Public sharing (#218):
- Bind public-share content to the requested shareId. getSharedPage now
enforces dto.shareId (forwarded from /share/:shareId/p/:slug): the page must
be reachable THROUGH that exact share (its own share, or an includeSubPages
ancestor that contains it). A forged/mismatched shareId 404s instead of
rendering off the slug alone and no longer leaks the real canonical key via
redirect. A request with no shareId keeps the legacy slug-capability path.
- Trim /shares/page-info: drop internal metadata (creatorId, spaceId,
workspaceId, contributorIds, lastUpdated*, parent/position, lock/template
flags, timestamps) from the anonymous payload.
- Default share-to-web includeSubPages to false (opt-in), so enabling a share
no longer silently exposes the whole sub-tree (#216).
Editor (#218):
- Harden the new-page pre-sync window: the body editor is kept read-only until
the collab provider is Connected and synced, so early keystrokes can't land
only in local ProseMirror and then be clobbered by the server's empty doc.
- Surface a "Connecting… (read-only)" affordance during the static phase so
input isn't silently swallowed.
Other:
- Breadcrumb: resolve from the page's own ancestor data (/pages/breadcrumbs)
instead of waiting for the lazily-built sidebar tree, so deep pages don't
render a blank breadcrumb for seconds.
- Pasting GitHub `> [!type]` callouts now converts to a callout node instead of
a literal blockquote (new marked extension wired into markdownToHtml).
Tests: editor-sync-state gate (client), getSharedPage share-binding (server),
github-callout markdown conversion (editor-ext).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The '(shareId,pageId) -> usable non-restricted page in THIS share' boundary was
written as 3 must-be-identical async sequences. They weren't: the chat funnel
omitted an explicit page.deletedAt check (latently safe via getShareForPage's
CTE) and layered isSharingAllowed separately. Add ShareService.resolveReadable-
SharePage(shareId,pageId,workspaceId) running the single canonical sequence
(getShareForPage -> id match (skipped when null) -> findById -> !deletedAt ->
!hasRestrictedAncestor) returning {share,page}|null; getSharedPage, the funnel,
and the getSharePage tool all use it. hasRestrictedAncestor now lives in the one
method no caller can skip; the funnel still returns uniform 404s and keeps
isSharingAllowed. Adds a direct security-invariant test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Convert the htmlEmbed node from same-origin raw-HTML execution to a sandboxed
iframe (sandbox="allow-scripts allow-popups allow-forms", no allow-same-origin,
srcdoc) with postMessage auto-resize (validated by event.source) and an optional
manual height attr. The block now runs in an opaque origin and cannot reach the
viewer's cookies/session/API, so it is safe for any member.
Because the block is now harmless, remove the entire admin/role gating apparatus:
drop htmlEmbedAllowed/canAuthorHtmlEmbed/stripDisallowedHtmlEmbedNodes/
collectHtmlEmbedSources and every role-based strip on the write paths (collab
REST/MCP + socket, page create/duplicate, import x2, transclusion unsync), along
with the now-unused WorkspaceRepo/UserRepo injections and the PageService.create
callerRole param. Keep one strip: prepareContentForShare still removes htmlEmbed
on the anonymous public-share read path when the workspace master toggle is OFF.
The workspace settings.htmlEmbed toggle is now a plain feature switch (gates the
slash-menu and share rendering); when ON the block is available to all members.
Add settings.trackerHead: an admin-only raw HTML/JS analytics snippet injected
verbatim into the <head> of public share pages only (ShareSeoController), for
trackers that genuinely need same-origin. Admin-gated via the existing CASL
Manage/Settings ability; never injected into the authenticated app shell.
Closes security-review findings #1, #2, #4, #5, #10 (and #3 as a security issue).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The html-embed feature toggle was enforced CLIENT-side in the NodeView (reads
settings.htmlEmbed from the logged-in workspace), so an anonymous public-share
viewer — who has no workspace context — always saw it as OFF and got a
placeholder instead of the executing embed. That broke the whole point (a
tracker must run for anonymous visitors).
Make it server-authoritative:
- share.service prepareContentForShare (the single path both share-content
flows use) strips htmlEmbed from served content when the workspace toggle is
OFF; both callers (updatePublicAttachments host page + lookupTransclusionForShare)
resolve the toggle once and pass it. Fail-closed: missing workspace -> OFF ->
stripped.
- NodeView executes whatever it was served in read-only/share mode
(shouldExecute = !editor.isEditable || htmlEmbedEnabled); the disabled
placeholder now only shows in the editable editor when OFF.
Net: anonymous share + toggle ON -> server serves the (admin-authored) embed ->
it executes for everyone; toggle OFF -> stripped server-side from every
share-content path (true kill switch); a non-admin embed can never be served
(save-path strip). No XSS regression in the editable editor.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix tree nodes sort
* remove comment mark in shares
* remove clickoutside hook for now
* feat: search in shared pages
* fix user-select
* use Link
* render page icons
