Agent suggestion-edits (comments with suggestedText, #315) piled up: Apply
auto-resolved the thread, cluttering the resolved tab, and the anchors stayed in
the document. Make them ephemeral: resolving (Apply OR the new Dismiss) makes the
comment DISAPPEAR — hard-delete + remove the Yjs `comment` mark — UNLESS the
thread has replies, in which case resolve it (preserve the discussion). Manual
Resolve is unchanged. Scope: only comments with `suggestedText`.
Server:
- New collab event `deleteCommentMark` (collaboration.handler) mirroring
resolveCommentMark, wiring the existing removeYjsMarkByAttribute to strip the
anchor from the doc.
- `finalizeAppliedSuggestion` forks on `hasChildren`: replies → apply + resolve
(outcome 'resolved'); none → apply + hard-delete + mark removal (outcome
'deleted').
- New `dismissSuggestion` (validates top-level + suggestedText + not applied/not
resolved) with the same fork; permission `canComment` (NOT canEdit — dismiss
doesn't change page text); audit COMMENT_SUGGESTION_DISMISSED. New
POST /comments/dismiss-suggestion; apply stays canEdit.
- Both return `{ outcome: 'deleted' | 'resolved' }` so the client picks the
optimistic action.
Data-integrity (review F1): the shared `deleteEphemeralSuggestion` removes the
anchor mark FIRST and FATALLY, then deletes the DB row only on success. The row
delete is irreversible, so a mark-removal failure — including the
COLLAB_DISABLE_REDIS "no live instance" hard-error — must abort the whole
operation (→ 5xx, repeatable) rather than swallow the error and leave a permanent
orphan anchor pointing at a deleted comment. `deleteCommentMark` is no longer
best-effort (unlike resolve, where the row is kept and a failed mark is
recoverable).
Client:
- `canShowDismiss` (canComment) alongside `canShowApply` (canEdit); a "Dismiss"
button next to Apply in the suggestion block.
- `useApplySuggestionMutation`/`useDismissSuggestionMutation` reconcile the cache
on `outcome` ('deleted' → remove; 'resolved' → relocate to the resolved tab).
- Idempotent races (review F2): BOTH apply and dismiss onError reduce 404/400 to
success (comment already gone/resolved), dropping it from the cache instead of
a red error — restores the #315 apply idempotency the ephemeral delete would
otherwise break.
- i18n Dismiss / "Не применять" (ru/en).
Not done (flagged): deleteCommentMark on the normal /comments/delete path — left
out (would change every non-suggestion delete + needs gateway injection; the
interactive client already strips the mark via unsetComment). Out of scope per
the issue.
Tests: server — apply/dismiss delete-vs-resolve fork, all four dismiss state
guards, the deleteCommentMark handler, controller authz (dismiss=canComment,
apply=canEdit), AND a mark-removal-failure test proving the row is NOT deleted +
the error propagates (F1). client — Dismiss show-conditions, outcome cache
reconciliation, and 404 idempotent race for BOTH dismiss and apply (F2).
Verified: server tsc clean; comment+collaboration jest 144 passed. client tsc
clean; vitest 905 passed | 1 expected-fail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
New custom collab event applyCommentSuggestion runs replaceYjsMarkedText inside
the document's Yjs transaction on the owning instance and returns the
{ applied, currentText } verdict to the API-server caller (cross-process via the
Redis bridge, whose customEventComplete/replyId already carries handler return
values).
- withYdocConnection is now generic and returns the callback's result (captured
in a closure, since hocuspocus connection.transact does not forward it). The
callback is typed synchronous-only: transact runs fn synchronously without
awaiting, so an async fn would mutate outside the transaction and lose
atomicity.
- collaboration.gateway.handleYjsEvent: when Redis is disabled
(COLLAB_DISABLE_REDIS), dispatch the handler locally against the single
hocuspocus instance and return its verdict instead of silently returning
undefined (which would make apply a no-op). Also fixes the pre-existing silent
no-op of setCommentMark/resolveCommentMark without Redis.
Tests: handler spec (applied mutates doc + returns verdict; changed-text returns
{applied:false} without mutating; args forwarded; withYdocConnection returns the
value) and gateway spec (no-Redis path dispatches locally, returns the verdict,
not undefined).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Convert the htmlEmbed node from same-origin raw-HTML execution to a sandboxed
iframe (sandbox="allow-scripts allow-popups allow-forms", no allow-same-origin,
srcdoc) with postMessage auto-resize (validated by event.source) and an optional
manual height attr. The block now runs in an opaque origin and cannot reach the
viewer's cookies/session/API, so it is safe for any member.
Because the block is now harmless, remove the entire admin/role gating apparatus:
drop htmlEmbedAllowed/canAuthorHtmlEmbed/stripDisallowedHtmlEmbedNodes/
collectHtmlEmbedSources and every role-based strip on the write paths (collab
REST/MCP + socket, page create/duplicate, import x2, transclusion unsync), along
with the now-unused WorkspaceRepo/UserRepo injections and the PageService.create
callerRole param. Keep one strip: prepareContentForShare still removes htmlEmbed
on the anonymous public-share read path when the workspace master toggle is OFF.
The workspace settings.htmlEmbed toggle is now a plain feature switch (gates the
slash-menu and share rendering); when ON the block is available to all members.
Add settings.trackerHead: an admin-only raw HTML/JS analytics snippet injected
verbatim into the <head> of public share pages only (ShareSeoController), for
trackers that genuinely need same-origin. Admin-gated via the existing CASL
Manage/Settings ability; never injected into the authenticated app shell.
Closes security-review findings #1, #2, #4, #5, #10 (and #3 as a security issue).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The admin-only raw HTML/JS embed is a deliberate stored-XSS surface, so gate the
whole feature behind a workspace toggle that is OFF by default; it only works
when a workspace admin explicitly enables it.
- settings.htmlEmbed (boolean, default false) + workspace-update field htmlEmbed,
persisted via WorkspaceRepo.updateSetting with an audit diff. Flipping it is
admin-only (same Manage Settings CASL as other workspace toggles).
- New gate htmlEmbedAllowed(featureEnabled, role) = featureEnabled && admin/owner.
All 7 server write paths (create, duplicate, collab onStoreDocument, REST/MCP/AI
updatePageContent, single + zip import, transclusion unsync) now read the
workspace's settings.htmlEmbed and strip unless (toggle ON AND admin). OFF
(default, or a failed/empty workspace lookup) strips htmlEmbed for EVERYONE
including admins -> existing embeds are cleaned up on next save, none persist.
- Client (defense-in-depth): the /html slash item is hidden unless toggle ON +
admin; the NodeView executes nothing and shows a 'disabled in this workspace'
placeholder when OFF; an admin Switch in Workspace Settings -> General with a
description of the behavior.
- docs/html-embed-admin.md documents the toggle + admin-only + fail-closed
coedit (a non-admin save strips an admin's embed) + execution semantics.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds an htmlEmbed block node that renders and executes raw HTML/CSS/JS in the
wiki origin (e.g. an analytics tracker) — the owner-chosen variant C. Because
this is stored-XSS by design, only workspace admins/owners may get such a node
persisted; everyone executes it when reading.
- Node (editor-ext): htmlEmbed atom/isolating block; source stored base64 in
data-source for lossless HTML<->JSON round-trip. renderHTML emits only the
encoded marker (never inlines raw markup), so generateHTML/export/search are
not themselves injection vectors. Registered in BOTH client extensions and
server tiptapExtensions. Markdown round-trip via an <!--html-embed:b64-->
comment (turndown) + a marked rule.
- Client NodeView: injects source and re-creates <script> elements so they
actually run; edit modal; renders in read-only/share too. Slash item is
admin-gated (adminOnly filtered by the user's workspace role).
- SERVER ENFORCEMENT (the real control — UI gating alone is insufficient):
stripHtmlEmbedNodes() removes htmlEmbed from any document persisted by a
non-admin, applied at every write path that introduces content from an
untrusted author: collab onStoreDocument, REST/MCP/AI updatePageContent,
single-file import, zip/multi-file import, page duplication, and transclusion
unsync. Page restore introduces no new content. Public share/readonly viewers
render fetched (already-stripped) content and do NOT open a collab socket, so
the only residual is a transient broadcast window to concurrent authenticated
editors (documented).
Implements docs/arbitrary-html-embed-plan.md (variant C).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
claude code agent 227
Philip Okugbe