api_key-принципал стал полноправным REST-принципалом → мог начеканить 24-ч
COLLAB-токен, который AuthenticationExtension не сверял с api_keys, и ревокация
не доставала websocket-редактирование. Блокировать /collab-token для api_key
нельзя (это правки агентов). Решение fail-closed:
- JwtCollabPayload расширен полем principal ('session'|'api_key') + apiKeyId.
generateCollabToken штампует его в КАЖДЫЙ токен: 'api_key'+apiKeyId, когда
чеканит api-key-принципал (внешний MCP-агент), иначе 'session'. Дискриминатор
ключуется на ОРИГИНЕ (наличии api-key), НЕ на actor:'agent' — внутренний
session-backed AI-агент остаётся 'session' и на no-check пути.
- /auth/collab-token читает подписью-выведенные req.raw.authType/apiKeyId
(не тело) и прокидывает origin через getCollabToken → generateCollabToken.
- doAuthenticate: при principal='api_key' на connect прогоняет
ApiKeyService.validate (отозванный ключ → новых collab-подключений нет; инфра
пробрасывается). api_key без apiKeyId — reject. Claimless-токен доверяется
только В ПРЕДЕЛАХ 24-ч grace-окна роллаута (легаси session-токен, api_key его
начеканить не мог); после окна всякий валидный токен обязан нести
дискриминатор, поэтому claimless — баг и отвергается (не молча-доверие 24ч).
CollaborationModule импортирует ApiKeyModule.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves the open items from the latest PR #143 code review:
- test(page): cover the four agentSourceFields stamp sites (create, update,
movePage, movePageToSpace) with agent + normal-user payload assertions;
add findById({ includeIsAgent: true }) wiring guards to the JWT and collab
auth-seam specs so a future drop of the option is caught.
- fix(privacy): drop `isAgent` from UserRepo.baseFields and gate it behind a
new opt-in `findById({ includeIsAgent })`, requested only by the two auth
seams that derive provenance — stops the flag leaking via the workspace
member list and generic user payloads.
- docs: correct the agentSourceFields JSDoc and the two UPDATE-site comments
to distinguish INSERT (omitted column → DB default 'user') from UPDATE
(omitted column → existing value kept, Kysely writes only present keys).
- style(page): collapse three stray double blank lines left by an earlier edit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Architecture & design:
- Arch A: introduce resolveProvenance() as the single source of truth for
deriving a write's actor/aiChatId from the SIGNED identity, and wire it into
BOTH transport seams — the REST jwt.strategy and the collab
authentication.extension. Previously the collab seam derived actor from the
token claim alone and ignored user.isAgent, so a flagged service account's
page-content edits over the websocket persisted as lastUpdatedSource='user',
drifting from REST. The seams now share one resolver and can't diverge.
- Arch B: drop AiAgentBadge's page-history coupling. The generic ui/ badge no
longer imports historyAtoms; it exposes an onActivate callback fired after the
deep-link, and the history row passes onActivate to close its own modal.
Suggestions/warnings:
- S1: soften the jwt.strategy provenance comment (applies to every REST write).
- S2/suggestion-3: drop the redundant comment-list-item null-aiChatId test
(covered by ai-agent-badge.test.tsx).
- S3: de-duplicate jwt.strategy.spec test #3 (the no-claim→'user' half
duplicated test #2); keep only the signed actor='agent' claim assertion.
- W2: add keyboard-activation tests for the badge (Enter/Space, unrelated key).
- W3: flip the design doc status to "реализовано (#143)".
Tests:
- new auth-provenance.decorator.spec.ts unit-tests resolveProvenance +
agentSourceFields.
- new collab-seam test: is_agent user with no claim → actor='agent'
(Arch A regression guard).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Batches 6-9: behaviour-preserving extractions of testable pure cores plus the
tests they unblock, and a fix for the broken client test environment.
Full suites green: server 113 suites / 1117 + 1 todo, client 30 files / 338.
client (R0 infra):
- vitest.setup.ts: in-memory localStorage/sessionStorage Storage stub wired via
setupFiles. Unblocks menu-items.gating.test.ts (was 9 failing) -> client suite
fully green. + menu-items.suggestions.test.ts (getSuggestionItems filter/sort).
share:
- extract buildShareMetaHtml (share-seo.util.ts) from the SEO controller; tests
for reflected-XSS escaping in <title>/og/twitter meta, noindex, truncation;
extractPageSlugId; updateAttachmentAttr; prepareContentForShare comment-strip
(anonymous-viewer metadata-leak guard).
ai-chat (security extractions):
- selectAccessibleHits: CASL post-filter for semantic search (restricted page in
an accessible space must NOT leak to the agent).
- validateResolvedAddresses: SSRF connect-time guard (block if ANY resolved
address is private).
- resolveAudioFormat: mime whitelist (dead `?? 'webm'` fallback dropped, set
unchanged). + mcp-servers toView header-leak guard, MCP tool namespacing.
collaboration (data-loss area):
- extract computeHistoryJob (pins the "agent delay MUST stay 0" invariant) and
resolveSource. Integration: onAuthenticate read-only matrix (collab auth
bypass), HistoryProcessor (contributor restore on save failure), onStoreDocument
Approach-A boundary snapshot (human revision pinned before agent overwrite).
Reviewed (APPROVE WITH SUGGESTIONS): extractions behaviour-preserving, security
tests mutation-resistant.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
agent_coder
claude_code