Convert the htmlEmbed node from same-origin raw-HTML execution to a sandboxed
iframe (sandbox="allow-scripts allow-popups allow-forms", no allow-same-origin,
srcdoc) with postMessage auto-resize (validated by event.source) and an optional
manual height attr. The block now runs in an opaque origin and cannot reach the
viewer's cookies/session/API, so it is safe for any member.
Because the block is now harmless, remove the entire admin/role gating apparatus:
drop htmlEmbedAllowed/canAuthorHtmlEmbed/stripDisallowedHtmlEmbedNodes/
collectHtmlEmbedSources and every role-based strip on the write paths (collab
REST/MCP + socket, page create/duplicate, import x2, transclusion unsync), along
with the now-unused WorkspaceRepo/UserRepo injections and the PageService.create
callerRole param. Keep one strip: prepareContentForShare still removes htmlEmbed
on the anonymous public-share read path when the workspace master toggle is OFF.
The workspace settings.htmlEmbed toggle is now a plain feature switch (gates the
slash-menu and share rendering); when ON the block is available to all members.
Add settings.trackerHead: an admin-only raw HTML/JS analytics snippet injected
verbatim into the <head> of public share pages only (ShareSeoController), for
trackers that genuinely need same-origin. Admin-gated via the existing CASL
Manage/Settings ability; never injected into the authenticated app shell.
Closes security-review findings #1, #2, #4, #5, #10 (and #3 as a security issue).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The admin-only raw HTML/JS embed is a deliberate stored-XSS surface, so gate the
whole feature behind a workspace toggle that is OFF by default; it only works
when a workspace admin explicitly enables it.
- settings.htmlEmbed (boolean, default false) + workspace-update field htmlEmbed,
persisted via WorkspaceRepo.updateSetting with an audit diff. Flipping it is
admin-only (same Manage Settings CASL as other workspace toggles).
- New gate htmlEmbedAllowed(featureEnabled, role) = featureEnabled && admin/owner.
All 7 server write paths (create, duplicate, collab onStoreDocument, REST/MCP/AI
updatePageContent, single + zip import, transclusion unsync) now read the
workspace's settings.htmlEmbed and strip unless (toggle ON AND admin). OFF
(default, or a failed/empty workspace lookup) strips htmlEmbed for EVERYONE
including admins -> existing embeds are cleaned up on next save, none persist.
- Client (defense-in-depth): the /html slash item is hidden unless toggle ON +
admin; the NodeView executes nothing and shows a 'disabled in this workspace'
placeholder when OFF; an admin Switch in Workspace Settings -> General with a
description of the behavior.
- docs/html-embed-admin.md documents the toggle + admin-only + fail-closed
coedit (a non-admin save strips an admin's embed) + execution semantics.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Embed another page's LIVE content into a host page (it updates when the source
changes, not a static copy). A page can be flagged a template for discovery in
the picker; any accessible page can be embedded.
Server:
- migrations: pages.is_template (+ partial index) and page_template_references
(whole-page back-refs); db.d.ts/entity types hand-merged (db.d.ts is curated).
- POST /pages/toggle-template (CASL Edit) flips is_template; is_template is
returned by findById + the sidebar tree select so the tree menu label
reflects state. Search suggestions gain an onlyTemplates filter for the picker.
- POST /pages/template/lookup ({sourcePageIds[]}, <=50): returns each accessible
source's {title, icon, slugId, content, sourceUpdatedAt} with comment marks
stripped (same access path as transclusion: filterViewerAccessiblePageIds;
inaccessible -> no_access, missing -> not_found; error path -> not_found, never
raw content).
- reference sync (collectPageEmbedsFromPmJson + syncPageTemplateReferences) on
the Yjs save hook; duplicatePage remaps pageEmbed.sourcePageId + inserts refs.
Known MVP gap: REST content updates don't resync refs (lookup uses in-doc ids).
Client:
- pageEmbed node (editor-ext, registered in BOTH client + server schemas);
read-only NodeView with a batching lookup; '/Embed page' slash + template
picker (self-embed prevented); 'Make/Unset template' in the tree node menu.
- Cycle guard: an ancestry-chain context + depth cap (5) render a 'circular
embed' placeholder instead of recursing.
- Public shares show a placeholder (no public lookup in MVP).
MVP excludes (follow-ups): public-share lookup, unsync->static copy, server-side
expansion for export/RAG, MCP schema mirror, point-in-time snapshots.
Implements docs/page-templates-plan.md (MVP, variant A).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds an htmlEmbed block node that renders and executes raw HTML/CSS/JS in the
wiki origin (e.g. an analytics tracker) — the owner-chosen variant C. Because
this is stored-XSS by design, only workspace admins/owners may get such a node
persisted; everyone executes it when reading.
- Node (editor-ext): htmlEmbed atom/isolating block; source stored base64 in
data-source for lossless HTML<->JSON round-trip. renderHTML emits only the
encoded marker (never inlines raw markup), so generateHTML/export/search are
not themselves injection vectors. Registered in BOTH client extensions and
server tiptapExtensions. Markdown round-trip via an <!--html-embed:b64-->
comment (turndown) + a marked rule.
- Client NodeView: injects source and re-creates <script> elements so they
actually run; edit modal; renders in read-only/share too. Slash item is
admin-gated (adminOnly filtered by the user's workspace role).
- SERVER ENFORCEMENT (the real control — UI gating alone is insufficient):
stripHtmlEmbedNodes() removes htmlEmbed from any document persisted by a
non-admin, applied at every write path that introduces content from an
untrusted author: collab onStoreDocument, REST/MCP/AI updatePageContent,
single-file import, zip/multi-file import, page duplication, and transclusion
unsync. Page restore introduces no new content. Public share/readonly viewers
render fetched (already-stripped) content and do NOT open a collab socket, so
the only residual is a transient broadcast window to concurrent authenticated
editors (documented).
Implements docs/arbitrary-html-embed-plan.md (variant C).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
BullMQ rejects custom job IDs containing ':' (Redis key separator),
throwing "Custom Id cannot contain :" inside the onStoreDocument hook
for every agent edit. This broke agent-driven page saves (MCP
create_page runs as actor='agent') with HTTP 400.
Switch the agent dedup suffix from `${page.id}:agent` to
`${page.id}-agent`. The jobId is only used as a BullMQ dedup key and is
never parsed by the history processor; page.id is a UUID, so the
hyphenated id cannot collide with a human job whose id is a bare page.id.
Page-history snapshots are debounced/coalesced (one per 1–5 min window,
jobId=page.id). A human edit followed by an agent edit in the same window
collapsed into a single snapshot, losing both the pre-agent human state and
a deterministic record of the agent's result.
Two provenance-aware boundaries now bracket an agent intervention:
- Before: on a user->agent transition, onStoreDocument synchronously pins the
current (pre-agent) human content as its own history version tagged 'user',
inside the page-write transaction, before the agent overwrites it.
- After: agent stores enqueue an immediate (delay 0), source-keyed history job
(jobId=`${pageId}:agent`) so the agent's result snapshots deterministically
as 'agent' and a later human edit (jobId=page.id) cannot coalesce/retag it.
Also add an `id desc` tie-break to findPageLastHistory so "last history" stays
deterministic when two snapshots share a created_at, consistent with
findPageHistoryByPageId.
Known trade-offs (Variant 1): the delay-0 worker re-reads the row, leaving a
millisecond mis-tag window; multiple agent edits in one turn may yield multiple
versions. The reverse agent->human boundary is intentionally out of scope.
WIP checkpoint of the gitmost AI-chat backend (plan stages A + B1 + B3a).
The agent acts under the requesting user's JWT (Docmost CASL enforces page
access); the external service-account /mcp endpoint is untouched.
LLM provider config (A2-A4):
- integrations/crypto: AES-256-GCM SecretBoxService (key derived from APP_SECRET,
per-record salt/iv; clear error on rotation instead of crashing).
- ai_provider_credentials table/repo/types: encrypted API key stored outside
workspace settings/baseFields, write-only (never returned by any endpoint).
- integrations/ai: per-workspace AI SDK v6 provider driver (openai/gemini/ollama),
admin-gated GET(masked)/PATCH(write-only key)/Test endpoints; settings.ai.provider
holds non-secret config incl. systemPrompt. Removed unused AI_* env getters (DB is
the single source of truth).
Chat module (A1, A5-A8):
- ai_chats/ai_chat_messages repos (workspace-scoped, soft-delete, tsv never selected).
- core/ai-chat: CRUD + POST /ai-chat/stream (Fastify hijack + AI SDK v6
pipeUIMessageStreamToResponse, abort on disconnect, persist user/assistant msgs).
- Agent loop: streamText + stepCountIs(8); read tools searchPages/getPage via a
per-request DocmostClient over loopback REST under the user's minted access token.
- Gate settings.ai.chat (+ 503 when provider unconfigured); buildSystemPrompt with a
non-removable safety/anti-prompt-injection framework. Per-user rate limit.
Per-user auth (B1):
- @docmost/mcp DocmostClient gains an additive getToken variant (carry a user JWT,
re-fetch on 401) and exports DocmostClient; the email/password service-account path
(external /mcp, stdio) is unchanged.
Agent-edit provenance backbone (B3a):
- Migration: pages/page_history (last_updated_source, last_updated_ai_chat_id) and
comments (created_source, ai_chat_id, resolved_source).
- Signed actor/aiChatId claim in the collab token; onAuthenticate propagates it,
onStoreDocument writes it with a sticky agent marker, saveHistory copies it.
Migrations auto-run on boot (additive). Write tools, frontend, RAG and external MCP
servers are not in this checkpoint.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Work on mentions
* fix: properly parse page slug
* fix editor suggestion bugs
* mentions must start with whitespace
* add icon to page mention render
* feat: backlinks - WIP
* UI - WIP
* permissions check
* use FTS for page suggestion
* cleanup
* WIP
* page title fallback
* feat: handle internal link paste
* link styling
* WIP
* Switch back to LIKE operator for search suggestion
* WIP
* scope to workspaceId
* still create link for pages not found
* select necessary columns
* cleanups
