Convert the htmlEmbed node from same-origin raw-HTML execution to a sandboxed
iframe (sandbox="allow-scripts allow-popups allow-forms", no allow-same-origin,
srcdoc) with postMessage auto-resize (validated by event.source) and an optional
manual height attr. The block now runs in an opaque origin and cannot reach the
viewer's cookies/session/API, so it is safe for any member.
Because the block is now harmless, remove the entire admin/role gating apparatus:
drop htmlEmbedAllowed/canAuthorHtmlEmbed/stripDisallowedHtmlEmbedNodes/
collectHtmlEmbedSources and every role-based strip on the write paths (collab
REST/MCP + socket, page create/duplicate, import x2, transclusion unsync), along
with the now-unused WorkspaceRepo/UserRepo injections and the PageService.create
callerRole param. Keep one strip: prepareContentForShare still removes htmlEmbed
on the anonymous public-share read path when the workspace master toggle is OFF.
The workspace settings.htmlEmbed toggle is now a plain feature switch (gates the
slash-menu and share rendering); when ON the block is available to all members.
Add settings.trackerHead: an admin-only raw HTML/JS analytics snippet injected
verbatim into the <head> of public share pages only (ShareSeoController), for
trackers that genuinely need same-origin. Admin-gated via the existing CASL
Manage/Settings ability; never injected into the authenticated app shell.
Closes security-review findings #1, #2, #4, #5, #10 (and #3 as a security issue).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add ~330 tests across server (Jest), client (Vitest), editor-ext (Vitest)
and packages/mcp (node:test) for the gitmost features added since
053a9c0d: AI chat, AI agent roles, public-share assistant, MCP per-user
auth, HTML embed, page templates/embed, realtime tree, tree
expand/collapse, and the AI-settings UI.
Test-tooling fixes (prerequisite, were silently hiding coverage):
- Repair 3 page-template specs broken by the 11-arg TransclusionService
constructor; they never compiled, so template access-control / content
-leak / unsync-strip coverage was fictitious.
- Build @docmost/editor-ext before server tests via a `pretest` hook;
the stale dist omitted the new HtmlEmbed/PageEmbed exports (TS2305).
- Let jest resolve the .tsx email templates: add `tsx` to
moduleFileExtensions and widen the ts-jest transform to (t|j)sx?.
Behaviour-preserving "extract pure core" refactors that the tests drive:
- server: resolveShareAssistantRequest + uiMessageTextLength
(public-share controller), decideBasicGate + mapAuthResultToResponse
(mcp), buildErrorAssistantRecord (ai-chat), jsonbObject export (roles).
- client: render-raw-html + shouldExecute/canEdit, decide-embed-state,
page-embed picker utils, tree-socket reducers, open/close branch maps,
isEndpointConfigured/resolveKeyField; buildTreeWithChildren now treats
a permission-trimmed orphan as a root instead of crashing.
Deferred (need a test DB or HTTP harness, documented in the specs):
repo-level Postgres integration tests and the public-share XFF E2E.
Pre-existing DI/lib0-ESM suite failures are untouched and out of scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The admin-only raw HTML/JS embed is a deliberate stored-XSS surface, so gate the
whole feature behind a workspace toggle that is OFF by default; it only works
when a workspace admin explicitly enables it.
- settings.htmlEmbed (boolean, default false) + workspace-update field htmlEmbed,
persisted via WorkspaceRepo.updateSetting with an audit diff. Flipping it is
admin-only (same Manage Settings CASL as other workspace toggles).
- New gate htmlEmbedAllowed(featureEnabled, role) = featureEnabled && admin/owner.
All 7 server write paths (create, duplicate, collab onStoreDocument, REST/MCP/AI
updatePageContent, single + zip import, transclusion unsync) now read the
workspace's settings.htmlEmbed and strip unless (toggle ON AND admin). OFF
(default, or a failed/empty workspace lookup) strips htmlEmbed for EVERYONE
including admins -> existing embeds are cleaned up on next save, none persist.
- Client (defense-in-depth): the /html slash item is hidden unless toggle ON +
admin; the NodeView executes nothing and shows a 'disabled in this workspace'
placeholder when OFF; an admin Switch in Workspace Settings -> General with a
description of the behavior.
- docs/html-embed-admin.md documents the toggle + admin-only + fail-closed
coedit (a non-admin save strips an admin's embed) + execution semantics.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Release-cycle test audit: the strip boundary was tested only via a stand-in
helper re-implemented in the spec, so a deleted/misplaced guard kept CI green
(the missing create() guard was proof). Replace it with tests against real code:
- persistence.extension.onStoreDocument: real ydoc from a rich doc (columns/
table/mention/htmlEmbed) -> non-admin strip removes only htmlEmbed, every other
node preserved (data-loss guard); admin keeps; empty fragment no-throw.
- collaboration.handler.updatePageContent: real path, user?.role gate, decoded
ydoc embed-free for non-admin, kept for admin.
- transclusion unsync: member stripped, admin preserved.
- editor-ext gains a vitest setup (was zero tests) + a markdown round-trip:
the <!--html-embed:BASE64--> marker -> htmlEmbed node with decoded source, and
hasHtmlEmbedNode matches it — pinning the marked/turndown shape the import
strip relies on. tsconfig now excludes specs from the shipped dist.
- Fail-closed identity: source-pinned contracts that the gate keys on
fileTask.creatorId (zip) / request userId (single) / callerRole (create) /
authUser.role (duplicate), and missing-user -> strip (services can't load under
jest's ESM graph; helpers replay the exact predicate).
Adds the verified-safe ^src/ jest moduleNameMapper (identical fail set).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Release-cycle red-team found the admin-only gate missed PageService.create():
content/textContent/ydoc were derived and persisted without the strip, so any
space member could POST /pages/create with an htmlEmbed node (incl. the
markdown/html <!--html-embed:BASE64--> form) and store executing JS for every
reader. Add the same gate used by duplicatePage: strip htmlEmbed when the
caller is not a workspace admin/owner. Role is plumbed from the controller
(user.role); unknown role => non-admin (strip). All four create paths (create,
duplicate, single import, zip import) plus the update paths are now guarded.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds an htmlEmbed block node that renders and executes raw HTML/CSS/JS in the
wiki origin (e.g. an analytics tracker) — the owner-chosen variant C. Because
this is stored-XSS by design, only workspace admins/owners may get such a node
persisted; everyone executes it when reading.
- Node (editor-ext): htmlEmbed atom/isolating block; source stored base64 in
data-source for lossless HTML<->JSON round-trip. renderHTML emits only the
encoded marker (never inlines raw markup), so generateHTML/export/search are
not themselves injection vectors. Registered in BOTH client extensions and
server tiptapExtensions. Markdown round-trip via an <!--html-embed:b64-->
comment (turndown) + a marked rule.
- Client NodeView: injects source and re-creates <script> elements so they
actually run; edit modal; renders in read-only/share too. Slash item is
admin-gated (adminOnly filtered by the user's workspace role).
- SERVER ENFORCEMENT (the real control — UI gating alone is insufficient):
stripHtmlEmbedNodes() removes htmlEmbed from any document persisted by a
non-admin, applied at every write path that introduces content from an
untrusted author: collab onStoreDocument, REST/MCP/AI updatePageContent,
single-file import, zip/multi-file import, page duplication, and transclusion
unsync. Page restore introduces no new content. Public share/readonly viewers
render fetched (already-stripped) content and do NOT open a collab socket, so
the only residual is a transient broadcast window to concurrent authenticated
editors (documented).
Implements docs/arbitrary-html-embed-plan.md (variant C).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The sidebar page tree only updated on other clients when a change was made
via the UI tree, in an open tab, within a ~50ms client relay window — API/MCP/
AI/import changes never propagated. Move the source of truth to the server.
Server:
- Enrich PageEvent with thin TreeNodeSnapshot(s) so the WS listener never reads
the DB (avoids the in-transaction visibility race). insertPage fills the
create snapshot from its returning() row; removePage ships only the deleted
subtree ROOT (client treeModel.remove drops descendants); restorePage carries
spaceId.
- New PAGE_MOVED event from movePage with old/new parent + position + snapshot
(generic PAGE_UPDATED stays for content/rename).
- WsService.emitTreeEvent mirrors emitCommentEvent (per-space restriction gate:
spaceHasRestrictions -> hasRestrictedAncestor -> broadcastToAuthorizedUsers);
author NOT excluded so non-UI creators see their own page (receiver is
idempotent).
- WsTreeService.broadcastPageCreated/Deleted/Moved + broadcastRefetchRoot;
new PageWsListener (create/delete/move/restore) registered in WsModule.
Client:
- Remove the client relay (emit + setTimeout(50)) from create/move/delete;
keep optimistic local updates. Make the optimistic create insert id-idempotent
(find-then-skip) so the now-fast server addTreeNode broadcast can't race it
into a duplicate row. addTreeNode inserts by fractional position among loaded
siblings (consistent order across clients).
Restore uses refetchRootTreeNodeEvent (robust for subtree re-attach). Rename/icon
updateOne and cross-space move realtime are deferred (commented as follow-ups).
Implements docs/backlog/realtime-tree-server-authoritative.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
These import paths relied on the private EE module that was deleted from
the repo. In the community build they either threw 'enterprise license'
(DOCX/PDF) or silently no-op'd (Confluence). The frontend buttons were
already removed in 38064064; this cleans up the dead backend stubs.
- import.service.ts: drop processDocx/processPdf methods, their dispatcher
branches, the pageId computation + insertPage spread, and the now-unused
moduleRef param/ModuleRef import
- file-import-task.service.ts: drop the Confluence branch and the now-unused
moduleRef param/ModuleRef import
- import.controller.ts: restrict file extensions to .md/.html and zip
sources to generic/notion; update the error message accordingly
- file.utils.ts: remove Confluence from the FileImportSource enum
- features.ts: remove the unused CONFLUENCE_IMPORT/DOCX_IMPORT/PDF_IMPORT
feature keys
The isConfluenceImport logic in import-attachment.service.ts is intentionally
left in place (real shared attachment-parsing code, not a stub); its removal
is a separate, riskier refactor.
- Add reversible write tools to the per-user agent toolset (page create/update/
move/soft-delete; comment reply + resolve), exposed under the user's JWT and
enforced by Docmost CASL; no permanent/force delete (D3).
- Non-spoofable agent provenance: sign actor/aiChatId into the access and collab
tokens (TokenService), propagate via jwt.strategy onto the request, and set
pages.last_updated_source/last_updated_ai_chat_id on REST create/update/move and
comments.created_source/resolved_source/ai_chat_id.
- packages/mcp: add an optional getCollabToken provider (content-edit provenance)
and guard against empty tokens; service-account /mcp path unchanged.
Frontend:
- Admin 'AI / Models' settings section: provider/model/embedding/base URL, a
write-only API key field, system prompt, and Test connection.
- AI chat panel (useChat + DefaultChatTransport): conversation list, streamed
messages, tool-call action log and page citations; header entry point gated on
settings.ai.chat.
Compile-verified (server nest build + client tsc/vite); not yet live-tested.
Known gaps: history 'AI agent' badge (C3), vector RAG (D), external MCP (E);
chat tool-card citation links pending a fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(export): add metadata file to preserve page icons and ordering on import
- Export includes `docmost-metadata.json`
- Import reads metadata to restore icons and sort siblings by original position
* cleanup
* bonus fixes
* handle unknown prosemirror nodes
* add docmost app version
* feat: implement space and workspace icons
- Create reusable AvatarUploader component supporting avatars, space icons, and workspace icons
- Add Sharp package for server-side image resizing and optimization
- Create reusable AvatarUploader component supporting avatars, space icons, and workspace icons
- Support removing icons
* add workspace logo support
- add upload loader
- add white background to transparent image
- other fixes and enhancements
* dark mode
* fixes
* cleanup
- Add PostgreSQL unaccent and pg_trgm extensions
- Create immutable f_unaccent wrapper function for performance
- Update all search queries to use f_unaccent for accent-insensitive matching
- Add 1MB limit to tsvector content to prevent errors on large documents
- Update full-text search trigger to use f_unaccent
- Fix MultiSelect client-side filtering to show server results properly
