ci(#476): гейты наблюдаемых свойств перед publish — image-smoke, migration-order на push, allowlist fail-closed, property-тесты

Retrospective of 22.06-10.07 merges showed one recurring miss class: local
logic verified, integration property never checked (#361, #353, #452, #172,
#435). This lands four gates so each of those classes fails BEFORE the
:develop image is pushed:

1. Image boot-smoke in the publish job (develop.yml + scripts/ci/image-smoke.sh):
   the exact image watchtower pulls is booted against postgres/redis services
   before the push — /api/health (startup migrator, #361-boot/#353), auth/setup,
   client dist served, hashed assets immutable + brotli (#452).
2. migration-order gate now also runs on push (test.yml): direct pushes used to
   bypass the PR-only gate; base = event.before, zero-SHA skips, force-push
   fails closed.
3. External-MCP tool allowlist fails closed (#172 class): corrupt stored value
   now reads as [] (deny-all) with an error log instead of null (allow-all);
   [] round-trips as jsonb [] via jsonbBind({preserveEmpty}) and means deny-all
   in the toolset filter. The settings form sends null for an empty tag field
   so existing "unrestricted" servers are not silently narrowed.
4. Property tests for the silent-degradation classes: converter fixpoint
   through the live server path (mcp e2e), and CollabSession cache-key
   stability under per-call fresh tokens (#435/#439 lesson) incl. a negative
   control with the token cache disabled.

Closes #476

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-11 01:02:29 +03:00
parent 3411bda2d1
commit 5f3f720d9a
16 changed files with 670 additions and 57 deletions
@@ -37,10 +37,13 @@ export class CreateMcpServerDto {
@IsObject()
headers?: Record<string, string>;
// Omit/null => no restriction; `[]` is persisted verbatim and means deny-all
// (zero tools) since #476. @IsOptional() skips validation for null as well,
// so an explicit null is accepted.
@IsOptional()
@IsArray()
@IsString({ each: true })
toolAllowlist?: string[];
toolAllowlist?: string[] | null;
// Admin-authored guidance ("how/when to use this server's tools") injected
// into the agent system prompt next to the tool descriptions (#180). Trusted,
@@ -38,10 +38,13 @@ export class UpdateMcpServerDto {
@IsObject()
headers?: Record<string, string>;
// Absent => unchanged; null => no restriction; `[]` is persisted verbatim
// and means deny-all (zero tools) since #476. @IsOptional() skips validation
// for null as well, so an explicit null is accepted.
@IsOptional()
@IsArray()
@IsString({ each: true })
toolAllowlist?: string[];
toolAllowlist?: string[] | null;
// Admin-authored prompt guidance (#180). Absent => unchanged; blank => cleared
// (stored as null by the repo). Capped to bound prompt/token size.
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
import { type Tool } from 'ai';
import { McpClientsService } from './mcp-clients.service';
/**
* Tool-allowlist filtering semantics on the merged external toolset (#476).
*
* COVERAGE CHOICE (documented per issue #476): the full corrupt-row chain
* (DB value -> repo normalizeRow -> toolsFor filter) is covered on TWO levels
* instead of one live-stub-MCP-server integration test:
* (a) apps/server/test/integration/ai-mcp-server-repo.int-spec.ts pins the
* repo read/write semantics against a real Postgres — `[]` round-trips
* as jsonb `[]`, a present-but-corrupt value fails CLOSED to `[]` with
* an error log;
* (b) THIS spec pins what the toolset builder does with the repo's output —
* null = unrestricted, `['alpha']` = only alpha, `[]` (including the
* corrupt-row fallback) = ZERO tools.
* Together they prove the end-to-end property "corrupt/empty allowlist can
* never widen to all tools" without a live stub HTTP MCP server.
*
* The drive path mirrors mcp-namespacing.spec.ts: stub the repo's listEnabled,
* spy the private `connect` to return a fake client, inspect the merged keys.
*/
function fakeTool(): Tool {
return { description: 'x', inputSchema: undefined } as unknown as Tool;
}
interface FakeServer {
id: string;
name: string;
transport: string;
url: string;
headersEnc: string | null;
toolAllowlist: string[] | null;
}
function server(
over: Partial<FakeServer> & { id: string; name: string },
): FakeServer {
return {
transport: 'http',
url: 'https://example.com/mcp',
headersEnc: null,
toolAllowlist: null,
...over,
};
}
/**
* Build a service whose repo returns `servers` and whose fake clients expose
* `rawTools` from tools(). Returns the merged tool keys produced by toolsFor.
*/
async function mergedKeysFor(
servers: FakeServer[],
rawTools: Record<string, Tool>,
): Promise<string[]> {
const repoStub = {
listEnabled: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(servers),
};
const service = new McpClientsService(repoStub as never, {} as never);
jest
.spyOn(
service as unknown as { connect: (s: FakeServer) => unknown },
'connect',
)
.mockImplementation(() =>
Promise.resolve({
tools: () => Promise.resolve(rawTools),
close: () => Promise.resolve(),
}),
);
const toolset = await service.toolsFor('ws-1');
// Release the lease so the service does not hold the fake clients open.
await Promise.all(toolset.clients.map((c) => c.close()));
return Object.keys(toolset.tools);
}
describe('external MCP tool-allowlist filtering (via toolsFor, #476)', () => {
afterEach(() => jest.restoreAllMocks());
const RAW = () => ({
alpha: fakeTool(),
beta: fakeTool(),
gamma: fakeTool(),
});
it("['alpha'] lets ONLY alpha through", async () => {
const keys = await mergedKeysFor(
[server({ id: 'id-1', name: 'srv', toolAllowlist: ['alpha'] })],
RAW(),
);
expect(keys).toEqual(['srv_alpha']);
});
it('null (no restriction) lets every tool through', async () => {
const keys = await mergedKeysFor(
[server({ id: 'id-1', name: 'srv', toolAllowlist: null })],
RAW(),
);
expect(keys.sort()).toEqual(['srv_alpha', 'srv_beta', 'srv_gamma']);
});
it('[] (deny-all) yields ZERO tools — an empty array is authoritative, not falsy (#476)', async () => {
// This is the regression the #476 change guards: `[]` used to fall through
// the old `allow.length > 0` check and expose ALL tools. It must expose NONE.
const keys = await mergedKeysFor(
[server({ id: 'id-1', name: 'srv', toolAllowlist: [] })],
RAW(),
);
expect(keys).toEqual([]);
});
it('the corrupt-row fallback ([] from the repo) also yields ZERO tools (#476)', async () => {
// The repo turns a present-but-corrupt tool_allowlist into `[]` (fail-closed,
// see normalizeRow in ai-mcp-server.repo.ts + the int-spec); this pins that
// the toolset builder honours that fallback as deny-all rather than allow-all.
const corruptFallback: string[] = [];
const keys = await mergedKeysFor(
[server({ id: 'id-1', name: 'srv', toolAllowlist: corruptFallback })],
RAW(),
);
expect(keys).toEqual([]);
});
it('allowlisted names not exposed by the server are ignored (no phantom tools)', async () => {
const keys = await mergedKeysFor(
[
server({
id: 'id-1',
name: 'srv',
toolAllowlist: ['alpha', 'does-not-exist'],
}),
],
RAW(),
);
expect(keys).toEqual(['srv_alpha']);
});
it('a deny-all server contributes no prompt instructions (0 tools merged)', async () => {
const repoStub = {
listEnabled: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue([
{
...server({ id: 'id-1', name: 'srv', toolAllowlist: [] }),
instructions: 'use the tools wisely',
},
]),
};
const service = new McpClientsService(repoStub as never, {} as never);
jest
.spyOn(
service as unknown as { connect: (s: FakeServer) => unknown },
'connect',
)
.mockImplementation(() =>
Promise.resolve({
tools: () => Promise.resolve(RAW()),
close: () => Promise.resolve(),
}),
);
const toolset = await service.toolsFor('ws-1');
await Promise.all(toolset.clients.map((c) => c.close()));
expect(Object.keys(toolset.tools)).toEqual([]);
// mergeNamespaced reported 0 contributed tools, so no guidance is attached.
expect(toolset.instructions).toEqual([]);
});
});
@@ -285,9 +285,13 @@ export class McpClientsService {
try {
client = await this.connectWithTimeout(server, CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS);
const raw = await withTimeout(client.tools(), CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS);
// Allowlist semantics (#476): null/absent = no restriction (all tools);
// ANY array — including `[]` — is authoritative, so an EMPTY allowlist
// yields ZERO tools (deny-all). Do NOT add a `.length > 0` escape here:
// that read `[]` as falsy and silently widened deny-all to allow-all
// (the repo also fails corrupt rows closed to `[]` for the same reason).
const allow = server.toolAllowlist;
const picked =
Array.isArray(allow) && allow.length > 0 ? pick(raw, allow) : raw;
const picked = Array.isArray(allow) ? pick(raw, allow) : raw;
// Bound each tool's execute with a per-call total-timeout guard before
// merging, so a single chatty-but-stuck call is aborted after the cap.
const guarded = wrapToolsWithCallTimeout(picked, callTimeoutMs);
@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ export class McpServersService {
transport: dto.transport,
url: dto.url,
headersEnc,
// undefined => unchanged; [] / value handled by repo (empty => null).
// undefined => unchanged; null => no restriction; `[]` is persisted
// verbatim and means deny-all (#476).
toolAllowlist: dto.toolAllowlist,
// undefined => unchanged; blank => cleared (null) by the repo.
instructions: dto.instructions,
@@ -35,4 +35,25 @@ describe('jsonbBind', () => {
expect(out).not.toBeNull();
expect(out).toBeDefined();
});
// preserveEmpty (#476): opts a column OUT of the empty-to-null collapse so an
// empty container is persisted verbatim (e.g. `[]` = deny-all for
// tool_allowlist). null stays null regardless of the flag.
describe('preserveEmpty', () => {
it('returns a (non-null) bind for an empty array', () => {
const out = jsonbBind([], { preserveEmpty: true });
expect(out).not.toBeNull();
expect(out).toBeDefined();
});
it('returns a (non-null) bind for an empty object', () => {
const out = jsonbBind({}, { preserveEmpty: true });
expect(out).not.toBeNull();
expect(out).toBeDefined();
});
it('still returns null for null (null means null, flag or not)', () => {
expect(jsonbBind(null, { preserveEmpty: true })).toBeNull();
});
});
});
@@ -78,7 +78,9 @@ export class AiMcpServerRepo {
headersEnc: values.headersEnc ?? null,
// jsonb column: the postgres driver would otherwise encode a JS array as
// a Postgres array literal. Bind the JSON text and cast it to jsonb.
toolAllowlist: jsonbBind(values.toolAllowlist),
// preserveEmpty (#476): `[]` is a real value here (deny-all), distinct
// from null ("no restriction") — it must round-trip as `[]`, not null.
toolAllowlist: jsonbBind(values.toolAllowlist, { preserveEmpty: true }),
// Plain text column: blank/whitespace-only guidance is stored as null.
instructions: blankToNull(values.instructions),
enabled: values.enabled ?? true,
@@ -111,7 +113,10 @@ export class AiMcpServerRepo {
if (patch.url !== undefined) set.url = patch.url;
if (patch.headersEnc !== undefined) set.headersEnc = patch.headersEnc;
if (patch.toolAllowlist !== undefined) {
set.toolAllowlist = jsonbBind(patch.toolAllowlist);
// preserveEmpty (#476): see insert — `[]` (deny-all) must not become null.
set.toolAllowlist = jsonbBind(patch.toolAllowlist, {
preserveEmpty: true,
});
}
if (patch.instructions !== undefined) {
// Blank/whitespace-only guidance clears the column (stored as null).
@@ -158,7 +163,9 @@ export function blankToNull(value: string | null | undefined): string | null {
* fix), so the driver hands back a string like `'["a","b"]'` rather than an
* array. Be tolerant: normalize a JSON string to its value, then accept it only
* if it is an array of strings; null / a non-array / unparseable value / an
* array with a non-string element all become null (unrestricted).
* array with a non-string element all become null. NOTE: null here only means
* "could not parse" — the null-vs-deny-all policy decision lives in
* normalizeRow (#476: present-but-corrupt fails CLOSED to `[]`).
*/
export function parseToolAllowlist(value: unknown): string[] | null {
// Shape guard only; the legacy double-encoding self-heal lives in
@@ -173,17 +180,20 @@ export function parseToolAllowlist(value: unknown): string[] | null {
/**
* Normalize a DB row so `toolAllowlist` is always `string[] | null`.
*
* FAIL-OPEN logging: a stored value that is present but cannot be parsed into a
* string[] (corrupt JSON, a non-array, non-string elements) degrades to `null` =
* "no restriction", so the agent silently gets ALL of the server's tools. Log
* one line (server id only, never the contents) so that widening is not silent.
* FAIL-CLOSED (#476): a stored value that is PRESENT but cannot be parsed into
* a string[] (corrupt JSON, a non-array, non-string elements) degrades to `[]`
* = deny-all, so a corrupted allowlist can never silently widen to "the agent
* gets ALL of the server's tools" (the old fail-open null). An error line is
* logged (server id only, never the contents) so the admin can repair the row.
* A column that is truly NULL/absent stays `null` = "no restriction".
*/
function normalizeRow(row: AiMcpServer): AiMcpServer {
const parsed = parseToolAllowlist(row.toolAllowlist);
if (parsed === null && row.toolAllowlist != null) {
logger.warn(
`Corrupt tool_allowlist for MCP server ${row.id}; ignoring it (no tool restriction applied)`,
logger.error(
`Corrupt tool_allowlist for MCP server ${row.id}; failing closed (NO tools allowed) — re-save the server's allowlist to repair it`,
);
return { ...row, toolAllowlist: [] };
}
return { ...row, toolAllowlist: parsed };
}
+19 -7
View File
@@ -78,18 +78,30 @@ export function violatedConstraint(err: unknown): string | undefined {
* verbatim); `::jsonb` then parses it into a real array/object. Read-side
* parsers repair rows written the old buggy way without a migration.
*
* Returns `null` for null/undefined and for "empty" values (an empty array, or
* an object with no own enumerable keys) — callers treat empty as "clear/unset",
* so an empty allowlist/config never round-trips as `[]`/`{}`.
* Returns `null` for null/undefined. By default it ALSO returns `null` for
* "empty" values (an empty array, or an object with no own enumerable keys) —
* most callers treat empty as "clear/unset", so an empty config never
* round-trips as `[]`/`{}`.
*
* `preserveEmpty` (issue #476) opts a column OUT of that empty-to-null
* normalization so `[]`/`{}` are persisted as real jsonb values. Needed where
* empty and null mean DIFFERENT things: an empty `tool_allowlist` is
* deny-all ("zero tools allowed"), while null is "no restriction" — collapsing
* `[]` to null silently widened deny-all to allow-all. Deliberately an opt-in
* flag, NOT a global change: the other jsonb callers (model_config, source)
* keep the empty-means-unset contract.
*/
export function jsonbBind<T>(
value: T | null | undefined,
opts?: { preserveEmpty?: boolean },
): RawBuilder<T> | null {
if (value === null || value === undefined) return null;
if (Array.isArray(value)) {
if (value.length === 0) return null;
} else if (typeof value === 'object') {
if (Object.keys(value as object).length === 0) return null;
if (!opts?.preserveEmpty) {
if (Array.isArray(value)) {
if (value.length === 0) return null;
} else if (typeof value === 'object') {
if (Object.keys(value as object).length === 0) return null;
}
}
return sql<T>`${JSON.stringify(value)}::text::jsonb`;
}