refactor(sandbox): address PR #250 round-3 review — dead import, env validation, uuid validator, docs (#243)

Must-fix:
- mcp.module: drop the now-dead EnvironmentModule import (and its stale
  comment). McpService no longer injects EnvironmentService; EnvironmentModule
  is @Global and imported at the app root, so DI still resolves.

Stability:
- environment.service: route getSandboxTtlMs + the three SANDBOX_MAX_*_BYTES
  caps through a shared getPositiveIntEnv() helper that warns once per key and
  falls back to the default on a non-integer or <= 0 value (previously the byte
  caps did a bare parseInt, so SANDBOX_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES=0 made every stash_page
  fail against a 0-byte cap). TTL behavior is unchanged.

Simplification:
- sandbox.controller: replace the homemade UUID_RE with the project's shared
  `uuid` validator (import { validate as isValidUUID } from 'uuid'), matching
  the attachment routes; update the spec fixtures to valid v4 UUIDs.
- mcp.service: inline the single-caller one-liner buildSandboxConfig() to
  this.sandboxStore.asSink() at the wiring site.

Docs:
- CHANGELOG: add an [Unreleased] > Added entry for #243 (stash_page tool,
  anonymous GET /api/sb/:id, five SANDBOX_* env vars).
- AGENTS.md: note that GET /api/sb/:id is in the workspace-gate preHandler's
  excludedPaths and is fully tokenless, unlike /api/files/public/... which
  still resolves a workspace and needs an attachment JWT.

Tests: cap-getter validation (0/-5/abc -> default, valid -> parsed), updated
UUID fixtures. apps/server jest sandbox/environment/mcp: 233 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
claude_code
2026-06-28 20:21:31 +03:00
parent 8842bc8bf3
commit aff58646d1
9 changed files with 113 additions and 62 deletions
@@ -41,6 +41,59 @@ describe('EnvironmentService', () => {
});
});
// The three byte caps share the same getPositiveIntEnv() helper as the TTL,
// so a non-integer / non-positive value ('0'/'-5'/'abc') falls back to the
// documented default and a valid positive integer is returned parsed. Note
// parseInt truncates '1.5' -> 1 (a valid positive integer), so that value is
// accepted, not rejected — same as the pre-existing TTL getter.
describe.each([
{
name: 'getSandboxMaxBytes',
key: 'SANDBOX_MAX_BYTES',
def: 8_388_608,
getter: (s: EnvironmentService) => s.getSandboxMaxBytes(),
},
{
name: 'getSandboxMaxImageBytes',
key: 'SANDBOX_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES',
def: 20_971_520,
getter: (s: EnvironmentService) => s.getSandboxMaxImageBytes(),
},
{
name: 'getSandboxMaxTotalBytes',
key: 'SANDBOX_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES',
def: 134_217_728,
getter: (s: EnvironmentService) => s.getSandboxMaxTotalBytes(),
},
])('$name', ({ key, def, getter }) => {
// ConfigService stub: get(k, d) returns the configured value for THIS cap's
// key (falling back to d), and the default for every other key.
const build = (value?: string) =>
new EnvironmentService({
get: (k: string, d?: string) =>
k === key ? (value ?? d) : d,
} as any);
it.each(['0', '-5', 'abc'])(
`falls back to the ${def} default for invalid value %s`,
(value) => {
expect(getter(build(value))).toBe(def);
},
);
it('returns the parsed value for a valid positive integer', () => {
expect(getter(build('4096'))).toBe(4096);
});
it('truncates a non-integer like "1.5" to 1 via parseInt (not rejected)', () => {
expect(getter(build('1.5'))).toBe(1);
});
it(`uses the ${def} default when the env is unset`, () => {
expect(getter(build(undefined))).toBe(def);
});
});
describe('getSandboxPublicUrl', () => {
// Stub that resolves BOTH keys the public-url logic consults.
const build = (vals: { sandboxUrl?: string; appUrl?: string }) =>
@@ -5,9 +5,10 @@ import ms, { StringValue } from 'ms';
@Injectable()
export class EnvironmentService {
private readonly logger = new Logger(EnvironmentService.name);
// One-shot guard so an invalid SANDBOX_TTL_MS is warned about once, not on
// every getSandboxTtlMs() call (which runs per blob put).
private sandboxTtlWarned = false;
// Env keys already warned about for an invalid value (one-shot per key, so a
// bad SANDBOX_* value is not logged on every blob put). Mirrors the original
// sandboxTtlWarned guard, generalized across the TTL + the three byte caps.
private readonly invalidPositiveIntWarned = new Set<string>();
constructor(private configService: ConfigService) {}
@@ -352,50 +353,48 @@ export class EnvironmentService {
return raw.replace(/\/+$/, '');
}
// Parse a REQUIRED positive-integer env (TTL in ms or a byte cap). A
// non-integer or <= 0 value would break the sandbox silently (instant expiry,
// or every put failing against a 0-byte cap), so warn once and fall back to
// the default instead. Blob bodies are never logged.
private getPositiveIntEnv(key: string, def: number): number {
const parsed = parseInt(
this.configService.get<string>(key, String(def)),
10,
);
if (!Number.isInteger(parsed) || parsed <= 0) {
if (!this.invalidPositiveIntWarned.has(key)) {
this.invalidPositiveIntWarned.add(key);
this.logger.warn(
`Invalid ${key} (must be a positive integer); falling back to the ${def} default`,
);
}
return def;
}
return parsed;
}
// Blob time-to-live. Default 1h. The unguessable UUID + this short TTL + TLS
// are the whole capability model (no tokens). A non-positive or non-integer
// value would make every blob expire instantly (silent 404s), so reject it and
// fall back to the 1h default (warned about once to avoid per-put log spam).
getSandboxTtlMs(): number {
const parsed = parseInt(
this.configService.get<string>('SANDBOX_TTL_MS', '3600000'),
10,
);
if (!Number.isInteger(parsed) || parsed <= 0) {
if (!this.sandboxTtlWarned) {
this.sandboxTtlWarned = true;
this.logger.warn(
`Invalid SANDBOX_TTL_MS (must be a positive integer); ` +
`falling back to the 3600000 ms default`,
);
}
return 3_600_000;
}
return parsed;
return this.getPositiveIntEnv('SANDBOX_TTL_MS', 3_600_000);
}
// Per-blob cap for non-image blobs (the serialized document). Default 8 MiB.
getSandboxMaxBytes(): number {
return parseInt(
this.configService.get<string>('SANDBOX_MAX_BYTES', '8388608'),
10,
);
return this.getPositiveIntEnv('SANDBOX_MAX_BYTES', 8_388_608);
}
// Per-blob cap for mirrored image blobs. Default 20 MiB.
getSandboxMaxImageBytes(): number {
return parseInt(
this.configService.get<string>('SANDBOX_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES', '20971520'),
10,
);
return this.getPositiveIntEnv('SANDBOX_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES', 20_971_520);
}
// RAM guard: total bytes the whole store may hold. Default 128 MiB. On
// overflow the store evicts oldest entries to make room.
getSandboxMaxTotalBytes(): number {
return parseInt(
this.configService.get<string>('SANDBOX_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES', '134217728'),
10,
);
return this.getPositiveIntEnv('SANDBOX_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES', 134_217_728);
}
}