Commit Graph

2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
claude code agent 227
4a00dfc3b2 feat(mcp): per-user auth for the embedded /mcp endpoint
The embedded MCP server acted as a single service account; now each /mcp
session authenticates as the current user, so tools run under that user's
CASL and edits attribute to them.

- HTTP Basic (chosen path): Authorization: Basic email:password, validated
  server-side via AuthService; the session carries the issued user JWT (not
  the raw password). Password may contain ':' (split on first only).
- Bearer fallback: Authorization: Bearer <access JWT>, verified as ACCESS and
  additionally checked for an active session + non-disabled user (matching
  JwtStrategy), so revoked/disabled users are rejected.
- Service account stays as an optional fallback (no creds + env configured).
- packages/mcp createMcpHttpHandler accepts a per-request config resolver
  (back-compat: static config / stdio unchanged); identity is bound to the
  mcp-session-id at init and re-validated from the caller's own credentials on
  every request (anti session-fixation: a guessed session id can't be reused
  without matching creds).
- A full login (session + audit) happens only once at session init; later
  requests re-verify credentials via a new non-side-effecting
  AuthService.verifyUserCredentials (no session/audit spam).
- Failed-login limiter (5/60s, keyed per-IP, per-IP+email, and per-email so IP
  rotation can't brute one account) since direct login bypasses the controller
  throttler. Only real credential failures count.
- MCP_TOKEN shared guard moved off Authorization to an X-MCP-Token header
  (timing-safe compare); credsConfigured 503 gate replaced by a clear 401.
- No secrets logged; all auth resolved before res.hijack() so failures return
  clean 401 JSON. .env.example marks the service account optional.

Implements docs/backlog/mcp-per-user-auth.md (variant L).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-20 07:19:31 +03:00
vvzvlad
1f5987d6b0 feat(mcp): serve embedded community MCP server at /mcp
Replace the removed enterprise EE MCP (private apps/server/src/ee submodule,
license-gated /mcp route) with our docmost-mcp, vendored as an isolated ESM
workspace package and served by the server over HTTP — no enterprise license.

Backend:
- Add packages/mcp (@docmost/mcp): vendored docmost-mcp refactored into a
  side-effect-free createDocmostMcpServer() factory (38 tools preserved),
  stdio entry kept in stdio.ts, Streamable-HTTP session manager in http.ts.
- Add apps/server McpModule: @Post/@Get/@Delete('mcp') (served at /mcp via the
  existing global-prefix exclude), @SkipTransform + reply.hijack to bridge raw
  Fastify req/res into the SDK transport. The module dynamically imports the
  ESM-only package from CommonJS via a Function-indirected import resolved with
  require.resolve + file:// URL. Gated by the workspace ai.mcp toggle, a
  service-account (MCP_DOCMOST_EMAIL/PASSWORD/API_URL) and optional MCP_TOKEN;
  per-session idle eviction (MCP_SESSION_IDLE_MS).
- Drop the enterprise license check on mcpEnabled in workspace.service.
- Dockerfile: copy packages/mcp into the production image.
- .env.example: document MCP_DOCMOST_*, MCP_TOKEN, MCP_SESSION_IDLE_MS.

Frontend:
- Recreate the community "AI & MCP" workspace-settings panel (mcp-settings.tsx):
  admin-only toggle on settings.ai.mcp with optimistic update, copyable
  ${APP_URL}/mcp URL; wired into workspace-settings page. Reuses existing i18n.

Fixes:
- Pin packages/mcp tiptap deps to 3.20.4 (matching the client) and inline
  getStyleProperty, preventing a duplicate @tiptap/core@3.26.1 from leaking into
  the client editor via pnpm shamefully-hoist (was breaking apps/client tsc).
2026-06-16 23:54:53 +03:00