The controller's buildPageSlug truncates the page title via
`title?.substring(0, 70)` before slugifying, but no test drove that
branch (the only titled case was 16 chars). Add a resolvable-alias
case with a 119-char title whose 70-char boundary falls mid-word and
assert the 302 target's slug reflects only the first 70 characters.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add the two blocking test-coverage specs requested in the PR #214 review and
clear the cheap non-blocking items.
Must-fix:
- share-alias-redirect.controller.spec.ts: routing/leak guard for the public
GET /l/:alias resolver (modeled on share-seo.controller.routing.spec). Pins
302-to-canonical on a hit; SPA index without a 302 for unknown/dangling/
unreadable aliases and a null workspace (no name-existence leak); defensive
percent-decoding treated as unknown; self-hosted findFirst vs subdomain
findByHostname workspace resolution; 404 when no built client index exists.
- share-alias.controller.spec.ts: authz gates with mocked PageRepo/ShareService/
ShareAliasService/PageAccessService. Covers cross-workspace/nonexistent page
-> NotFoundException, validateCanEdit, resolveReadableSharePage null ->
BadRequestException, isSharingAllowed false -> ForbiddenException, set happy
path delegation, remove() of a dangling alias (pageId null) skipping
validateCanEdit but still deleting, and for-page validateCanView.
Cheap review items:
- Remove dead Logger import/field from ShareAliasRedirectController.
- Remove dead PagePermissionRepo import/dependency from ShareAliasController.
- Register the new share-alias UI strings in en-US and ru-RU catalogs.
- Add an [Unreleased]/Added CHANGELOG entry for /l/:alias (#205).
- Drop the tautological boilerplate assertions from the migration spec
(exports up/down; runtime checks of typed entity literals).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a retargetable, human-readable vanity link namespace /l/<alias> that
sits alongside the untouched /share/... routes.
- New share_aliases table (workspace-scoped, UNIQUE(workspace_id, alias),
page_id nullable ON DELETE SET NULL so the address outlives its target).
- ShareAliasRepo + ShareAliasService (create / no-op / 409 reassign guard /
availability / request-time readable-target resolution through the single
existing share boundary).
- Public ShareAliasRedirectController (GET /l/:alias) issues a 302 (never 301,
the target is mutable) to the canonical /share/:key/p/:slug page; unknown /
dangling / no-longer-readable aliases serve the SPA index with no leak.
'l/:alias' excluded from the global /api prefix.
- Authenticated ShareAliasController (set/remove/availability/for-page).
- Shared ASCII-only normalize/validate util (server + client copies).
- Client: Custom address block in the share modal (live normalize + debounced
availability + copy + reassign confirmation dialog).
- Unit tests: util, repo SQL-shape, service semantics, migration/entity sanity
(server jest) + client alias util (vitest).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`ShareSeoController.getShare` resolved the inherited share with the RAW
`getShareForPage`, which does NOT run the restricted-ancestor gate. So for a
page shared with includeSubPages whose descendant is permission-restricted, the
SEO route served that descendant's real title in <title>/og:title/twitter:title
to anonymous visitors and crawlers — even though the content API returns 404 for
it (red-team finding #3).
Funnel the SEO path through the canonical `resolveReadableSharePage` boundary
(the single place that checks `hasRestrictedAncestor`): a non-readable page now
serves the plain SPA index with no meta. Also honour `isSharingAllowed` — a
share whose workspace/space sharing toggle was flipped off after creation no
longer leaks its title via SEO. Title comes from the server-resolved page;
`buildShareMetaHtml` already emits robots=noindex when the share opted out of
indexing.
Tests (controller routing, fs spied at call time so bcrypt's native loader is
untouched): non-readable page => plain index, no title; sharing-disabled =>
plain index; readable+indexing => title + og:title, no noindex; readable+no-
indexing => noindex. Asserts getShareForPage is never called by the SEO path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Batches 6-9: behaviour-preserving extractions of testable pure cores plus the
tests they unblock, and a fix for the broken client test environment.
Full suites green: server 113 suites / 1117 + 1 todo, client 30 files / 338.
client (R0 infra):
- vitest.setup.ts: in-memory localStorage/sessionStorage Storage stub wired via
setupFiles. Unblocks menu-items.gating.test.ts (was 9 failing) -> client suite
fully green. + menu-items.suggestions.test.ts (getSuggestionItems filter/sort).
share:
- extract buildShareMetaHtml (share-seo.util.ts) from the SEO controller; tests
for reflected-XSS escaping in <title>/og/twitter meta, noindex, truncation;
extractPageSlugId; updateAttachmentAttr; prepareContentForShare comment-strip
(anonymous-viewer metadata-leak guard).
ai-chat (security extractions):
- selectAccessibleHits: CASL post-filter for semantic search (restricted page in
an accessible space must NOT leak to the agent).
- validateResolvedAddresses: SSRF connect-time guard (block if ANY resolved
address is private).
- resolveAudioFormat: mime whitelist (dead `?? 'webm'` fallback dropped, set
unchanged). + mcp-servers toView header-leak guard, MCP tool namespacing.
collaboration (data-loss area):
- extract computeHistoryJob (pins the "agent delay MUST stay 0" invariant) and
resolveSource. Integration: onAuthenticate read-only matrix (collab auth
bypass), HistoryProcessor (contributor restore on save failure), onStoreDocument
Approach-A boundary snapshot (human revision pinned before agent overwrite).
Reviewed (APPROVE WITH SUGGESTIONS): extractions behaviour-preserving, security
tests mutation-resistant.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extract the admin trackerHead <head> injection into a pure injectTrackerHead()
and test it: a snippet containing $&/$$/backtick-dollar survives BYTE-FOR-BYTE
(pins the function-replacer fix), empty/whitespace/undefined and a missing </head>
leave the html unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Deduplicate the "save a workspace setting" plumbing shared by HtmlEmbedSettings
and TrackerSettings (workspace atom read, isLoading state, updateWorkspace + atom
merge forcing settings[key], success/error notifications) into a new
feature-scoped hook useWorkspaceSetting(key).
- Each component keeps its own interaction model: html-embed is an optimistic
toggle with revert-on-failure; tracker is edit-then-save on an explicit button.
- Unify error handling on the better pattern: surface err.response?.data?.message
and use console.error (html-embed previously used console.log + a generic message).
No user-facing behavior change; client typecheck clean.
Test-coverage follow-ups (untested trackerHead injection in ShareSeoController and
the no-op audit branch) tracked in #100.
The '(shareId,pageId) -> usable non-restricted page in THIS share' boundary was
written as 3 must-be-identical async sequences. They weren't: the chat funnel
omitted an explicit page.deletedAt check (latently safe via getShareForPage's
CTE) and layered isSharingAllowed separately. Add ShareService.resolveReadable-
SharePage(shareId,pageId,workspaceId) running the single canonical sequence
(getShareForPage -> id match (skipped when null) -> findById -> !deletedAt ->
!hasRestrictedAncestor) returning {share,page}|null; getSharedPage, the funnel,
and the getSharePage tool all use it. hasRestrictedAncestor now lives in the one
method no caller can skip; the funnel still returns uniform 404s and keeps
isSharingAllowed. Adds a direct security-invariant test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up fixes to the htmlEmbed-sandbox / trackerHead change:
- share-seo: inject trackerHead via a function replacer so `$`-sequences
($&, $', $`, $$) in the admin snippet are inserted literally instead of
being treated as String.replace substitution patterns; warn when the
</head> marker is absent instead of silently skipping injection.
- mcp: register a passthrough `htmlEmbed` node in the schema mirror so an
AI/MCP edit of a page containing an embed no longer throws
"Unknown node type: htmlEmbed" in TiptapTransformer.toYdoc.
- editor-ext + client: treat a non-finite `data-height` as auto (null) so a
crafted/corrupted height cannot disable auto-resize or yield a NaN iframe
height; extract a shared clampHeight helper.
- client: rename render-raw-html.{ts,test.ts} -> html-embed-sandbox.{...} and
shouldExecute -> shouldRender so the seam name matches the sandbox model.
- client: i18n the iframe title; surface the real error reason in
tracker-settings (console.error + err.response.data.message).
- docs: note hasHtmlEmbedNode is now a test-only helper; add an Unreleased
CHANGELOG entry; drop the dangling "arbitrary HTML embed" planning-doc ref.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Convert the htmlEmbed node from same-origin raw-HTML execution to a sandboxed
iframe (sandbox="allow-scripts allow-popups allow-forms", no allow-same-origin,
srcdoc) with postMessage auto-resize (validated by event.source) and an optional
manual height attr. The block now runs in an opaque origin and cannot reach the
viewer's cookies/session/API, so it is safe for any member.
Because the block is now harmless, remove the entire admin/role gating apparatus:
drop htmlEmbedAllowed/canAuthorHtmlEmbed/stripDisallowedHtmlEmbedNodes/
collectHtmlEmbedSources and every role-based strip on the write paths (collab
REST/MCP + socket, page create/duplicate, import x2, transclusion unsync), along
with the now-unused WorkspaceRepo/UserRepo injections and the PageService.create
callerRole param. Keep one strip: prepareContentForShare still removes htmlEmbed
on the anonymous public-share read path when the workspace master toggle is OFF.
The workspace settings.htmlEmbed toggle is now a plain feature switch (gates the
slash-menu and share rendering); when ON the block is available to all members.
Add settings.trackerHead: an admin-only raw HTML/JS analytics snippet injected
verbatim into the <head> of public share pages only (ShareSeoController), for
trackers that genuinely need same-origin. Admin-gated via the existing CASL
Manage/Settings ability; never injected into the authenticated app shell.
Closes security-review findings #1, #2, #4, #5, #10 (and #3 as a security issue).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add ~330 tests across server (Jest), client (Vitest), editor-ext (Vitest)
and packages/mcp (node:test) for the gitmost features added since
053a9c0d: AI chat, AI agent roles, public-share assistant, MCP per-user
auth, HTML embed, page templates/embed, realtime tree, tree
expand/collapse, and the AI-settings UI.
Test-tooling fixes (prerequisite, were silently hiding coverage):
- Repair 3 page-template specs broken by the 11-arg TransclusionService
constructor; they never compiled, so template access-control / content
-leak / unsync-strip coverage was fictitious.
- Build @docmost/editor-ext before server tests via a `pretest` hook;
the stale dist omitted the new HtmlEmbed/PageEmbed exports (TS2305).
- Let jest resolve the .tsx email templates: add `tsx` to
moduleFileExtensions and widen the ts-jest transform to (t|j)sx?.
Behaviour-preserving "extract pure core" refactors that the tests drive:
- server: resolveShareAssistantRequest + uiMessageTextLength
(public-share controller), decideBasicGate + mapAuthResultToResponse
(mcp), buildErrorAssistantRecord (ai-chat), jsonbObject export (roles).
- client: render-raw-html + shouldExecute/canEdit, decide-embed-state,
page-embed picker utils, tree-socket reducers, open/close branch maps,
isEndpointConfigured/resolveKeyField; buildTreeWithChildren now treats
a permission-trimmed orphan as a root instead of crashing.
Deferred (need a test DB or HTTP harness, documented in the specs):
repo-level Postgres integration tests and the public-share XFF E2E.
Pre-existing DI/lib0-ESM suite failures are untouched and out of scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The html-embed feature toggle was enforced CLIENT-side in the NodeView (reads
settings.htmlEmbed from the logged-in workspace), so an anonymous public-share
viewer — who has no workspace context — always saw it as OFF and got a
placeholder instead of the executing embed. That broke the whole point (a
tracker must run for anonymous visitors).
Make it server-authoritative:
- share.service prepareContentForShare (the single path both share-content
flows use) strips htmlEmbed from served content when the workspace toggle is
OFF; both callers (updatePublicAttachments host page + lookupTransclusionForShare)
resolve the toggle once and pass it. Fail-closed: missing workspace -> OFF ->
stripped.
- NodeView executes whatever it was served in read-only/share mode
(shouldExecute = !editor.isEditable || htmlEmbedEnabled); the disabled
placeholder now only shows in the editable editor when OFF.
Net: anonymous share + toggle ON -> server serves the (admin-authored) embed ->
it executes for everyone; toggle OFF -> stripped server-side from every
share-content path (true kill switch); a non-admin embed can never be served
(save-path strip). No XSS regression in the editable editor.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lets an unauthenticated viewer of a published share ask an AI scoped strictly
to that share's page tree. The authenticated agent is untouched; the security
boundary is the tool scope (no identity), and nothing is persisted.
Server:
- workspace toggle settings.ai.publicShareAssistant (default off) +
optional settings.ai.provider.publicShareChatModel (cheap model id; reuses
the chat driver/baseUrl/key). getChatModel(workspaceId, override) substitutes
only the model id, falling back to chatModel.
- POST /api/shares/ai/stream (@Public, SSE). Guardrail funnel, each failing
before streaming: toggle off -> 404; share missing/wrong-workspace/sharing
off -> 404; pageId not in share tree -> 404; provider unconfigured -> 503;
per-IP (5/min) and per-workspace (300/h, IP-independent) rate limits -> 429.
Uniform 404s never confirm a private page's existence.
- forShare read-only in-process toolset: searchSharePages (existing shareId
FTS branch, no spaceId/userId), getSharePage (getShareForPage gate +
share.id check, content via the public sanitizer), listSharePages. No write/
comment/history/cross-space/external-MCP tools.
- Locked share system prompt + immutable safety block; stepCountIs(5).
- /shares/page-info exposes an aiAssistant flag (gated behind isSharingAllowed).
Client: an ephemeral, text-only Ask-AI widget on the public shared page,
shown only when the flag is set; useChat -> /api/shares/ai/stream,
credentials omit. Admin toggle + model field in Settings -> AI.
Also adds a jest moduleNameMapper for src/-rooted imports (fixes pre-existing
unresolvable specs; additive).
Implements docs/public-share-assistant-plan.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix tree nodes sort
* remove comment mark in shares
* remove clickoutside hook for now
* feat: search in shared pages
* fix user-select
* use Link
* render page icons
