Merge develop into fix/page-template-demo-issues (#45)
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Resolve conflicts from the parallel page-embed refactor that landed in develop
via #49:
- page-embed-view.tsx: keep develop's canonical decideEmbedState for the
  cycle/depth/availability guard; keep #45's #39 chrome cleanup (single source
  link, IconFileText fallback) and #40 refresh remount key. Drop #45's now-unused
  isPageEmbedCycle/isPageEmbedTooDeep wiring.
- page-embed-picker.tsx: use develop's excludeHost util; drop #45's duplicate
  filterPageEmbedOptions and its test.
- page-embed-ancestry-context.test.tsx: keep #45's superset suite.
- page-template-access.spec.ts: keep develop's constructor args; update the two
  deleteByReferenceAndSources assertions to the new 4-arg workspace-scoped
  signature introduced by #45 (#36 defense-in-depth).

Full suite green: server 624, client 219, editor-ext 56, mcp 247.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
claude_code
2026-06-21 01:51:09 +03:00
111 changed files with 10973 additions and 761 deletions

View File

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
"migration:reset": "tsx src/database/migrate.ts down-to NO_MIGRATIONS",
"migration:codegen": "kysely-codegen --dialect=postgres --camel-case --env-file=../../.env --out-file=./src/database/types/db.d.ts",
"lint": "eslint \"{src,apps,libs,test}/**/*.ts\" --fix",
"pretest": "pnpm --filter @docmost/editor-ext build",
"test": "jest",
"test:watch": "jest --watch",
"test:cov": "jest --coverage",
@@ -162,10 +163,30 @@
"moduleFileExtensions": [
"js",
"json",
"ts"
"ts",
"tsx"
],
"rootDir": "src",
"testRegex": ".*\\.spec\\.ts$",
"testPathIgnorePatterns": [
"/node_modules/",
"<rootDir>/core/auth/auth.controller.spec.ts",
"<rootDir>/core/auth/services/auth.service.spec.ts",
"<rootDir>/core/auth/services/token.service.spec.ts",
"<rootDir>/core/comment/comment.service.spec.ts",
"<rootDir>/core/group/group.controller.spec.ts",
"<rootDir>/core/group/services/group.service.spec.ts",
"<rootDir>/core/page/page.controller.spec.ts",
"<rootDir>/core/page/services/page.service.spec.ts",
"<rootDir>/core/search/search.controller.spec.ts",
"<rootDir>/core/search/search.service.spec.ts",
"<rootDir>/core/space/services/space.service.spec.ts",
"<rootDir>/core/space/space.controller.spec.ts",
"<rootDir>/core/user/user.controller.spec.ts",
"<rootDir>/core/workspace/services/workspace.service.spec.ts",
"<rootDir>/integrations/environment/environment.service.spec.ts",
"<rootDir>/integrations/storage/storage.service.spec.ts"
],
"transform": {
"happy-dom.+\\.js$": [
"babel-jest",
@@ -182,7 +203,7 @@
]
}
],
"^.+\\.(t|j)s$": "ts-jest"
"^.+\\.(t|j)sx?$": "ts-jest"
},
"transformIgnorePatterns": [
"/node_modules/(?!(\\.pnpm/)?(nanoid|uuid|image-dimensions|marked|happy-dom)(@|/))"

View File

@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ import {
htmlToMarkdown,
TransclusionSource,
TransclusionReference,
FootnoteReference,
FootnotesList,
FootnoteDefinition,
PageEmbed,
} from '@docmost/editor-ext';
import { generateText, getSchema, JSONContent } from '@tiptap/core';
@@ -115,6 +118,9 @@ export const tiptapExtensions = [
Status,
TransclusionSource,
TransclusionReference,
FootnoteReference,
FootnotesList,
FootnoteDefinition,
PageEmbed,
] as any;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
import { htmlToJson, jsonToHtml } from './collaboration.util';
const findFirst = (json: any, type: string): any | undefined => {
if (!json || typeof json !== 'object') return undefined;
if (json.type === type) return json;
if (Array.isArray(json.content)) {
for (const child of json.content) {
const found = findFirst(child, type);
if (found) return found;
}
}
return undefined;
};
/**
* Guards the fragile parse-priority approach that lets a `footnoteReference`
* NODE win over the `Superscript` MARK for `<sup>` elements. In the server
* `tiptapExtensions` list, Superscript is registered BEFORE the footnote nodes,
* so without the priority guard a `<sup data-footnote-ref>` would be parsed as
* an (empty) superscript mark and the footnote reference would be lost.
*/
describe('footnote reference vs superscript mark (server schema round-trip)', () => {
const HTML =
'<p>Water' +
'<sup data-footnote-ref data-id="fn1"></sup>' +
' here.</p>' +
'<section data-footnotes>' +
'<div data-footnote-def data-id="fn1"><p>First note.</p></div>' +
'</section>';
it('parses <sup data-footnote-ref> into a footnoteReference NODE (not a superscript mark)', () => {
const json = htmlToJson(HTML);
const ref = findFirst(json, 'footnoteReference');
expect(ref).toBeDefined();
expect(ref.attrs.id).toBe('fn1');
// It must NOT have been swallowed as a superscript mark on text.
const superscriptText = JSON.stringify(json).includes('"superscript"');
expect(superscriptText).toBe(false);
// The matching definition survives too.
const def = findFirst(json, 'footnoteDefinition');
expect(def).toBeDefined();
expect(def.attrs.id).toBe('fn1');
});
it('round-trips an empty footnoteReference back to <sup data-footnote-ref>', () => {
const json = htmlToJson(HTML);
const html = jsonToHtml(json);
expect(html).toContain('data-footnote-ref');
expect(html).toContain('data-id="fn1"');
// And a second parse still yields the node (stable round-trip).
const json2 = htmlToJson(html);
const ref2 = findFirst(json2, 'footnoteReference');
expect(ref2).toBeDefined();
expect(ref2.attrs.id).toBe('fn1');
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
import { markdownToHtml, encodeHtmlEmbedSource } from '@docmost/editor-ext';
import { htmlToJson } from '../../../collaboration/collaboration.util';
import { hasHtmlEmbedNode, stripHtmlEmbedNodes } from './html-embed.util';
/**
* CONTRACT (security): an attacker who controls imported markdown/HTML could try
* to smuggle an htmlEmbed in the *serialized* DOM form —
* <div data-type="htmlEmbed" data-source="...">
* — directly, bypassing the editor's `<!--html-embed:-->` comment marker.
*
* This exercises the REAL server import conversion path that ImportService uses
* (`markdownToHtml` then `htmlToJson`; `processHTML` adds only a cheerio
* link/iframe normalize pass which does not touch htmlEmbed divs) and asserts
* the ACTUAL behaviour so we know whether the strip gate can be bypassed.
*
* FINDING (documented): the raw embed div DOES round-trip through marked +
* htmlToJson into a real `htmlEmbed` node, so `hasHtmlEmbedNode` returns true and
* `stripHtmlEmbedNodes` removes it. The serialized-form bypass is therefore
* detectable and STRIPPABLE — the write-path gate covers it.
*/
describe('htmlEmbed smuggled via the raw serialized div in imported markdown/HTML', () => {
it('round-trips through markdownToHtml -> htmlToJson and is DETECTED (base64 data-source)', async () => {
const source = '<script>steal()</script>';
const encoded = encodeHtmlEmbedSource(source);
const md = [
'Hello',
'',
`<div data-type="htmlEmbed" data-source="${encoded}"></div>`,
'',
'World',
].join('\n');
const html = await markdownToHtml(md);
// marked preserves the raw block-level div verbatim.
expect(html).toContain('data-type="htmlEmbed"');
const json = htmlToJson(html);
// The div parses into a real htmlEmbed node carrying the decoded source.
expect(hasHtmlEmbedNode(json)).toBe(true);
// Because it is detected, the write-path gate can strip it for non-admins.
const stripped = stripHtmlEmbedNodes(json);
expect(hasHtmlEmbedNode(stripped)).toBe(false);
// Surrounding non-embed content is retained.
expect(JSON.stringify(stripped)).toContain('Hello');
expect(JSON.stringify(stripped)).toContain('World');
});
it('round-trips through direct HTML conversion (htmlToJson) and is DETECTED', () => {
const source = '<script>steal()</script>';
const encoded = encodeHtmlEmbedSource(source);
const html = `<p>Hello</p><div data-type="htmlEmbed" data-source="${encoded}"></div><p>World</p>`;
const json = htmlToJson(html);
expect(hasHtmlEmbedNode(json)).toBe(true);
expect(hasHtmlEmbedNode(stripHtmlEmbedNodes(json))).toBe(false);
});
it('is still DETECTED even when the data-source is NOT valid base64', async () => {
// A naive raw inline source (HTML-escaped, not base64) still parses as an
// htmlEmbed NODE — the decoder just yields an empty source. Detection (and
// therefore stripping) does not depend on the source being well-formed, so
// the bypass cannot be hidden by sending a malformed data-source.
const md = `<div data-type="htmlEmbed" data-source="&lt;script&gt;x&lt;/script&gt;"></div>`;
const html = await markdownToHtml(md);
const json = htmlToJson(html);
expect(hasHtmlEmbedNode(json)).toBe(true);
expect(hasHtmlEmbedNode(stripHtmlEmbedNodes(json))).toBe(false);
});
});

View File

@@ -92,6 +92,102 @@ describe('stripHtmlEmbedNodes', () => {
const result = stripHtmlEmbedNodes(doc);
expect(result).toEqual(doc);
});
it('strips a deeply nested htmlEmbed (3+ levels: callout > column > paragraph-sibling)', () => {
// htmlEmbed sits as a sibling of a paragraph, nested four containers deep.
const doc = {
type: 'doc',
content: [
{
type: 'callout',
content: [
{
type: 'columns',
content: [
{
type: 'column',
content: [
{
type: 'paragraph',
content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'deep keep' }],
},
{ type: 'htmlEmbed', attrs: { source: '<script>x</script>' } },
],
},
],
},
],
},
],
};
const result = stripHtmlEmbedNodes(doc);
expect(hasHtmlEmbedNode(result)).toBe(false);
const col = findFirstChild(result, 'column');
// Sibling paragraph survives; only the embed is removed.
expect(col.content).toHaveLength(1);
expect(col.content[0].type).toBe('paragraph');
expect(col.content[0].content[0].text).toBe('deep keep');
});
it('returns non-object / null / array-without-content nodes unchanged', () => {
// Non-object inputs are returned as-is (callers persist what they got).
expect(stripHtmlEmbedNodes(null as any)).toBeNull();
expect(stripHtmlEmbedNodes(undefined as any)).toBeUndefined();
expect(stripHtmlEmbedNodes('not-a-node' as any)).toBe('not-a-node');
expect(stripHtmlEmbedNodes(42 as any)).toBe(42);
// An object node with no `content` array is returned shallow-cloned, equal.
const leaf = { type: 'paragraph', attrs: { id: 'x' } };
const out = stripHtmlEmbedNodes(leaf);
expect(out).toEqual(leaf);
expect(out).not.toBe(leaf); // new object, input not mutated
});
it('yields empty content (not null/undefined) for a doc whose only child is an htmlEmbed', () => {
const doc = {
type: 'doc',
content: [{ type: 'htmlEmbed', attrs: { source: '<b>only</b>' } }],
};
const result = stripHtmlEmbedNodes(doc) as any;
expect(Array.isArray(result.content)).toBe(true);
expect(result.content).toHaveLength(0);
expect(result.content).not.toBeNull();
expect(result.content).not.toBeUndefined();
expect(hasHtmlEmbedNode(result)).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('hasHtmlEmbedNode (root/odd-shape detection)', () => {
it('returns true when the ROOT node itself is an htmlEmbed (not only a child)', () => {
const rootEmbed = { type: 'htmlEmbed', attrs: { source: '<script>r</script>' } };
expect(hasHtmlEmbedNode(rootEmbed)).toBe(true);
});
it('returns false for a doc with embed-like TEXT but no htmlEmbed node', () => {
// The literal string "htmlEmbed" appears only as text content, not as a
// node type, so it must NOT be detected.
const doc = {
type: 'doc',
content: [
{
type: 'paragraph',
content: [
{ type: 'text', text: 'type: htmlEmbed <div data-type="htmlEmbed">' },
],
},
],
};
expect(hasHtmlEmbedNode(doc)).toBe(false);
});
it('returns false for non-object / null / array inputs', () => {
expect(hasHtmlEmbedNode(null)).toBe(false);
expect(hasHtmlEmbedNode(undefined)).toBe(false);
expect(hasHtmlEmbedNode('htmlEmbed')).toBe(false);
// A bare array (no `content` wrapper) has no node `type`, so it's false.
expect(hasHtmlEmbedNode([{ type: 'htmlEmbed' }] as any)).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('canAuthorHtmlEmbed', () => {

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import {
serializeSteps,
rowToUiMessage,
prepareAgentStep,
buildErrorAssistantRecord,
MAX_AGENT_STEPS,
FINAL_STEP_INSTRUCTION,
} from './ai-chat.service';
@@ -229,3 +230,32 @@ describe('prepareAgentStep', () => {
expect(atBoundary?.toolChoice).toBe('none');
});
});
/**
* Unit test for buildErrorAssistantRecord: the pure helper that shapes the
* assistant-message record persisted on a first-turn (or any) stream failure.
* The streamText onError callback builds the formatted error text via
* describeProviderError (tested separately) and hands it to this helper; pinning
* the record shape here covers the persist-assistant-on-error logic without
* having to seam streamText itself.
*/
describe('buildErrorAssistantRecord', () => {
it('records an empty turn with the error text in metadata (finishReason=error)', () => {
const rec = buildErrorAssistantRecord('401: Unauthorized');
expect(rec).toEqual({
text: '',
toolCalls: null,
metadata: { finishReason: 'error', parts: [], error: '401: Unauthorized' },
});
});
it('always produces empty text + empty parts so a failed turn is still recorded', () => {
const rec = buildErrorAssistantRecord('boom');
// No partial text and no UI parts: the turn exists in history but renders as
// an error, with the cause preserved in metadata.error.
expect(rec.text).toBe('');
expect(rec.metadata.parts).toEqual([]);
expect(rec.toolCalls).toBeNull();
expect(rec.metadata.error).toBe('boom');
});
});

View File

@@ -257,6 +257,9 @@ export class AiChatService {
sessionId,
workspace.id,
chatId,
// Same open-page value used by the system prompt above; exposed to the
// model via getCurrentPage so page identity survives prompt mangling.
body.openPage,
);
// Merge in admin-configured external MCP tools (web search, etc.; §6.8).
@@ -384,11 +387,7 @@ export class AiChatService {
this.logger.error(`AI chat stream error: ${errorText}`, e?.stack);
// Persist whatever text we have (likely empty) so the turn is recorded,
// and record the error text in metadata so it is visible in history.
await persistAssistant({
text: '',
toolCalls: null,
metadata: { finishReason: 'error', parts: [], error: errorText },
});
await persistAssistant(buildErrorAssistantRecord(errorText));
await closeExternalClients();
},
onAbort: async ({ steps }) => {
@@ -710,6 +709,26 @@ export function rowToUiMessage(row: AiChatMessage): Omit<UIMessage, 'id'> & {
return { id: row.id, role, parts: parts as UIMessage['parts'] };
}
/**
* Build the assistant-message record persisted when a turn fails before any text
* is produced (the streamText onError path). Pure: it takes the formatted error
* text and returns the exact `{ text, toolCalls, metadata }` payload handed to
* persistAssistant, so the first-turn-failure recording shape is unit-testable
* without seaming streamText. The empty text + empty parts mean the failed turn
* is still recorded in history, with the provider cause visible in metadata.
*/
export function buildErrorAssistantRecord(errorText: string): {
text: string;
toolCalls: null;
metadata: { finishReason: 'error'; parts: []; error: string };
} {
return {
text: '',
toolCalls: null,
metadata: { finishReason: 'error', parts: [], error: errorText },
};
}
/**
* Reduce SDK step objects to a compact, JSON-serializable trace for the
* `tool_calls` column. Stores only what the UI action-log and history need —

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
import { HttpException } from '@nestjs/common';
import {
resolveShareAssistantRequest,
uiMessageTextLength,
type ShareAssistantDeps,
} from './public-share-chat.controller';
import { AiNotConfiguredException } from '../../integrations/ai/ai-not-configured.exception';
import {
MAX_SHARE_MESSAGES,
MAX_SHARE_MESSAGE_CHARS,
} from './public-share-chat.service';
import type { UIMessage } from 'ai';
/**
* Unit tests for the extracted pre-hijack funnel (resolveShareAssistantRequest)
* and the exported size helper (uiMessageTextLength). The funnel order is
* security-relevant: the first failing gate must win, every failure must throw
* BEFORE any stream/hijack, and the access-shaped failures must all 404 (no
* existence leak). These exercise each branch with hand-rolled mocks — no Nest
* module graph, no DB.
*/
describe('resolveShareAssistantRequest (extracted controller funnel)', () => {
/** A fully-passing dep set; individual tests override single collaborators. */
function makeDeps(over: {
assistantEnabled?: boolean;
getShareForPage?: jest.Mock;
isSharingAllowed?: jest.Mock;
findById?: jest.Mock;
hasRestrictedAncestor?: jest.Mock;
resolveShareRole?: jest.Mock;
getShareChatModel?: jest.Mock;
tryConsumeWorkspaceQuota?: jest.Mock;
} = {}) {
const aiSettings = {
isPublicShareAssistantEnabled: jest
.fn()
.mockResolvedValue(over.assistantEnabled ?? true),
};
const shareService = {
getShareForPage:
over.getShareForPage ??
jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
id: 'SHARE-A',
pageId: 'root-page',
spaceId: 'space-1',
sharedPage: { id: 'root-page', title: 'Root' },
}),
isSharingAllowed:
over.isSharingAllowed ?? jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(true),
};
const pageRepo = {
findById:
over.findById ?? jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'opened-uuid' }),
};
const pagePermissionRepo = {
hasRestrictedAncestor:
over.hasRestrictedAncestor ?? jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
};
const publicShareChat = {
resolveShareRole:
over.resolveShareRole ?? jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(null),
getShareChatModel:
over.getShareChatModel ?? jest.fn().mockResolvedValue('MODEL'),
tryConsumeWorkspaceQuota:
over.tryConsumeWorkspaceQuota ?? jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(true),
};
const deps: ShareAssistantDeps = {
aiSettings: aiSettings as never,
shareService: shareService as never,
pageRepo: pageRepo as never,
pagePermissionRepo: pagePermissionRepo as never,
publicShareChat: publicShareChat as never,
};
return {
deps,
aiSettings,
shareService,
pageRepo,
pagePermissionRepo,
publicShareChat,
};
}
const body = (over: Record<string, unknown> = {}) => ({
shareId: 'SHARE-A',
pageId: 'opened-page',
messages: [],
...over,
});
/** Run the funnel and capture the thrown HttpException status (or null). */
async function statusOf(
deps: ShareAssistantDeps,
b: Record<string, unknown>,
): Promise<number | null> {
try {
await resolveShareAssistantRequest(deps, {
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
body: b as never,
});
return null;
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof HttpException) return err.getStatus();
throw err;
}
}
it('happy path: returns the resolved, non-null request', async () => {
const { deps } = makeDeps();
const out = await resolveShareAssistantRequest(deps, {
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
body: body() as never,
});
expect(out.shareId).toBe('SHARE-A');
expect(out.share.id).toBe('SHARE-A');
expect(out.model).toBe('MODEL');
expect(out.role).toBeNull();
expect(out.openedPage).toEqual({ id: 'opened-page', title: 'Root' });
});
it('assistant disabled => 404 and NO share/page/model lookups', async () => {
const { deps, shareService, pageRepo, publicShareChat } = makeDeps({
assistantEnabled: false,
});
expect(await statusOf(deps, body())).toBe(404);
expect(shareService.getShareForPage).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(pageRepo.findById).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(publicShareChat.getShareChatModel).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('share.id !== body.shareId => 404 (cross-share id swap rejected)', async () => {
const { deps, publicShareChat } = makeDeps({
getShareForPage: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
id: 'OTHER-SHARE',
pageId: 'root',
spaceId: 'space-1',
sharedPage: null,
}),
});
expect(await statusOf(deps, body({ shareId: 'SHARE-A' }))).toBe(404);
// Never reached the model resolution for an unusable share.
expect(publicShareChat.getShareChatModel).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('opened page unresolvable (pageRepo.findById -> null) => fail-closed 404', async () => {
const { deps } = makeDeps({
findById: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(null),
});
expect(await statusOf(deps, body())).toBe(404);
});
it('restricted descendant => 404 (same as out-of-tree, no existence leak)', async () => {
const { deps, pagePermissionRepo } = makeDeps({
hasRestrictedAncestor: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(true),
});
expect(await statusOf(deps, body())).toBe(404);
expect(pagePermissionRepo.hasRestrictedAncestor).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('getShareChatModel throws AiNotConfiguredException => 503', async () => {
const { deps } = makeDeps({
getShareChatModel: jest
.fn()
.mockRejectedValue(new AiNotConfiguredException()),
});
expect(await statusOf(deps, body())).toBe(503);
});
it('getShareChatModel throws a non-AiNotConfigured error => re-thrown (not a 503/404)', async () => {
const boom = new Error('boom');
const { deps } = makeDeps({
getShareChatModel: jest.fn().mockRejectedValue(boom),
});
await expect(
resolveShareAssistantRequest(deps, {
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
body: body() as never,
}),
).rejects.toBe(boom);
});
it('tryConsumeWorkspaceQuota false => 429 thrown BEFORE any stream', async () => {
const { deps, publicShareChat } = makeDeps({
tryConsumeWorkspaceQuota: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
});
expect(await statusOf(deps, body())).toBe(429);
// The quota gate ran AFTER the model resolved (provider configured) but the
// function returns/throws before producing a streamable request.
expect(publicShareChat.tryConsumeWorkspaceQuota).toHaveBeenCalledWith('ws-1');
});
it('messages over MAX_SHARE_MESSAGES => 413', async () => {
const { deps } = makeDeps();
const tooMany = Array.from({ length: MAX_SHARE_MESSAGES + 1 }, () => ({
role: 'user',
parts: [{ type: 'text', text: 'hi' }],
}));
expect(await statusOf(deps, body({ messages: tooMany }))).toBe(413);
});
it('a single message over MAX_SHARE_MESSAGE_CHARS => 413 (uiMessageTextLength)', async () => {
const { deps } = makeDeps();
const huge = {
role: 'user',
parts: [{ type: 'text', text: 'x'.repeat(MAX_SHARE_MESSAGE_CHARS + 1) }],
};
expect(await statusOf(deps, body({ messages: [huge] }))).toBe(413);
});
it('the quota gate is checked BEFORE the payload caps (429 wins over 413)', async () => {
// Over-cap workspace AND an over-long message: the 429 must surface first, so
// an over-cap caller is rejected without even paying the payload-cap scan.
const { deps } = makeDeps({
tryConsumeWorkspaceQuota: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
});
const huge = {
role: 'user',
parts: [{ type: 'text', text: 'x'.repeat(MAX_SHARE_MESSAGE_CHARS + 1) }],
};
expect(await statusOf(deps, body({ messages: [huge] }))).toBe(429);
});
});
describe('uiMessageTextLength', () => {
it('returns 0 for an undefined / parts-less / non-array message', () => {
expect(uiMessageTextLength(undefined)).toBe(0);
expect(uiMessageTextLength({} as UIMessage)).toBe(0);
expect(uiMessageTextLength({ parts: 'nope' } as never)).toBe(0);
});
it('sums the lengths of ONLY the text parts', () => {
const msg = {
role: 'user',
parts: [
{ type: 'text', text: 'hello' }, // 5
{ type: 'tool-call', text: 'IGNORED' }, // non-text: ignored
{ type: 'text', text: 'world!' }, // 6
{ type: 'text' }, // no text field: ignored
],
} as unknown as UIMessage;
expect(uiMessageTextLength(msg)).toBe(11);
});
it('matches the 413 boundary used by the funnel', () => {
const atCap = {
role: 'user',
parts: [{ type: 'text', text: 'x'.repeat(MAX_SHARE_MESSAGE_CHARS) }],
} as unknown as UIMessage;
const overCap = {
role: 'user',
parts: [{ type: 'text', text: 'x'.repeat(MAX_SHARE_MESSAGE_CHARS + 1) }],
} as unknown as UIMessage;
expect(uiMessageTextLength(atCap)).toBe(MAX_SHARE_MESSAGE_CHARS);
expect(uiMessageTextLength(overCap)).toBeGreaterThan(MAX_SHARE_MESSAGE_CHARS);
});
});

View File

@@ -77,142 +77,25 @@ export class PublicShareChatController {
@AuthWorkspace() workspace: Workspace,
): Promise<void> {
const body = (req.body ?? {}) as PublicShareChatStreamBody;
const shareId = typeof body.shareId === 'string' ? body.shareId.trim() : '';
const pageId = typeof body.pageId === 'string' ? body.pageId.trim() : '';
// ---- Guardrail funnel (order matters; each failure exits before stream) ----
// 1. Workspace master toggle. 404 (do not reveal the feature exists).
const assistantEnabled = await this.aiSettings.isPublicShareAssistantEnabled(
workspace.id,
// The whole pre-hijack fact-resolution + cap-ordering block is a pure-ish
// helper (collaborators passed in) so every funnel branch — 404 disabled /
// share-mismatch / page-unresolvable / restricted, 503 unconfigured, 429
// over-cap, 413 too many/too long — is unit-testable against the red-team
// boundaries without the full Nest/DB graph. It throws the SAME HttpException
// the controller would, and never starts streaming.
const resolved = await resolveShareAssistantRequest(
{
aiSettings: this.aiSettings,
shareService: this.shareService,
pageRepo: this.pageRepo,
pagePermissionRepo: this.pagePermissionRepo,
publicShareChat: this.publicShareChat,
},
{ workspaceId: workspace.id, body },
);
// 2. Share usable? Resolved via the page's share membership, since the page
// resolution (getShareForPage) ALSO yields the share + workspace. We
// still need basic input to attempt it.
// 3. Page in share? The same getShareForPage lookup confirms the opened page
// resolves to THIS share tree, PLUS an explicit restricted-ancestor gate
// (getShareForPage itself does NOT exclude restricted descendants) so a
// restricted page hidden from the public view is graded not-in-share.
// (shareUsable + pageInShare are set together below; the funnel grades
// them as distinct ordered steps.)
let share: Awaited<ReturnType<ShareService['getShareForPage']>> | undefined;
let shareUsable = false;
let pageInShare = false;
if (assistantEnabled && shareId && pageId) {
// getShareForPage walks up the tree to the nearest ancestor share,
// enforces share.workspaceId === workspaceId and includeSubPages, and
// returns undefined when the page is not publicly reachable. NOTE: it
// joins only the `shares` table — it does NOT exclude restricted
// descendants — so a restricted page inside an includeSubPages share
// still resolves here. We add an explicit restricted-ancestor gate below
// (same as the public view) so the opened page's title never leaks into
// the system prompt for a page the public view 404s.
share = await this.shareService.getShareForPage(pageId, workspace.id);
if (share && share.id === shareId) {
// Confirm sharing is still allowed for the share's space (and not
// disabled at workspace/space level) — same gate the public views use.
const sharingAllowed = await this.shareService.isSharingAllowed(
workspace.id,
share.spaceId,
);
// A restricted descendant is hidden from the public share view; treat
// the opened page as not-in-share so the funnel returns the SAME 404 it
// returns for an out-of-tree page (uniform, no existence leak).
// hasRestrictedAncestor matches on the page UUID only, while the
// opened pageId may be a slugId, so resolve to the UUID first (cheap
// base-fields lookup, mirroring how getSharedPage resolves the page
// before its restricted check).
const openedPageRow = await this.pageRepo.findById(pageId);
const restricted = openedPageRow
? await this.pagePermissionRepo.hasRestrictedAncestor(
openedPageRow.id,
)
: true; // unresolvable opened page => fail closed (treat as not-in-share)
// The security-relevant combination (server-resolved share id ===
// requested shareId, + sharingAllowed, + the restricted gate) is a pure,
// unit-tested helper so the access join point can be exercised against
// the red-team boundaries without the full Nest/DB graph.
({ shareUsable, pageInShare } = deriveShareAccess({
resolvedShareId: share.id,
requestedShareId: shareId,
sharingAllowed,
restricted,
}));
}
}
// 4. Provider configured? Resolve the model now so an unconfigured provider
// yields a clean 503 (AiNotConfiguredException) BEFORE hijack. Only
// attempt this once the earlier gates passed, to avoid leaking timing.
let model: Awaited<ReturnType<PublicShareChatService['getShareChatModel']>> | undefined;
// Admin-selected identity (agent role) for the anonymous assistant, resolved
// server-authoritatively. null = built-in locked persona.
let role: AiAgentRole | null = null;
let providerConfigured = false;
if (assistantEnabled && shareUsable && pageInShare) {
try {
role = await this.publicShareChat.resolveShareRole(workspace.id);
model = await this.publicShareChat.getShareChatModel(workspace.id, role);
providerConfigured = true;
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof AiNotConfiguredException) {
providerConfigured = false;
} else {
throw err;
}
}
}
const outcome = evaluateShareAssistantFunnel({
assistantEnabled,
shareUsable,
pageInShare,
providerConfigured,
});
if (outcome.ok === false) {
// 404 for everything access-shaped (feature/share/page); 503 for config.
if (outcome.status === 503) {
throw new ServiceUnavailableException('AI is not configured');
}
throw new NotFoundException('Not found');
}
// 5. Per-WORKSPACE anti-abuse cap (IP-independent; defense in depth). The
// per-IP @Throttle above can be evaded by an attacker rotating
// `X-Forwarded-For` (the app runs with trustProxy), and each evaded call
// spends REAL tokens on the workspace owner's paid AI provider. This cap
// is keyed by the server-resolved workspace id (never attacker-
// controllable), so it bounds the owner's bill even when the per-IP limit
// is fully defeated via XFF spoofing. Checked here, BEFORE res.hijack(),
// so an over-cap workspace gets a clean 429 and spends nothing. NOTE:
// production should ALSO front this endpoint with a trusted proxy that
// REWRITES (not appends) XFF so the per-IP throttle stays meaningful.
if (!(await this.publicShareChat.tryConsumeWorkspaceQuota(workspace.id))) {
throw new HttpException(
'This documentation assistant is temporarily busy. Please try again later.',
HttpStatus.TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
);
}
// ---- Validate / bound the payload (cheap caps; ephemeral, never stored) ----
const messages = Array.isArray(body.messages)
? (body.messages as UIMessage[])
: [];
if (messages.length > MAX_SHARE_MESSAGES) {
throw new HttpException('Too many messages', 413);
}
for (const m of messages) {
const text = uiMessageTextLength(m);
if (text > MAX_SHARE_MESSAGE_CHARS) {
throw new HttpException('Message too long', 413);
}
}
const openedPage = {
id: pageId,
title: share?.sharedPage?.title ?? undefined,
};
const { shareId, share, model, role, messages, openedPage } = resolved;
// Abort the agent loop when the client disconnects (mirrors ai-chat).
const controller = new AbortController();
@@ -230,15 +113,15 @@ export class PublicShareChatController {
workspaceId: workspace.id,
shareId,
share: {
id: share!.id,
pageId: share!.pageId,
sharedPage: share!.sharedPage,
id: share.id,
pageId: share.pageId,
sharedPage: share.sharedPage,
},
openedPage,
messages,
res,
signal: controller.signal,
model: model!,
model,
role,
});
} catch (err) {
@@ -255,8 +138,174 @@ export class PublicShareChatController {
}
}
/** Sum of the text-part lengths of a UIMessage (cheap, for the size cap). */
function uiMessageTextLength(message: UIMessage | undefined): number {
/**
* The collaborators the pre-hijack funnel needs. Declared as the minimal slice
* of each injected service it actually calls, so the resolver can be unit-tested
* with hand-rolled mocks (no Nest module graph, no DB).
*/
export interface ShareAssistantDeps {
aiSettings: Pick<AiSettingsService, 'isPublicShareAssistantEnabled'>;
shareService: Pick<
ShareService,
'getShareForPage' | 'isSharingAllowed'
>;
pageRepo: Pick<PageRepo, 'findById'>;
pagePermissionRepo: Pick<PagePermissionRepo, 'hasRestrictedAncestor'>;
publicShareChat: Pick<
PublicShareChatService,
| 'resolveShareRole'
| 'getShareChatModel'
| 'tryConsumeWorkspaceQuota'
>;
}
/** The resolved, validated request ready to stream (everything is non-null). */
export interface ResolvedShareAssistantRequest {
shareId: string;
share: NonNullable<Awaited<ReturnType<ShareService['getShareForPage']>>>;
model: Awaited<ReturnType<PublicShareChatService['getShareChatModel']>>;
role: AiAgentRole | null;
messages: UIMessage[];
openedPage: { id: string; title?: string };
}
/**
* Pre-hijack fact-resolution + cap-ordering for the anonymous public-share
* assistant, extracted from the controller so every funnel branch is unit-
* testable without the Nest/DB graph. Order is security-relevant and each
* failure exits BEFORE any stream/hijack:
* 1. assistant toggle off => 404 (no share/page/model lookups);
* 2. share/page access (deriveShareAccess + evaluateShareAssistantFunnel) =>
* 404 (uniform; restricted descendant and out-of-tree look identical);
* 3. provider unconfigured => 503 (AiNotConfiguredException), other errors
* re-thrown;
* 4. per-workspace quota exhausted => 429 (BEFORE any stream/hijack);
* 5. payload caps => 413 (too many messages / a single message too long).
* Throws the SAME HttpException the controller would; returns the resolved,
* non-null request otherwise.
*/
export async function resolveShareAssistantRequest(
deps: ShareAssistantDeps,
input: { workspaceId: string; body: PublicShareChatStreamBody },
): Promise<ResolvedShareAssistantRequest> {
const { workspaceId, body } = input;
const shareId = typeof body.shareId === 'string' ? body.shareId.trim() : '';
const pageId = typeof body.pageId === 'string' ? body.pageId.trim() : '';
// 1. Workspace master toggle. 404 (do not reveal the feature exists).
const assistantEnabled =
await deps.aiSettings.isPublicShareAssistantEnabled(workspaceId);
// 2/3. Share usable? Page in share? Resolved via the page's share membership,
// since getShareForPage ALSO yields the share + workspace. The opened
// page is then gated by an explicit restricted-ancestor check (which
// getShareForPage does NOT do) so a restricted page hidden from the
// public view is graded not-in-share.
let share: Awaited<ReturnType<ShareService['getShareForPage']>> | undefined;
let shareUsable = false;
let pageInShare = false;
if (assistantEnabled && shareId && pageId) {
share = await deps.shareService.getShareForPage(pageId, workspaceId);
if (share && share.id === shareId) {
const sharingAllowed = await deps.shareService.isSharingAllowed(
workspaceId,
share.spaceId,
);
// hasRestrictedAncestor matches on the page UUID only, while the opened
// pageId may be a slugId, so resolve to the UUID first (cheap base-fields
// lookup). An unresolvable opened page fails closed (not-in-share).
const openedPageRow = await deps.pageRepo.findById(pageId);
const restricted = openedPageRow
? await deps.pagePermissionRepo.hasRestrictedAncestor(openedPageRow.id)
: true;
({ shareUsable, pageInShare } = deriveShareAccess({
resolvedShareId: share.id,
requestedShareId: shareId,
sharingAllowed,
restricted,
}));
}
}
// 4. Provider configured? Resolve the model now so an unconfigured provider
// yields a clean 503 BEFORE hijack. Only after the access gates pass, to
// avoid leaking timing.
let model:
| Awaited<ReturnType<PublicShareChatService['getShareChatModel']>>
| undefined;
let role: AiAgentRole | null = null;
let providerConfigured = false;
if (assistantEnabled && shareUsable && pageInShare) {
try {
role = await deps.publicShareChat.resolveShareRole(workspaceId);
model = await deps.publicShareChat.getShareChatModel(workspaceId, role);
providerConfigured = true;
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof AiNotConfiguredException) {
providerConfigured = false;
} else {
throw err;
}
}
}
const outcome = evaluateShareAssistantFunnel({
assistantEnabled,
shareUsable,
pageInShare,
providerConfigured,
});
if (outcome.ok === false) {
// 404 for everything access-shaped (feature/share/page); 503 for config.
if (outcome.status === 503) {
throw new ServiceUnavailableException('AI is not configured');
}
throw new NotFoundException('Not found');
}
// 5. Per-WORKSPACE anti-abuse cap (IP-independent; defense in depth). Checked
// BEFORE res.hijack(), so an over-cap workspace gets a clean 429 and spends
// nothing.
if (!(await deps.publicShareChat.tryConsumeWorkspaceQuota(workspaceId))) {
throw new HttpException(
'This documentation assistant is temporarily busy. Please try again later.',
HttpStatus.TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
);
}
// ---- Validate / bound the payload (cheap caps; ephemeral, never stored) ----
const messages = Array.isArray(body.messages)
? (body.messages as UIMessage[])
: [];
if (messages.length > MAX_SHARE_MESSAGES) {
throw new HttpException('Too many messages', 413);
}
for (const m of messages) {
if (uiMessageTextLength(m) > MAX_SHARE_MESSAGE_CHARS) {
throw new HttpException('Message too long', 413);
}
}
const openedPage = {
id: pageId,
title: share?.sharedPage?.title ?? undefined,
};
// The funnel passed, so share/model are guaranteed present.
return {
shareId,
share: share!,
model: model!,
role,
messages,
openedPage,
};
}
/** Sum of the text-part lengths of a UIMessage (cheap, for the size cap).
* Exported so the 413 size-cap logic is unit-testable without the Nest/DB graph.
*/
export function uiMessageTextLength(message: UIMessage | undefined): number {
if (!message?.parts || !Array.isArray(message.parts)) return 0;
let total = 0;
for (const p of message.parts) {

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,11 @@ import {
filterShareTranscript,
} from './public-share-chat.service';
import { PublicShareChatToolsService } from './tools/public-share-chat-tools.service';
import { PublicShareWorkspaceLimiter } from './public-share-workspace-limiter';
import {
PublicShareWorkspaceLimiter,
resolveShareAiWorkspaceMax,
SHARE_AI_WORKSPACE_MAX_PER_WINDOW,
} from './public-share-workspace-limiter';
/**
* Minimal in-memory fake of the slice of ioredis the sliding-window limiter
@@ -195,6 +199,54 @@ describe('buildShareSystemPrompt locking', () => {
expect(prompt).toContain('read-only assistant');
expect(prompt).toContain('anti prompt-injection');
});
it('an opened page with a title injects both the pageId and the title', () => {
const prompt = buildShareSystemPrompt({
share: null,
openedPage: { id: 'page-123', title: 'Getting Started' },
});
expect(prompt).toContain('(pageId: page-123)');
expect(prompt).toContain('"Getting Started"');
expect(prompt).toContain('the current page');
});
it('an opened page with a blank/whitespace title falls back to "Untitled"', () => {
const prompt = buildShareSystemPrompt({
share: null,
openedPage: { id: 'page-123', title: ' ' },
});
expect(prompt).toContain('(pageId: page-123)');
expect(prompt).toContain('"Untitled"');
});
it('an empty / blank pageId omits the opened-page context line entirely', () => {
const emptyId = buildShareSystemPrompt({
share: null,
openedPage: { id: '', title: 'Ignored' },
});
expect(emptyId).not.toContain('pageId:');
expect(emptyId).not.toContain('the current page');
const blankId = buildShareSystemPrompt({
share: null,
openedPage: { id: ' ', title: 'Ignored' },
});
expect(blankId).not.toContain('pageId:');
});
it('a present share title is injected; a blank share title is omitted', () => {
const withTitle = buildShareSystemPrompt({
share: { sharedPageTitle: 'Product Docs' },
openedPage: null,
});
expect(withTitle).toContain('titled "Product Docs"');
const blankTitle = buildShareSystemPrompt({
share: { sharedPageTitle: ' ' },
openedPage: null,
});
expect(blankTitle).not.toContain('This published documentation is titled');
});
});
describe('PublicShareChatService model fallback', () => {
@@ -306,6 +358,44 @@ describe('PublicShareChatService model fallback', () => {
});
});
describe('resolveShareAiWorkspaceMax (env-overridable per-workspace cap)', () => {
const ENV = 'SHARE_AI_WORKSPACE_MAX_PER_HOUR';
const original = process.env[ENV];
afterEach(() => {
if (original === undefined) delete process.env[ENV];
else process.env[ENV] = original;
});
it('uses a valid positive integer from the env', () => {
process.env[ENV] = '42';
expect(resolveShareAiWorkspaceMax()).toBe(42);
});
it('floors a float value', () => {
process.env[ENV] = '99.9';
expect(resolveShareAiWorkspaceMax()).toBe(99);
});
it('falls back to the default for an unparseable / NaN value', () => {
process.env[ENV] = 'not-a-number';
expect(resolveShareAiWorkspaceMax()).toBe(SHARE_AI_WORKSPACE_MAX_PER_WINDOW);
expect(SHARE_AI_WORKSPACE_MAX_PER_WINDOW).toBe(300);
});
it('falls back to the default when unset', () => {
delete process.env[ENV];
expect(resolveShareAiWorkspaceMax()).toBe(SHARE_AI_WORKSPACE_MAX_PER_WINDOW);
});
it('falls back to the default for zero or a negative value (no unlimited / negative cap)', () => {
process.env[ENV] = '0';
expect(resolveShareAiWorkspaceMax()).toBe(SHARE_AI_WORKSPACE_MAX_PER_WINDOW);
process.env[ENV] = '-5';
expect(resolveShareAiWorkspaceMax()).toBe(SHARE_AI_WORKSPACE_MAX_PER_WINDOW);
});
});
describe('PublicShareWorkspaceLimiter (cluster-wide sliding-window per-workspace cap)', () => {
it('allows up to the cap within a window, then 429s (returns false)', async () => {
const limiter = makeLimiter(3, 60_000, () => 1_000);
@@ -353,6 +443,23 @@ describe('PublicShareWorkspaceLimiter (cluster-wide sliding-window per-workspace
expect(await limiter.tryConsume('ws-1')).toBe(true);
});
it('consumes a distinct member slot per call at one FIXED clock value (no same-ms score-collision under-count)', async () => {
// All calls happen at the SAME millisecond. The limiter mints a unique member
// id per attempt, so distinct calls in the same ms must NOT collide on the
// sorted-set score and under-count: exactly `cap` calls are admitted, the
// rest rejected — even though every score is identical.
const cap = 5;
const limiter = makeLimiter(cap, 60_000, () => 7_000); // clock never advances
const results: boolean[] = [];
for (let i = 0; i < cap + 3; i++) {
results.push(await limiter.tryConsume('ws-1'));
}
// First `cap` admitted, the remaining 3 rejected.
expect(results.slice(0, cap)).toEqual(Array(cap).fill(true));
expect(results.slice(cap)).toEqual([false, false, false]);
expect(results.filter(Boolean)).toHaveLength(cap);
});
it('keeps separate budgets per workspace (one over-cap ws cannot starve another)', async () => {
const limiter = makeLimiter(1, 60_000, () => 1_000);
expect(await limiter.tryConsume('ws-a')).toBe(true);

View File

@@ -93,6 +93,56 @@ describe('AiAgentRolesService guards', () => {
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(BadRequestException);
expect(repo.update).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('instructions cleared to whitespace => BadRequest, repo.update NOT called', async () => {
const { service, repo } = makeService({ existing: makeRow() });
await expect(
service.update('ws-1', 'r1', {
instructions: ' ',
} as UpdateAgentRoleDto),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(BadRequestException);
expect(repo.update).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('concurrent soft-delete: row exists on the pre-update lookup but the re-fetch is undefined => BadRequest (not a TypeError)', async () => {
// findById returns the live row FIRST (pre-update guard passes), then the
// role is soft-deleted concurrently, so the POST-update re-fetch returns
// undefined. The service must surface a clean 400, never dereference
// undefined (which would throw a TypeError in toView).
const { service, repo } = makeService();
repo.findById
.mockResolvedValueOnce(makeRow())
.mockResolvedValueOnce(undefined);
await expect(
service.update('ws-1', 'r1', { name: 'X' } as UpdateAgentRoleDto),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(BadRequestException);
// The UPDATE ran (the row existed pre-update), but the re-fetch failed.
expect(repo.update).toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(repo.findById).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
});
it('emoji/description tri-state: emoji:"" => null (clear), emoji omitted => undefined (unchanged), description:" " => null', async () => {
const { service, repo } = makeService({ existing: makeRow() });
// emoji explicitly emptied => clear to null; description whitespace => null.
await service.update('ws-1', 'r1', {
emoji: '',
description: ' ',
} as UpdateAgentRoleDto);
const patch1 = repo.update.mock.calls[0][2];
expect(patch1.emoji).toBeNull();
expect(patch1.description).toBeNull();
repo.update.mockClear();
// emoji omitted => unchanged (undefined passed through to the repo patch).
await service.update('ws-1', 'r1', {
name: 'Renamed',
} as UpdateAgentRoleDto);
const patch2 = repo.update.mock.calls[0][2];
expect(patch2.emoji).toBeUndefined();
expect(patch2.description).toBeUndefined();
});
});
describe('remove', () => {
@@ -136,6 +186,51 @@ describe('AiAgentRolesService guards', () => {
expect(repo.insert).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('modelConfig:{chatModel} only persists {chatModel} (no driver key)', async () => {
const { service, repo } = makeService();
await service.create('ws-1', 'u1', {
name: 'R',
instructions: 'do',
modelConfig: { chatModel: 'gpt-4o' },
} as CreateAgentRoleDto);
const values = repo.insert.mock.calls[0][0];
expect(values.modelConfig).toEqual({ chatModel: 'gpt-4o' });
expect('driver' in values.modelConfig).toBe(false);
});
it('modelConfig:{} (empty) normalizes to null', async () => {
const { service, repo } = makeService();
await service.create('ws-1', 'u1', {
name: 'R',
instructions: 'do',
modelConfig: {},
} as CreateAgentRoleDto);
expect(repo.insert.mock.calls[0][0].modelConfig).toBeNull();
});
it('modelConfig:{chatModel:" "} (whitespace-only) normalizes to null', async () => {
const { service, repo } = makeService();
await service.create('ws-1', 'u1', {
name: 'R',
instructions: 'do',
modelConfig: { chatModel: ' ' },
} as CreateAgentRoleDto);
expect(repo.insert.mock.calls[0][0].modelConfig).toBeNull();
});
it('modelConfig:{driver,chatModel} round-trips both fields (trimmed)', async () => {
const { service, repo } = makeService();
await service.create('ws-1', 'u1', {
name: 'R',
instructions: 'do',
modelConfig: { driver: 'gemini', chatModel: ' gemini-2.0-flash ' },
} as CreateAgentRoleDto);
expect(repo.insert.mock.calls[0][0].modelConfig).toEqual({
driver: 'gemini',
chatModel: 'gemini-2.0-flash',
});
});
it('duplicate name (Postgres 23505) => ConflictException (409), not 500', async () => {
const { service, repo } = makeService();
// The partial unique (workspace_id, name) index rejects the insert.
@@ -148,6 +243,28 @@ describe('AiAgentRolesService guards', () => {
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
});
it('duplicate name 409 message contains the TRIMMED submitted name', async () => {
const { service, repo } = makeService();
repo.insert.mockRejectedValueOnce({ code: '23505' });
await service
.create('ws-1', 'u1', {
name: ' Researcher ',
instructions: 'do',
} as CreateAgentRoleDto)
.then(
() => {
throw new Error('expected create to throw');
},
(err: unknown) => {
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
const message = (err as ConflictException).message;
// The trimmed name appears verbatim; the untrimmed padding does not.
expect(message).toContain('"Researcher"');
expect(message).not.toContain(' Researcher ');
},
);
});
it('non-unique-violation error is NOT swallowed (re-thrown as-is)', async () => {
const { service, repo } = makeService();
const other = Object.assign(new Error('boom'), { code: '23502' });

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
import { jsonbObject } from '@docmost/db/repos/ai-agent-roles/ai-agent-roles.repo';
/**
* Unit tests for jsonbObject: the repo helper that encodes a model_config object
* as a jsonb bind (or null when there is nothing to persist). It is the last
* line of defence before the column write, so the null-vs-bind decision is what
* matters here. We assert only null vs non-null because the non-null value is a
* kysely `sql` template fragment whose internal shape is an implementation
* detail of the SQL tag.
*/
describe('jsonbObject', () => {
it('returns null for null', () => {
expect(jsonbObject(null)).toBeNull();
});
it('returns null for undefined', () => {
expect(jsonbObject(undefined)).toBeNull();
});
it('returns null for an empty object (nothing to persist)', () => {
expect(jsonbObject({})).toBeNull();
});
it('returns a (non-null) jsonb bind for a non-empty object', () => {
const out = jsonbObject({ driver: 'gemini', chatModel: 'gemini-2.0-flash' });
// A real sql fragment is produced, never null/undefined.
expect(out).not.toBeNull();
expect(out).toBeDefined();
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
import { AiService } from '../../../integrations/ai/ai.service';
import { AiNotConfiguredException } from '../../../integrations/ai/ai-not-configured.exception';
import { roleModelOverride } from './role-model-config';
import type { AiAgentRole } from '@docmost/db/types/entity.types';
/**
* Contract test for the override SHAPE that travels from a role's persisted
* `model_config` (via roleModelOverride) into AiService.getChatModel.
*
* This is the seam between the two halves of the role-model feature:
* - roleModelOverride (pure) turns model_config into a ChatModelOverride;
* - getChatModel consumes that override to build the model (or to 503).
* Wiring the REAL roleModelOverride output into a unit-constructed AiService
* (with stubbed deps, no DB) pins that the two agree on the override contract:
* - a cross-driver override whose creds are absent => AiNotConfiguredException
* naming the role + driver;
* - a chatModel-only override keeps the workspace driver/creds (no creds
* lookup, no decrypt);
* - an ollama cross-driver override => 503 (no silent baseUrl reuse).
*/
describe('role override -> AiService.getChatModel contract', () => {
function role(modelConfig: unknown, name = 'Researcher'): AiAgentRole {
return { id: 'r1', name, modelConfig } as unknown as AiAgentRole;
}
function makeService(opts: {
workspaceDriver: string;
baseUrl?: string;
credsApiKeyEnc?: string;
}) {
const aiSettings = {
resolve: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
driver: opts.workspaceDriver,
chatModel: 'gpt-4o-mini',
apiKey: 'workspace-key',
baseUrl: opts.baseUrl,
}),
};
const aiProviderCredentialsRepo = {
find: jest
.fn()
.mockResolvedValue(
opts.credsApiKeyEnc ? { apiKeyEnc: opts.credsApiKeyEnc } : undefined,
),
};
const secretBox = { decryptSecret: jest.fn().mockReturnValue('decrypted') };
const service = new AiService(
aiSettings as never,
aiProviderCredentialsRepo as never,
secretBox as never,
);
return { service, aiSettings, aiProviderCredentialsRepo, secretBox };
}
it('cross-driver override with NO creds => 503 naming the role and the override driver', async () => {
const override = roleModelOverride(
role({ driver: 'gemini', chatModel: 'gemini-2.0-flash' }),
);
expect(override).toEqual({
driver: 'gemini',
chatModel: 'gemini-2.0-flash',
roleName: 'Researcher',
});
// Workspace is openai; the gemini override has no configured creds.
const { service, aiProviderCredentialsRepo } = makeService({
workspaceDriver: 'openai',
});
await service.getChatModel('ws-1', override).then(
() => {
throw new Error('expected getChatModel to throw');
},
(err: unknown) => {
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(AiNotConfiguredException);
const message = (err as AiNotConfiguredException).message;
expect(message).toContain('gemini');
expect(message).toContain('Researcher');
},
);
expect(aiProviderCredentialsRepo.find).toHaveBeenCalledWith('ws-1', 'gemini');
});
it('chatModel-only override keeps the workspace driver/creds (no creds lookup, no decrypt)', async () => {
const override = roleModelOverride(role({ chatModel: 'gpt-4o' }));
// No driver in the override => the workspace driver/creds are reused.
expect(override).toEqual({
driver: undefined,
chatModel: 'gpt-4o',
roleName: 'Researcher',
});
const { service, aiProviderCredentialsRepo, secretBox } = makeService({
workspaceDriver: 'openai',
});
const model = await service.getChatModel('ws-1', override);
expect(model).toBeDefined();
expect(aiProviderCredentialsRepo.find).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(secretBox.decryptSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('ollama cross-driver override (workspace driver != ollama) => 503, no baseUrl reuse', async () => {
const override = roleModelOverride(
role({ driver: 'ollama', chatModel: 'llama3' }, 'Local'),
);
expect(override).toEqual({
driver: 'ollama',
chatModel: 'llama3',
roleName: 'Local',
});
const { service, aiProviderCredentialsRepo } = makeService({
workspaceDriver: 'openai',
baseUrl: 'https://openrouter.example/v1',
});
await service.getChatModel('ws-1', override).then(
() => {
throw new Error('expected getChatModel to throw');
},
(err: unknown) => {
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(AiNotConfiguredException);
const message = (err as AiNotConfiguredException).message;
expect(message).toContain('ollama');
expect(message).toContain('openai');
expect(message).toContain('Local');
// The workspace gateway baseUrl must never be reused for ollama.
expect(message).not.toContain('openrouter.example');
},
);
// No creds lookup for ollama: we fail before reaching the creds branch.
expect(aiProviderCredentialsRepo.find).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});

View File

@@ -50,6 +50,11 @@ export class AiChatToolsService {
// agent write (REST + collab) records { actor:'agent', aiChatId } off a
// SIGNED claim — non-spoofable, never a client body field (§6.5/§6.6).
aiChatId: string,
// The page the user currently has open (from the request context), exposed
// to the model via getCurrentPage. Optional and last so existing callers
// keep compiling. Kept proxy-robust: the model can CALL for the current
// page instead of relying on it surviving in the system prompt text.
openedPage?: { id?: string; title?: string } | null,
): Promise<Record<string, Tool>> {
const apiUrl =
process.env.MCP_DOCMOST_API_URL ||
@@ -210,6 +215,23 @@ export class AiChatToolsService {
},
}),
getCurrentPage: tool({
description:
'Return the page the user is currently viewing — i.e. what "this page", ' +
'"the current page", or "here" refers to. Returns the page id and title, ' +
'or null if the user is not currently on a page. Call this first whenever ' +
'the user refers to the current page without giving an explicit id.',
inputSchema: z.object({}),
execute: async () => {
if (!openedPage?.id) {
return { page: null };
}
return {
page: { id: openedPage.id, title: openedPage.title ?? '' },
};
},
}),
getPage: tool({
description:
'Fetch a single page as Markdown by its page id. Returns the page ' +

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
import { PublicShareChatToolsService } from './public-share-chat-tools.service';
/**
* Mock-based integration tests for the anonymous public-share toolset built by
* forShare(). Constructed directly with hand-rolled collaborators (no Nest/DB):
* - listSharePages tree assembly (dedupe, single-page root fallback, fail-soft);
* - the blank-input guards on search / read.
*/
describe('PublicShareChatToolsService.forShare', () => {
type ToolExec = { execute: (args: unknown) => Promise<unknown> };
function makeService(over: {
getShareTree?: jest.Mock;
findById?: jest.Mock;
searchPage?: jest.Mock;
getShareForPage?: jest.Mock;
} = {}) {
const shareService = {
getShareTree: over.getShareTree ?? jest.fn(),
getShareForPage: over.getShareForPage ?? jest.fn(),
updatePublicAttachments: jest.fn(),
};
const searchService = { searchPage: over.searchPage ?? jest.fn() };
const pageRepo = { findById: over.findById ?? jest.fn() };
const pagePermissionRepo = { hasRestrictedAncestor: jest.fn() };
const svc = new PublicShareChatToolsService(
shareService as never,
searchService as never,
pageRepo as never,
pagePermissionRepo as never,
);
return { svc, shareService, searchService, pageRepo, pagePermissionRepo };
}
describe('listSharePages', () => {
it('includeSubPages tree: returns deduped, titled pages (root already in tree)', async () => {
// getShareTree returns the share root + descendants; the root IS in the
// tree, so no extra title lookup is needed and the tree is listed as-is.
const { svc, pageRepo } = makeService({
getShareTree: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
share: { pageId: 'root' },
pageTree: [
{ id: 'root', title: 'Home' },
{ id: 'child-1', title: 'Child One' },
{ id: 'child-2', title: 'Child Two' },
],
}),
});
const tools = svc.forShare('SHARE-A', 'ws-1');
const out = (await (tools.listSharePages as unknown as ToolExec).execute(
{},
)) as Array<{ id: string; title: string }>;
expect(out).toEqual([
{ id: 'root', title: 'Home' },
{ id: 'child-1', title: 'Child One' },
{ id: 'child-2', title: 'Child Two' },
]);
// The root was already in the tree => no fallback title lookup.
expect(pageRepo.findById).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('single-page share (empty tree): falls back to the root title and PREPENDS it', async () => {
const { svc, pageRepo } = makeService({
getShareTree: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
share: { pageId: 'root' },
pageTree: [], // includeSubPages=false => empty tree
}),
findById: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'root', title: 'Solo Page' }),
});
const tools = svc.forShare('SHARE-A', 'ws-1');
const out = (await (tools.listSharePages as unknown as ToolExec).execute(
{},
)) as Array<{ id: string; title: string }>;
expect(out).toEqual([{ id: 'root', title: 'Solo Page' }]);
expect(pageRepo.findById).toHaveBeenCalledWith('root');
});
it('de-duplicates pages by id, keeping the first (titled) occurrence', async () => {
const { svc } = makeService({
getShareTree: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
share: { pageId: 'root' },
pageTree: [
{ id: 'root', title: 'Home' },
{ id: 'dup', title: 'First' },
{ id: 'dup', title: 'Second (dropped)' },
{ id: 'root', title: 'Home again (dropped)' },
],
}),
});
const tools = svc.forShare('SHARE-A', 'ws-1');
const out = (await (tools.listSharePages as unknown as ToolExec).execute(
{},
)) as Array<{ id: string; title: string }>;
expect(out).toEqual([
{ id: 'root', title: 'Home' },
{ id: 'dup', title: 'First' },
]);
});
it('getShareTree throws => returns [] (fail-soft, never throws to the model)', async () => {
const { svc } = makeService({
getShareTree: jest.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error('db down')),
});
const tools = svc.forShare('SHARE-A', 'ws-1');
await expect(
(tools.listSharePages as unknown as ToolExec).execute({}),
).resolves.toEqual([]);
});
});
describe('searchSharePages blank guard', () => {
it('blank query => [] WITHOUT calling searchService', async () => {
const { svc, searchService } = makeService({ searchPage: jest.fn() });
const tools = svc.forShare('SHARE-A', 'ws-1');
await expect(
(tools.searchSharePages as unknown as ToolExec).execute({ query: ' ' }),
).resolves.toEqual([]);
expect(searchService.searchPage).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe('getSharePage blank guard', () => {
it('blank pageId => throws "A pageId is required." WITHOUT calling getShareForPage', async () => {
const { svc, shareService } = makeService({ getShareForPage: jest.fn() });
const tools = svc.forShare('SHARE-A', 'ws-1');
await expect(
(tools.getSharePage as unknown as ToolExec).execute({ pageId: ' ' }),
).rejects.toThrow('A pageId is required.');
expect(shareService.getShareForPage).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
});

View File

@@ -41,6 +41,20 @@ import {
} from '../../../integrations/audit/audit.service';
import { EnvironmentService } from '../../../integrations/environment/environment.service';
// A valid bcrypt hash (cost 10, of an arbitrary throwaway string) used ONLY to
// equalize timing in verifyUserCredentials: when the email does not exist or
// the user is disabled, we still run ONE bcrypt comparison against this hash
// before throwing, so the missing/disabled path takes about the same time as
// the real-user wrong-password path. Without it, the "no bcrypt at all" branch
// returns measurably faster, leaking whether an email is registered (a user-
// enumeration timing oracle, now reachable via /mcp where throttling is only a
// spoofable in-memory limiter). This is never used as a real credential.
// The cost factor MUST match the production saltRounds (12 — see
// common/helpers/utils.ts hashPassword), otherwise the dummy compare runs
// faster than a real wrong-password compare and the timing oracle survives.
const DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH =
'$2b$12$q/l637TULK3vU3Cmji0y8utpJS/UiftMi3Jdm4Tsi5EIv/0FE7WV.';
@Injectable()
export class AuthService {
constructor(
@@ -82,6 +96,12 @@ export class AuthService {
// recognises this exact message via isCredentialsFailure.
const errorMessage = CREDENTIALS_MISMATCH_MESSAGE;
if (!user || isUserDisabled(user)) {
// Constant-time intent: run ONE bcrypt comparison (against a dummy hash)
// even when the user is missing/disabled, so this path takes about the
// same time as the real-user wrong-password path below. This closes the
// user-enumeration timing oracle (registered vs. not). The result is
// intentionally discarded — we always throw the same credentials error.
await comparePasswordHash(loginDto.password, DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH);
throw new UnauthorizedException(errorMessage);
}

View File

@@ -100,4 +100,40 @@ describe('AuthService no-side-effect contract (item 4)', () => {
expect(verifyBody.includes(effect)).toBe(false);
}
});
// Item 4: user-enumeration timing-oracle fix. When the email is missing or the
// user is disabled, verifyUserCredentials must still run ONE bcrypt comparison
// (against a dummy hash) BEFORE throwing, so the missing/disabled path takes
// about the same time as the real-user wrong-password path. Asserted at the
// source level for the same reason as the rest of this file: AuthService cannot
// be imported under this jest config to spy on comparePasswordHash live.
describe('constant-time missing/disabled branch (item 4)', () => {
// Isolate the body of the `if (!user || isUserDisabled(user)) { ... }` guard.
const guardMatch = verifyBody.match(
/if \(!user \|\| isUserDisabled\(user\)\) \{([\s\S]*?)\n {4}\}/,
);
it('the missing/disabled guard runs a bcrypt compare before throwing', () => {
expect(guardMatch).not.toBeNull();
const guardBody = guardMatch![1];
// It performs the dummy bcrypt comparison...
expect(guardBody).toContain('comparePasswordHash');
// ...and only AFTER that throws the credentials error (compare precedes
// the throw STATEMENT — match `throw new`, not the word "throw" in a comment).
const compareIdx = guardBody.indexOf('comparePasswordHash');
const throwIdx = guardBody.indexOf('throw new');
expect(compareIdx).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
expect(throwIdx).toBeGreaterThan(compareIdx);
});
it('uses a module-level dummy hash constant (never a real credential)', () => {
// The dummy hash is a module-level constant referenced in the guard, not an
// inline literal recomputed per call.
expect(verifyBody).toContain('DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH');
// Cost factor MUST be 12 to match production saltRounds, otherwise the
// dummy compare is faster than a real wrong-password compare and the
// timing oracle survives.
expect(source).toMatch(/const DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH =\s*'\$2b\$12\$/);
});
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
import { UnauthorizedException } from '@nestjs/common';
import { AuthService } from './auth.service';
import { CREDENTIALS_MISMATCH_MESSAGE } from '../auth.constants';
import { hashPassword } from '../../../common/helpers';
/**
* LIVE security contract for AuthService.verifyUserCredentials / login (M4
* item 5).
*
* The (now-fixed) jest config CAN import AuthService at the module level (the
* `^src/(.*)$` moduleNameMapper resolves the transitive `src/...` imports and the
* ts-jest transform loads the graph). AuthService cannot be `.compile()`-d via
* the Nest TestingModule (its full provider graph is not wired here), but it can
* be constructed directly with mocked collaborators — which is exactly what we
* need to exercise the credential-check decision live.
*
* The load-bearing property: verifyUserCredentials (and login(), which reuses it)
* throws EXACTLY the shared CREDENTIALS_MISMATCH_MESSAGE for all three
* credentials-failure cases — unknown email, disabled user, wrong password. The
* /mcp Basic brute-force limiter only counts a failure when it recognises THIS
* exact message (isCredentialsFailure in mcp-auth.helpers matches the same shared
* constant); a reword that diverged here would silently turn /mcp Basic into an
* unthrottled password-guessing oracle.
*/
const WORKSPACE_ID = 'ws-1';
// Build an AuthService with the dependencies verifyUserCredentials/login touch
// stubbed, and a userRepo whose findByEmail is overridable per test. Only the
// collaborators actually reached on these paths need real behaviour; the rest
// are inert mocks (constructor wiring only).
function makeAuthService(over: {
findByEmail?: jest.Mock;
} = {}): {
service: AuthService;
userRepo: { findByEmail: jest.Mock; updateLastLogin: jest.Mock };
sessionService: { createSessionAndToken: jest.Mock };
auditService: { log: jest.Mock };
} {
const userRepo = {
findByEmail: over.findByEmail ?? jest.fn(),
updateLastLogin: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
};
const sessionService = {
createSessionAndToken: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue('issued-token'),
};
const auditService = { log: jest.fn() };
// environmentService: isCloud() false (so throwIfEmailNotVerified does not
// require verification) + a stable app secret.
const environmentService = {
isCloud: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(false),
getAppSecret: jest.fn().mockReturnValue('test-secret'),
};
// Constructor signature (auth.service.ts): signupService, tokenService,
// sessionService, userSessionRepo, userRepo, userTokenRepo, mailService,
// domainService, environmentService, db, auditService.
const service = new (AuthService as unknown as new (...args: unknown[]) => AuthService)(
{}, // signupService
{}, // tokenService
sessionService, // sessionService
{}, // userSessionRepo
userRepo, // userRepo
{}, // userTokenRepo
{}, // mailService
{}, // domainService
environmentService, // environmentService
{}, // db
auditService, // auditService
);
return { service, userRepo, sessionService, auditService };
}
describe('AuthService.verifyUserCredentials (live credentials-mismatch contract)', () => {
it('UNKNOWN email -> throws exactly CREDENTIALS_MISMATCH_MESSAGE', async () => {
const { service } = makeAuthService({
findByEmail: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
});
await expect(
service.verifyUserCredentials(
{ email: 'nobody@example.com', password: 'whatever' },
WORKSPACE_ID,
),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ message: CREDENTIALS_MISMATCH_MESSAGE });
await expect(
service.verifyUserCredentials(
{ email: 'nobody@example.com', password: 'whatever' },
WORKSPACE_ID,
),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(UnauthorizedException);
});
it('DISABLED user -> throws exactly CREDENTIALS_MISMATCH_MESSAGE (no password oracle)', async () => {
// A deactivated user must be indistinguishable from a wrong password: same
// message, before any password comparison.
const passwordHash = await hashPassword('correct-horse');
const disabledUser = {
id: 'u-1',
email: 'disabled@example.com',
password: passwordHash,
deactivatedAt: new Date(),
deletedAt: null,
emailVerifiedAt: new Date(),
};
const { service } = makeAuthService({
findByEmail: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(disabledUser),
});
await expect(
service.verifyUserCredentials(
{ email: 'disabled@example.com', password: 'correct-horse' },
WORKSPACE_ID,
),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ message: CREDENTIALS_MISMATCH_MESSAGE });
});
it('WRONG password -> throws exactly CREDENTIALS_MISMATCH_MESSAGE', async () => {
const passwordHash = await hashPassword('correct-horse');
const user = {
id: 'u-1',
email: 'user@example.com',
password: passwordHash,
deactivatedAt: null,
deletedAt: null,
emailVerifiedAt: new Date(),
};
const { service } = makeAuthService({
findByEmail: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(user),
});
await expect(
service.verifyUserCredentials(
{ email: 'user@example.com', password: 'wrong-password' },
WORKSPACE_ID,
),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ message: CREDENTIALS_MISMATCH_MESSAGE });
});
it('CORRECT credentials -> resolves the matched user (no side effects here)', async () => {
const passwordHash = await hashPassword('correct-horse');
const user = {
id: 'u-1',
email: 'user@example.com',
password: passwordHash,
deactivatedAt: null,
deletedAt: null,
emailVerifiedAt: new Date(),
};
const { service, sessionService, auditService, userRepo } =
makeAuthService({ findByEmail: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(user) });
const result = await service.verifyUserCredentials(
{ email: 'user@example.com', password: 'correct-horse' },
WORKSPACE_ID,
);
expect(result).toBe(user);
// verifyUserCredentials is non-side-effecting: no session/audit/lastLogin.
expect(sessionService.createSessionAndToken).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(auditService.log).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(userRepo.updateLastLogin).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe('AuthService.login (live credentials-mismatch contract via verifyUserCredentials)', () => {
it('UNKNOWN email -> login throws exactly CREDENTIALS_MISMATCH_MESSAGE, mints NO session', async () => {
const { service, sessionService } = makeAuthService({
findByEmail: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
});
await expect(
service.login(
{ email: 'nobody@example.com', password: 'whatever' },
WORKSPACE_ID,
),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ message: CREDENTIALS_MISMATCH_MESSAGE });
expect(sessionService.createSessionAndToken).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('WRONG password -> login throws exactly CREDENTIALS_MISMATCH_MESSAGE', async () => {
const passwordHash = await hashPassword('correct-horse');
const user = {
id: 'u-1',
email: 'user@example.com',
password: passwordHash,
deactivatedAt: null,
deletedAt: null,
emailVerifiedAt: new Date(),
};
const { service } = makeAuthService({
findByEmail: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(user),
});
await expect(
service.login(
{ email: 'user@example.com', password: 'wrong-password' },
WORKSPACE_ID,
),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ message: CREDENTIALS_MISMATCH_MESSAGE });
});
it('CORRECT credentials -> login mints the session (the side-effecting path)', async () => {
const passwordHash = await hashPassword('correct-horse');
const user = {
id: 'u-1',
email: 'user@example.com',
password: passwordHash,
deactivatedAt: null,
deletedAt: null,
emailVerifiedAt: new Date(),
};
const { service, sessionService, auditService, userRepo } =
makeAuthService({ findByEmail: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(user) });
await expect(
service.login(
{ email: 'user@example.com', password: 'correct-horse' },
WORKSPACE_ID,
),
).resolves.toBe('issued-token');
// login() reuses verifyUserCredentials but DOES run the three side effects.
expect(userRepo.updateLastLogin).toHaveBeenCalledWith('u-1', WORKSPACE_ID);
expect(auditService.log).toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(sessionService.createSessionAndToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith(user);
});
it('the message login throws is the SAME shared constant the /mcp limiter matches', () => {
// Cross-file coupling lock: the constant is the single source of truth shared
// by AuthService and mcp-auth.helpers.isCredentialsFailure.
expect(CREDENTIALS_MISMATCH_MESSAGE).toBe('Email or password does not match');
});
});

View File

@@ -80,6 +80,67 @@ describe('collectPageEmbedsFromPmJson', () => {
};
expect(collectPageEmbedsFromPmJson(doc)).toEqual([]);
});
it('ignores a pageEmbed whose sourcePageId is not a string', () => {
const doc = {
type: 'doc',
content: [
{ type: 'pageEmbed', attrs: { sourcePageId: 123 as any } },
{ type: 'pageEmbed', attrs: { sourcePageId: null as any } },
{ type: 'pageEmbed', attrs: { sourcePageId: { nested: true } as any } },
{ type: 'pageEmbed', attrs: { sourcePageId: ['arr'] as any } },
// a valid one mixed in proves only the bad ones are dropped
{ type: 'pageEmbed', attrs: { sourcePageId: 'good' } },
],
};
expect(collectPageEmbedsFromPmJson(doc)).toEqual([
{ sourcePageId: 'good' },
]);
});
it('collects a pageEmbed nested under multiple block containers', () => {
const doc = {
type: 'doc',
content: [
{
type: 'callout',
content: [
{
type: 'columns',
content: [
{
type: 'column',
content: [
{
type: 'details',
content: [
{
type: 'pageEmbed',
attrs: { sourcePageId: 'deep' },
},
],
},
],
},
],
},
],
},
],
};
expect(collectPageEmbedsFromPmJson(doc)).toEqual([{ sourcePageId: 'deep' }]);
});
it('terminates (does not silently hang) on a self-referencing/cyclic object', () => {
// FINDING: there is NO explicit cycle guard. A hand-built cyclic JS object
// (which cannot arise from JSON parsing — the real input path) makes the
// recursive walk overflow the stack and throw a RangeError. It TERMINATES
// with a controlled error rather than recursing unboundedly forever, and a
// non-cyclic (JSON-shaped) document is never affected.
const node: any = { type: 'doc', content: [] };
node.content.push(node); // content array references its own parent node
expect(() => collectPageEmbedsFromPmJson(node)).toThrow(RangeError);
});
});
describe('pageEmbed HTML <-> JSON round-trip (server schema)', () => {

View File

@@ -193,8 +193,103 @@ describe('TransclusionService — template access core (real filter)', () => {
});
});
describe('TransclusionService.filterViewerAccessiblePageIds — AND ordering (content-leak control)', () => {
function makeDb(executeRows: Array<{ id: string }>) {
const builder: any = {};
builder.selectFrom = jest.fn(() => builder);
builder.select = jest.fn(() => builder);
builder.where = jest.fn(() => builder);
builder.execute = jest.fn(async () => executeRows);
return builder;
}
function makeService(opts: {
spaceVisibleRows: Array<{ id: string }>;
permissionAccessibleIds: string[];
}) {
const db = makeDb(opts.spaceVisibleRows);
const spaceMemberRepo = {
getUserSpaceIdsQuery: jest.fn(() => ({ __subquery: true })),
};
const filterAccessiblePageIds = jest
.fn()
.mockResolvedValue(opts.permissionAccessibleIds);
const pagePermissionRepo = { filterAccessiblePageIds };
const service = new TransclusionService(
db as any, // db
{} as any, // pageTransclusionsRepo
{} as any, // pageTransclusionReferencesRepo
{} as any, // pageTemplateReferencesRepo
{} as any, // pageRepo
pagePermissionRepo as any,
spaceMemberRepo as any,
{} as any, // attachmentRepo
{} as any, // storageService
{} as any, // pageAccessService
{} as any, // workspaceRepo
);
return { service, filterAccessiblePageIds };
}
it('space-visible AND permission-accessible → returned', async () => {
const { service } = makeService({
spaceVisibleRows: [{ id: 'p1' }],
permissionAccessibleIds: ['p1'],
});
const out = await service.filterViewerAccessiblePageIds(
['p1'],
'u1',
'w1',
);
expect(out).toEqual(['p1']);
});
it('space-visible but permission-rejected → dropped', async () => {
const { service, filterAccessiblePageIds } = makeService({
spaceVisibleRows: [{ id: 'p1' }],
permissionAccessibleIds: [],
});
const out = await service.filterViewerAccessiblePageIds(
['p1'],
'u1',
'w1',
);
expect(out).toEqual([]);
// The permission filter only ever sees the space-visible candidate.
expect(filterAccessiblePageIds).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
pageIds: ['p1'],
userId: 'u1',
});
});
it('NOT space-visible but permission-accessible → STILL dropped (AND-ordering enforced)', async () => {
// The page would pass page-level permission filtering, but it is not visible
// at the space level (e.g. a private space the viewer is not a member of).
// The space-visibility gate runs FIRST and short-circuits, so the page-level
// permission filter is never even consulted — preventing a private-space
// content leak via an unrestricted source page.
const { service, filterAccessiblePageIds } = makeService({
spaceVisibleRows: [],
permissionAccessibleIds: ['private-but-permitted'],
});
const out = await service.filterViewerAccessiblePageIds(
['private-but-permitted'],
'u1',
'w1',
);
expect(out).toEqual([]);
expect(filterAccessiblePageIds).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe('TransclusionService.syncPageTemplateReferences — workspace scoping', () => {
function makeService(opts: { inWorkspaceIds: string[] }) {
function makeService(opts: {
inWorkspaceIds: string[];
/** existing rows already persisted for the reference page */
existingSourceIds?: string[];
}) {
// db stub: the in-workspace existence query returns only allowed ids.
const builder: any = {};
builder.selectFrom = jest.fn(() => builder);
@@ -207,26 +302,37 @@ describe('TransclusionService.syncPageTemplateReferences — workspace scoping',
const insertMany = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const deleteByReferenceAndSources = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const pageTemplateReferencesRepo = {
findByReferencePageId: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
findByReferencePageId: jest
.fn()
.mockResolvedValue(
(opts.existingSourceIds ?? []).map((sourcePageId) => ({
sourcePageId,
})),
),
insertMany,
deleteByReferenceAndSources,
};
const service = new TransclusionService(
builder as any,
{} as any,
{} as any,
builder as any, // db
{} as any, // pageTransclusionsRepo
{} as any, // pageTransclusionReferencesRepo
pageTemplateReferencesRepo as any,
{} as any,
{} as any,
{} as any,
{} as any,
{} as any,
{} as any, // pageRepo
{} as any, // pagePermissionRepo
{} as any, // spaceMemberRepo
{} as any, // attachmentRepo
{} as any, // storageService
{} as any, // pageAccessService
{} as any, // workspaceRepo
);
return { service, insertMany, pageTemplateReferencesRepo };
return {
service,
insertMany,
deleteByReferenceAndSources,
pageTemplateReferencesRepo,
};
}
function docWithEmbeds(sourceIds: string[]) {
@@ -271,4 +377,152 @@ describe('TransclusionService.syncPageTemplateReferences — workspace scoping',
expect(result.inserted).toBe(0);
expect(insertMany).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('DELETE branch: an existing in-workspace ref removed from the doc is deleted', async () => {
// 'gone' was referenced before but is no longer in the doc; 'stay' remains.
const { service, insertMany, deleteByReferenceAndSources } = makeService({
inWorkspaceIds: ['stay'],
existingSourceIds: ['stay', 'gone'],
});
const result = await service.syncPageTemplateReferences(
'host',
'w1',
docWithEmbeds(['stay']),
);
expect(result.deleted).toBe(1);
expect(result.inserted).toBe(0); // 'stay' already existed
expect(insertMany).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(deleteByReferenceAndSources).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(deleteByReferenceAndSources).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'host',
'w1', // workspace-scoped delete (#36 defense-in-depth)
['gone'],
undefined, // no trx supplied
);
});
it('does NOT delete a stale ref whose source is now cross-workspace if it is also still embedded', async () => {
// Edge: 'x' is still embedded in the doc but no longer in-workspace. It is
// not in desiredIds (filtered out) AND it exists → it should be deleted, not
// kept, because the reference graph must drop the cross-workspace edge.
const { service, deleteByReferenceAndSources } = makeService({
inWorkspaceIds: [], // 'x' no longer in-workspace
existingSourceIds: ['x'],
});
const result = await service.syncPageTemplateReferences(
'host',
'w1',
docWithEmbeds(['x']),
);
expect(result.deleted).toBe(1);
expect(deleteByReferenceAndSources).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'host',
'w1', // workspace-scoped delete (#36 defense-in-depth)
['x'],
undefined,
);
});
});
describe('TransclusionService.insertTemplateReferencesForPages — per-workspace existence validation', () => {
/**
* Smart db stub: each existence query is `.where('id','in', ids)` +
* `.where('workspaceId','=', wsId)`; `.execute()` returns only the ids that
* `validByWorkspace[wsId]` declares in-workspace. The builder snapshots the
* last `id`-in list and `workspaceId` value per chain (selectFrom resets).
*/
function makeDb(validByWorkspace: Record<string, string[]>) {
const builder: any = {};
let curIds: string[] = [];
let curWs: string | undefined;
builder.selectFrom = jest.fn(() => {
curIds = [];
curWs = undefined;
return builder;
});
builder.select = jest.fn(() => builder);
builder.where = jest.fn((col: string, op: string, val: any) => {
if (col === 'id' && op === 'in') curIds = val;
if (col === 'workspaceId' && op === '=') curWs = val;
return builder;
});
builder.execute = jest.fn(async () => {
const valid = new Set(validByWorkspace[curWs ?? ''] ?? []);
return curIds.filter((id) => valid.has(id)).map((id) => ({ id }));
});
return builder;
}
function makeService(validByWorkspace: Record<string, string[]>) {
const insertMany = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const pageTemplateReferencesRepo = { insertMany };
const service = new TransclusionService(
makeDb(validByWorkspace) as any, // db
{} as any, // pageTransclusionsRepo
{} as any, // pageTransclusionReferencesRepo
pageTemplateReferencesRepo as any,
{} as any, // pageRepo
{} as any, // pagePermissionRepo
{} as any, // spaceMemberRepo
{} as any, // attachmentRepo
{} as any, // storageService
{} as any, // pageAccessService
{} as any, // workspaceRepo
);
return { service, insertMany };
}
const embedDoc = (ids: string[]) => ({
type: 'doc',
content: ids.map((id) => ({
type: 'pageEmbed',
attrs: { sourcePageId: id },
})),
});
it('validates each workspace separately: a source in-ws for A but cross-ws for B inserts only the valid delta', async () => {
// 'shared' is in-workspace for wA but NOT for wB. Page A embeds 'shared'
// (valid → inserted). Page B embeds 'shared' (cross-ws for wB → dropped).
const { service, insertMany } = makeService({
wA: ['shared'],
wB: [], // 'shared' is not a page in wB
});
const result = await service.insertTemplateReferencesForPages([
{ id: 'pageA', workspaceId: 'wA', content: embedDoc(['shared']) },
{ id: 'pageB', workspaceId: 'wB', content: embedDoc(['shared']) },
]);
expect(result.inserted).toBe(1);
expect(insertMany).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(insertMany.mock.calls[0][0]).toEqual([
{ workspaceId: 'wA', referencePageId: 'pageA', sourcePageId: 'shared' },
]);
});
it('inserts the in-workspace deltas for both pages when each is valid in its own workspace', async () => {
const { service, insertMany } = makeService({
wA: ['a-src'],
wB: ['b-src'],
});
const result = await service.insertTemplateReferencesForPages([
{ id: 'pageA', workspaceId: 'wA', content: embedDoc(['a-src']) },
{ id: 'pageB', workspaceId: 'wB', content: embedDoc(['b-src']) },
]);
expect(result.inserted).toBe(2);
const rows = insertMany.mock.calls[0][0];
expect(rows).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
{ workspaceId: 'wA', referencePageId: 'pageA', sourcePageId: 'a-src' },
{ workspaceId: 'wB', referencePageId: 'pageB', sourcePageId: 'b-src' },
]),
);
expect(rows).toHaveLength(2);
});
});

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import { TransclusionService } from '../transclusion.service';
import * as collabUtil from '../../../../collaboration/collaboration.util';
/**
* Exercises the pure access/mapping logic of `lookupTemplate`:
@@ -111,4 +112,61 @@ describe('TransclusionService.lookupTemplate (access mapping)', () => {
expect((items[1] as any).status).toBeUndefined();
expect((items[2] as any).status).toBe('no_access');
});
// Content-prep failure path: if jsonToNode throws for an accessible page, the
// item must degrade to not_found and NEVER return content (which would
// otherwise carry the source's un-stripped comment marks).
describe('content-prep failure → not_found', () => {
let jsonToNodeSpy: jest.SpyInstance;
afterEach(() => {
jsonToNodeSpy?.mockRestore();
});
it('maps to not_found and returns no content when jsonToNode throws', async () => {
// The page is accessible and present, but content preparation blows up.
jsonToNodeSpy = jest
.spyOn(collabUtil, 'jsonToNode')
.mockImplementation(() => {
throw new Error('boom');
});
const contentWithComment = {
type: 'doc',
content: [
{
type: 'paragraph',
content: [
{
type: 'text',
text: 'secret',
marks: [{ type: 'comment', attrs: { commentId: 'leak' } }],
},
],
},
],
};
const { service } = makeService({
accessibleIds: ['p1'],
pages: [
{
id: 'p1',
title: 'T',
icon: null,
content: contentWithComment,
updatedAt: now,
},
],
});
// Silence the service's error logger for the expected throw.
jest.spyOn((service as any).logger, 'error').mockImplementation(() => {});
const { items } = await service.lookupTemplate(['p1'], 'u1', 'w1');
expect(items).toEqual([{ sourcePageId: 'p1', status: 'not_found' }]);
// Crucially: no content field, so no comment mark can leak.
expect((items[0] as any).content).toBeUndefined();
});
});
});

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
import { ForbiddenException, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
import { plainToInstance } from 'class-transformer';
import { validate } from 'class-validator';
import { PageTemplateController } from '../page-template.controller';
import { TransclusionService } from '../transclusion.service';
import { TemplateLookupDto } from '../dto/template-lookup.dto';
import { PageRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/page/page.repo';
import { PageAccessService } from '../../page-access/page-access.service';
import { JwtAuthGuard } from '../../../../common/guards/jwt-auth.guard';
@@ -90,4 +93,52 @@ describe('PageTemplateController.toggleTemplate', () => {
);
expect(out).toEqual({ pageId: 'p1', isTemplate: false });
});
it('lookup forwards dto.sourcePageIds + user.id + user.workspaceId to the service', async () => {
const expected = { items: [] };
(transclusionService.lookupTemplate as jest.Mock).mockResolvedValue(
expected,
);
const dto = { sourcePageIds: ['s1', 's2'] } as any;
const out = await controller.lookup(dto, user);
expect(transclusionService.lookupTemplate).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
['s1', 's2'],
'u1', // user.id
'w1', // user.workspaceId
);
expect(out).toBe(expected);
});
});
describe('TemplateLookupDto validation (class-validator)', () => {
const uuid = (n: number) =>
`00000000-0000-4000-8000-${String(n).padStart(12, '0')}`;
it('accepts an array of <=50 valid UUIDs', async () => {
const dto = plainToInstance(TemplateLookupDto, {
sourcePageIds: [uuid(1), uuid(2)],
});
const errors = await validate(dto);
expect(errors).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('rejects an over-cap array (ArrayMaxSize 50)', async () => {
const dto = plainToInstance(TemplateLookupDto, {
sourcePageIds: Array.from({ length: 51 }, (_, i) => uuid(i)),
});
const errors = await validate(dto);
expect(errors).toHaveLength(1);
expect(errors[0].constraints).toHaveProperty('arrayMaxSize');
});
it('rejects a non-UUID member (IsUUID each)', async () => {
const dto = plainToInstance(TemplateLookupDto, {
sourcePageIds: [uuid(1), 'not-a-uuid'],
});
const errors = await validate(dto);
expect(errors).toHaveLength(1);
expect(errors[0].constraints).toHaveProperty('isUuid');
});
});

View File

@@ -131,3 +131,131 @@ describe('ShareService htmlEmbed server-authoritative kill-switch (real code)',
expect(hasHtmlEmbedNode(out)).toBe(true);
});
});
// Exercises the REAL ShareService.lookupTransclusionForShare post-processing for
// the share-served transclusion path: the same server-authoritative htmlEmbed
// kill-switch must apply to each transcluded item's content, and a not_found
// item must never be run through prepareContentForShare (so its absent content
// can't be serialized/leaked). The access graph (shareRepo / isSharingAllowed /
// getShareForPage / restricted-ancestor) is stubbed so the strip/serve mapping
// runs deterministically; lookupWithAccessSet is mocked to control the items.
describe('ShareService.lookupTransclusionForShare htmlEmbed kill-switch (real code)', () => {
const SHARE = 'share-1';
const SPACE = 'space-1';
const SRC = 'src-page';
function buildTransclusionService(opts: {
htmlEmbed?: boolean | undefined;
items: any[];
}) {
const shareRepo = {
findById: jest.fn(async () => ({
id: SHARE,
workspaceId: WS,
spaceId: SPACE,
})),
};
const pageRepo = { findById: jest.fn() };
const pagePermissionRepo = {
hasRestrictedAncestor: jest.fn(async () => false),
};
const tokenService = {
generateAttachmentToken: jest.fn(async () => 'tok'),
};
const lookupWithAccessSet = jest.fn(async () => ({ items: opts.items }));
const transclusionService = { lookupWithAccessSet };
const workspaceRepo = {
findById: jest.fn(async () => ({
id: WS,
settings: { htmlEmbed: opts.htmlEmbed },
})),
};
const service = new ShareService(
shareRepo as any,
pageRepo as any,
pagePermissionRepo as any,
{} as any, // db (unused — isSharingAllowed stubbed below)
tokenService as any,
transclusionService as any,
workspaceRepo as any,
);
// isSharingAllowed and getShareForPage hit the raw db; stub them so the
// access chain resolves SRC as reachable and prepareContentForShare runs.
jest.spyOn(service, 'isSharingAllowed').mockResolvedValue(true);
jest
.spyOn(service, 'getShareForPage')
.mockResolvedValue({ pageId: SRC, spaceId: SPACE, id: 's2' } as any);
return { service, transclusionService, lookupWithAccessSet };
}
const transcludedItemWithEmbed = () => ({
sourcePageId: SRC,
transclusionId: 't1',
content: {
type: 'doc',
content: [
{ type: 'paragraph', content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'block body' }] },
{ type: 'htmlEmbed', attrs: { source: '<script>t()</script>' } },
],
},
sourceUpdatedAt: new Date('2026-06-20T00:00:00.000Z'),
});
const refs = [{ sourcePageId: SRC, transclusionId: 't1' }];
it('toggle OFF: strips htmlEmbed from each transcluded item content', async () => {
const { service } = buildTransclusionService({
htmlEmbed: false,
items: [transcludedItemWithEmbed()],
});
const { items } = await service.lookupTransclusionForShare(SHARE, refs, WS);
expect(items).toHaveLength(1);
const item = items[0] as any;
expect(item.status).toBeUndefined();
expect(hasHtmlEmbedNode(item.content)).toBe(false);
// Non-embed body of the transcluded block is preserved.
expect(JSON.stringify(item.content)).toContain('block body');
});
it('toggle ON: serves htmlEmbed in the transcluded item content', async () => {
const { service } = buildTransclusionService({
htmlEmbed: true,
items: [transcludedItemWithEmbed()],
});
const { items } = await service.lookupTransclusionForShare(SHARE, refs, WS);
const item = items[0] as any;
expect(item.status).toBeUndefined();
expect(hasHtmlEmbedNode(item.content)).toBe(true);
expect(JSON.stringify(item.content)).toContain('block body');
});
it('a not_found item is NOT run through prepareContentForShare (no token minting)', async () => {
const notFoundItem = {
sourcePageId: SRC,
transclusionId: 't1',
status: 'not_found' as const,
};
const { service } = buildTransclusionService({
htmlEmbed: true,
items: [notFoundItem],
});
// tokenService is reachable via the service; spy on it to assert it is never
// touched for a status item (prepareContentForShare mints tokens).
const tokenSpy = jest.spyOn(
(service as any).tokenService,
'generateAttachmentToken',
);
const { items } = await service.lookupTransclusionForShare(SHARE, refs, WS);
// not_found is collapsed to no_access for share viewers and carries NO content.
const item = items[0] as any;
expect(item.status).toBe('no_access');
expect(item.content).toBeUndefined();
expect(tokenSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
import { WorkspaceService } from './workspace.service';
/**
* Exercises the REAL WorkspaceService.update htmlEmbed-toggle persistence at the
* service seam: an update carrying `htmlEmbed` must call
* `workspaceRepo.updateSetting(workspaceId, 'htmlEmbed', value, trx)`, and an
* update WITHOUT it must not touch that setting. The repo, db transaction, and
* audit service are mocked; `executeTx` runs the callback against a fake trx.
*
* DEFERRED (DB-only): the "does not clobber sibling settings" guarantee is a
* jsonb merge property of `updateSetting`'s SQL and needs a real Postgres to
* assert. This spec only asserts the service-level CALL SHAPE.
*/
describe('WorkspaceService.update — htmlEmbed toggle persistence (real code)', () => {
function buildService(opts: { settingsBefore?: Record<string, any> }) {
const updateSetting = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const updateWorkspace = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const workspaceRepo = {
// First call: read settingsBefore. Second call: return the updated
// workspace (must include a licenseKey because update() destructures it).
findById: jest
.fn()
.mockResolvedValueOnce({ id: 'w1', settings: opts.settingsBefore ?? {} })
.mockResolvedValueOnce({ id: 'w1', name: 'WS', licenseKey: null }),
updateSetting,
updateWorkspace,
};
// Fake kysely db: only .transaction().execute(cb) is used on this path.
const db = {
transaction: jest.fn(() => ({
execute: jest.fn(async (cb: any) => cb({ __trx: true })),
})),
};
const auditService = { log: jest.fn() };
const service = new WorkspaceService(
workspaceRepo as any, // workspaceRepo
{} as any, // spaceService
{} as any, // spaceMemberService
{} as any, // groupRepo
{} as any, // groupUserRepo
{} as any, // userRepo
{} as any, // environmentService
{} as any, // domainService
{} as any, // licenseCheckService
{} as any, // shareRepo
{} as any, // watcherRepo
{} as any, // favoriteRepo
db as any, // db (InjectKysely)
{} as any, // attachmentQueue
{} as any, // billingQueue
{} as any, // aiQueue
auditService as any, // auditService
{} as any, // userSessionRepo
);
return { service, workspaceRepo, updateSetting, auditService };
}
it('persists htmlEmbed:true via updateSetting with the htmlEmbed key', async () => {
const { service, updateSetting } = buildService({});
await service.update('w1', { htmlEmbed: true } as any);
expect(updateSetting).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(updateSetting).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'w1',
'htmlEmbed',
true,
expect.anything(), // the transaction handle
);
});
it('persists htmlEmbed:false (explicit disable is not dropped)', async () => {
const { service, updateSetting } = buildService({
settingsBefore: { htmlEmbed: true },
});
await service.update('w1', { htmlEmbed: false } as any);
expect(updateSetting).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'w1',
'htmlEmbed',
false,
expect.anything(),
);
});
it('does NOT call updateSetting when htmlEmbed is undefined in the dto', async () => {
const { service, updateSetting } = buildService({});
await service.update('w1', { name: 'New name' } as any);
expect(updateSetting).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('audits the htmlEmbed change (before/after) when the value actually changes', async () => {
const { service, auditService } = buildService({
settingsBefore: { htmlEmbed: false },
});
await service.update('w1', { htmlEmbed: true } as any);
expect(auditService.log).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
const logged = auditService.log.mock.calls[0][0];
expect(logged.changes.before.htmlEmbed).toBe(false);
expect(logged.changes.after.htmlEmbed).toBe(true);
});
});

View File

@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ export class AiAgentRoleRepo {
* generated column type is the broad `JsonValue` union, which a concrete object
* type is not structurally assignable to.
*/
function jsonbObject(value: ModelConfigValue | undefined) {
export function jsonbObject(value: ModelConfigValue | undefined) {
if (value === null || value === undefined || Object.keys(value).length === 0) {
return null;
}

View File

@@ -58,4 +58,26 @@ describe('describeProviderError', () => {
// 'e | response body: ' + 300 chars + '…'
expect(out.length).toBeLessThan('e | response body: '.length + 305);
});
it('uses the fallback for a numeric or boolean (non-object, non-string) error', () => {
// typeof number / boolean is neither 'object' nor a non-empty 'string', so
// the early branch returns the fallback verbatim.
expect(describeProviderError(500, 'AI stream error')).toBe('AI stream error');
expect(describeProviderError(0, 'AI stream error')).toBe('AI stream error');
expect(describeProviderError(true)).toBe('Unknown error');
expect(describeProviderError(false, 'fb')).toBe('fb');
});
it('statusCode present but message undefined => "<code>:" with no trailing space', () => {
// `${code}: ${undefined ?? ''}`.trim() collapses to just "<code>:".
expect(describeProviderError({ statusCode: 503 })).toBe('503:');
// The trailing space after the colon is trimmed away.
expect(describeProviderError({ statusCode: 503 }).endsWith(': ')).toBe(false);
});
it('object with neither message nor statusCode nor body => fallback', () => {
expect(describeProviderError({}, 'AI stream error')).toBe('AI stream error');
// An object carrying only unrelated keys is still treated as message-less.
expect(describeProviderError({ foo: 'bar' } as never)).toBe('Unknown error');
});
});

View File

@@ -171,4 +171,117 @@ describe('AiService.getChatModel role model override', () => {
expect(aiProviderCredentialsRepo.find).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(secretBox.decryptSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
/**
* Build a service whose workspace driver is ollama (no apiKey, with a baseUrl).
* Complements makeService (which configures openai) for the same-driver and
* not-configured ollama cases.
*/
function makeOllamaService(over: { baseUrl?: string } = {}) {
const aiSettings = {
resolve: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
driver: 'ollama',
chatModel: 'llama3',
apiKey: undefined,
baseUrl: over.baseUrl ?? 'http://localhost:11434/v1',
}),
};
const aiProviderCredentialsRepo = { find: jest.fn() };
const secretBox = { decryptSecret: jest.fn() };
const service = new AiService(
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
aiSettings as any,
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
aiProviderCredentialsRepo as any,
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
secretBox as any,
);
return { service, aiSettings, aiProviderCredentialsRepo, secretBox };
}
it('same-driver ollama override (workspace driver=ollama): reuses the workspace ollama baseUrl, no creds lookup/decrypt', async () => {
// Workspace driver IS ollama. A role that overrides to ollama (same driver)
// legitimately reuses the workspace's configured ollama endpoint — it must
// NOT hit the cross-driver 503 path, NOT query ai_provider_credentials, and
// NOT decrypt anything (ollama needs no key).
const { service, aiProviderCredentialsRepo, secretBox } = makeOllamaService();
const model = await service.getChatModel('ws-1', {
driver: 'ollama',
chatModel: 'llama3.1',
roleName: 'Local',
});
expect(model).toBeDefined();
expect(aiProviderCredentialsRepo.find).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(secretBox.decryptSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('chatModel-only override on an ollama workspace: reuses the workspace ollama baseUrl, no creds lookup', async () => {
// No override.driver on an ollama workspace => the workspace ollama driver +
// baseUrl are reused; no creds lookup, no decrypt (the cheap public-share
// model-only override path against an ollama workspace).
const { service, aiProviderCredentialsRepo, secretBox } = makeOllamaService();
const model = await service.getChatModel('ws-1', { chatModel: 'mistral' });
expect(model).toBeDefined();
expect(aiProviderCredentialsRepo.find).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(secretBox.decryptSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('blank chatModel guard: workspace has a driver but a blank chatModel and no override chatModel => AiNotConfiguredException', async () => {
// cfg.driver passes the first guard, but cfg.chatModel is blank and the
// override carries no chatModel, so the effective chatModel is empty.
const aiSettings = {
resolve: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
driver: 'openai',
chatModel: '',
apiKey: 'workspace-key',
baseUrl: undefined,
}),
};
const aiProviderCredentialsRepo = { find: jest.fn() };
const secretBox = { decryptSecret: jest.fn() };
const service = new AiService(
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
aiSettings as any,
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
aiProviderCredentialsRepo as any,
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
secretBox as any,
);
await expect(
// Override has only a roleName, no chatModel to fill the blank.
service.getChatModel('ws-1', { roleName: 'Writer' }),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(AiNotConfiguredException);
});
it('non-ollama driver with a missing apiKey => AiNotConfiguredException', async () => {
// Workspace is openai (non-ollama) with a model but NO apiKey: the combined
// `driver !== ollama && !apiKey` guard must 503.
const aiSettings = {
resolve: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
driver: 'openai',
chatModel: 'gpt-4o-mini',
apiKey: undefined,
baseUrl: undefined,
}),
};
const aiProviderCredentialsRepo = { find: jest.fn() };
const secretBox = { decryptSecret: jest.fn() };
const service = new AiService(
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
aiSettings as any,
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
aiProviderCredentialsRepo as any,
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
secretBox as any,
);
await expect(service.getChatModel('ws-1')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
AiNotConfiguredException,
);
});
});

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
// the Authorization header.
import { UnauthorizedException } from '@nestjs/common';
import { timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
import { isInitializeRequest } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js';
import { JwtType } from '../../core/auth/dto/jwt-payload';
import { CREDENTIALS_MISMATCH_MESSAGE } from '../../core/auth/auth.constants';
@@ -291,6 +292,14 @@ export interface BearerVerifyDeps {
workspaceId?: string;
sessionId?: string;
}>;
// The workspace id of THIS MCP instance, when the caller can resolve it (the
// community build is single-workspace, so McpService passes its default
// workspace's id). When provided, the token's `workspaceId` claim MUST equal
// it, mirroring JwtStrategy's `req.raw.workspaceId !== payload.workspaceId`
// guard so a valid ACCESS token from a DIFFERENT workspace cannot be replayed
// against this instance in a multi-workspace deployment. Optional so callers /
// tests that genuinely cannot resolve an instance workspace are unchanged.
expectedWorkspaceId?: string;
// Load the user (or undefined) for the disabled check.
findUser: (
sub: string,
@@ -321,6 +330,19 @@ export async function verifyBearerAccess(
throw new UnauthorizedException(generic);
}
// Bind the token to THIS instance's workspace (mirrors JwtStrategy). When the
// caller resolved an instance workspace id, a token whose `workspaceId` claim
// points at another workspace is rejected, so a valid ACCESS token minted in
// workspace B cannot be replayed against an MCP instance serving workspace A.
// In the single-workspace community build expectedWorkspaceId equals the only
// workspace, so this is a no-op there; it only bites a multi-workspace deploy.
if (
deps.expectedWorkspaceId &&
payload.workspaceId !== deps.expectedWorkspaceId
) {
throw new UnauthorizedException(generic);
}
const user = await deps.findUser(payload.sub, payload.workspaceId);
if (!user || user.deactivatedAt || user.deletedAt) {
throw new UnauthorizedException(generic);
@@ -342,21 +364,129 @@ export async function verifyBearerAccess(
/**
* Detect a genuine JSON-RPC `initialize` request from an already-parsed body.
* Mirrors the @modelcontextprotocol/sdk `isInitializeRequest` signal that
* packages/mcp/src/http.ts uses to decide whether to mint a session, but
* framework/SDK-free so it is unit-testable and usable from the CommonJS
* McpService. An initialize request is a single JSON-RPC object whose `method`
* is exactly 'initialize'; a batch (array) body is never an initialize request.
* Delegates to the @modelcontextprotocol/sdk `isInitializeRequest` predicate —
* the SAME predicate packages/mcp/src/http.ts uses to decide whether to mint a
* session — so the session-minting side (this server) and the session-creating
* side (http.ts) agree EXACTLY on what counts as an initialize request. The SDK
* predicate validates the full InitializeRequest shape (jsonrpc, id, method ===
* 'initialize', params incl. protocolVersion); a bare `{ method: 'initialize' }`
* with no params, a batch (array) body, etc. are NOT initialize requests.
*
* This is the second half of the session-INIT decision: `isSessionInit` is
* (no `mcp-session-id` header) AND `isInitializeRequestBody(body)`. Using it
* ensures the side-effecting login() (user_sessions insert + USER_LOGIN audit +
* lastLoginAt) only runs for a real initialize, never for an arbitrary
* header-less request that http.ts will subsequently 400.
* (no `mcp-session-id` header) AND `isInitializeRequestBody(body)`. Matching the
* SDK predicate exactly ensures the side-effecting login() (user_sessions insert
* + USER_LOGIN audit + lastLoginAt) only runs for a request http.ts will also
* accept as an initialize — never for an arbitrary header-less request that
* http.ts would subsequently 400 (which would otherwise spam the audit log /
* grow user_sessions without ever creating an MCP session).
*/
export function isInitializeRequestBody(body: unknown): boolean {
if (!body || typeof body !== 'object' || Array.isArray(body)) return false;
return (body as { method?: unknown }).method === 'initialize';
return isInitializeRequest(body);
}
/**
* The outcome of McpService.handle's pre-hijack gauntlet, as a pure value the
* caller acts on. Either send a JSON error with a fixed status (`respond`), or
* proceed to hijack the response and delegate to the MCP transport (`hijack`).
* Keeping this a pure decision (no FastifyReply, no res.hijack) makes the
* status/body mapping unit-testable, and guarantees no error path can leak the
* password or Authorization header — the body is only ever a fixed string or the
* UnauthorizedException's own message.
*/
export type McpHandleDecision =
| { kind: 'respond'; status: number; body: { error: string } }
| { kind: 'hijack' };
/**
* Pure mapping of McpService.handle's auth/enablement gauntlet to a response
* decision. Precedence mirrors handle():
* 1. shared X-MCP-Token mismatch -> 401 {error:'Unauthorized'} (no hijack).
* 2. workspace MCP disabled -> 403 {error:'MCP is disabled ...'}.
* 3. resolveSessionConfig threw:
* - an UnauthorizedException -> 401 with err.message (a SPECIFIC reason;
* never the password/header — the message is the only thing surfaced).
* - any other error -> 500 generic 'Internal server error'.
* 4. otherwise (auth resolved) -> hijack and delegate to the transport.
*/
export function mapAuthResultToResponse(input: {
sharedTokenOk: boolean;
enabled: boolean;
error?: unknown;
}): McpHandleDecision {
if (!input.sharedTokenOk) {
return { kind: 'respond', status: 401, body: { error: 'Unauthorized' } };
}
if (!input.enabled) {
return {
kind: 'respond',
status: 403,
body: { error: 'MCP is disabled for this workspace' },
};
}
if (input.error !== undefined) {
if (input.error instanceof UnauthorizedException) {
return {
kind: 'respond',
status: 401,
body: { error: input.error.message },
};
}
return {
kind: 'respond',
status: 500,
body: { error: 'Internal server error' },
};
}
return { kind: 'hijack' };
}
// Result of the EE MFA module's requirement check for the Basic gate. Both
// flags absent/false means MFA does not block the password login.
export interface BasicGateMfaResult {
userHasMfa?: boolean;
requiresMfaSetup?: boolean;
}
/**
* Pure decision logic for the /mcp HTTP-Basic pre-token gate, replicating EXACTLY
* what AuthController.login enforces before issuing a token, so the Basic path is
* not an SSO/MFA bypass. Framework-free (no ModuleRef, no on-disk EE MFA module)
* so the SSO/MFA decision is unit-testable in isolation:
*
* - `ssoEnforced` true -> throw Unauthorized ("enforced SSO"); a password
* login is not allowed on an SSO-enforced workspace.
* - otherwise, `mfa` is the EE MFA module's requirement result (or undefined
* when no EE MFA module is bundled — a community/fork build). If MFA is
* present and the user has MFA enabled OR needs MFA setup, throw Unauthorized
* telling the caller to use a Bearer access token (Basic cannot complete MFA).
* - no SSO + no MFA gate -> resolve (the Basic login is allowed to proceed).
*
* McpService.enforceBasicLoginGate wires the concrete `validateSsoEnforcement`
* result and the lazily-loaded MFA module result into this, so the gate decision
* itself carries no framework dependencies. Throws UnauthorizedException on
* rejection (surfaced as a clean 401); never logs the password.
*/
export function decideBasicGate(input: {
ssoEnforced: boolean;
mfa?: BasicGateMfaResult;
}): void {
if (input.ssoEnforced) {
throw new UnauthorizedException(
'This workspace has enforced SSO login. Use SSO; MCP HTTP Basic is not allowed.',
);
}
const mfa = input.mfa;
if (mfa && (mfa.userHasMfa || mfa.requiresMfaSetup)) {
throw new UnauthorizedException(
'This account requires multi-factor authentication. MCP HTTP Basic ' +
'cannot complete MFA — log in normally and use a Bearer access token ' +
'instead.',
);
}
}
/** Extract a Bearer token from an Authorization header (case-insensitive). */

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
import { UnauthorizedException } from '@nestjs/common';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// These tests exercise the REAL McpService.enforceBasicLoginGate (the pre-token
// SSO/MFA gate on the /mcp HTTP-Basic path). Unlike the resolveMcpSessionConfig
// tests in mcp.service.spec.ts — which STUB the gate and only assert it runs
// before login()/verifyCredentials — here the gate logic is instantiated for
// real and only its LEAF dependencies are mocked:
// - the workspace object (plain object with/without enforceSso),
// - the user credentials (plain object),
// - the lazily-required EE MFA module (jest.mock with { virtual: true } so we
// can simulate BOTH "bundled" and "not bundled" community-build states),
// - the injected MfaService instance (via a stub moduleRef).
//
// McpService cannot normally be imported under jest because it imports
// AuthService, which drags in the React email-template graph
// (@docmost/transactional/emails/*) that the jest moduleNameMapper does not
// resolve. We therefore mock the heavy collaborator modules (auth.service,
// token.service, the @docmost/db repos and mcp-auth.helpers) at the module
// level so importing mcp.service.ts succeeds. None of those are touched by the
// gate itself, so the gate runs unmodified against the real code path.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// The EE MFA module specifier the jest.mock below intercepts MUST be
// byte-for-byte the specifier that mcp.service.ts lazily require()s
// ('./../../ee/mfa/services/mfa.service'). jest.mock is hoisted above all
// non-hoisted code, so the path is inlined as a literal in the call below
// rather than referenced through a const (which would not yet be initialised).
// `{ virtual: true }` is required because the EE module does not exist in this
// OSS build (there is no src/ee directory) — without it jest cannot register a
// mock for a path it cannot resolve on disk.
// Mutable handle the virtual mock factory reads, so each test can decide whether
// the EE module is "bundled" (factory returns a MfaService class) or "not
// bundled" (factory throws, mimicking the require() failing on a community
// build). jest.mock is hoisted, so the factory must close over this lazily.
let mfaModuleState: { bundled: boolean; checkMfaRequirements?: jest.Mock } = {
bundled: false,
};
jest.mock(
'./../../ee/mfa/services/mfa.service',
() => {
if (!mfaModuleState.bundled) {
// Simulate a community/fork build with no EE MFA module: the real
// require() throws, which the gate catches as the "no MFA gate" path.
throw new Error('Cannot find module (EE MFA not bundled)');
}
// "Bundled" build: expose a MfaService class token. The actual instance the
// gate calls is resolved through moduleRef.get(MfaModule.MfaService), which
// our stub moduleRef returns regardless of the token identity.
class MfaService {}
return { MfaService };
},
{ virtual: true },
);
// --- Mock the heavy collaborator modules so importing mcp.service succeeds. ---
// The gate never calls into these; they exist only to satisfy the import graph.
jest.mock('../../core/auth/services/auth.service', () => ({
AuthService: class AuthService {},
}));
jest.mock('../../core/auth/services/token.service', () => ({
TokenService: class TokenService {},
}));
jest.mock('@docmost/db/repos/workspace/workspace.repo', () => ({
WorkspaceRepo: class WorkspaceRepo {},
}));
jest.mock('@docmost/db/repos/user/user.repo', () => ({
UserRepo: class UserRepo {},
}));
jest.mock('@docmost/db/repos/session/user-session.repo', () => ({
UserSessionRepo: class UserSessionRepo {},
}));
// mcp-auth.helpers exports runtime values the gate relies on (decideBasicGate,
// mapAuthResultToResponse, etc.). Keep the REAL helpers so the gate exercises
// real logic; only stub FailedLoginLimiter so its constructor runs without a
// real sweep timer. The module is framework-free and loads cleanly under jest
// (mcp.service.spec.ts already imports it directly), so requireActual is safe.
jest.mock('./mcp-auth.helpers', () => {
const actual = jest.requireActual('./mcp-auth.helpers');
return {
...actual,
FailedLoginLimiter: class FailedLoginLimiter {
sweep() {}
},
};
});
// Import AFTER the mocks are registered.
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
import { McpService } from './mcp.service';
type GateCreds = { email: string; password: string };
// Build an McpService instance with stubbed constructor deps. We never call the
// auth/db collaborators from the gate, so undefined stand-ins are fine for all
// but moduleRef, which the MFA branch reads.
function makeService(opts: {
checkMfaRequirements?: jest.Mock;
}): { service: McpService; gate: (ws: unknown, creds: GateCreds) => Promise<void> } {
// Stub moduleRef.get -> returns an object whose checkMfaRequirements is the
// provided mock. The gate calls moduleRef.get(MfaModule.MfaService).
const moduleRef = {
get: jest.fn().mockReturnValue({
checkMfaRequirements:
opts.checkMfaRequirements ?? jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
}),
};
const service = new McpService(
undefined as never, // environmentService
undefined as never, // workspaceRepo
undefined as never, // authService
undefined as never, // tokenService
undefined as never, // userRepo
undefined as never, // userSessionRepo
moduleRef as never, // moduleRef (read by the MFA branch)
);
// Stop the constructor's unref'd sweep timer leaking across tests.
service.onModuleDestroy();
// enforceBasicLoginGate is private; reach it through the instance. Calling the
// REAL method (not a stub) is the whole point of this suite.
const gate = (
service as unknown as {
enforceBasicLoginGate: (ws: unknown, creds: GateCreds) => Promise<void>;
}
).enforceBasicLoginGate.bind(service);
return { service, gate };
}
const CREDS: GateCreds = { email: 'user@example.com', password: 'pw' };
describe('McpService.enforceBasicLoginGate (REAL gate, leaf deps mocked)', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
// Reset to the community-build default (no EE module) before each test.
mfaModuleState = { bundled: false };
jest.clearAllMocks();
});
describe('SSO enforcement (validateSsoEnforcement)', () => {
it('rejects with Unauthorized when the workspace enforces SSO, before any MFA/login', async () => {
const { gate } = makeService({});
const workspace = { id: 'ws-1', enforceSso: true };
await expect(gate(workspace, CREDS)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
UnauthorizedException,
);
// The /mcp 401 surfaces an SSO-specific message (not a generic MCP error).
await expect(gate(workspace, CREDS)).rejects.toThrow(/enforced SSO/i);
});
it('does NOT consult the MFA module when SSO is enforced (gate short-circuits)', async () => {
// Even if the EE module WERE bundled, the SSO branch throws first, so the
// moduleRef MFA lookup must never run.
mfaModuleState = {
bundled: true,
checkMfaRequirements: jest.fn(),
};
const { service, gate } = makeService({
checkMfaRequirements: mfaModuleState.checkMfaRequirements,
});
const moduleRefGet = (
service as unknown as { moduleRef: { get: jest.Mock } }
).moduleRef.get;
await expect(
gate({ id: 'ws-1', enforceSso: true }, CREDS),
).rejects.toThrow(/enforced SSO/i);
// The SSO branch fired before the MFA require/lookup.
expect(moduleRefGet).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(mfaModuleState.checkMfaRequirements).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe('community build: EE MFA module NOT bundled', () => {
it('passes (no throw) when SSO is not enforced and the lazy require fails (no MFA gate)', async () => {
// mfaModuleState.bundled === false -> the virtual mock factory throws,
// exactly like require() of a missing EE module on a community build.
const { service, gate } = makeService({});
const moduleRefGet = (
service as unknown as { moduleRef: { get: jest.Mock } }
).moduleRef.get;
await expect(
gate({ id: 'ws-1', enforceSso: false }, CREDS),
).resolves.toBeUndefined();
// The require() failed, so the gate returned before touching moduleRef.
expect(moduleRefGet).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe('EE MFA module bundled', () => {
it('rejects with a "use a Bearer token" signal when the user has MFA enabled', async () => {
const check = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
userHasMfa: true,
requiresMfaSetup: false,
});
mfaModuleState = { bundled: true, checkMfaRequirements: check };
const { gate } = makeService({ checkMfaRequirements: check });
const promise = gate({ id: 'ws-1', enforceSso: false }, CREDS);
await expect(promise).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(UnauthorizedException);
await expect(
gate({ id: 'ws-1', enforceSso: false }, CREDS),
).rejects.toThrow(/Bearer access token/i);
// The real requirement check was consulted with the creds + workspace.
expect(check).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
CREDS,
{ id: 'ws-1', enforceSso: false },
undefined,
);
});
it('rejects when the workspace enforces MFA (requiresMfaSetup)', async () => {
// requiresMfaSetup === true models a workspace that enforces MFA for a
// user who has not set it up yet; the Basic path cannot complete it.
const check = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
userHasMfa: false,
requiresMfaSetup: true,
});
mfaModuleState = { bundled: true, checkMfaRequirements: check };
const { gate } = makeService({ checkMfaRequirements: check });
await expect(
gate({ id: 'ws-1', enforceSso: false }, CREDS),
).rejects.toThrow(/Bearer access token/i);
});
it('passes when the user has no MFA and the workspace does not enforce it', async () => {
const check = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
userHasMfa: false,
requiresMfaSetup: false,
});
mfaModuleState = { bundled: true, checkMfaRequirements: check };
const { gate } = makeService({ checkMfaRequirements: check });
await expect(
gate({ id: 'ws-1', enforceSso: false }, CREDS),
).resolves.toBeUndefined();
// The bundled module's requirement check WAS consulted (proving we took
// the bundled branch, not the community no-op branch).
expect(check).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
it('passes when checkMfaRequirements returns a falsy result (no requirement flags)', async () => {
// Defensive: a bundled module that returns undefined must not reject.
const check = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
mfaModuleState = { bundled: true, checkMfaRequirements: check };
const { gate } = makeService({ checkMfaRequirements: check });
await expect(
gate({ id: 'ws-1', enforceSso: false }, CREDS),
).resolves.toBeUndefined();
});
});
});

View File

@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ import {
sharedTokenMatches,
clientIp,
bindAccessJwtVerifier,
extractBearer,
decideBasicGate,
mapAuthResultToResponse,
McpAuthDeps,
} from './mcp-auth.helpers';
import { JwtType } from '../../core/auth/dto/jwt-payload';
@@ -79,6 +82,26 @@ describe('parseBasicAuth', () => {
});
});
describe('extractBearer', () => {
it('extracts the token from a "Bearer <token>" header', () => {
expect(extractBearer('Bearer abc.def.ghi')).toBe('abc.def.ghi');
});
it('is case-insensitive on the scheme (lowercase + uppercase)', () => {
// The split keeps the token as-is; only the scheme is compared lowercased.
expect(extractBearer('bearer abc')).toBe('abc');
expect(extractBearer('BEARER abc')).toBe('abc');
});
it('returns undefined for a non-Bearer scheme (e.g. Basic)', () => {
expect(extractBearer('Basic abc')).toBeUndefined();
});
it('returns undefined for an undefined header', () => {
expect(extractBearer(undefined)).toBeUndefined();
});
});
describe('isCredentialsFailure', () => {
it('is true for the credentials-mismatch UnauthorizedException', () => {
expect(
@@ -185,6 +208,43 @@ describe('FailedLoginLimiter', () => {
expect(lim.isBlocked(k, 0)).toBe(true);
expect(lim.isBlocked(k, 1000)).toBe(false);
});
describe('sweep (expired-bucket eviction, injectable clock)', () => {
// sweep() drops buckets whose windowStart is older than windowMs so
// never-revisited keys cannot accumulate forever. It takes an injectable
// `now` so the behaviour is deterministic without faking timers.
it('drops a bucket strictly older than windowMs', () => {
const lim = new FailedLoginLimiter(5, 1000);
// Seed a bucket at t=0 (windowStart=0).
lim.recordFailure('stale', 0);
// Sweep well past the window: now - windowStart = 5000 >= 1000 -> dropped.
lim.sweep(5000);
// A dropped bucket means a brand-new bucket is created on next touch, so
// the prior failure count is gone (a single fresh failure is far from 5).
lim.recordFailure('stale', 5001);
expect(lim.isBlocked('stale', 5001)).toBe(false);
});
it('drops a bucket exactly at the windowMs boundary (>= is inclusive)', () => {
const lim = new FailedLoginLimiter(1, 1000);
lim.recordFailure('boundary', 0); // windowStart=0, blocked at threshold 1
expect(lim.isBlocked('boundary', 0)).toBe(true);
// now - windowStart = 1000 == windowMs -> the >= check evicts it.
lim.sweep(1000);
// Re-touch at the same instant: a fresh bucket (count 0) is created, so the
// key is no longer blocked, proving the boundary bucket was swept.
expect(lim.isBlocked('boundary', 1000)).toBe(false);
});
it('retains a fresh bucket still within the window', () => {
const lim = new FailedLoginLimiter(1, 1000);
lim.recordFailure('fresh', 0); // windowStart=0
// now - windowStart = 999 < 1000 -> the bucket survives the sweep.
lim.sweep(999);
// Still blocked because the bucket (and its count) was retained.
expect(lim.isBlocked('fresh', 999)).toBe(true);
});
});
});
describe('verifyBearerAccess (Bearer revocation/disabled checks)', () => {
@@ -264,6 +324,31 @@ describe('verifyBearerAccess (Bearer revocation/disabled checks)', () => {
),
).rejects.toThrow('jwt expired');
});
// Item 3: bind the Bearer token to THIS instance's workspace (mirrors
// JwtStrategy). A token whose workspaceId claim differs from the instance
// workspace must be rejected; matching/absent expectedWorkspaceId is allowed.
it('rejects a token from a DIFFERENT workspace when expectedWorkspaceId is set', async () => {
await expect(
verifyBearerAccess('t', {
...bearerDeps(),
expectedWorkspaceId: 'ws-OTHER',
}),
).rejects.toThrow(UnauthorizedException);
});
it('accepts a token whose workspace matches expectedWorkspaceId', async () => {
const res = await verifyBearerAccess('t', {
...bearerDeps(),
expectedWorkspaceId: 'ws-1',
});
expect(res).toEqual({ sub: 'user-1', email: 'u@e.com' });
});
it('does NOT enforce a workspace when expectedWorkspaceId is undefined (single-workspace no-op)', async () => {
const res = await verifyBearerAccess('t', bearerDeps());
expect(res).toEqual({ sub: 'user-1', email: 'u@e.com' });
});
});
describe('resolveMcpSessionConfig', () => {
@@ -587,23 +672,48 @@ describe('resolveMcpSessionConfig', () => {
});
});
describe('isInitializeRequestBody (session-INIT detection)', () => {
it('true only for a single JSON-RPC object with method === "initialize"', () => {
expect(isInitializeRequestBody({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'initialize' })).toBe(
true,
);
// A full, valid JSON-RPC InitializeRequest as the @modelcontextprotocol/sdk
// `isInitializeRequest` predicate (which isInitializeRequestBody now delegates
// to) requires: jsonrpc + id + method === 'initialize' + params.protocolVersion.
const fullInitializeRequest = {
jsonrpc: '2.0',
id: 1,
method: 'initialize',
params: {
protocolVersion: '2024-11-05',
capabilities: {},
clientInfo: { name: 'test-client', version: '1.0.0' },
},
};
describe('isInitializeRequestBody (session-INIT detection, matches SDK predicate)', () => {
it('true for a FULL valid InitializeRequest (the SDK predicate signal)', () => {
expect(isInitializeRequestBody(fullInitializeRequest)).toBe(true);
});
it('false for a bare { method: "initialize" } with no id/params (item 1)', () => {
// Item 1: this previously returned true (method-only check) and let an
// authenticated client POST a params-less body with no mcp-session-id, which
// ran the side-effecting login() before http.ts 400'd it. The SDK predicate
// rejects it (no id, no params.protocolVersion), so it no longer mints a
// session / audit row.
expect(isInitializeRequestBody({ method: 'initialize' })).toBe(false);
expect(
isInitializeRequestBody({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'initialize' }),
).toBe(false);
expect(
isInitializeRequestBody({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method: 'initialize', params: {} }),
).toBe(false);
});
it('false for a non-initialize method (e.g. tools/call)', () => {
expect(
isInitializeRequestBody({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'tools/call' }),
isInitializeRequestBody({ ...fullInitializeRequest, method: 'tools/call' }),
).toBe(false);
});
it('false for a batch (array) body, null/undefined, or a non-object', () => {
expect(
isInitializeRequestBody([{ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'initialize' }]),
).toBe(false);
expect(isInitializeRequestBody([fullInitializeRequest])).toBe(false);
expect(isInitializeRequestBody(undefined)).toBe(false);
expect(isInitializeRequestBody(null)).toBe(false);
expect(isInitializeRequestBody('initialize')).toBe(false);
@@ -618,8 +728,14 @@ describe('isSessionInit decision (no mcp-session-id AND initialize body)', () =>
const decide = (sessionId: string | undefined, body: unknown): boolean =>
!sessionId && isInitializeRequestBody(body);
it('no header + initialize body -> init', () => {
expect(decide(undefined, { method: 'initialize' })).toBe(true);
it('no header + full initialize body -> init', () => {
expect(decide(undefined, fullInitializeRequest)).toBe(true);
});
it('no header + bare params-less initialize body -> NOT init (item 1)', () => {
// A header-less { method: 'initialize' } with no params is no longer treated
// as an init by the SDK predicate, so it does not mint a session via login().
expect(decide(undefined, { method: 'initialize' })).toBe(false);
});
it('no header + non-initialize body -> NOT init (verifyCredentials path)', () => {
@@ -627,7 +743,7 @@ describe('isSessionInit decision (no mcp-session-id AND initialize body)', () =>
});
it('has session-id -> never init regardless of body', () => {
expect(decide('sess-1', { method: 'initialize' })).toBe(false);
expect(decide('sess-1', fullInitializeRequest)).toBe(false);
});
});
@@ -769,3 +885,138 @@ describe('bindAccessJwtVerifier enforces JwtType.ACCESS (item 3)', () => {
expect(res).toEqual({ sub: 'user-1', email: undefined });
});
});
describe('decideBasicGate (pure SSO/MFA pre-token gate, refactor R1)', () => {
// The pure decision extracted out of McpService.enforceBasicLoginGate. It is
// tested WITHOUT ModuleRef and WITHOUT an on-disk EE MFA module: the SSO verdict
// and the MFA requirement result are passed in as plain values.
it('SSO enforced -> throws Unauthorized ("enforced SSO")', () => {
expect(() => decideBasicGate({ ssoEnforced: true })).toThrow(
UnauthorizedException,
);
expect(() => decideBasicGate({ ssoEnforced: true })).toThrow(/enforced SSO/);
// SSO takes precedence even if MFA flags are also set.
expect(() =>
decideBasicGate({ ssoEnforced: true, mfa: { userHasMfa: true } }),
).toThrow(/enforced SSO/);
});
it('no SSO + no MFA module (mfa undefined) -> resolves (Basic allowed)', () => {
// A community/fork build with no EE MFA module passes mfa: undefined and the
// gate must allow the password login (same as the controller with no MFA).
expect(() => decideBasicGate({ ssoEnforced: false })).not.toThrow();
expect(() =>
decideBasicGate({ ssoEnforced: false, mfa: undefined }),
).not.toThrow();
});
it('MFA present + userHasMfa -> rejects ("use a Bearer access token")', () => {
expect(() =>
decideBasicGate({ ssoEnforced: false, mfa: { userHasMfa: true } }),
).toThrow(/use a Bearer access token/);
expect(() =>
decideBasicGate({ ssoEnforced: false, mfa: { userHasMfa: true } }),
).toThrow(UnauthorizedException);
});
it('MFA present + requiresMfaSetup -> rejects', () => {
expect(() =>
decideBasicGate({ ssoEnforced: false, mfa: { requiresMfaSetup: true } }),
).toThrow(/use a Bearer access token/);
});
it('MFA present but none required (both flags false) -> resolves', () => {
expect(() =>
decideBasicGate({
ssoEnforced: false,
mfa: { userHasMfa: false, requiresMfaSetup: false },
}),
).not.toThrow();
});
});
describe('mapAuthResultToResponse (handle status/body mapping, refactor R2)', () => {
// The pure response decision extracted out of McpService.handle. It maps the
// pre-hijack gauntlet (shared token, enablement, auth error) to either a fixed
// JSON error response or the hijack path — never leaking the password/header.
it('wrong X-MCP-Token -> 401 {error:"Unauthorized"} and NOT the hijack path', () => {
const d = mapAuthResultToResponse({ sharedTokenOk: false, enabled: true });
expect(d).toEqual({
kind: 'respond',
status: 401,
body: { error: 'Unauthorized' },
});
});
it('workspace MCP disabled -> 403', () => {
const d = mapAuthResultToResponse({ sharedTokenOk: true, enabled: false });
expect(d.kind).toBe('respond');
if (d.kind === 'respond') {
expect(d.status).toBe(403);
expect(d.body).toEqual({ error: 'MCP is disabled for this workspace' });
}
});
it('an UnauthorizedException -> 401 with err.message; no password/header leaked', () => {
// Construct an UnauthorizedException whose message is the SPECIFIC auth reason.
const err = new UnauthorizedException('Email or password does not match');
const d = mapAuthResultToResponse({
sharedTokenOk: true,
enabled: true,
error: err,
});
expect(d).toEqual({
kind: 'respond',
status: 401,
body: { error: 'Email or password does not match' },
});
// The surfaced body is ONLY the exception message — never the raw secret.
if (d.kind === 'respond') {
const serialized = JSON.stringify(d.body);
expect(serialized).not.toContain('password=');
expect(serialized).not.toContain('Authorization');
expect(serialized).not.toContain('Basic ');
expect(serialized).not.toContain('Bearer ');
}
});
it('a non-Unauthorized error -> 500 generic (no error detail surfaced)', () => {
const err = new Error('db blew up: connection string secret');
const d = mapAuthResultToResponse({
sharedTokenOk: true,
enabled: true,
error: err,
});
expect(d).toEqual({
kind: 'respond',
status: 500,
body: { error: 'Internal server error' },
});
// The generic body must NOT echo the underlying error message.
if (d.kind === 'respond') {
expect(d.body.error).not.toContain('secret');
}
});
it('happy path (auth resolved, no error) -> hijack', () => {
const d = mapAuthResultToResponse({ sharedTokenOk: true, enabled: true });
expect(d).toEqual({ kind: 'hijack' });
});
it('shared-token failure takes precedence over disabled/error', () => {
// Even with a disabled workspace and an error, a bad shared token is the
// first gate, so the response is the uniform 401 Unauthorized.
const d = mapAuthResultToResponse({
sharedTokenOk: false,
enabled: false,
error: new UnauthorizedException('should not surface'),
});
expect(d).toEqual({
kind: 'respond',
status: 401,
body: { error: 'Unauthorized' },
});
});
});

View File

@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ import {
sharedTokenMatches,
clientIp,
bindAccessJwtVerifier,
decideBasicGate,
mapAuthResultToResponse,
DocmostMcpConfig,
ResolvedMcpAuth,
} from './mcp-auth.helpers';
@@ -154,6 +156,15 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
private async verifyMcpBearer(
token: string,
): Promise<{ sub?: string; email?: string }> {
// Resolve THIS instance's workspace so verifyBearerAccess can bind the
// token's `workspaceId` claim to it (mirrors JwtStrategy). The community
// build is single-workspace (findFirst), so this is the default workspace
// and the check is a no-op here; it only rejects a foreign-workspace token
// in a multi-workspace deployment. Undefined (no workspace configured) means
// no check — the credentials path would already have failed with no
// workspace, and an undefined here keeps the helper a no-op rather than
// rejecting every token.
const instanceWorkspace = await this.workspaceRepo.findFirst();
// The revocation/disabled decision logic lives in the framework-free
// verifyBearerAccess helper (unit-testable without the heavy auth graph);
// this method only wires in the concrete TokenService + repos.
@@ -163,6 +174,7 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
verifyJwt: bindAccessJwtVerifier(this.tokenService) as (
t: string,
) => Promise<JwtPayload>,
expectedWorkspaceId: instanceWorkspace?.id,
findUser: (sub, workspaceId) =>
this.userRepo.findById(sub, workspaceId),
findActiveSession: (sessionId) =>
@@ -231,49 +243,54 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
workspace: Workspace,
creds: { email: string; password: string },
): Promise<void> {
// 1) SSO enforcement. validateSsoEnforcement throws BadRequestException; we
// re-surface it as Unauthorized so the /mcp 401 path is consistent and a
// token is never issued.
// 1) SSO enforcement. validateSsoEnforcement throws when the workspace
// enforces SSO; we only need the boolean verdict for the pure decision.
let ssoEnforced = false;
try {
validateSsoEnforcement(workspace);
} catch {
throw new UnauthorizedException(
'This workspace has enforced SSO login. Use SSO; MCP HTTP Basic is not allowed.',
);
ssoEnforced = true;
}
// 2) MFA gate — lazy-require the EE module exactly like AuthController.login.
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
let MfaModule: any;
try {
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
MfaModule = require('./../../ee/mfa/services/mfa.service');
} catch {
// No EE MFA module bundled in this build: same as the controller -> no
// MFA gate. (A community/fork build has no MFA, so Basic is allowed.)
return;
// On a fork WITHOUT the EE module bundled, mfaResult stays undefined and the
// pure gate behaves exactly like the controller (no MFA module -> no MFA
// gate). We only LOAD the module + read the requirement flags here; the
// accept/reject decision lives in the framework-free decideBasicGate so the
// SSO/MFA logic is unit-testable without ModuleRef or the on-disk EE module.
let mfaResult: { userHasMfa?: boolean; requiresMfaSetup?: boolean } | undefined;
// Only consult the MFA module when SSO has not already disqualified the
// request (SSO short-circuits, and skipping the load avoids a needless
// require on the SSO-reject path).
if (!ssoEnforced) {
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
let MfaModule: any;
try {
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
MfaModule = require('./../../ee/mfa/services/mfa.service');
} catch {
// No EE MFA module bundled in this build: same as the controller -> no
// MFA gate. (A community/fork build has no MFA, so Basic is allowed.)
MfaModule = undefined;
}
if (MfaModule) {
const mfaService = this.moduleRef.get(MfaModule.MfaService, {
strict: false,
});
// Same requirement check the controller uses. We pass NO FastifyReply
// (the controller passes `res` only to set a cookie on the no-MFA happy
// path, which we never take here): we only read the requirement flags.
mfaResult = await mfaService.checkMfaRequirements(
creds,
workspace,
undefined,
);
}
}
const mfaService = this.moduleRef.get(MfaModule.MfaService, {
strict: false,
});
// Use the same requirement check the controller uses. We pass NO FastifyReply
// (the controller passes `res` only to set a cookie on the no-MFA happy path,
// which we never take here): we only read the requirement flags. Be tolerant
// of either a (loginInput, workspace) or (loginInput, workspace, res) shape.
const mfaResult = await mfaService.checkMfaRequirements(
creds,
workspace,
undefined,
);
if (mfaResult && (mfaResult.userHasMfa || mfaResult.requiresMfaSetup)) {
throw new UnauthorizedException(
'This account requires multi-factor authentication. MCP HTTP Basic ' +
'cannot complete MFA — log in normally and use a Bearer access token ' +
'instead.',
);
}
// Pure accept/reject decision (throws UnauthorizedException on rejection).
decideBasicGate({ ssoEnforced, mfa: mfaResult });
}
// Lazily create the HTTP handler exactly once. The import is indirected so
@@ -333,52 +350,61 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
// matching `X-MCP-Token` header. It now lives in its OWN header so it never
// collides with `Authorization`, which carries the per-user credentials.
const sharedToken = process.env.MCP_TOKEN;
if (sharedToken) {
const provided = req.headers['x-mcp-token'];
if (!sharedTokenMatches(sharedToken, provided)) {
res.status(401).send({ error: 'Unauthorized' });
return;
}
}
const sharedTokenOk = sharedToken
? sharedTokenMatches(sharedToken, req.headers['x-mcp-token'])
: true;
if (!(await this.isEnabled())) {
res.status(403).send({ error: 'MCP is disabled for this workspace' });
return;
}
// Short-circuit checks (shared token, enablement) that do not need the auth
// resolution. Compute them up front so the response mapping is a single pure
// decision (mapAuthResultToResponse) that cannot leak the password/header.
const enabled = sharedTokenOk ? await this.isEnabled() : false;
// Resolve + validate the per-session identity BEFORE hijacking the response
// so bad credentials surface as a clean 401 JSON (never a torn response and
// never a generic "MCP error"). The resolved config/identity is stashed on
// the raw request for the package's resolver + identify hook to read back.
let resolved: ResolvedMcpAuth;
try {
resolved = await this.resolveSessionConfig(req);
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof UnauthorizedException) {
// Warn once if the only thing missing is the service account, to keep
// the original operator hint.
if (
!this.credsConfigured() &&
!req.headers['authorization'] &&
!this.warnedMissingCreds
) {
this.warnedMissingCreds = true;
this.logger.warn(
'MCP is enabled but received a request with no credentials and no ' +
'MCP_DOCMOST_EMAIL/MCP_DOCMOST_PASSWORD service account configured.',
);
let resolved: ResolvedMcpAuth | undefined;
let authError: unknown;
if (sharedTokenOk && enabled) {
try {
resolved = await this.resolveSessionConfig(req);
} catch (err) {
authError = err;
if (err instanceof UnauthorizedException) {
// Warn once if the only thing missing is the service account, to keep
// the original operator hint.
if (
!this.credsConfigured() &&
!req.headers['authorization'] &&
!this.warnedMissingCreds
) {
this.warnedMissingCreds = true;
this.logger.warn(
'MCP is enabled but received a request with no credentials and no ' +
'MCP_DOCMOST_EMAIL/MCP_DOCMOST_PASSWORD service account configured.',
);
}
} else {
this.logger.error('MCP auth resolution failed', err as Error);
}
res.status(401).send({ error: err.message });
return;
}
this.logger.error('MCP auth resolution failed', err as Error);
res.status(500).send({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
// Pure status/body mapping for the whole pre-hijack gauntlet.
const decision = mapAuthResultToResponse({
sharedTokenOk,
enabled,
error: authError,
});
if (decision.kind === 'respond') {
res.status(decision.status).send(decision.body);
return;
}
// Stash the resolved auth on the raw request so the package's resolver +
// identify hook (wired in getHandler) read it back instead of re-parsing.
(req.raw as unknown as Record<symbol, unknown>)[MCP_RESOLVED] = resolved;
(req.raw as unknown as Record<symbol, unknown>)[MCP_RESOLVED] =
resolved as ResolvedMcpAuth;
// Hand the raw Node req/res to the MCP transport. hijack() tells Fastify
// to stop managing this response so the transport can write to it directly.

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { PageWsListener } from './page-ws.listener';
import { WsTreeService } from '../ws-tree.service';
import {
PageEvent,
PageMovedEvent,
TreeNodeSnapshot,
} from '../../database/listeners/page.listener';
@@ -93,3 +94,139 @@ describe('PageWsListener.onPageCreated', () => {
expect(wsTree.broadcastRefetchRoot).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe('PageWsListener delete/move/restore handlers', () => {
let listener: PageWsListener;
let wsTree: {
broadcastPageCreated: jest.Mock;
broadcastPageDeleted: jest.Mock;
broadcastPageMoved: jest.Mock;
broadcastRefetchRoot: jest.Mock;
};
let warnSpy: jest.SpyInstance;
const secondSnapshot: TreeNodeSnapshot = {
id: 'page-2',
slugId: 'slug-2',
title: 'World',
icon: '📁',
position: 'a2',
spaceId: 'space-1',
parentPageId: null,
};
beforeEach(async () => {
wsTree = {
broadcastPageCreated: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
broadcastPageDeleted: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
broadcastPageMoved: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
broadcastRefetchRoot: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
};
const module: TestingModule = await Test.createTestingModule({
providers: [
PageWsListener,
{ provide: WsTreeService, useValue: wsTree },
],
}).compile();
listener = module.get<PageWsListener>(PageWsListener);
// The PAGE_RESTORED-without-spaceId branch logs a warning; silence + assert.
warnSpy = jest
.spyOn(listener['logger'], 'warn')
.mockImplementation(() => undefined);
});
afterEach(() => {
warnSpy.mockRestore();
});
// --- onPageDeleted (PAGE_SOFT_DELETED / PAGE_DELETED) ---
it('onPageDeleted with N `pages`: one broadcastPageDeleted per page', async () => {
const event: PageEvent = {
pageIds: ['page-1', 'page-2'],
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
pages: [snapshot, secondSnapshot],
};
await listener.onPageDeleted(event);
expect(wsTree.broadcastPageDeleted).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
expect(wsTree.broadcastPageDeleted).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(1, snapshot);
expect(wsTree.broadcastPageDeleted).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(
2,
secondSnapshot,
);
});
it('onPageDeleted with an EMPTY `pages` array: no broadcast', async () => {
const event: PageEvent = {
pageIds: ['page-1'],
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
pages: [],
};
await listener.onPageDeleted(event);
expect(wsTree.broadcastPageDeleted).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('onPageDeleted with UNDEFINED `pages`: no broadcast (no crash)', async () => {
const event: PageEvent = {
pageIds: ['page-1'],
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
};
await listener.onPageDeleted(event);
expect(wsTree.broadcastPageDeleted).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
// --- onPageMoved (PAGE_MOVED) ---
it('onPageMoved: forwards the whole event to a single broadcastPageMoved', async () => {
const event: PageMovedEvent = {
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
oldParentId: 'old-parent',
hasChildren: false,
node: { ...snapshot, parentPageId: 'new-parent', position: 'a5' },
};
await listener.onPageMoved(event);
expect(wsTree.broadcastPageMoved).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(wsTree.broadcastPageMoved).toHaveBeenCalledWith(event);
});
// --- onPageRestored (PAGE_RESTORED) ---
it('onPageRestored WITHOUT spaceId: warns and does NOT refetch', async () => {
const event: PageEvent = {
pageIds: ['page-1'],
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
};
await listener.onPageRestored(event);
expect(warnSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(warnSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.stringContaining('PAGE_RESTORED'),
);
expect(wsTree.broadcastRefetchRoot).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('onPageRestored WITH spaceId: one broadcastRefetchRoot scoped to the space', async () => {
const event: PageEvent = {
pageIds: ['page-1'],
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
spaceId: 'space-9',
};
await listener.onPageRestored(event);
expect(warnSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(wsTree.broadcastRefetchRoot).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(wsTree.broadcastRefetchRoot).toHaveBeenCalledWith('space-9');
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
import { Test, TestingModule } from '@nestjs/testing';
import { CACHE_MANAGER } from '@nestjs/cache-manager';
import { WsService } from './ws.service';
import { PagePermissionRepo } from '@docmost/db/repos/page/page-permission.repo';
import {
getSpaceRoomName,
WS_SPACE_RESTRICTION_CACHE_PREFIX,
WS_CACHE_TTL_MS,
} from './ws.utils';
/**
* WsService server-side unit tests (M7 item 2):
* - spaceHasRestrictions cache lifecycle (miss -> read+set with TTL; hit ->
* no re-read; documents the stale-false window).
* - broadcastToAuthorizedUsers fan-out (authorized-only delivery, multi-socket
* fan-out per user, sockets with no userId skipped).
*
* Both private methods are exercised through their public entry points:
* spaceHasRestrictions via emitTreeEvent, broadcastToAuthorizedUsers via
* emitToAuthorizedUsers. WsService is constructed with mocked cache + repo and a
* mocked socket.io server, so no live infra is needed.
*/
describe('WsService.spaceHasRestrictions (cache lifecycle, via emitTreeEvent)', () => {
let service: WsService;
let pagePermissionRepo: {
hasRestrictedPagesInSpace: jest.Mock;
hasRestrictedAncestor: jest.Mock;
getUserIdsWithPageAccess: jest.Mock;
};
let cache: { get: jest.Mock; set: jest.Mock; del: jest.Mock };
let roomEmit: jest.Mock;
beforeEach(async () => {
pagePermissionRepo = {
hasRestrictedPagesInSpace: jest.fn(),
hasRestrictedAncestor: jest.fn(),
getUserIdsWithPageAccess: jest.fn(),
};
cache = {
get: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(null),
set: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
del: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
};
const module: TestingModule = await Test.createTestingModule({
providers: [
WsService,
{ provide: PagePermissionRepo, useValue: pagePermissionRepo },
{ provide: CACHE_MANAGER, useValue: cache },
],
}).compile();
service = module.get<WsService>(WsService);
roomEmit = jest.fn();
const server = {
to: jest.fn().mockReturnValue({ emit: roomEmit }),
in: jest.fn().mockReturnValue({ fetchSockets: jest.fn() }),
};
service.setServer(server as never);
});
const cacheKey = (spaceId: string): string =>
`${WS_SPACE_RESTRICTION_CACHE_PREFIX}${spaceId}`;
it('first call MISSES the cache -> reads the repo and sets it with WS_CACHE_TTL_MS', async () => {
cache.get.mockResolvedValue(null); // miss
pagePermissionRepo.hasRestrictedPagesInSpace.mockResolvedValue(true);
pagePermissionRepo.hasRestrictedAncestor.mockResolvedValue(false);
await service.emitTreeEvent('space-1', 'page-1', { op: 'x' });
expect(cache.get).toHaveBeenCalledWith(cacheKey('space-1'));
expect(pagePermissionRepo.hasRestrictedPagesInSpace).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(pagePermissionRepo.hasRestrictedPagesInSpace).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'space-1',
);
// The freshly-read verdict is cached with the 30s TTL.
expect(cache.set).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
cacheKey('space-1'),
true,
WS_CACHE_TTL_MS,
);
});
it('second call HITS the cache -> the repo is NOT re-read', async () => {
// Cache hit returns false (no restrictions) -> open-space fast path.
cache.get.mockResolvedValue(false);
await service.emitTreeEvent('space-1', 'page-1', { op: 'x' });
expect(cache.get).toHaveBeenCalledWith(cacheKey('space-1'));
// The whole point of the cache: no repo read on a hit.
expect(pagePermissionRepo.hasRestrictedPagesInSpace).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(cache.set).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
// false verdict -> broadcast to the whole room (open-space fast path).
expect(roomEmit).toHaveBeenCalledWith('message', { op: 'x' });
});
it('a cached `false` is returned even when restrictions now exist (the stale window)', async () => {
// The cache says "no restrictions" (false) but the repo, if asked, would now
// say true. spaceHasRestrictions trusts the cached false and never re-reads —
// this documents the up-to-TTL stale window the production comment warns about
// (a payload can fan out room-wide until the cache is invalidated/expires).
cache.get.mockResolvedValue(false);
pagePermissionRepo.hasRestrictedPagesInSpace.mockResolvedValue(true);
await service.emitTreeEvent('space-1', 'page-1', { op: 'stale' });
expect(pagePermissionRepo.hasRestrictedPagesInSpace).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
// Treated as open -> the event is broadcast to the WHOLE room.
expect(roomEmit).toHaveBeenCalledWith('message', { op: 'stale' });
});
it('caches a `false` verdict too (so the next emit hits, not re-reads)', async () => {
cache.get.mockResolvedValueOnce(null); // first call: miss
pagePermissionRepo.hasRestrictedPagesInSpace.mockResolvedValue(false);
await service.emitTreeEvent('space-2', 'page-9', { op: 'y' });
expect(cache.set).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
cacheKey('space-2'),
false,
WS_CACHE_TTL_MS,
);
});
});
describe('WsService.broadcastToAuthorizedUsers fan-out (via emitToAuthorizedUsers)', () => {
let service: WsService;
let pagePermissionRepo: {
hasRestrictedPagesInSpace: jest.Mock;
hasRestrictedAncestor: jest.Mock;
getUserIdsWithPageAccess: jest.Mock;
};
let cache: { get: jest.Mock; set: jest.Mock; del: jest.Mock };
let fetchSockets: jest.Mock;
let serverIn: jest.Mock;
beforeEach(async () => {
pagePermissionRepo = {
hasRestrictedPagesInSpace: jest.fn(),
hasRestrictedAncestor: jest.fn(),
getUserIdsWithPageAccess: jest.fn(),
};
cache = {
get: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(null),
set: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
del: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
};
const module: TestingModule = await Test.createTestingModule({
providers: [
WsService,
{ provide: PagePermissionRepo, useValue: pagePermissionRepo },
{ provide: CACHE_MANAGER, useValue: cache },
],
}).compile();
service = module.get<WsService>(WsService);
fetchSockets = jest.fn();
serverIn = jest.fn().mockReturnValue({ fetchSockets });
const server = {
to: jest.fn().mockReturnValue({ emit: jest.fn() }),
in: serverIn,
};
service.setServer(server as never);
});
it('only sockets whose userId is in getUserIdsWithPageAccess receive the event', async () => {
pagePermissionRepo.getUserIdsWithPageAccess.mockResolvedValue(['user-ok']);
const okEmit = jest.fn();
const noEmit = jest.fn();
fetchSockets.mockResolvedValue([
{ id: 's1', data: { userId: 'user-ok' }, emit: okEmit },
{ id: 's2', data: { userId: 'user-no' }, emit: noEmit },
]);
const data = { operation: 'moveTreeNode' };
await service.emitToAuthorizedUsers('space-1', 'page-1', data);
// The authorized set is resolved from the candidate userIds present on the
// sockets (deduped), then only those users' sockets get the event.
expect(pagePermissionRepo.getUserIdsWithPageAccess).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'page-1',
expect.arrayContaining(['user-ok', 'user-no']),
);
expect(okEmit).toHaveBeenCalledWith('message', data);
expect(noEmit).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('a user with TWO sockets receives the event on BOTH (userSocketMap fan-out)', async () => {
pagePermissionRepo.getUserIdsWithPageAccess.mockResolvedValue(['user-ok']);
const tab1 = jest.fn();
const tab2 = jest.fn();
fetchSockets.mockResolvedValue([
{ id: 's1', data: { userId: 'user-ok' }, emit: tab1 },
{ id: 's2', data: { userId: 'user-ok' }, emit: tab2 },
]);
const data = { operation: 'moveTreeNode' };
await service.emitToAuthorizedUsers('space-1', 'page-1', data);
// Both of the authorized user's sockets (e.g. two browser tabs) receive it.
expect(tab1).toHaveBeenCalledWith('message', data);
expect(tab2).toHaveBeenCalledWith('message', data);
// The candidate set is deduped to a single userId even with two sockets.
expect(pagePermissionRepo.getUserIdsWithPageAccess).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'page-1',
['user-ok'],
);
});
it('a socket with NO userId is skipped (not a candidate, never emitted to)', async () => {
pagePermissionRepo.getUserIdsWithPageAccess.mockResolvedValue(['user-ok']);
const okEmit = jest.fn();
const anonEmit = jest.fn();
fetchSockets.mockResolvedValue([
{ id: 's1', data: { userId: 'user-ok' }, emit: okEmit },
// Unauthenticated socket: no userId -> excluded from the candidate map.
{ id: 's2', data: {}, emit: anonEmit },
]);
const data = { operation: 'moveTreeNode' };
await service.emitToAuthorizedUsers('space-1', 'page-1', data);
expect(okEmit).toHaveBeenCalledWith('message', data);
expect(anonEmit).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
// The no-userId socket is not even offered as a candidate to the repo.
expect(pagePermissionRepo.getUserIdsWithPageAccess).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'page-1',
['user-ok'],
);
});
it('no sockets in the room -> no repo lookup, no emit', async () => {
fetchSockets.mockResolvedValue([]);
await service.emitToAuthorizedUsers('space-1', 'page-1', { op: 'x' });
expect(pagePermissionRepo.getUserIdsWithPageAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('routes through the space room name', async () => {
pagePermissionRepo.getUserIdsWithPageAccess.mockResolvedValue([]);
fetchSockets.mockResolvedValue([
{ id: 's1', data: { userId: 'u' }, emit: jest.fn() },
]);
await service.emitToAuthorizedUsers('space-7', 'page-1', { op: 'x' });
expect(serverIn).toHaveBeenCalledWith(getSpaceRoomName('space-7'));
});
});

View File

@@ -329,3 +329,109 @@ describe('WsService.emitTreeEvent', () => {
expect(anonEmit).toHaveBeenCalledWith('message', data);
});
});
describe('move-into-restricted disjointness contract (WsTreeService + real WsService)', () => {
// CONTRACT: a move under a restricted ancestor PARTITIONS the room. The
// authorized set (gets the moveTreeNode via emitToAuthorizedUsers) and its
// complement (gets the deleteTreeNode via emitDeleteToUnauthorized) are
// disjoint and together cover every socket — and an anonymous (no-userId)
// socket lands in the delete set. We wire a REAL WsService (only its repo,
// cache and socket server mocked) so both broadcasts run against the SAME fixed
// socket set, the way they do in production.
let treeService: WsTreeService;
let pagePermissionRepo: {
hasRestrictedPagesInSpace: jest.Mock;
hasRestrictedAncestor: jest.Mock;
getUserIdsWithPageAccess: jest.Mock;
};
// Fixed room: two authorized users (one with two sockets), one unauthorized
// user, one anonymous socket.
const moveSeen: string[] = [];
const deleteSeen: string[] = [];
const mkSocket = (id: string, userId: string | undefined) => ({
id,
data: userId ? { userId } : {},
emit: jest.fn((_event: string, payload: { operation: string }) => {
if (payload.operation === 'moveTreeNode') moveSeen.push(id);
if (payload.operation === 'deleteTreeNode') deleteSeen.push(id);
}),
});
const sockets = [
mkSocket('s-ok-1', 'user-ok'), // authorized, tab 1
mkSocket('s-ok-2', 'user-ok'), // authorized, tab 2 (fan-out)
mkSocket('s-no', 'user-no'), // unauthorized
mkSocket('s-anon', undefined), // anonymous (no userId)
];
beforeEach(async () => {
moveSeen.length = 0;
deleteSeen.length = 0;
pagePermissionRepo = {
hasRestrictedPagesInSpace: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(true),
// The move destination IS under a restricted ancestor.
hasRestrictedAncestor: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(true),
// Only user-ok is authorized to see the page.
getUserIdsWithPageAccess: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(['user-ok']),
};
const cache = {
get: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(null),
set: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
del: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
};
const module: TestingModule = await Test.createTestingModule({
providers: [
WsTreeService,
WsService,
{ provide: PagePermissionRepo, useValue: pagePermissionRepo },
{ provide: CACHE_MANAGER, useValue: cache },
],
}).compile();
const wsService = module.get<WsService>(WsService);
const server = {
to: jest.fn().mockReturnValue({ emit: jest.fn() }),
in: jest.fn().mockReturnValue({
fetchSockets: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(sockets),
}),
};
wsService.setServer(server as never);
treeService = module.get<WsTreeService>(WsTreeService);
});
it('authorized set (move) and complement (delete) partition the room; anon is in delete', async () => {
const event: PageMovedEvent = {
workspaceId: 'ws-1',
oldParentId: 'old-parent',
hasChildren: false,
node: { ...snapshot, parentPageId: 'restricted-parent', position: 'a5' },
};
await treeService.broadcastPageMoved(event);
const moveSet = new Set(moveSeen);
const deleteSet = new Set(deleteSeen);
// Authorized user's BOTH sockets got the move; nobody else did.
expect(moveSet).toEqual(new Set(['s-ok-1', 's-ok-2']));
// Everyone else (unauthorized + anonymous) got the delete.
expect(deleteSet).toEqual(new Set(['s-no', 's-anon']));
// DISJOINT: no socket received both a move and a delete.
const intersection = [...moveSet].filter((id) => deleteSet.has(id));
expect(intersection).toEqual([]);
// PARTITION: the two sets together cover every socket in the room exactly.
const union = new Set([...moveSet, ...deleteSet]);
expect(union).toEqual(new Set(sockets.map((s) => s.id)));
// The anonymous socket specifically lands in the DELETE set, never the move.
expect(deleteSet.has('s-anon')).toBe(true);
expect(moveSet.has('s-anon')).toBe(false);
});
});