Extract parse/renderHtmlEmbedHeight and test: '300'->300, absent->null,
'abc'->null (pins the NaN guard), '120px'->120; render 120->data-height, null/0->{}.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up fixes to the htmlEmbed-sandbox / trackerHead change:
- share-seo: inject trackerHead via a function replacer so `$`-sequences
($&, $', $`, $$) in the admin snippet are inserted literally instead of
being treated as String.replace substitution patterns; warn when the
</head> marker is absent instead of silently skipping injection.
- mcp: register a passthrough `htmlEmbed` node in the schema mirror so an
AI/MCP edit of a page containing an embed no longer throws
"Unknown node type: htmlEmbed" in TiptapTransformer.toYdoc.
- editor-ext + client: treat a non-finite `data-height` as auto (null) so a
crafted/corrupted height cannot disable auto-resize or yield a NaN iframe
height; extract a shared clampHeight helper.
- client: rename render-raw-html.{ts,test.ts} -> html-embed-sandbox.{...} and
shouldExecute -> shouldRender so the seam name matches the sandbox model.
- client: i18n the iframe title; surface the real error reason in
tracker-settings (console.error + err.response.data.message).
- docs: note hasHtmlEmbedNode is now a test-only helper; add an Unreleased
CHANGELOG entry; drop the dangling "arbitrary HTML embed" planning-doc ref.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The encode catch comment promised 'fall back to raw' but the code returns '';
returning raw source wouldn't help anyway (un-encoded markup can't be atob-decoded
downstream, so decode would yield '' regardless), and a raw value in data-source
breaks the inert-storage guarantee. '' is the correct decode-symmetric failure —
fix the misleading comment to say so. Adds a codec test for the encode-throw path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Convert the htmlEmbed node from same-origin raw-HTML execution to a sandboxed
iframe (sandbox="allow-scripts allow-popups allow-forms", no allow-same-origin,
srcdoc) with postMessage auto-resize (validated by event.source) and an optional
manual height attr. The block now runs in an opaque origin and cannot reach the
viewer's cookies/session/API, so it is safe for any member.
Because the block is now harmless, remove the entire admin/role gating apparatus:
drop htmlEmbedAllowed/canAuthorHtmlEmbed/stripDisallowedHtmlEmbedNodes/
collectHtmlEmbedSources and every role-based strip on the write paths (collab
REST/MCP + socket, page create/duplicate, import x2, transclusion unsync), along
with the now-unused WorkspaceRepo/UserRepo injections and the PageService.create
callerRole param. Keep one strip: prepareContentForShare still removes htmlEmbed
on the anonymous public-share read path when the workspace master toggle is OFF.
The workspace settings.htmlEmbed toggle is now a plain feature switch (gates the
slash-menu and share rendering); when ON the block is available to all members.
Add settings.trackerHead: an admin-only raw HTML/JS analytics snippet injected
verbatim into the <head> of public share pages only (ShareSeoController), for
trackers that genuinely need same-origin. Admin-gated via the existing CASL
Manage/Settings ability; never injected into the authenticated app shell.
Closes security-review findings #1, #2, #4, #5, #10 (and #3 as a security issue).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add ~330 tests across server (Jest), client (Vitest), editor-ext (Vitest)
and packages/mcp (node:test) for the gitmost features added since
053a9c0d: AI chat, AI agent roles, public-share assistant, MCP per-user
auth, HTML embed, page templates/embed, realtime tree, tree
expand/collapse, and the AI-settings UI.
Test-tooling fixes (prerequisite, were silently hiding coverage):
- Repair 3 page-template specs broken by the 11-arg TransclusionService
constructor; they never compiled, so template access-control / content
-leak / unsync-strip coverage was fictitious.
- Build @docmost/editor-ext before server tests via a `pretest` hook;
the stale dist omitted the new HtmlEmbed/PageEmbed exports (TS2305).
- Let jest resolve the .tsx email templates: add `tsx` to
moduleFileExtensions and widen the ts-jest transform to (t|j)sx?.
Behaviour-preserving "extract pure core" refactors that the tests drive:
- server: resolveShareAssistantRequest + uiMessageTextLength
(public-share controller), decideBasicGate + mapAuthResultToResponse
(mcp), buildErrorAssistantRecord (ai-chat), jsonbObject export (roles).
- client: render-raw-html + shouldExecute/canEdit, decide-embed-state,
page-embed picker utils, tree-socket reducers, open/close branch maps,
isEndpointConfigured/resolveKeyField; buildTreeWithChildren now treats
a permission-trimmed orphan as a root instead of crashing.
Deferred (need a test DB or HTTP harness, documented in the specs):
repo-level Postgres integration tests and the public-share XFF E2E.
Pre-existing DI/lib0-ESM suite failures are untouched and out of scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds an htmlEmbed block node that renders and executes raw HTML/CSS/JS in the
wiki origin (e.g. an analytics tracker) — the owner-chosen variant C. Because
this is stored-XSS by design, only workspace admins/owners may get such a node
persisted; everyone executes it when reading.
- Node (editor-ext): htmlEmbed atom/isolating block; source stored base64 in
data-source for lossless HTML<->JSON round-trip. renderHTML emits only the
encoded marker (never inlines raw markup), so generateHTML/export/search are
not themselves injection vectors. Registered in BOTH client extensions and
server tiptapExtensions. Markdown round-trip via an <!--html-embed:b64-->
comment (turndown) + a marked rule.
- Client NodeView: injects source and re-creates <script> elements so they
actually run; edit modal; renders in read-only/share too. Slash item is
admin-gated (adminOnly filtered by the user's workspace role).
- SERVER ENFORCEMENT (the real control — UI gating alone is insufficient):
stripHtmlEmbedNodes() removes htmlEmbed from any document persisted by a
non-admin, applied at every write path that introduces content from an
untrusted author: collab onStoreDocument, REST/MCP/AI updatePageContent,
single-file import, zip/multi-file import, page duplication, and transclusion
unsync. Page restore introduces no new content. Public share/readonly viewers
render fetched (already-stripped) content and do NOT open a collab socket, so
the only residual is a transient broadcast window to concurrent authenticated
editors (documented).
Implements docs/arbitrary-html-embed-plan.md (variant C).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
