Add ~330 tests across server (Jest), client (Vitest), editor-ext (Vitest)
and packages/mcp (node:test) for the gitmost features added since
053a9c0d: AI chat, AI agent roles, public-share assistant, MCP per-user
auth, HTML embed, page templates/embed, realtime tree, tree
expand/collapse, and the AI-settings UI.
Test-tooling fixes (prerequisite, were silently hiding coverage):
- Repair 3 page-template specs broken by the 11-arg TransclusionService
constructor; they never compiled, so template access-control / content
-leak / unsync-strip coverage was fictitious.
- Build @docmost/editor-ext before server tests via a `pretest` hook;
the stale dist omitted the new HtmlEmbed/PageEmbed exports (TS2305).
- Let jest resolve the .tsx email templates: add `tsx` to
moduleFileExtensions and widen the ts-jest transform to (t|j)sx?.
Behaviour-preserving "extract pure core" refactors that the tests drive:
- server: resolveShareAssistantRequest + uiMessageTextLength
(public-share controller), decideBasicGate + mapAuthResultToResponse
(mcp), buildErrorAssistantRecord (ai-chat), jsonbObject export (roles).
- client: render-raw-html + shouldExecute/canEdit, decide-embed-state,
page-embed picker utils, tree-socket reducers, open/close branch maps,
isEndpointConfigured/resolveKeyField; buildTreeWithChildren now treats
a permission-trimmed orphan as a root instead of crashing.
Deferred (need a test DB or HTTP harness, documented in the specs):
repo-level Postgres integration tests and the public-share XFF E2E.
Pre-existing DI/lib0-ESM suite failures are untouched and out of scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Release-cycle test audit: the /mcp auth's constant-time token guard, IP keying,
ACCESS-type pinning, and brute-force message coupling were untested. Extract
behavior-preserving pure helpers so they're testable and cover them:
- sharedTokenMatches: length-mismatch early-returns before timingSafeEqual
(which throws on unequal lengths); equal-length uses timingSafeEqual; array
header -> first element; non-string -> false.
- clientIp: req.ip > socket > first XFF hop > 'unknown' (limiter keying).
- bindAccessJwtVerifier: verifyJwt pinned to JwtType.ACCESS (rejects REFRESH).
- CREDENTIALS_MISMATCH_MESSAGE single source of truth shared by
verifyUserCredentials and isCredentialsFailure, so a reworded auth error can't
silently disable the /mcp brute-force counter.
- verifyUserCredentials no-side-effect contract asserted via a TS-AST spec
(AuthService can't load under jest): its body has no createSessionAndToken/
audit/updateLastLogin while login() has all three.
Extractions are behavior-preserving (reviewed); class delegates to the helpers,
dead code + unused imports removed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Release-cycle review found the /mcp Basic path skipped the controller's
pre-token gates and over-eagerly minted sessions:
- SSO/MFA bypass (blocker): the Basic path called AuthService.login/
verifyUserCredentials directly, but validateSsoEnforcement + the lazy EE MFA
gate live in AuthController.login. Now enforceBasicLoginGate runs in the Basic
branch BEFORE any token is minted: validateSsoEnforcement(workspace) (reject
on enforced SSO) and the same lazy-require MFA check the controller uses
(reject MFA users -> 'use a Bearer access token'). No EE module bundled (this
fork) -> no MFA gate, identical to the controller; a throw from the check
fails closed (no token). Bearer/service-account paths are not gated (those
JWTs are minted post-gate).
- Non-init session mint: isSessionInit is now (no mcp-session-id) AND the body
is a real JSON-RPC initialize (isInitializeRequestBody). A header-less
non-initialize request takes the side-effect-free verifyCredentials path -> no
user_sessions row, no USER_LOGIN audit, no lastLoginAt bump.
- FailedLoginLimiter.sweep() now runs on an unref'd 60s interval, cleared on
module destroy (was never scheduled -> unbounded Map growth under XFF rotation).
- Subsequent (non-init) valid login no longer resets the global per-email brute
bucket (only per-IP / per-IP+email); the email backstop is reset only on a
deliberate init login.
Note: in a hypothetical EE build, checkMfaRequirements is called with no
FastifyReply (we only read requirement flags); a res-dereferencing EE impl would
surface as a clean rejection (fail-closed), not a bypass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The embedded MCP server acted as a single service account; now each /mcp
session authenticates as the current user, so tools run under that user's
CASL and edits attribute to them.
- HTTP Basic (chosen path): Authorization: Basic email:password, validated
server-side via AuthService; the session carries the issued user JWT (not
the raw password). Password may contain ':' (split on first only).
- Bearer fallback: Authorization: Bearer <access JWT>, verified as ACCESS and
additionally checked for an active session + non-disabled user (matching
JwtStrategy), so revoked/disabled users are rejected.
- Service account stays as an optional fallback (no creds + env configured).
- packages/mcp createMcpHttpHandler accepts a per-request config resolver
(back-compat: static config / stdio unchanged); identity is bound to the
mcp-session-id at init and re-validated from the caller's own credentials on
every request (anti session-fixation: a guessed session id can't be reused
without matching creds).
- A full login (session + audit) happens only once at session init; later
requests re-verify credentials via a new non-side-effecting
AuthService.verifyUserCredentials (no session/audit spam).
- Failed-login limiter (5/60s, keyed per-IP, per-IP+email, and per-email so IP
rotation can't brute one account) since direct login bypasses the controller
throttler. Only real credential failures count.
- MCP_TOKEN shared guard moved off Authorization to an X-MCP-Token header
(timing-safe compare); credsConfigured 503 gate replaced by a clear 401.
- No secrets logged; all auth resolved before res.hijack() so failures return
clean 401 JSON. .env.example marks the service account optional.
Implements docs/backlog/mcp-per-user-auth.md (variant L).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the removed enterprise EE MCP (private apps/server/src/ee submodule,
license-gated /mcp route) with our docmost-mcp, vendored as an isolated ESM
workspace package and served by the server over HTTP — no enterprise license.
Backend:
- Add packages/mcp (@docmost/mcp): vendored docmost-mcp refactored into a
side-effect-free createDocmostMcpServer() factory (38 tools preserved),
stdio entry kept in stdio.ts, Streamable-HTTP session manager in http.ts.
- Add apps/server McpModule: @Post/@Get/@Delete('mcp') (served at /mcp via the
existing global-prefix exclude), @SkipTransform + reply.hijack to bridge raw
Fastify req/res into the SDK transport. The module dynamically imports the
ESM-only package from CommonJS via a Function-indirected import resolved with
require.resolve + file:// URL. Gated by the workspace ai.mcp toggle, a
service-account (MCP_DOCMOST_EMAIL/PASSWORD/API_URL) and optional MCP_TOKEN;
per-session idle eviction (MCP_SESSION_IDLE_MS).
- Drop the enterprise license check on mcpEnabled in workspace.service.
- Dockerfile: copy packages/mcp into the production image.
- .env.example: document MCP_DOCMOST_*, MCP_TOKEN, MCP_SESSION_IDLE_MS.
Frontend:
- Recreate the community "AI & MCP" workspace-settings panel (mcp-settings.tsx):
admin-only toggle on settings.ai.mcp with optimistic update, copyable
${APP_URL}/mcp URL; wired into workspace-settings page. Reuses existing i18n.
Fixes:
- Pin packages/mcp tiptap deps to 3.20.4 (matching the client) and inline
getStyleProperty, preventing a duplicate @tiptap/core@3.26.1 from leaking into
the client editor via pnpm shamefully-hoist (was breaking apps/client tsc).
claude_code
vvzvlad