fix(comment): store the real anchored substring as expectedText + pin authz (#318 F1/F2)

F1 [blocking]: a suggestion whose anchor matched via normalization could never
be applied (spurious 409). The comment mark lands on the doc's ACTUAL text
(Docmost auto-converts to typographic quotes/dashes/nbsp), but the stored
selection — used as expectedText at apply — was the raw ASCII agent input
(+substring(0,250)). So replaceYjsMarkedText's strict joined!==expectedText
always failed and threw "text changed" though nobody edited. Fix: new pure
getAnchoredText(doc, selection) reconstructs the exact raw doc substring the mark
covers (slicing identical to spliceCommentMark); on the suggestion path
client.createComment stores THAT as selection, so expectedText equals the marked
text and apply returns applied:true. Live anchoring still uses the raw agent
selection (normalization still finds the anchor). Truncation raised 250->2000
(+ DTO @MaxLength(2000)) so the anchored substring is never cut below the mark
span. Ordinary comments unchanged. AI-chat shares client.createComment, so
covered. Regression tests: getAnchoredText raw-vs-ASCII; create payload selection
is the typographic substring; apply with typographic expectedText -> applied.

F2 [blocking]: added comment.controller.spec.ts pinning that validateCanEdit runs
before applySuggestion (Forbidden -> applySuggestion never called; happy path ->
called; missing comment -> 404 without authorizing).

MCP 448 pass; server comment+yjs 54 pass. MCP build/ rebuilt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
claude code agent 227
2026-07-03 20:29:42 +03:00
parent cd539558ed
commit 48c1ec46f7
10 changed files with 457 additions and 4 deletions
@@ -87,7 +87,15 @@ export class CommentService {
}
}
const selection = createCommentDto?.selection?.substring(0, 250) ?? null;
// Do NOT lossily truncate at 250: for a suggestion the client sends the RAW
// anchored document substring (the exact text under the comment mark) as the
// selection, which can be LONGER than the agent's <=250-char typed input
// (normalization collapses whitespace/typographic runs, so the raw span can
// exceed the normalized selection). Truncating it shorter than the mark span
// would break the apply-time equality check and make the suggestion
// un-appliable. Keep a generous 2000-char safety bound (matching
// suggestedText) so a legitimate anchored substring is never cut.
const selection = createCommentDto?.selection?.substring(0, 2000) ?? null;
// A suggested edit rewrites the exact text under an inline comment mark, so
// it is only meaningful on a top-level inline comment that carries a