatModel.
- POST /api/shares/ai/stream (@Public, SSE). Guardrail funnel, each failing
before streaming: toggle off -> 404; share missing/wrong-workspace/sharing
off -> 404; pageId not in share tree -> 404; provider unconfigured -> 503;
per-IP (5/min) and per-workspace (300/h, IP-independent) rate limits -> 429.
Uniform 404s never confirm a private page's existence.
- forShare read-only in-process toolset: searchSharePages (existing shareId
FTS branch, no spaceId/userId), getSharePage (getShareForPage gate +
share.id check, content via the public sanitizer), listSharePages. No write/
comment/history/cross-space/external-MCP tools.
- Locked share system prompt + immutable safety block; stepCountIs(5).
- /shares/page-info exposes an aiAssistant flag (gated behind isSharingAllowed).
Client: an ephemeral, text-only Ask-AI widget on the public shared page,
shown only when the flag is set; useChat -> /api/shares/ai/stream,
credentials omit. Admin toggle + model field in Settings -> AI.
Also adds a jest moduleNameMapper for src/-rooted imports (fixes pre-existing
unresolvable specs; additive).
Implements docs/public-share-assistant-plan.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The embedded MCP server acted as a single service account; now each /mcp
session authenticates as the current user, so tools run under that user's
CASL and edits attribute to them.
- HTTP Basic (chosen path): Authorization: Basic email:password, validated
server-side via AuthService; the session carries the issued user JWT (not
the raw password). Password may contain ':' (split on first only).
- Bearer fallback: Authorization: Bearer <access JWT>, verified as ACCESS and
additionally checked for an active session + non-disabled user (matching
JwtStrategy), so revoked/disabled users are rejected.
- Service account stays as an optional fallback (no creds + env configured).
- packages/mcp createMcpHttpHandler accepts a per-request config resolver
(back-compat: static config / stdio unchanged); identity is bound to the
mcp-session-id at init and re-validated from the caller's own credentials on
every request (anti session-fixation: a guessed session id can't be reused
without matching creds).
- A full login (session + audit) happens only once at session init; later
requests re-verify credentials via a new non-side-effecting
AuthService.verifyUserCredentials (no session/audit spam).
- Failed-login limiter (5/60s, keyed per-IP, per-IP+email, and per-email so IP
rotation can't brute one account) since direct login bypasses the controller
throttler. Only real credential failures count.
- MCP_TOKEN shared guard moved off Authorization to an X-MCP-Token header
(timing-safe compare); credsConfigured 503 gate replaced by a clear 401.
- No secrets logged; all auth resolved before res.hijack() so failures return
clean 401 JSON. .env.example marks the service account optional.
Implements docs/backlog/mcp-per-user-auth.md (variant L).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reusable, workspace-shared agent roles for the built-in AI chat. A role is
a named persona (system-prompt instructions) + optional model override; a
chat is bound to a role at creation and applies it every turn.
Backend:
- migration 20260620T120000: ai_agent_roles table + ai_chats.role_id
(FK ON DELETE SET NULL); hand-merged types into db.d.ts/entity.types.ts
(db.d.ts is hand-curated here, full codegen would clobber it).
- core/ai-chat/roles: CRUD module. list = any workspace member; create/
update/delete = admin (Manage Settings ability, like ai-settings/mcp).
All repo queries scoped by workspace_id; soft-delete (deleted_at).
- buildSystemPrompt gains roleInstructions: role REPLACES the persona base
(admin prompt / DEFAULT_PROMPT) but SAFETY_FRAMEWORK + context are always
still appended.
- stream(): role resolved from ai_chats.role_id for existing chats (never
the request body -> no per-turn role swap); body.roleId only on creation.
Disabled (enabled=false) and soft-deleted roles fall back to universal.
- getChatModel(workspaceId, override): role model_config can swap model id /
driver; a driver without configured creds throws 503 with a clear message
naming the driver+role, resolved BEFORE response hijack.
Client:
- new-chat role picker (enabled roles only, default Universal assistant),
roleId sent only on the first message; role badge (emoji+name) in the chat
header and conversation list; admin Agent-roles management section in
Settings -> AI (add/edit/delete, MCP-form pattern).
Tests: ai-chat.prompt.spec (role layering + safety always present, incl.
jailbreak); ai.service.spec (override on unconfigured driver -> 503).
Implements docs/ai-agent-roles-plan.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
These import paths relied on the private EE module that was deleted from
the repo. In the community build they either threw 'enterprise license'
(DOCX/PDF) or silently no-op'd (Confluence). The frontend buttons were
already removed in 38064064; this cleans up the dead backend stubs.
- import.service.ts: drop processDocx/processPdf methods, their dispatcher
branches, the pageId computation + insertPage spread, and the now-unused
moduleRef param/ModuleRef import
- file-import-task.service.ts: drop the Confluence branch and the now-unused
moduleRef param/ModuleRef import
- import.controller.ts: restrict file extensions to .md/.html and zip
sources to generic/notion; update the error message accordingly
- file.utils.ts: remove Confluence from the FileImportSource enum
- features.ts: remove the unused CONFLUENCE_IMPORT/DOCX_IMPORT/PDF_IMPORT
feature keys
The isConfluenceImport logic in import-attachment.service.ts is intentionally
left in place (real shared attachment-parsing code, not a stub); its removal
is a separate, riskier refactor.
The two catch blocks in importPage() threw an opaque "Error processing file
content" / "Failed to create imported page" BadRequest, hiding the real cause
from the HTTP response. This made a production 400 regression impossible to
diagnose without server log access, and violated the project convention that
errors must never be swallowed.
Extract `${err.name}: ${err.message}` into both the log (full err object kept
for the stack) and the thrown BadRequestException. Inner processMarkdown/
processHTML rethrowing catches and the EE processDocx/processPdf license
catches are left unchanged.
Local reproduction of the happy-dom 14->20 theory failed (full import chain
+ 22 edge cases pass on happy-dom@20.8.9), so the root cause is still pending
the now-visible reason from a recurring 400. Diagnostic script test-import.tsx
added; backlog doc updated with findings.
Replace the implicit `hostname endsWith openrouter.ai` detection with an
explicit, admin-chosen provider field `sttApiStyle` ('multipart' = OpenAI-
compatible multipart /audio/transcriptions; 'json' = OpenRouter-style JSON +
base64 input_audio). The transcription path now branches on the stored field,
not on the URL — nothing hidden from the admin.
- ai.types: add SttApiStyle + STT_API_STYLES; field on AiProviderSettings and
MaskedAiSettings (resolved via ResolvedAiConfig).
- update-ai-settings.dto: validate sttApiStyle with @IsIn(STT_API_STYLES).
- ai-settings.service: plumb sttApiStyle through resolve()/getMasked() and the
non-secret update whitelist; workspace.repo: add it to the ALLOWED array so it
persists.
- ai.service: drop isOpenRouter(); transcribe() branches on cfg.sttApiStyle;
rename helper to transcribeJsonBase64 with provider-neutral error text and a
BadRequestException (400) when the base URL is missing for the JSON style.
- client: SttApiStyle type on IAiSettings/IAiSettingsUpdate; "Request format"
Select on the Voice/STT settings card; i18n.
- ai.service: route *.openrouter.ai STT to its JSON+base64
/audio/transcriptions API; keep the OpenAI multipart path (AI SDK) for
OpenAI/self-hosted whisper. Unify transcription behind transcribe().
- /transcribe controller: surface the real provider/transport reason
(describeProviderError) instead of an opaque 500; preserve HttpException.
- testConnection: add an 'stt' capability (silent-WAV probe) + DTO; client
gets a Test endpoint button and status dot on the Voice/STT card.
- useDictation: log full errors to the console and show the real reason
(mic start + transcription paths); handle NotReadable/Abort and missing
mediaDevices.
- docs(CLAUDE.md): require full error logging + specific user-facing messages.
Add push-to-talk voice dictation that transcribes recorded audio on the
server via the workspace's OpenAI-compatible AI provider (Whisper /
gpt-4o-transcribe / self-hosted whisper), then inserts the text.
Backend:
- New `stt_api_key_enc` column + migration; STT creds parity with chat/
embeddings (sttModel/sttBaseUrl/sttApiKey, write-only key, fallbacks to
chat baseUrl/key). Both provider whitelists updated (service + repo).
- AiService.getTranscriptionModel + AiTranscriptionService.
- Gated POST /ai-chat/transcribe (dictation flag → 403, JWT + workspace
scope + throttle, 25MB cap, MIME whitelist, never logs audio/key).
- New `settings.ai.dictation` workspace flag (DTO + service + audit).
Frontend:
- Wire up the Voice/STT settings card (model/base URL/key) and the
Voice-dictation toggle.
- New `features/dictation`: useDictation (MediaRecorder state machine),
MicButton, transcribe service; integrated into the chat composer and a
new editor-toolbar dictation group, both gated by ai.dictation.
Rebuild the workspace AI settings page into card-based "Endpoints"
(Chat / Embeddings / Voice) matching the new design, and split the
single connection test into independent per-endpoint Test buttons.
- server: testConnection(workspaceId, capability) probes only the
requested capability ('chat' | 'embeddings'); add TestAiConnectionDto
and wire it through the /workspace/ai-settings/test controller
- client: testAiConnection(capability) + capability-typed mutation; two
independent test mutation instances so Chat/Embeddings results are isolated
- client: full rewrite of ai-provider-settings into Endpoints section —
drop the provider dropdown (driver is always openai, base URL + key
always shown), move the "AI chat" and surface the "Semantic search"
feature toggles into card headers, system message behind an Edit modal,
pgvector/reindex footer, and a disabled Voice/STT stub
- client: restyle external MCP tools and the MCP server section; collapse
the AI sections in workspace-settings; remove the standalone
ai-chat-settings component
- toggles now surface the server error message (e.g. missing pgvector)
- i18n: add new English strings
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
"Indexed N of M pages" stayed at e.g. "27 of 34" forever even after a
successful full reindex. The numerator counted pages that have embeddings
while the denominator counted ALL non-deleted pages, so empty / text-less
pages (which legitimately store zero embeddings) could never be reached.
Add PageRepo.countEmbeddablePages: counts non-deleted pages that have
non-empty textContent OR already have a stored embedding row, and use it as
the totalPages denominator in AiSettingsService.getMasked. The "has
embeddings" clause covers pages indexed from the content JSON (null
textContent) and guarantees indexedPages <= totalPages. No DB migration.
The bulk embedding reindex could hang on a single page forever
("Indexed 27 of 34 pages") with zero log output:
- all progress logs were debug-level, suppressed in production (pino info);
- embedMany() had no timeout, so a slow/hung embeddings endpoint blocked
the sequential per-page loop indefinitely.
Changes:
- ai.service.embedTexts: bound embedMany with AbortSignal.timeout
(configurable via AI_EMBEDDING_TIMEOUT_MS, default 120000ms); on timeout
throw a clear, greppable message, classified by both signal.aborted and
the error name (TimeoutError/AbortError/ResponseAborted) so a real
provider error racing the timer keeps its diagnostics.
- embedding-indexer.reindexWorkspace: promote lifecycle/progress logs to
info; log "[i/N] indexing page <id>" BEFORE the await so a hang names the
stuck page; warn on slow pages (>30s); add timing + final summary.
- .env.example: document AI_EMBEDDING_TIMEOUT_MS.
A misconfigured embeddings endpoint failed the RAG indexer with an opaque
"Invalid JSON response" and was not caught by "Test connection" (which only
probed the chat model), so it only surfaced silently during background
indexing.
- add describeProviderError(): formats AI SDK errors as
"<statusCode>: <message> | response body: <truncated one-line snippet>"
(statusCode/message/responseBody never carry the API key)
- use it in the bulk-reindex catch and the embedding processor's formatter so
the real cause (e.g. an HTML 404 from a wrong base URL) is visible in logs
- testConnection now probes chat AND embeddings independently: skips a probe
when that capability is unconfigured, returns ok:false with a Chat:/Embeddings:
prefix on real failure, "not configured" when neither is set
The WORKSPACE_CREATE_EMBEDDINGS / WORKSPACE_DELETE_EMBEDDINGS jobs were
enqueued (on AI Search enable/disable) but had no AI_QUEUE handler, so
existing pages were never indexed ("Indexed 0 of N pages") and disabling
never purged embeddings.
- EmbeddingProcessor: handle WORKSPACE_CREATE_EMBEDDINGS (bulk reindex all
live pages) and WORKSPACE_DELETE_EMBEDDINGS (purge workspace embeddings)
- EmbeddingIndexerService: add reindexWorkspace() (skips when embeddings
unconfigured; per-page error isolation) and removeWorkspace()
- PageRepo.getIdsByWorkspace(), PageEmbeddingRepo.deleteByWorkspace()
- AiSettingsService.reindex() + admin-only POST /workspace/ai-settings/reindex
- Frontend: "Reindex now" button, service call and mutation
- Stable per-workspace jobId with remove-before-add so a stale job can't
block future reindexes; cancel the delayed purge on enable/reindex so it
can't wipe freshly-built embeddings
Per-workspace AI provider config previously shared a single base URL and
a single API key between the chat model and the embedding model. Add
dedicated, optional embedding endpoint/token that fall back to the chat
values when empty, preserving backward compatibility.
- db: new migration adds nullable `embedding_api_key_enc` to
`ai_provider_credentials`; chat key stays in `api_key_enc`
- repo: add `upsertEmbeddingKey` / `clearEmbeddingKey` (on-conflict
touches only its own column, so chat/embedding keys never overwrite)
- ai-settings.service: store non-secret `embeddingBaseUrl`; resolve()
applies fallback (embeddingBaseUrl || baseUrl; embedding key || chat
key); getMasked() exposes raw `embeddingBaseUrl` + `hasEmbeddingApiKey`,
never the key; update() handles the embedding key write-only
- ai.service: getEmbeddingModel() builds openai/gemini/ollama with the
embedding-specific URL/key; chat path unchanged
- client: new "Embedding base URL" and "Embedding API key" fields with
fallback hints and a clear-key action
Requires running the DB migration on deploy.
Display "Indexed N of M pages" on the AI provider settings page so admins
can see how much of the wiki is covered by vector-RAG semantic search.
- page-embedding.repo: add countIndexedPages() — distinct non-deleted pages
that have stored embeddings in the workspace
- page.repo: add countByWorkspace() — total non-deleted pages
- ai-settings.service: compute both counts in getMasked() (Promise.all) and
return them with the masked settings; inject PageEmbeddingRepo + PageRepo
- MaskedAiSettings / IAiSettings: add indexedPages + totalPages
- ai-provider-settings: render a dimmed coverage line under "Embedding model"
- i18n: add the "Indexed {{indexed}} of {{total}} pages" key (en-US, ru-RU)
- openai provider: use .chat() (Chat Completions) instead of the default callable
(Responses API), which gateways reject on multi-turn -> 400.
- updateAiProviderSettings: assemble settings.ai.provider via jsonb_build_object
with ::text-cast bound params + jsonb_typeof self-heal (postgres.js was
double-encoding it into an array; the ::text cast avoids 'could not determine
data type of parameter').
- chat agent: drop the hard maxOutputTokens cap (truncated complex tool calls);
keep a tiny cap only on the test-connection ping.
- testConnection + chat stream: surface the real provider error (statusCode+message)
to logs and the UI instead of generic masks; never log the API key.
- chat UI: typing indicator, incremental streaming render, tool 'running' status, Stop.
Also bundled (prior uncommitted ai-chat work):
- history 'AI agent' provenance badge; vector RAG (pgvector image + page_embeddings
+ AI_QUEUE indexer + space-scoped semanticSearch); external MCP servers backend
(@ai-sdk/mcp client, SSRF IP-pinning, encrypted headers, admin CRUD/Test);
yjs duplicate-instance fix via pnpm patch (single CJS instance server-side).
WIP checkpoint of the gitmost AI-chat backend (plan stages A + B1 + B3a).
The agent acts under the requesting user's JWT (Docmost CASL enforces page
access); the external service-account /mcp endpoint is untouched.
LLM provider config (A2-A4):
- integrations/crypto: AES-256-GCM SecretBoxService (key derived from APP_SECRET,
per-record salt/iv; clear error on rotation instead of crashing).
- ai_provider_credentials table/repo/types: encrypted API key stored outside
workspace settings/baseFields, write-only (never returned by any endpoint).
- integrations/ai: per-workspace AI SDK v6 provider driver (openai/gemini/ollama),
admin-gated GET(masked)/PATCH(write-only key)/Test endpoints; settings.ai.provider
holds non-secret config incl. systemPrompt. Removed unused AI_* env getters (DB is
the single source of truth).
Chat module (A1, A5-A8):
- ai_chats/ai_chat_messages repos (workspace-scoped, soft-delete, tsv never selected).
- core/ai-chat: CRUD + POST /ai-chat/stream (Fastify hijack + AI SDK v6
pipeUIMessageStreamToResponse, abort on disconnect, persist user/assistant msgs).
- Agent loop: streamText + stepCountIs(8); read tools searchPages/getPage via a
per-request DocmostClient over loopback REST under the user's minted access token.
- Gate settings.ai.chat (+ 503 when provider unconfigured); buildSystemPrompt with a
non-removable safety/anti-prompt-injection framework. Per-user rate limit.
Per-user auth (B1):
- @docmost/mcp DocmostClient gains an additive getToken variant (carry a user JWT,
re-fetch on 401) and exports DocmostClient; the email/password service-account path
(external /mcp, stdio) is unchanged.
Agent-edit provenance backbone (B3a):
- Migration: pages/page_history (last_updated_source, last_updated_ai_chat_id) and
comments (created_source, ai_chat_id, resolved_source).
- Signed actor/aiChatId claim in the collab token; onAuthenticate propagates it,
onStoreDocument writes it with a sticky agent marker, saveHistory copies it.
Migrations auto-run on boot (additive). Write tools, frontend, RAG and external MCP
servers are not in this checkpoint.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the removed enterprise EE MCP (private apps/server/src/ee submodule,
license-gated /mcp route) with our docmost-mcp, vendored as an isolated ESM
workspace package and served by the server over HTTP — no enterprise license.
Backend:
- Add packages/mcp (@docmost/mcp): vendored docmost-mcp refactored into a
side-effect-free createDocmostMcpServer() factory (38 tools preserved),
stdio entry kept in stdio.ts, Streamable-HTTP session manager in http.ts.
- Add apps/server McpModule: @Post/@Get/@Delete('mcp') (served at /mcp via the
existing global-prefix exclude), @SkipTransform + reply.hijack to bridge raw
Fastify req/res into the SDK transport. The module dynamically imports the
ESM-only package from CommonJS via a Function-indirected import resolved with
require.resolve + file:// URL. Gated by the workspace ai.mcp toggle, a
service-account (MCP_DOCMOST_EMAIL/PASSWORD/API_URL) and optional MCP_TOKEN;
per-session idle eviction (MCP_SESSION_IDLE_MS).
- Drop the enterprise license check on mcpEnabled in workspace.service.
- Dockerfile: copy packages/mcp into the production image.
- .env.example: document MCP_DOCMOST_*, MCP_TOKEN, MCP_SESSION_IDLE_MS.
Frontend:
- Recreate the community "AI & MCP" workspace-settings panel (mcp-settings.tsx):
admin-only toggle on settings.ai.mcp with optimistic update, copyable
${APP_URL}/mcp URL; wired into workspace-settings page. Reuses existing i18n.
Fixes:
- Pin packages/mcp tiptap deps to 3.20.4 (matching the client) and inline
getStyleProperty, preventing a duplicate @tiptap/core@3.26.1 from leaking into
the client editor via pnpm shamefully-hoist (was breaking apps/client tsc).
Adds SAML_DISABLE_REQUESTED_AUTHN_CONTEXT env var, passed through
to the SAML strategy's disableRequestedAuthnContext option.
Defaults to existing behavior (element sent). Set to true to omit
the element when the IdP authenticates the user with a method that
does not match (e.g. MFA, FIDO, passwordless), which would
otherwise cause AADSTS75011 with Microsoft Entra ID.
Some embedding models don't accept a `dimensions` parameter. This adds
an optional env var that controls whether the dimension is sent to the
model API, while always using it for pgvector indexing. Preset models
have this handled automatically; the env var allows explicit override
for custom models.
* autojoiner
* fix marked
* return clipboardTextSerializer as markdown
* fix clipboardTextSerializer for single lines
* cleanup two preceeding spaces in ordered lists item
* fix extra paragraph in task list
* don't zip sinple page exports
